Judaism and Mindfulness: A Textual Journey

(2) A table one of whose legs was removed is not susceptible to impurity. If a second leg was removed it is still pure. But if a third was removed it becomes susceptible to impurity when the owner has the intention of using it. Rabbi Yose says: no intention is necessary. The same applies also to the side-board.

(9) Sacred vessels do not have [a distinction, with regard to purity status, between their] outsides and insides, nor do they have a [similar distinction for their] holding-place. And one may not immerse vessels within vessels [such that they can be used] for [handling] sacred things [i.e. rather each vessel must be immersed independently in order to achieve the required level of purity]. All vessels may descend to impurity [status] through intentional thought, but they may only rise out of their impurity through a change-effecting action; for an action may annul [the effects of] an action or an intentional thought, but an intentional thought cannot annul [the effects of] either an action nor an intentional thought.

(1) Any liquid which is desirable at the start achieves BeKhi Yutan [a state where liquid put upon food makes it susceptible to impurity] even if it is not desirable at the end; similarly [BeKhi Yutan is achieved if the liquid] is desirable at the end even if it is not desirable at the start. Impure liquids transfer impurity [whether their presence] is desirable or is not desirable.

(2) One who slaughters the offering [with the intention] of sprinkeling its blood outside [the Temple courtyard], or [with the intention of sprinkeling] some of its blood outside, [or with the intention of] burning its designated parts outside, or [with the intention of burning] some of its designated parts outside; [or with the intention of] eating its meat outside, or [with the intention of eating] an olive's bulk of its meat outside, or [with the intention of] eating an olive's bulk of the skin of the fatty tail outside - it [the offering] is invalid but he is not subject to Karet. [If one slaughters with the intention of] sprinkeling its blood the next day, or [with the intention of sprinkeling] some of its blood the next day; [or with the intention of] burning its designated parts the next day, or [with the intention of burning] some of its designated parts the next day; [or with the intention of] eating its meat the next day, or [with the intention of eating] an olive's bulk of its meat the next day, or [with the intention of eating] an olive's bulk from the skin of the fatty tail the next day - it [the offering] is [defined as] Piggul [a sacrifice that becomes unfit due to the intention of the officiating priest, while offering it, to consume it after its permitted time] and it makes him subject to Karet.

(6) Each offering is offered for six objectives: For the sake of the offering, for the sake of the one who brings the offering, for the sake of God, for the sake of [burning parts of it in] the [altar] fires, for the sake of the smell [of the offering as it burns], for the sake of the aroma [for God]. And [with regard to] the Chattat and the Asham, [these are also brought] for the sake of the sin [for which they atone]. Rabbi Yose said: Even if an individual did not have one of these [objectives] in mind the sacrifice is still valid, because it is a stipulation of the court that [only] the intentions of the one performing the service matter [rather than those of the owner].

...5:4 The Torah regards intention as stronger than action in cases of sacrifice and action as stronger than intention in cases of sacrifice. How is intention stronger than actions in cases of sacrifice? One who slaughters a sacrifice (with the intention) to sprinkle its blood or a little of its blood outside, or to burn the entrails or an olive's bulk of its entrails outside, or to eat its meat or an olive's bulk of its meat outside, the sacrifice is invalid though there is no punishment of karet. And if he actually did it the sacrifice is not invalid. (If he slaughtered it with the intention) to sprinkle the blood or some of the blood the next dat, to burn the entrails or an olive's bulk of its entrails the next day, or to eat its meat or an olive's bulk of its meat the next day, the sacrifice is piggul and he his liable for the punishment of karet.

5:5 How is action stronger than intention in the case of sacrifice? One who slaughters sacrifice on condition that uncircumcised priests and unclean priests toss its blood, on condition that uncircumcised and unclean priests offer up its sacrificial parts, on condition that uncircumcised priests eat its flesh, it is valid. But if he actually did it, it is valid. If he had the intention to apply on the upper area blood that should be applied on the lower area, or vice versa, or to apply outside that which should be applied inside or vice versa, it is valid. But if actually did it the sacrifice is invalid.

(5) If one was riding a donkey, he should dismount from it [while he prays]. And if he is unable to dismount, he should turn his face [towards Jerusalem]. And if he is unable to turn his face, he should focus his heart toward the Holy of Holies [in the Temple in Jerusalem].

It was taught in a baraita: One who prays must focus his heart in all of the blessings. And if he is unable to focus his heart in all of them, he should focus his heart at least in one.

MISHNA: If the time for the recitation of Shema arrived and one is impure due to a seminal emission, he may contemplate Shema in his heart, but neither recites the blessings preceding Shema, nor the blessings following it. Over food which, after partaking, one is obligated by Torah law to recite a blessing, one recites a blessing afterward, but one does not recite a blessing beforehand, because the blessing recited prior to eating is a requirement by rabbinic law. And in all of these instances Rabbi Yehuda says: He recites a blessing beforehand and thereafter in both the case of Shema and in the case of food. GEMARA: Ravina said: That is to say, from the mishna that contemplation is tantamount to speech. As if it would enter your mind that it is not tantamount to speech, then why does one who is impure because of a seminal emission contemplate? It must be that it is tantamount to speech. The Gemara rejects this: But what are you saying, that contemplation is tantamount to speech? Then, if one who is impure because of a seminal emission is permitted to contemplate, why does he not utter the words with his lips? The Gemara answers: As we found at Mount Sinai. There one who had sexual relations with a woman was required to immerse himself before receiving the Torah, which was spoken and not merely contemplated. Here, too, it was decreed that one who was impure due to a seminal emission may not recite matters of Torah out loud until he immerses himself. And Rav Ḥisda said that the opposite conclusion should be drawn from the mishna: Contemplation is not tantamount to speech, as if it would enter your mind that contemplation is tantamount to speech, then one who is impure because of a seminal emission should ab initio, utter Shema with his lips. The Gemara challenges this argument: But what are you saying, that contemplation is not tantamount to speech? If so, why does he contemplate? Rabbi Elazar said: So that a situation will not arise where everyone is engaged in reciting Shema and he sits idly by. The Gemara asks: If that is the only purpose, let him study another chapter and not specifically Shema or one of the blessings. Rav Adda bar Ahava said: It is fitting that one engage in a matter in which the community is engaged.

...R. Eleazar b. Azariah announced with four hundred trumpets that anyone who receives a cup from the hand of a[nother man’s] bride shall never have atonement. Learn from this that thought is akin to action [hirhur ke-ma‘aseh damei]. And if you think to say that it is not akin to action, why are they so strict as to say that he shall never have atonement? Ultimately, I’ll say to you that thought is not akin to action, as it is written, “If I saw sin in my heart, the Lord will not hearken.” And adultery is different because it is such a strict [case].