Jewish Thought and Jewish Thinkers: Maimonides

Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon, Maimonides, Rambam

1135: Maimonides is born on Saturday afternoon, 14th of Nissan 4895 in Cordoba Spain.

1148: Almohads, a fanatic Muslim sect, conquer Spain and persecute and expel Jews.

1158: Rambam begins his Commentary to the Mishnah

1160: Maimonides' family settles in Fez

Publishes Iggeret HaNechamah, Iggeret HaShemad, Iggeret Kiddush HaShem

1165: Flees Fez and arrives in Acre, spends five months in Eretz Yisrael. Visits Yerushalayim on 6 Marheshvan

1165: Moves to Alexandria, and then Cairo a short time later

1168: Completes Commentary to the Mishnah

1169: David ben Maimon dies at sea. Rambam becomes a physician to support his family

1177: Rambam is head of the Jewish community in Fostat (Jewish Cairo)

1180: Completes Mishneh Torah, his magnum opus

1190: Completes Guide for the Perplexed, his magnum opus.

1191: Writes Ma'amar Techiyat HaMetim

1204: Dies on December 13th. His body is taken to Tiberius for burial.

Jay M. Harris, "Preface" to "Maimonides After 800 Years: Essays on Maimonides and his Influence"

What then is one to say about Maimonides, the subject of literally thousands of academic articles and books (and I do not mean "literally" in its current usage of "figuratively"; I mean quite literally), not to mention traditional commentaries, animadversions, hagiographies, and more? And yet, who would dare claim that the wells of Maimonidean wisdom have been exhausted, that all is clear and readily understood? And so, yes indeed, another book on Maimonides, and no doubt one of many hundreds yet to come.

ibid.

Those who thirst for convivencia today will need to turn away from romantic images of a bygone day and look to the possibilities of our own cultural moment, a claim that, I realize, alas, is sufficient to drive one back to the twelfth century for inspiration, even as that century was scarcely devoid of violent religious contest and persecution.

ibid.

Further, the importance of Maimonides to an academically recognized discipline is part of the story; after all, no comprehensive history of Christian biblical exegesis could be written without attention to Rashi, but there is no biblical exegesis department in Western universities (even as the history of such exegesis may well be studied there). Thus, for Jews seeking some historical connection to Western culture, Maimonides emerges as the far more heroic figure. That Western Jews often evaluate elements of their tradition in terms of their importance to other traditions is one of the many resemblances between Jews and other, more formally, colonized peoples.

Professor Haym Soloveitchik, "Mishneh Torah: Polemic and Art"
Put differently, after the text of the Shulhan Arukh was clarified - and that was done within some seventy or eighty years of its publication - the subsequent commentarial literature is centrifugal. It does not more toward the text of the Shulhan Arukh, focusing on understanding its formulations, elucidating in greater detail the nuances of its positions, but moves away from the text to address new, allied cases...The reverse holds true of the Yad ha-Hazaqah. Its commentarial literature is centripetal - centuries after centuries of writers have focused on decoding the meaning of Maimonides' words. Indeed, while there is a vast commentarial literature on the Yad, there is no super-commentarial literature on it as there is on the Shulhan Arukh. Sensibly so; if you are moving away from the text to treat new cases and variations of the doctrines mentioned in the Shulhan Arukh, one of the most effective ways of doing it is to comment on the commentators - for your initial data base is then larger. ONe does not begin with the three cases found in the Shulhan Arukh but with the six or seven ones discussed in the Shakh and Magen Avraham...

The Shulhan Arukh is a great work, especially its funcitonal classification - indeed, in ease of use, it far exceeds that of Maimonides' code - but it is not a work of art. It is a pastiche, a great pastiche if you will, but a pastiche nonetheless. You can gloss it, tear the factric of its prose with no sense of violation or even of dimunition. You can equally transform it, Ashkenize it, as did so successfully R. Mosheh Isserles. You can no more Ashkenize Mishneh Torah than you can Americanize the Brothers Karamazov of Russify Huckleberry Finn, for a work of art is the product of an innate development...

In speaking of Mishneh Torah as a masterpiece, I have made analogies to works of the imagination as in literature and art; perhaps an analogy from philosophy, a field, like law, of discursive thinking and articulation, may be in place. I would put the matter this way: There are some thinkers who wrote poorly (Kant and Hegel), some who wrote well (Descartes, Berkely, and Hume), and a few, a very few, who wrote too well (Plato and Nietzsche) - so well that one sometimes does not know what they said. This is not a matter of opaqueness. Kant is only too often opaque but the range of possible meanings is restricted, and all interpretations will yield a solution that is distinctly Kantian; whereas diametrically opposed interpretations are offered of the thinkers who wrote too well. Despite their surface clarity, crucial passages allow a wide range of differing emphases and multiple, even conflicting patterns of linkage. To this day we do not know whether Plato was a libertarian or totalitarian or whether Nietzsche was a liberal or proto-Fascist. Put differently, Berkeley and Hume were pellucid stylists; Plato and Nietzsche were artists, and their writings have all the polysemy of literary masterpieces, their capacity to sustain in places the most contrary interpretations. I suggest that Maimonides be added to the small band of thinkers who wrote too well. Not just the Maimonides of the Guide to the Perplexed, a book openly written as "a riddle wrapped in enigma," but equally the Maimonides of the Mishneh Torah - a work of crystalline clarity and protean ambiguity.

Elements of Maimonidean Thought

I. Rationalism

1. Incorporeality of God

2. Rejection of anthropomorphism

3. Philosophically rigorous doctrine of God’s perfection

i. God is unchanging

ii. God does not have needs

4. Limiting religious significance of miracles

5. Rejection of Superstition

6. Rationalization of Commandments

7. Universalism

II. Public Religious Leadership

1. Letters

2. Communal involvement

3. Educator

III. Poetry and Passion of Religious Life

IV. The Meaning of Life

Marc Shapiro: "Maimonidean Halakhah and Superstition"

In his Letter on Astrology, Maimonides writes that it is not proper to accept something as true unless it falls inot one of the following categories:

1) It can be proven, such as concepts in arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy.

2) It can be perceived through the senses.

3) It is received as tradition from the prophets or the righteous ones of previous generations.

The various superstitions I will be examining were regarded by Maimonides as falling into none of these three categories. Yet the fact remains that there is a great deal of arbitrariness in Maimonides’ approach…I say this because the three categories he sets forth are in no way controversial, and could easily be accepted by many medieval Jewish scholars who believed in the superstitions Maimonides rejects. For example, advocates of astrology could claim that the veracity of their science was proven and was not, as Maimonides argued, based on a false conception of causation. Even more important for our purposes, they could claim, with obvious justice, that the truth of astrology was attested to in the Talmud and Midrash, thus placing it squarely into Maimonides’ third category.

Similarly, the believers in demons, who in medieval times included virtually all Jewish thinkers, could argue that demons were perceived through the senses, putting this belief into Maimonides’ second category…Also, as Maimonides opponents never tired of pointing out, the existence of demons is attested to throughout rabbinic literature – if not in the Torah itself – thus satisfying Maimonides’ third condition.


…Thus, I think the best definition that can be given to what Maimonides regards as superstition is any belief or practice which in his opinion resulted from ignorance, fear of the unknown, trust in magic, or a false conception of causation.

תניא אמר רבי יוסי פעם אחת הייתי מהלך בדרך ונכנסתי לחורבה אחת מחורבות ירושלים להתפלל בא אליהו זכור לטוב ושמר לי על הפתח (והמתין לי) עד שסיימתי תפלתי לאחר שסיימתי תפלתי אמר לי שלום עליך רבי ואמרתי לו שלום עליך רבי ומורי ואמר לי בני מפני מה נכנסת לחורבה זו אמרתי לו להתפלל ואמר לי היה לך להתפלל בדרך ואמרתי לו מתיירא הייתי שמא יפסיקו בי עוברי דרכים ואמר לי היה לך להתפלל תפלה קצרה
Incidental to the mention of the elevated significance of the night watches, the Gemara cites a related story: It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei said: I was once walking along the road when I entered the ruins of an old, abandoned building among the ruins of Jerusalem in order to pray. I noticed that Elijah, of blessed memory, came and guarded the entrance for me and waited at the entrance until I finished my prayer. When I finished praying and exited the ruin, Elijah said to me, deferentially as one would address a Rabbi: Greetings to you, my Rabbi. I answered him: Greetings to you, my Rabbi, my teacher. And Elijah said to me: My son, why did you enter this ruin? I said to him: In order to pray. And Elijah said to me: You should have prayed on the road. And I said to him: I was unable to pray along the road, because I was afraid that I might be interrupted by travelers and would be unable to focus. Elijah said to me: You should have recited the abbreviated prayer instituted for just such circumstances.
באותה שעה למדתי ממנו שלשה דברים למדתי שאין נכנסין לחורבה ולמדתי שמתפללין בדרך ולמדתי שהמתפלל בדרך מתפלל תפלה קצרה
Rabbi Yosei concluded: At that time, from that brief exchange, I learned from him, three things: I learned that one may not enter a ruin; and I learned that one need not enter a building to pray, but he may pray along the road; and I learned that one who prays along the road recites an abbreviated prayer so that he may maintain his focus.

(ו) ... וְכֵן אָסוּר לָאָדָם לַעֲבֹר תַּחַת קִיר נָטוּי אוֹ עַל גֶּשֶׁר רָעוּעַ אוֹ לִכָּנֵס לְחֻרְבָּה. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בְּאֵלּוּ מִשְּׁאָר הַסַּכָּנוֹת אָסוּר לַעֲבֹר בִּמְקוֹמָן:

...

And so too it is forbidden to pass under an unstable wall or upon a shaky bridge or to enter a ruin. And so too all similar dangerous things – it is forbidden to stand there.

איני והתניא שלשה דברים נאמרו בצפרנים הקוברן צדיק שורפן חסיד זורקן רשע טעמא מאי שמא תעבור עליהן אשה עוברה ותפיל

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Three things were said about nails: One who buries them in the ground is deemed righteous. One who burns them is even better, as he is considered pious. One who merely throws them away is regarded as wicked. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that it is prohibited to throw away nail clippings? This is prohibited lest a pregnant women pass over them and miscarry, for the Sages had a tradition that it is dangerous for a pregnant woman to walk over fingernails.

(א) מבני אדם אנשים שיכבד עליהם נתינת סיבה למצוה מן המצוות והטוב אצלם - שלא יושכל למצוה ולאזהרה ענין כלל. ואשר יביאם אל זה הוא חלי שימצאוהו בנפשם ולא יוכלו להגות בו ולא ידעו לומר אותו. והוא שהם יחשבו שאם היו אלו התורות מועילות בזה המציאות ומפני כך וכך נצטוינו בהם ויהיו כאילו באו ממחשבת והסתכלות בעל שכל; אמנם כאשר יהיה דבר שלא יושכל לו ענין כלל ולא יביא לתועלת יהיה בלא ספק מאת האלוה כי לא תביא מחשבת אנוש לדבר מזה. וכאילו אלו חלושי הדעות - היה האדם אצלם יותר שלם מעושהו כי האדם הוא אשר יאמר ויעשה מה שמביא לתכלית אחת והאלוה לא יעשה כן אבל יצונו לעשות מה שלא יועילנו עשותו ויזהירנו מעשות מה שלא יזיקנו עשותו. חלילה לו חלילה! אבל הענין בהפך זה! והכונה כולה להועילנו - כמו שבארנו מאמרו "לטוב לנו כל הימים לחיותנו כהיום הזה" ואמר "אשר ישמעון את כל החוקים האלה ואמרו רק עם חכם ונבון הגוי הגדול הזה" - כבר באר שאפילו ה'חוקים' כולם יורו אל כל הגוים שהם 'בחכמה ותבונה' ואם היה ענין שלא תודע לו סיבה ולא יביא תועלת ולא ידחה נזק - למה יאמר במאמינו או בעושהו שהוא 'חכם ונבון' וגדל המעלה ויפלאו מזה האומות?: אבל הענין כמו שזכרנו בלא ספק והוא שכל 'מצוה' מאלו ה'שש מאות ושלוש עשרה מצוות' היא - לנתינת דעת אמיתי או להסיר דעת רע או לנתינת סדר ישר או להסיר עול או להתלמד במדות טובות או להזהיר ממדות רעות - הכל נתלה בשלשה דברים בדעות ובמדות ובמעשי ההנהגה המדינית. ואשר חייב שלא נמנה המאמרים כי המאמרים אשר זרזה התוורה לאמרם או הזהירה מהם מהם - מה שהוא מכלל המעשים המדיניים ומהם - ללמד דעת אמיתי ומהם - ללמד מדות. ומפני זה הספיק לנו באלו השלשה ענינים בנתינת סיבה בכל מצוה מן המצוות:

(1) THERE are persons who find it difficult to give a reason for any of the commandments, and consider it right to assume that the commandments and prohibitions have no rational basis whatever. They are led to adopt this theory by a certain disease in their soul, the existence of which they perceive, but which they are unable to discuss or to describe. For they imagine that these precepts, if they were useful in any respect, and were commanded because of their usefulness, would seem to originate in the thought and reason of some intelligent being. But as things which are not objects of reason and serve no purpose, they would undoubtedly be attributed to God, because no thought of man could have produced them. According to the theory of those weak-minded persons, man is more perfect than his Creator. For what man says or does has a certain object, whilst the actions of God are different; He commands us to do what is of no use to us, and forbids us to do what is harmless. Far be this! On the contrary, the sole object of the Law is to benefit us. Thus we explained the Scriptural passage, "for our good always, that He might preserve us alive, as it is this day" (Deut. 6:24). Again, "which shall hear all those statutes (ḥuḳḳim), and say, surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people" (ibid. 4:6). He thus says that even every one of these "statutes" convinces all nations of the wisdom and understanding it includes. But if no reason could be found for these statutes, if they produced no advantage and removed no evil, why then should he who believes in them and follows them be wise, reasonable, and so excellent as to raise the admiration of all nations? But the truth is undoubtedly as we have said, that every one of the six hundred and thirteen precepts serves to inculcate some truth, to remove some erroneous opinion, to establish proper relations in society, to diminish evil, to train in good manners or to warn against bad habits. All this depends on three things: opinions, morals, and social conduct. We do not count words, because precepts, whether positive or negative, if they relate to speech, belong to those precepts which regulate our social conduct, or to those which spread truth, or to those which teach morals. Thus these three principles suffice for assigning a reason for every one of the Divine commandments.

(ד) מנהג פשוט שכותבים על המזוזה מבחוץ כנגד הריוח שבין פרשה לפרשה שדי ואין בזה הפסד לפי שהוא מבחוץ אבל אלו שכותבין מבפנים שמות המלאכים או שמות קדושים או פסוק או חותמות הרי הן בכלל מי שאין להם חלק לעולם הבא שאלו הטפשים לא די להם שבטלו המצוה אלא שעשו מצוה גדולה שהיא יחוד השם של הקדוש ברוך הוא ואהבתו ועבודתו כאילו הוא קמיע של הניית עצמן כמו שעלה על לבם הסכל שזהו דבר המהנה בהבלי העולם.

(4) The simple practice is that we write on the *mezuza* on the outside, opposite the space between one paragraph and another, "*Shaddai*." And there is no loss from this, since it is on the outside. However, those who write on the inside the names of the angels, holy names, a verse, or signatures, these are among those who have no portion in the world to come. For these simpletons, it is not enough for them that they invalidated the commandment, but they treated a great commadment - the unifications of the name of the Holy One, blessed be He, with His love, and His service - as if it is an amulet for their own benefit, as it arose on their hearts the foolish idea that this is something that will provide benefit with respect to the vanities of the world.

Daniel Rynhold: An Introduction to Medieval Jewish Philosophy p. 151-152

The reason that the commandments no longer appear to be rational is because they no longer serve the

ends that Maimonides believes once rationalized them. Originally, these commandments served the end

of perfecting humanity, since they weaned people away from their idolatrous beliefs towards the

correct opinions. The historical explanations merely serve to make this clear; they show how these

rituals served that end. But the problem now is that, given the changes in historical circumstances, they

no longer lead to that end. So Maimonides rationalizes the commandments in terms of a means-end

relationship and the historical explanations make it clear that this relationship no longer holds.

Basically, if sacrificing animals still led to human perfection, the commandments would still be

perfectly rational. The fact that they do not is the real roof of the problem. If the commandments cannot

serve their purported ends they cease to be rational...

But in truth, it might be that Maimonides is less concerned to rationalize our continued observance of

the commandments than he is to show that the commandments; reveal a God who acts by reasons that

are intelligible to man; as David Hartman puts it. According to Hartman, Maimonides was not

concerned with the meaning that the commandments might have for us as individuals. He was not

'attempting to inspire one to observe commandments, but to convince his reader that nature and Torah

reveal the same God.' For Hartman and others, Maimonides was primarily concerned to show how the

commandments reflect a God whose laws are intelligible to man...

But do Maimonides' rationalizations achieve the alternative aim of revealing a God whose laws are

intelligible to man? The problem is that according to Maimonides the commandments are part of an

eternal and absolute law. But we cannot explain why it was rational for God to command the sacrificial

cults as part of an eternal law. The teleological explanations only rationalize the commandments for as

long as they serve the ends they were designed to serve and that time has passed. So the teleological

explanations show that the commandments that God has given are entirely mutable. In the final

analysis at a purely philosophical level, Maimonides' rationalization makes it just as difficult to

understand why it was rational for God to command these laws for eternity as it does to understand

why one ought to perform them.

(ו) דָּבָר יָדוּעַ וּבָרוּר שֶׁאֵין אַהֲבַת הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא נִקְשֶׁרֶת בְּלִבּוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁגֶּה בָּהּ תָּמִיד כָּרָאוּי וְיַעֲזֹב כָּל מַה שֶּׁבָּעוֹלָם חוּץ מִמֶּנָּה. כְּמוֹ שֶׁצִּוָּה וְאָמַר בְּכָל לְבָבְךָ וּבְכָל נַפְשְׁךָ. אֵינוֹ אוֹהֵב הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא אֶלָּא בְּדַעַת שֶׁיְּדָעֵהוּ. וְעַל פִּי הַדֵּעָה תִּהְיֶה הָאַהֲבָה אִם מְעַט מְעַט וְאִם הַרְבֵּה הַרְבֵּה. לְפִיכָךְ צָרִיךְ הָאָדָם לְיַחֵד עַצְמוֹ לְהָבִין וּלְהַשְׂכִּיל בְּחָכְמוֹת וּתְבוּנוֹת הַמּוֹדִיעִים לוֹ אֶת קוֹנוֹ כְּפִי כֹּחַ שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּאָדָם לְהָבִין וּלְהַשִּׂיג כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ בְּהִלְכוֹת יְסוֹדֵי הַתּוֹרָה:

(6) It is a clearly known matter, that Love of the Holy Blessed One is not bound up in a person’s heart until she engages it constantly as is appropriate, and abandons everything else in the world but this, as God commanded and said: with all your heart and with all your soul (Deut. 6:5). Love will be according to understanding: if [understanding] is slight, [love] will be slight, and if [understanding] is great, [love] will be great. Therefore a person must set aside [time] for himself to understand and grasp the wisdom and understanding that his Creator provides him according to each person’s ability to understand and grasp, as we have explained in Laws of the Foundations of Torah.

(יד) הָיָה לְפָנָיו נֵר בֵּיתוֹ וְנֵר חֲנֻכָּה אוֹ נֵר בֵּיתוֹ וְקִדּוּשׁ הַיּוֹם נֵר בֵּיתוֹ קוֹדֵם מִשּׁוּם שְׁלוֹם בֵּיתוֹ שֶׁהֲרֵי הַשֵּׁם נִמְחָק לַעֲשׂוֹת שָׁלוֹם בֵּין אִישׁ לְאִשְׁתּוֹ. גָּדוֹל הַשָּׁלוֹם שֶׁכָּל הַתּוֹרָה נִתְּנָה לַעֲשׂוֹת שָׁלוֹם בָּעוֹלָם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (משלי ג יז) "דְּרָכֶיהָ דַרְכֵי נֹעַם וְכָל נְתִיבֹתֶיהָ שָׁלוֹם":

(14) 14 Someone had a light for his house or light for chanuka, or a light for his house or for the sanctification of the day; the light for the house come first for the sake of peace in the home. For surely God is erased in order to make peace between a husband and wife. Great is the peace for all of the Torah was given in order to make peace in the world as it says; her ways are the ways of pleasantness and all her paths are that of peace.

(ג) ואחר מה שהצענוהו לך שמע מה שאומר כבר בארו הפילוסופים הקדומים והאחרונים שהשמליות הנמצאות לאדם ארבעה מינים: הראשון - והוא הפחות שבהם והוא אשר עליו יכלו ימיהם אנשי העולם - הוא שלמות הקנין - רצוני לומר מה שימצא לאדם מממון ובגדים וכלים ועבדים וקרקעות וכיוצא באלו; ושיהיה האדם מלך גדול - הוא מזה המין - ושלמות שאין דבקות בינו ובין האיש ההוא כלל אבל הוא יחס אחד רוב הנאתו - דמיון גמור - רצוני לומר שזה ביתי וזה עבדי וזה הממון שלי ואלו הם גדודי וצבאי - וכשיבחון גופו ימצא הכל חוצה לו וכל אחד מאלו הקנינים הוא מה שהוא נמצא בפני עצמו; ומפני זה כשיעדר היחס ההוא ישכים האיש ההוא אשר היה מלך גדול - אין הפרש בינו ובין הפחות שבבני אדם מבלתי שישתנה דבר מהדברים ההם אשר היו מיוחסים אליו. ובארו הפילוסופים כי מי שישים השתדלותו וטרחו לזה המין מן השלמות - לא טרח רק לדמיון גמור והוא דבר שאין לו קימא; ואפילו יתקים בידו הקנין ההוא כל ימי חייו - לא יהיה לו בעצמו שום שלמות:

(ד) והמין השני יש לו התלות בטבע האדם יותר מן הראשון והוא - שלמות תבנית הגוף ותכונתו וצורתו - רצוני לומר שיהיה מזג האיש ההוא בתכלית השווי ואבריו נערכים חזקים כראוי. וזה המין גם כן מן השלמות אין לעשותו תכלית כונה - מפני שהוא שלמות גופני ואין הוא לאדם מאשר הוא אדם אבל מאשר הוא בעל חיים וישתתף בזה עם הפחות שבבעלי חיים גם כן. ואילו הגיע כח אחד מבני האדם עד התכלית האחרון - לא ישיג לכח פרד אחד חזק כל שכן כח אריה או כח פיל. ותכלית זה השלמות (כמו שזכרנו) - שישא משא כבד או ישבור עצם עב וכיוצא בזה ממה שאין תועלת גופנית גדולה בו אך תועלת נפשית נעדרת מזה המין:

(ה) והמין השלישי הוא שלמות בטבע האדם יותר מן השני והוא - שלמות מעלות המדות והוא שיהיו מדות האיש ההוא על תכלית מעלתם. ורוב ה'מצוות' אינם רק להגיע אל זה המין מן השלמות. וזה המין מן השלמות גם כן איננו רק הצעה לזולתו ואינו תכלית כונה בעצמו. כי המדות כולם אינם רק בין האדם ובין זולתו וכאילו זה השלמות במידותיו הוכן בו לתועלת בני אדם ושב כלי לזולתו. שאם תעלה בלבך שאחד מבני אדם עומד לבדו ואין לו עסק עם אדם - נמצאו כל מדותיו הטובות עומדות בטלות אין צריך להם ולא ישלימוהו בדבר ואמנם יצטרך אליהם ויקבל תועלתם עם זולתו:

(ו) והמין הרביעי הוא השלמות האנושי האמיתי והוא - הגיע לאדם המעלות השכליות - רצוני לומר ציור המושכלות ללמוד מהם דעות אמתיות באלוקיות. וזאת היא התכלית האחרונה והיא משלמת האדם שלמות אמיתי והיא לו לבדו ובעבורה יזכה לקיום הנצחי ובה האדם אדם. ובחון כל שלמות מן השלש שלמויות הקודמות - תמצאם לזולתך לא לך; ואם אי אפשר לפי המפורסם מבלעדי היותם גם כך הם לך ולזולתך; - אבל זה השלמות האחרון הוא לך לבדך אין לאחר עמך בו שיתוף כלל "יהיו לך לבדך וגו'". ומפני זה ראוי לך שתהיה השתדלותך להגיע אל זה הנשאר לך ולא תטרח ולא תיגע לאחרים - אתה השוכח נפשך עד ששחר לובן פניה במשול הכוחות הגופניות עליה - כמו שנאמר בראש המשלים השיריים הם הנשואים לזה הענין - אמר "בני אמי ניחרו בי שמוני נוטרה את הכרמים כרמי שלי לא נטרתי"; ובזה הענין בעצמו אמר "פן תתן לאחרים הודך ושנותך לאכזרי":

(ז) הנה בארו לנו הנביאים גם הם אלו הענינים בעצמם ופרשו אותם לנו כמו שפרשום הפילוסופים. ואמרו לנו בפרוש שאין שלמות הקנין ולא שלמות בריאות הגוף ולא שלמות המדות - שלמות שראוי להתפאר ולהתהלל בו ולא לבקש אותו; ושהשלמות שראוי להתהלל ולבקשו הוא - ידיעת האלוה ית' שהיא החכמה האמיתית. אמר ירמיה באלו השלמיות הארבע "כה אמר יי אל יתהלל חכם בחכמתו ואל יתהלל הגיבור בגבורתו אל יתהלל עשיר בעשרו; כי אם בזאת יתהלל המתהלל השכל וידוע אותי". הסתכל - איך לקחם כפי סדרם אצל ההמון כי השלמות הגדול אצלם - 'עשיר בעשרו' ואחריו - 'גיבור בגבורתו' ואחריו - 'חכם בחכמתו' - רצוני לומר בעל המדות הטובות כי האיש ההוא גם כן גדול בעיני ההמון אשר להם נאמרו הדברים - ומפני זה סדרם על הסדר הזה:

(ח) וכבר השיגו ה'חכמים ז"ל' מזה ה'פסוק' אלו הענינים בעצמם אשר זכרנום ובארו לנו מה שבארתי לך בזה הפרק והוא שה'חכמה' הנאמרת סתם בכל מקום והיא התכלית היא השגתו ית' ושאלו הקנינים שיקנם האדם שישימם סגולתו ויחשבם שלמות אינם שלמות; ושמעשי התורה כולם - רצוני לומר מיני העבודות -. וכן המדות המועילות לבני אדם כולם בעסקיהם קצתם עם קצתם - כל זה אין לדמותו אל התכלית האחרון ולא ישוה בו אבל הם הצעות בגלל זה התכלית: ושמע דבריהם באלו הענינים בלשונם והוא ב"בראשית רבה". שם נאמר "כתוב אחד אומר 'וכל - חפצים לא ישוו בה' וכתוב אחר אומר 'וכל חפציך לא ישוו בה' 'חפצים' - אלו מצוות ומעשים טובים 'חפציך' - אלו אבנים טובות ומרגליות 'חפצים' ו'חפציך' 'לא ישוו בה' אלא 'כי אם בזאת יתהלל המתהלל - השכל וידוע אותי'". ראה קוצר זה המאמר ושלמות אומרו ואיך לא חיסר דבר מכל מה שאמרנוהו והארכנו בבאורו ובהצעותיו:

(ט) ואחר שזכרנו זה ה'פסוק' ומה שכלל מן הענינים הנפלאים וזכרנו דברי ה'חכמים ז"ל' עליו נשלים כל מה שהוא כולל. וזה שלא הספיק לו בזה ה'פסוק' לבאר שהשגתו ית' לבד היא הנכבדת שבשלמיות - כי אילו היתה זאת כונתו היה אומר 'כי אם בזאת יתהלל המתהלל - השכל וידוע אותי' והיה פוסק דבריו או היה אומר 'השכל וידוע אותי - כי אני אחד' או היה אומר 'כי אין לי תמונה' או 'כי אין כמוני' ומה שדומה לזה; אבל אמר שאין להתהלל רק בהשגתי ובידיעת דרכי ותארי - רצוני לומר פעולותיו - כמו שבארנו באמרו "הודיעני נא את דרכיך וגו'". ובאר לנו בזה ה'פסוק' שהפעולות ההם שראוי שיודעו ויעשה כהם הם - 'חסד ומשפט וצדקה': והוסיף ענין אחר צריך מאד והוא - אמרו 'בארץ' - אשר הוא קוטב התורה; ולא כמחשבת ההורסים שחשבו שהשגחתו ית' כלתה אצל גלגל הירח ושהארץ ומה שבה נעזב "עזב יי את הארץ" - אינו רק כמו שבאר לנו על יד אדון כל החכמים "כי ליי הארץ" - יאמר שהשגחתו גם כן בארץ כפי מה שהיא כמו שהשגיח בשמים כפי מה שהם - והוא אמרו "כי אני יי עושה חסד משפט וצדקה בארץ". ואחר כן השלים הענין ואמר "כי באלה חפצתי - נאום יי" - רצונו לומר שכונתי - שיצא מכם 'חסד וצדקה ומשפט בארץ' - כמו שבארנו ב'שלש עשרה מדות' כי הכונה - להדמות בהם ושנלך על דרכם. אם כן הכונה אשר זכרה בזה ה'פסוק' היא באורו ששלמות האדם אשר בו יתהלל באמת הוא - להגיע אל השגת האלוה כפי היכולת ולדעת השגחתו בברואיו בהמציאו אותם והנהיגו אותם איך היא וללכת אחרי ההשגה ההיא בדרכים שיתכוון בהם תמיד לעשות 'חסד צדקה ומשפט' - להדמות בפעולות האלוה - כמו שבארנו פעמים בזה המאמר:

(י) זהו מה שראיתי לשומו בזה המאמר ממה שאחשוב שהוא מועיל מאד לכיוצא בך. ואני מקוה עליך שאם ההסתכלות הטוב תשיג כל הענינים שכללתי בו בעזרת האלוה ית': והוא יזכנו ו'כל ישראל חברים' למה שיעד לנו. "אז תפקחנה עיני עורים ואזני חרשים תפתחנה". "העם ההולכים בחושך ראו אור גדול יושבי בארץ צלמות - אור נגה עליהם" אמן:

(יא) קרוב מאד האל לכל קורא אם באמת יקרא ולא ישעה נמצא לכל דורש יבקשהו אם יהלך נכחו ולא יתעה: נשלם החלק השלישי בעזרת האלוה ובהישלמו נשלם מורה הנבוכים:

(3) Hear now what I have to say after having given the above explanation. The ancient and the modern philosophers have shown that man can acquire four kinds of perfection. The first kind, the lowest, in the acquisition of which people spend their days, is perfection as regards property; the possession of money, garments, furniture, servants, land, and the like; the possession of the title of a great king belongs to this class. There is no close connexion between this possession and its possessor; it is a perfectly imaginary relation when on account of the great advantage a person derives from these possessions, he says, This is my house, this is my servant, this is my money, and these are my hosts and armies. For when he examines himself he will find that all these things are external, and their qualities are entirely independent of the possessor. When, therefore, that relation ceases, he that has been a great king may one morning find that there is no difference between him and the lowest person, and yet no change has taken place in the things which were ascribed to him. The philosophers have shown that he whose sole aim in all his exertions and endeavours is the possession of this kind of perfection, only seeks perfectly imaginary and transient things; and even if these remain his property all his lifetime, they do not give him any perfection.

(4) The second kind is more closely related to man's body than the first. It includes the perfection of the shape, constitution, and form of mans body; the utmost evenness of temperaments, and the proper order and strength of his limbs. This kind of perfection must likewise be excluded from forming our chief aim; because it is a perfection of the body, and man does not possess it as man, but as a living being: he has this property besides in common with the lowest animal; and even if a person possesses the greatest possible strength, he could not be as strong as a mule, much less can he be as strong as a lion or an elephant; he, therefore, can at the utmost have strength that might enable him to carry a heavy burden, or break a thick substance, or do similar things, in which there is no great profit for the body. The soul derives no profit whatever from this kind of perfection.

(5) The third kind of perfection is more closely connected with man himself than the second perfection. It includes moral perfection, the highest degree of excellency in man's character. Most of the precepts aim at producing this perfection; but even this kind is only a preparation for another perfection, and is not sought for its own sake. For all moral principles concern the relation of man to his neighbour; the perfection of man's moral principles is, as it were, given to man for the benefit of mankind. Imagine a person being alone, and having no connexion whatever with any other person, all his good moral principles are at rest, they are not required, and give man no perfection whatever. These principles are only necessary and useful when man comes in contact with others.

(6) The fourth kind of perfection is the true perfection of man: the possession of the highest, intellectual faculties; the possession of such notions which lead to true metaphysical opinions as regards God. With this perfection man has obtained his final object; it gives him true human perfection; it remains to him alone; it gives him immortality, and on its account he is called man. Examine the first three kinds of perfection, you will find that, if you possess them, they are not your property, but the property of others; according to the ordinary view, however, they belong to you and to others. But the last kind of perfection is exclusively yours; no one else owns any part of it, "They shall be only thine own, and not strangers' with thee" (Prov. 5:17). Your aim must therefore be to attain this [fourth] perfection that is exclusively yours, and you ought not to continue to work and weary yourself for that which belongs to others, whilst neglecting your soul till it has lost entirely its original purity through the dominion of the bodily powers over it. The same idea is expressed in the beginning of those poems, which allegorically represent the state of our soul. "My mother's children were angry with me; they made me the keeper of the vineyards; but mine own vineyard have I not kept" (Song 1:6). Also the following passage refers to the same subject, "Lest thou give thine honour unto others, and thy years unto the cruel" (Prov. 5:9).

(7) The prophets have likewise explained unto us these things, and have expressed the same opinion on them as the philosophers. They say distinctly that perfection in property, in health, or in character, is not a perfection worthy to be sought as a cause of pride and glory for us: that the knowledge of God, i.e., true wisdom, is the only perfection which we should seek, and in which we should glorify ourselves. Jeremiah, referring to these four kinds of perfection, says: "Thus saith the Lord, Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty man glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in his riches; but let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me" (Jer. 9:22, 23). See how the prophet arranged them according to their estimation in the eyes of the multitude. The rich man occupies the first rank; next is the mighty man; and then the wise man; that is, the man of good moral principles: for in the eyes of the multitude, who are addressed in these words, he is likewise a great man. This is the reason why the three classes are enumerated in this order.

(8) Our Sages have likewise derived from this passage the above-mentioned lessons, and stated the same theory that has been explained in this chapter, viz., that the simple term ḥokmah, as a rule, denotes the highest aim of man, the knowledge of God; that those properties which man acquires, makes his peculiar treasure, and considers as his perfection, in reality do not include any perfection: and that the religious acts prescribed in the Law, viz., the various kinds of worship and the moral principles which benefit all people in their social intercourse with each other, do not constitute the ultimate aim of man, nor can they be compared to it, for they are but preparations leading to it. Hear the opinion of our Sages on this subject in their own words. The passage occurs in Bereshit Rabba, and runs thus, "In one place Scripture says, 'And all things that are desirable (ḥafaẓim) are not to be compared to her' (Prov. 8:11); and in another place, 'And all things that thou desirest (hafaẓeḥa) are not to be compared unto her'" (ibid. 3:15). By "things that are desirable" the performance of Divine precepts and good deeds is to be understood, whilst "things that thou desirest" refer to precious stones and pearls. Both--things that are desirable, and things that thou desirest--cannot be compared to wisdom, but "in this let him that glorieth glory, that he understandeth and knoweth me." Consider how concise this saying is, and how perfect its author; how nothing is here omitted of all that we have put forth after lengthy explanations and preliminary remarks.

(9) Having stated the sublime ideas contained in that Scriptural passage, and quoted the explanation of our Sages, we will now complete what the remainder of that passage teaches us. The prophet does not content himself with explaining that the knowledge of God is the highest kind of perfection; for if this only had been his intention, he would have said, "But in this let him who glorieth glory, that he understandeth and knoweth me," and would have stopped there; or he would have said, "that he understandeth and knoweth me that I am One," or, "that I have not any likeness," or, "that there is none like me," or a similar phrase. He says, however, that man can only glory in the knowledge of God and in the knowledge of His ways and attributes, which are His actions, as we have shown (Part 1. liv.) in expounding the passage, "Show me now thy ways" (Exod. 38:13). We are thus told in this passage that the Divine acts which ought to be known, and ought to serve as a guide for our actions, are, ḥesed, "loving-kindness," mishpat, "judgment," and ẓedakah, "righteousness." Another very important lesson is taught by the additional phrase, "in the earth." It implies a fundamental principle of the Law; it rejects the theory of those who boldly assert that God's providence does not extend below the sphere of the moon, and that the earth with its contents is abandoned, that "the Lord hath forsaken the earth" (Ez. 8:12). It teaches, as has been taught by the greatest of all wise men in the words, "The earth is the Lord's" (Exod. 9:29), that His providence extends to the earth in accordance with its nature, in the same manner as it controls the heavens in accordance with their nature. This is expressed in the words, "That I am the Lord which exercise loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness in the earth." The prophet thus, in conclusion, says, "For in these things I delight, saith the Lord," i.e., My object [in saying this] is that you shall practise loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness in the earth. In a similar manner we have shown (Part I. liv.) that the object of the enumeration of God's thirteen attributes is the lesson that we should acquire similar attributes and act accordingly. The object of the above passage is therefore to declare, that the perfection, in which man can truly glory, is attained by him when he has acquired--as far as this is possible for man--the knowledge of God, the knowledge of His Providence, and of the manner in which it influences His creatures in their production and continued existence. Having acquired this knowledge he will then be determined always to seek loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness, and thus to imitate the ways of God. We have explained this many times in this treatise.

(10) This is all that I thought proper to discuss in this treatise, and which I considered useful for men like you. I hope that, by the help of God, you will, after due reflection, comprehend all the things which I have treated here. May He grant us and all Israel with us to attain what He promised us, "Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of the deaf shall be unstopped" (Isa. 35:5); "The people that walked in darkness have seen a great light; they that dwell in the shadow of death upon them hath the light shined" (ibid. 9:1).

(11) God is near to all who call Him, if they call Him in truth, and turn to Him. He is found by every one who seeks Him, if he always goes towards Him, and never goes astray. AMEN.