זכויות וחובות

And God said: ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.’ And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them. And God blessed them; and God said unto them: ‘Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that creepeth upon the earth.’ And God said: ‘Behold, I have given you every herb yielding seed, which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree, in which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed—to you it shall be for food; and to every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to every thing that creepeth upon the earth, wherein there is a living soul, [I have given] every green herb for food.’ And it was so. And God saw every thing that He had made, and, behold, it was very good. And there was evening and there was morning, the sixth day.

These are the generations of the heaven and of the earth when they were created, in the day that the LORD God made earth and heaven. No shrub of the field was yet in the earth, and no herb of the field had yet sprung up; for the LORD God had not caused it to rain upon the earth, and there was not a man to till the ground; but there went up a mist from the earth, and watered the whole face of the ground. Then the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul. And the LORD God planted a garden eastward, in Eden; and there He put the man whom He had formed. And out of the ground made the LORD God to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight, and good for food; the tree of life also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. And a river went out of Eden to water the garden; and from thence it was parted, and became four heads. The name of the first is Pishon; that is it which compasseth the whole land of Havilah, where there is gold; and the gold of that land is good; there is bdellium and the onyx stone. And the name of the second river is Gihon; the same is it that compasseth the whole land of Cush. And the name of the third river is Tigris; that is it which goeth toward the east of Asshur. And the fourth river is the Euphrates. And the LORD God took the man, and put him into the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it.

And the LORD said unto Moses and Aaron: ‘This is the ordinance of the passover: there shall no alien eat thereof; but every man’s servant that is bought for money, when thou hast circumcised him, then shall he eat thereof. A sojourner and a hired servant shall not eat thereof. In one house shall it be eaten; thou shalt not carry forth aught of the flesh abroad out of the house; neither shall ye break a bone thereof. All the congregation of Israel shall keep it. And when a stranger shall sojourn with thee, and will keep the passover to the LORD, let all his males be circumcised, and then let him come near and keep it; and he shall be as one that is born in the land; but no uncircumcised person shall eat thereof. One law shall be to him that is homeborn, and unto the stranger that sojourneth among you.’

And when a stranger shall sojourn with thee, and will keep the Passover to the Lord (ibid., v. 48). Does this mean that a stranger who is converted should offer a paschal sacrifice at the first opportunity? Yes, for Scripture says: And he shall be as one that is born in the land (ibid.). Therefore, just as one born in the land offers his sacrifice on the fourteenth day, so the proselyte should do so on the fourteenth day. If he is converted, however, between the two Passovers,¹¹That is, between the fifteenth day of Nisan and the fourteenth day of Iyar, the second Passover (Num. 19:10). he should offer the sacrifice on the second Passover. Let all his males be circumcised, and then let him come near and keep it (ibid.). This refers to the circumcision of free males and the circumcision of slaves, (the absence of which) prevents him (from offering the paschal sacrifice). If one wishes to perform the two rituals, the commandment of circumcision and the commandment of the paschal lamb, which takes precedence? Let all his males be circumcised is stated first, and that is followed by And let him come near and keep it. One law shall be to him that is home-born (ibid., v. 49). This verse declares that the home-born and the convert are equal with regard to all the commandments inscribed in the Torah.

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, who says that with regard to both of them, men and women, the verse states: “And God blessed them, and God said to them: Be fruitful and multiply, replenish the earth and conquer it” (Genesis 1:28), what can be said? According to his opinion, women are exempt from only one positive mitzva that is not time bound, Torah study; why not derive other mitzvot from this case? The Gemara answers: The reason this is not a difficulty is because Torah study and the redemption of the firstborn son, from which women are also exempt, are two verses that come as one, and any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka as well, let procreation, which he maintains applies to women, and fear of one’s mother and father be considered two verses that come as one and they should not teach a precedent. The Gemara answers: Both cases are necessary. As, if the Merciful One had written only that women are obligated in fear of their parents, and had not written that they are obligated in procreation, I would say that as the Merciful One states: “Be fruitful and multiply, replenish the earth and conquer it” (Genesis 1:28), this leads to the conclusion that women are exempt from procreation, by the following reasoning: As it is the manner of a man to go to war and to conquer, yes, he is obligated in procreation, but as it is not the manner of a woman to conquer, she is not obligated in procreation. And if the Merciful One had written only that women are obligated in the mitzva of procreation, and had not written that they are obligated to fear their parents, I would say: With regard to a man, as it is in his power to perform this mitzva, yes, he is obligated to fear his mother and father, but with regard to a woman, as it is not in her power to perform this mitzva when she is married, since her obligations to her husband may prevent her from doing so, she is not obligated. And as it is not in her power to perform this mitzva when she is married, perhaps women should not be obligated at all and there should be no difference between a married and an unmarried woman. Therefore, it is necessary for the Torah to state that women are obligated in both procreation and the fear of parents, and these are not considered two verses that come as one. The Gemara notes that the earlier question remains difficult: This works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent. But according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, what can be said? According to this opinion it can be derived that women are obligated in positive, time-bound mitzvot from matza and assembly, and that they are exempt from positive mitzvot that are not time bound, from Torah study and the redemption of the firstborn son. Rava said: The Sages of Pafunya know the reason for this matter. The Gemara comments: And who is the scholar called by the nickname: The Sages of Paphunya? It is Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, who said as follows: The verse states with regard to phylacteries: “And it shall be a sign for you on your arm and for a memorial between your eyes, that the Torah of the Lord may be in your mouth” (Exodus 13:9). In this manner the entire Torah is juxtaposed to phylacteries: Just as donning phylacteries is a positive, time-bound mitzva and women are exempt from it, so too are women exempt from every positive, time-bound mitzva in the Torah. And from the fact that women are exempt from every positive, time-bound mitzva, one can learn by inference that women are obligated in every positive mitzva that is not time bound. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that the mitzva of donning phylacteries is a positive, time-bound mitzva. But according to the one who says that donning phylacteries is a positive mitzva that is not time bound, as it is applicable the entire year, day and night, what can be said? The Gemara answers: Who did you hear who said that donning phylacteries is a positive mitzva that is not time bound? It is Rabbi Meir, and he holds that matza and assembly are verses that come as one, and he further maintains that any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, and who also says that donning phylacteries is a positive mitzva that is not time bound, what can be said? The Gemara answers: It is not derived from here that women are obligated in positive, time-bound mitzvot because the verses that mention matza, rejoicing, and assembly are three verses that come as one, and everyone agrees three verses that come as one do not teach a precedent. § The mishna further teaches: And with regard to all prohibitions, whether or not they are time bound, both men and women are obligated to observe them. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, and likewise the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The verse states with regard to a guilt-offering: “When a man or woman shall commit any sin that a person commits” (Numbers 5:6). The verse equates a woman to a man with regard to all punishments in the Torah, as a woman is also required to bring an offering for atonement. The school of Rabbi Eliezer taught as follows. The verse states: “Now these are the ordinances which you shall set before them” (Exodus 21:1), stating “them” in the plural. This verse equates a woman to a man with regard to all judgments in the Torah, i.e., monetary cases and damages. The school of Ḥizkiyya taught: The verse states, with regard to the ransom one pays if his animal killed a person: “And killed a man or woman” (Exodus 21:29). Here too, the verse equates a woman to a man, with regard to all deaths in the Torah, i.e., the same halakha applies to an animal that kills either a man or a woman. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state all three of these verses. As, if the Torah had taught us only this first case, with regard to a woman’s obligation to sacrifice guilt-offerings, I would say that the Merciful One has pity on her due to atonement, i.e., God gave her the possibility to atone for her sin through an offering. But with regard to monetary judgments, I would say that with regard to a man, who generally conducts business negotiations, yes, these halakhot apply to him, but in the case of a woman, who generally does not conduct business negotiations, no, the halakhot of monetary judgments do not apply to her. And similarly if the Torah had taught us only this case of monetary judgments, I would say that these judgments apply to a woman, because there are circumstances where engaging in business is her livelihood. But with regard to the ransom that is paid when one’s animal killed someone, I would say: If the animal killed a man, who is commanded in all mitzvot, yes, its owner should have to pay the ransom, but if the animal killed a woman, who is obligated in only some mitzvot, no, he is exempt from the ransom. And conversely: If the Torah had taught us that men and women are equated only in this case of the ransom, one might say that because there is the loss of life the Merciful One has pity on her and therefore the owner of the animal is always obligated to pay the ransom. But with regard to those two other categories, I might say no, a woman is not equated to a man. Therefore it was necessary to mention them all. § The mishna teaches that women are obligated in all prohibitions except for the prohibitions of: Do not round the corners of one’s head, and: Do not destroy the corners of your beard, and: Do not contract ritual impurity from a corpse. The Gemara asks: Granted, a woman of priestly lineage is not obligated in the mitzva of: Do not contract ritual impurity from a corpse, as it is written: “Speak to the priests, the sons of Aaron, and say to them: None shall become impure for the dead among his people” (Leviticus 21:1). This verse teaches that the prohibition applies to the sons of Aaron, but not the daughters of Aaron. But from where do we derive the prohibitions of: Do not round the corners of one’s head, and: Do not destroy the corners of your beard? The Gemara answers that this is as it is written: “You shall not round the corners of your head and you shall not destroy the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27). The juxtaposition of the two prohibitions teaches that anyone who is included in the prohibition against destroying the beard is included in the prohibition against rounding the head. And since these women are not included in the prohibition against destroying, they are also not included in the prohibition against rounding the head. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that women are not obligated in the prohibition against destroying the corners of one’s beard? The Gemara answers: If you wish, propose a logical reason, as ordinarily women do not have a beard. And if you wish, cite a verse that teaches this point, as the verse states: “You shall not round the corners of your head [roshekhem] and you shall not destroy the corners of your beard [zekanekha]” (Leviticus 19:27). The Gemara explains: From the fact that the verse changed its language, as the term “your head [roshekhem]” is in the plural while “your beard [zekanekha]” is in the singular, it can be inferred that if so, if the prohibition against destroying one’s beard applied to everyone, let the Merciful One write: And you shall not destroy the corners of your beards [zekanekhem], in the plural, so that the end of the verse parallels the beginning. What is indicated by the fact that the verse states: “And you shall not destroy the corners of your beard [zekanekha],” in the singular? This serves to teach: Your beard is included, but not your wife’s beard. The Gemara asks: And is a woman not included in this prohibition? But isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Nega’im 4:8): The beard of a woman and that of a eunuch, if they grow facial hair, are considered like a beard for all matters. What, is it not the case that this statement is referring to the prohibition against destroying? Abaye said: You cannot say that the baraita is referring to destroying, as it is derived that a woman is exempt through the verbal analogy of “the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27) here and “the corners of their beard” (Leviticus 21:5) from the sons of Aaron: Just as there, in the case of priests, women are certainly exempt from the mitzva, as the verse is referring to the male descendants of Aaron who perform the Temple service and not to women, so too here, with regard to the prohibition against destroying one’s beard, which is stated to all Jews, women are exempt. At this stage the Gemara assumes that the exclusion of women denoted by the verse: “Speak to the priests, the sons of Aaron” (Leviticus 21:1), which excludes women, is applied to all the mitzvot stated in that chapter, including destroying the corners of one’s beard. The Gemara asks: But if we maintain that when the Merciful One writes: “The sons of Aaron” (Leviticus 21:1), it is written with regard to the entire manner of that chapter, including the prohibition against destroying one’s beard, let the verse, i.e., the Torah, be silent and not state about this prohibition concerning all Jews. And this halakha could be derived through an a fortiori inference, as I could say the following: And if with regard to priests, for whom the verse includes additional mitzvot, this prohibition applies only to the sons of Aaron and not the daughters of Aaron, is it not all the more so the case with regard to Israelites, who have fewer mitzvot, that only men should be obligated and not women? The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, the verbal analogy is necessary. Were it not for the verbal analogy, I would say that the halakhot of ritual impurity concluded discussion of that matter. In other words, the exclusion of women denoted by the phrase “the sons of Aaron” applies only to the halakhot of impurity, which appear immediately after that phrase. Conversely, the other halakhot mentioned in this chapter, including the prohibition against destroying the beard, apply to women as well. The Gemara asks: If so, now too, let us say that the halakhot of ritual impurity concluded discussion of that matter, and the daughters of Aaron are also prohibited to destroy their beards. And if you maintain that the reason the prohibition stated with regard to priests does not apply to women is due to the verbal analogy employing the term “the corners of,” which serves to connect the halakha stated with regard to priests with the halakha stated with regard to all Jews, that verbal analogy is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to priests: “Neither shall they shave off the corners of their beard” (Leviticus 21:5). One might have thought that a priest would be liable even if he shaved his beard with scissors. Therefore the verse states, in a command issued to all Jews: “And you shall not destroy the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27). This teaches that one is liable only for destroying the beard to the root, which is not achieved with scissors. The baraita continues: One might have thought that if he extracted his hairs with tweezers, which uproot hairs, or small planes [uvirhitni], he should likewise be liable for destroying his hair. The verse therefore states: “Neither shall they shave off the corners of their beard,” to teach that shaving alone is prohibited and these actions are not considered shaving. How can both these requirements for the prohibition be met? The verse is referring to a type of shaving that involves destruction. You must say this is shaving with a razor. According to this baraita, the verbal analogy is necessary to define the action included in the prohibition against destroying, not to teach who is included in the prohibition. The Gemara explains: If it is so that the verbal analogy teaches only which action is included in the prohibition against destroying, let the verse write: That which is of your beard. What is added by the expression “the corners of your beard”? Conclude two conclusions from it, both the definition of the prohibition against shaving and the exemption of women. The Gemara returns to its question. But that which is taught in the baraita: The beard of a woman and that of a eunuch, if they grew facial hair, are considered like a beard for all matters, with regard to what halakha is this stated? Mar Zutra says: It is stated with regard to ritual impurity from leprosy. A leprous sore in the beard of a woman or a eunuch is treated like an affliction of the beard, not like an affliction on the skin. Different halakhot apply to leprous sores that develop on various parts of the body. The Gemara objects: Concerning ritual impurity from leprosy, it is written explicitly: “And when a man or woman has a plague upon the head or upon the beard” (Leviticus 13:29). This indicates that there is no difference between a man and woman with regard to the beard in the case of leprosy. The baraita would not state a halakha that is explicit in the verse. Rather, Mar Zutra says: This baraita is referring to ritual purification from leprosy, i.e., women can also be purified from leprosy of the beard. The Gemara asks: With regard to ritual purification from leprosy it is also obvious: Since impurity applies to a woman, purity likewise applies to her. The Gemara answers: It was necessary to state this with regard to the impurity of afflictions of the beard, as it might enter your mind to say that this verse is written disjunctively, i.e., that the phrase: “And when a man or woman has a plague upon the head,” applies to both a man or a woman; whereas when it states: “Or upon the beard,” we have come back to the case of a man alone. Therefore the baraita teaches us that this phrase is not referring solely to a man, as there is no difference between a man and a woman with regard to leprosy. Isi taught in a baraita: Women are also exempt from the prohibition: Do not make baldness upon your heads, a prohibition against tearing out one’s hair in grief over someone’s death. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Isi? The Gemara explains that he teaches as follows: The verse states: “You are the sons of the Lord your God; you shall not cut yourselves, nor make any baldness between your eyes for the dead. For you are a holy people to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 14:1–2). This verse, which applies to sons and not daughters, is referring to causing baldness, and therefore this prohibition includes only men. The Gemara asks: Do you say that this is referring to causing baldness, or is it perhaps referring only to the prohibition against cutting, which appears first? The Gemara answers that when it states: “For you are a holy people to the Lord your God,” it is stated with regard to the prohibition against cutting, and this verse applies to both men and women, as they are all members of God’s people. How then do I realize and explain the emphasis on sons and not daughters? This is referring to the prohibition against causing baldness. The Gemara asks: And what did you see to include cutting and to exclude causing baldness? Perhaps the opposite is true, and causing baldness applies to men and women whereas cutting applies only to men. The Gemara answers: I include cutting, whose prohibition is broader, as it is applicable both in a place of hair and not in a place of hair; and I exclude causing baldness, which is more limited, as it applies only in a place of hair. The Gemara asks: But one can say that the limitation of sons and not daughters applies both to causing baldness and to cutting, and when the verse writes: “For you are a holy people to the Lord your God,” that is written with regard to scoring oneself. The prohibition against scoring oneself is derived from a verbal analogy from a verse stated with regard to priests (see Leviticus 21:5), which applies to both men and women. The Gemara answers: Isi maintains that scoring oneself and cutting are one prohibition. Abaye said that this is the reason of Isi for exempting women from the prohibition against baldness: As he learns the prohibition against causing baldness in grief over someone who is dead through a verbal analogy from the prohibition against causing baldness stated with regard to the sons of Aaron. The verse states with regard to priests: “They shall not make baldness upon their head” (Leviticus 21:5). Just as there, with regard to priests, women are exempt, as the expression “the sons of Aaron” serves to exclude the daughters of Aaron, so too here, women are exempt. The Gemara asks: But if we maintain that when the Merciful One writes: “The sons of Aaron” (Leviticus 21:1), it is written with regard to the entire matter of that chapter, including the prohibition against causing baldness, let the verse be silent about this prohibition concerning all Jews. And this halakha could be derived through an a fortiori inference, as I could say the following: If in the case of priests, for whom the verse includes additional mitzvot, the prohibition against causing baldness applies only to the sons of Aaron and not the daughters of Aaron, is it not all the more so the case with regard to Israelites, who have fewer mitzvot, that only the men should be obligated and not the women? The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, the verbal analogy is necessary. As, were it not for the verbal analogy I would say that the halakhot of ritual impurity concluded discussion of that matter, and the prohibition against causing baldness applies to all the descendants of Aaron, including women. The Gemara asks: If so, now too, let us say that the halakhot of ritual impurity concluded discussion of that matter, and it is prohibited for the daughters of Aaron as well to cause baldness. And if you maintain that the reason the prohibition stated with regard to priests does not apply to women is due to the verbal analogy employing the term “make baldness,” which serves to connect the halakha stated with regard to priests with the halakha stated with regard to all Jews, this verbal analogy is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “They shall not make baldness [yikreḥu korḥa]” (Leviticus 21:5). If the verse had stated only “yikreḥu,” one might have thought that even if one made four or five patches of baldness he would be obligated for only one violation, as there is only one prohibition against making a bald spot. Therefore the verse also states “korḥa,” to render him liable for each and every one of the bald spots. The baraita continues: What is the meaning when the verse states: “Upon their head” (Leviticus 21:5), with regard to the prohibition against a priest causing baldness? Because it is stated: “You shall not cut yourselves, nor make any baldness between your eyes for the dead” (Deuteronomy 14:1), one might have thought that he is obligated only for removing the hair between the eyes. From where is it derived to include the entire head in this prohibition? When the verse states “upon their head,” it serves to render a priest liable for removing hair on his entire head like the spot between the eyes. The baraita continues: And I have derived only that this halakha applies to priests, for whom the verse includes additional mitzvot; from where do we derive that it applies to every Israelite, i.e., all Jews are liable for each and every bald spot and for the entire head? It is stated here, with regard to priests, “baldness,” and it is stated there, with regard to non-priests, “baldness.” Just as here, with regard to priests, one is obligated for each and every bald spot, and one is obligated for the entire head like the spot between the eyes, so too there, with regard to all Jews, one is obligated for each and every bald spot, and one is obligated for the entire head like the spot between the eyes. The baraita continues: And conversely, just as there, in the case of Israelites, it is referring specifically to causing baldness over someone who is dead, so too here, with regard to priests, it is prohibited to cause baldness only over someone who is dead, not in other circumstances. This baraita shows that the verbal analogy is required for the halakhot of bald spots. How, then, can it teach the exemption of women? The Gemara answers: If it is so that it may be used only for one purpose, let the verse be written merely bald [keraḥ]. What is meant by the term “baldness [korḥa]”? Conclude two conclusions from it, both the verbal analogy that exempts women and the halakha that each bald spot constitutes a separate violation. Rava said that this is Isi’s reason, as he derives the verbal analogy of “between your eyes” with regard to baldness from phylacteries, concerning which it says: “And they shall be for frontlets between your eyes” (Deuteronomy 11:18): Just as there, with regard to phylacteries, women are exempt, so too here, in the case of baldness, women are exempt. The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that Rava did not state the same reason as Abaye? The Gemara answers: Rava does not learn anything from the distinction between keraḥ and korḥa, as he maintains that no halakha can be derived from this slight difference in language. The Gemara further asks: And what is the reason that Abaye did not state the same reason as Rava? The Gemara answers that Abaye could have said to you: Phylacteries themselves are derived from here, i.e., the meaning of the phrase “between your eyes” stated with regard to phylacteries is understood from the case of baldness: Just as there, with regard to a bald spot, “between your eyes” is referring to a place where baldness is formed, a spot where there is hair, which is on the upper part of the head but not actually between the eyes, so too, the place where phylacteries are donned is on the upper part of the head. The Gemara asks: And both Abaye and Rava, what do they derive from this verse: “You are the sons to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 14:1)? According to the first explanation of Isi’s opinion, the exclusion of women is derived from this phrase, whereas they derive that halakha from a different source. The Gemara answers: This verse is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse: “You are the sons to the Lord your God,” indicates that when you act like sons and cleave to the Holy One, Blessed be He, you are called sons, but when you do not act like sons you are not called sons. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Meir says: Either way you are still called sons, as it is stated: “They are foolish sons” (Jeremiah 4:22). And it also states: “Sons in whom there is no faithfulness” (Deuteronomy 32:20). And it states: “A seed of evildoers, sons who deal corruptly” (Isaiah 1:4). And it states: “And it shall come to pass that, instead of what was said to them: You are not My people, it shall be said to them: Sons of the living God” (Hosea 2:1). The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to cite these additional proofs introduced by the phrase: And it states? All these verses apparently make the same point. The Gemara explains why all the quotes are necessary. And if you would say: Granted, when they are foolish they are still called sons, as the verse states: “Foolish sons,” but when they do not have faithfulness they are not called sons; therefore, come and hear another verse. And that verse states: “Sons in whom there is no faithfulness.” And if you would say: It is when they do not have faithfulness that they are called sons, as stated, but when they worship idols they are not called sons anymore; therefore, come and hear: And the verse states: “A seed of evildoers, sons who deal corruptly,” which alludes to the corruption of idol worship. And if you would say that although they are called “sons who deal corruptly,” they are no longer called full-fledged sons of God once they have sinned, come and hear: And the verse states: “And it shall come to pass that, instead of what was said to them: You are not My people, it shall be said to them: Sons of the living God.” This verse indicates that when the Jews repent they are again called full-fledged sons of God. MISHNA: With regard to the placing of hands on the head of an offering, and the waving of certain offerings, and the bringing near of meal-offerings to the corner of the altar, and the removal of a handful from meal-offerings, and the burning of sacrificial parts on the altar, and the pinching of bird-offerings, and the collecting of blood of offerings in a vessel, and the sprinkling of blood, these apply to men and not to women. All these mitzvot apply specifically to men and not to women, except for the meal-offering of a sota, and the meal-offering of a nazirite woman, which these women wave. GEMARA: From where is it derived that placing of hands on the head of an offering applies only to men? As it is written: “Speak to the sons of Israel…and he shall place his hand” (Leviticus 1:2–4), which indicates that the sons of Israel place hands on offerings, but the daughters of Israel do not place hands. The Gemara explains that the halakha of waving is derived from the following verse: “Speak to the sons of Israel…and he shall wave” (see Leviticus 7:29–30), which likewise teaches that the sons of Israel wave, but the daughters of Israel do not wave. § With regard to bringing near, this is as it is written: “And this is the law of the meal-offering: The sons of Aaron shall bring it near” (Leviticus 6:7). This teaches that the sons of Aaron bring the meal-offering near, but not the daughters of Aaron. With regard to the removal of a handful, this is as it is written: “And he shall bring it to the sons of Aaron, the priests, and he shall remove a handful” (Leviticus 2:2). This teaches that the sons of Aaron take a handful, but not the daughters of Aaron. With regard to the burning of sacrificial parts, this is as it is written: “And the sons of Aaron shall burn it” (Leviticus 3:5). This teaches that it is the sons of Aaron who burn the parts, but not the daughters of Aaron. With regard to pinching, this is as it is written: “And he shall pinch…and he shall burn” (Leviticus 1:15). The verse juxtaposes killing to burning, and just as the burning of an offering must be performed by men, so too pinching may be performed only by men. With regard to receiving, this is as it is written: “And the sons of Aaron shall present the blood” (Leviticus 1:5). And the Master said in explanation of this verse:

All obligations of the son upon the father, men are obligated, but women are exempt. But all obligations of the father upon the son, both men and women are obligated. All positive, time-bound commandments, men are obligated and women are exempt. But all positive non-time-bound commandments both men and women are obligated. And all negative commandments, whether time-bound or not time-bound, both men and women are obligated, except for, the prohibition against rounding [the corners of the head], and the prohibition against marring [the corner of the beard], and the prohibition [for a priest] to become impure through contact with the dead.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Women are obligated to recite the sanctification of the Shabbat day [kiddush]by Torah law. The Gemara asks: Why? Kiddush is a time-bound, positive mitzva, and women are exempt from all time-bound, positive mitzvot. Abaye said: Indeed, women are obligated to recite kiddush by rabbinic, but not by Torah law. Rava said to Abaye: There are two refutations to your explanation. First, Rav Adda bar Ahava said that women are obligated to recite kiddush by Torah law, and, furthermore, the very explanation is difficult to understand. If the Sages do indeed institute ordinances in these circumstances, let us obligate them to fulfill all time-bound, positive mitzvot by rabbinic law, even though they are exempt by Torah law. Rather, Rava said: This has a unique explanation. In the Ten Commandments in the book of Exodus, the verse said: “Remember Shabbat and sanctify it” (Exodus 20:8), while in the book of Deuteronomy it is said: “Observe Shabbat and sanctify it” (Deuteronomy 5:12). From these two variants we can deduce that anyone included in the obligation to observe Shabbat by avoiding its desecration, is also included in the mitzva to remember Shabbat by reciting kiddush. Since these women are included in the mitzva to observe Shabbat, as there is no distinction between men and women in the obligation to observe prohibitions in general and to refrain from the desecration of Shabbat in particular, so too are they included in the mitzva of remembering Shabbat. Ravina said to Rava: We learned in the mishna that women are obligated in the mitzva of Grace after Meals. However, are they obligated by Torah law or merely by rabbinic law? What difference does it make whether it is by Torah or rabbinic law? The difference is regarding her ability to fulfill the obligation of others when reciting the blessing on their behalf. Granted, if you say that their obligation is by Torah law, one whose obligation is by Torah law can come and fulfill the obligation of others who are obligated by Torah law. However, if you say that their obligation is by rabbinic law, then from the perspective of Torah law, women are considered to be one who is not obligated, and the general principle is that one who is not obligated to fulfill a particular mitzva cannot fulfill the obligations of the many in that mitzva. Therefore, it is important to know what is the resolution of this dilemma.