פרשת אחרי מות - קדושים תשי"ג - "לא תשנא את אחיך בלבבך"
למורים ולמדריכי נוער: שוחחו בשיעור זה עם הנוער על השקפת "מה זה אכפת לי" ו"אין זה מעסקך" הרווחת בעולמנו.
א. "לא תשנא את אחיך בלבבך"
"לֹא תִשְׂנָא אֶת אָחִיךָ בִּלְבָבֶךָ הוֹכֵחַ תּוֹכִיחַ אֶת עֲמִיתֶךָ וְלֹא תִשָּׂא עָלָיו חֵטְא"
Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart; thou shalt surely rebuke thy neighbour, and not bear sin because of him.
ד"ה לא תשנא את אחיך: בעבור שדרך השונאים לכסות את שנאתם בלבם כמו שאמר (משלי כ"ו כ"ד) "בשפתיו ינכר שונא", הזכיר הכתוב בהווה.
You shall not hate your brother in your heart: Since it is the way of haters to hide their hatred in their hearts, as it stated (Proverbs 26:24), "A hater makes his lips foreign," the verse mentioned what is common. And [then] it stated, "you shall surely rebuke your kinsman," [as] a separate commandment to teach him ethical reproofs. And "and you shall not carry sin for him" [is] that there will be guilt upon you if he sins and you had not reproved him. And the language of Onkelos inclines to this [understanding], as he says, "that you not receive liability for what is his" - that you do not receive punishment for his sin. And afterwards (Leviticus 19:18), it commanded that you love him. And behold, one who hates his neighbor transgresses a negative commandment and one who loves him, fulfills a positive commandment. And what is correct in my eyes is that "you shall surely rebuke your kinsman," is like "And Avraham rebuked Avimelekh" (Genesis 21:25). And the verse states, "You shall not hate your brother in your heart" in his doing to you that which is not like your will; but rather, rebuke him [by saying], "Why did you do like this to me." [Hence the meaning of] "And you shall not carry sin for him" [is] to cover up your hatred for him in your heart and not to tell him. As in your rebuking him, he will make amends with you or repent and admit his sin, and it will be atoned for him. And afterwards it warns that you not take revenge from him and not bear a grudge in your heart [about] what he did to you. As it is likely that he will not hate him but he will remember the sin in his heart. And therefore it warns him that he erase the crime and sin of his brother from his heart. And afterwards it commands him, "and you shall love your neighbor as yourself." The phrase "love your neighbor as yourself" is an exaggeration, since the heart of a person will not accept that he love his fellow as he loves himself. Moreover, Rabbi Akiva has already taught (Bava Metzia 62), "Your life comes before the life of your fellow." Rather, the Torah here enjoins us that one should love his neighbor with every item with which he loves himself, [to receive] every benefit [that he wish upon himself]. It is likely that this is the reason for the dative (literally, "to your neighbor") instead of the accusative form of the verb phrase; we find the same in "and you shall love to him as yourself" (Leviticus 19:34) regarding the convert - the understanding of which is to equalize the love of both of them in his mind. As sometimes a person may wish upon his neighbor certain benefits, but only wealth, not wisdom and the like. But even if he wishes his cherished friend well in everything, i.e. wealth, honor, knowledge, and wisdom, he will not make him equal to him, but rather he will still desire in his heart a larger share of all the benefits. And [so] the Torah commanded that there not be this petty jealousy in his heart. Rather, a man should wish his fellow well in everything, just as he does in his own case, and place no limitations on his love. Therefore, in the case of Yonatan and David (I Samuel 20:17), it stated that Yonatan "loved him as his own soul," since he had removed all jealousy from his heart, and stated "and you shall rule over Israel, etc." (I Samuel 23:17). And our Rabbis have already explained the matter of vengeance and grudges (Sifra, Kedoshim Chapter 4 10-11), that it is with something that has no monetary liability [such as if he says], "Lend me your sickle, lend me your spade." As with something that his fellow has a monetary liability to him, such as with damages and similar to it, he is not obligated to leave him alone. Rather, he should make a claim against him in court and be paid by him, from the verse (Leviticus 24:19), "as he has done, so shall it be done to him." And when he pays that which he borrowed or which he stole, he himself is obligated to pay [it]. And all the more so with the matter of souls, that he take vengeance and a grudge through a court that instructs with the laws of the Torah, until he redeems the blood of his brother from his hand.
1. מה קשה לו?
הסבר את הביטוי שבדבריו "הזכיר הכתוב בהווה".
ד"ה וכי יגח שור: אחד שור ואחד כל בהמה וחיה ועוף, אלא שדיבר הכתוב בהווה.
וכי יגח שור AND IF AN OX THRUST — This law applies to an ox as well to any other cattle, wild beast or fowl, but Scripture mentions the ox, because it speaks of what usually occurs (Bava Kamma 54b).
3. מה רוצה הרמב"ן להוכיח בעזרת הפסוק ממשלי כ"ו כ"ד?
ב. מצוות "הוכח תוכיח" (1)
"לֹא תִשְׂנָא אֶת אָחִיךָ בִּלְבָבֶךָ הוֹכֵחַ תּוֹכִיחַ אֶת עֲמִיתֶךָ וְלֹא תִשָּׂא עָלָיו חֵטְא"
Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart; thou shalt surely rebuke thy neighbour, and not bear sin because of him.
ד"ה הוכח תוכיח את עמיתך: מצוה אחרת: ללמדו תוכחת מוסר, "ולא תשא עליו חטא" שיהיה עליך אשם כאשר יחטא ולא הוכחת אותו. ולזה יטה לשון אונקלוס שאמר: ולא תקבל על דיליה חובא, שלא תקבל אתה עונש בחטא שלו. ואחרי כן ציוה שתאהוב אותו. והנה השונא את רעהו עובר בלאו, והאוהב לו מקיים עשה. והנכון בעיני, כי "הוכח תוכיח", כמו והוכיח אברהם את אבימלך (בראשית כ"א כ"ה). ויאמר הכתוב, אל תשנא את אחיך בלבבך בעשותו לך שלא כרצונך, אבל תוכיחנו מדוע ככה עשית עמדי, ולא תשא עליו חטא לכסות שנאתו בלבך ולא תגיד לו, כי בהוכיחך אותו יתנצל לך, או ישוב ויתוודה על חטאו ותכפר לו.
You shall not hate your brother in your heart: Since it is the way of haters to hide their hatred in their hearts, as it stated (Proverbs 26:24), "A hater makes his lips foreign," the verse mentioned what is common. And [then] it stated, "you shall surely rebuke your kinsman," [as] a separate commandment to teach him ethical reproofs. And "and you shall not carry sin for him" [is] that there will be guilt upon you if he sins and you had not reproved him. And the language of Onkelos inclines to this [understanding], as he says, "that you not receive liability for what is his" - that you do not receive punishment for his sin. And afterwards (Leviticus 19:18), it commanded that you love him. And behold, one who hates his neighbor transgresses a negative commandment and one who loves him, fulfills a positive commandment. And what is correct in my eyes is that "you shall surely rebuke your kinsman," is like "And Avraham rebuked Avimelekh" (Genesis 21:25). And the verse states, "You shall not hate your brother in your heart" in his doing to you that which is not like your will; but rather, rebuke him [by saying], "Why did you do like this to me." [Hence the meaning of] "And you shall not carry sin for him" [is] to cover up your hatred for him in your heart and not to tell him. As in your rebuking him, he will make amends with you or repent and admit his sin, and it will be atoned for him. And afterwards it warns that you not take revenge from him and not bear a grudge in your heart [about] what he did to you. As it is likely that he will not hate him but he will remember the sin in his heart. And therefore it warns him that he erase the crime and sin of his brother from his heart. And afterwards it commands him, "and you shall love your neighbor as yourself." The phrase "love your neighbor as yourself" is an exaggeration, since the heart of a person will not accept that he love his fellow as he loves himself. Moreover, Rabbi Akiva has already taught (Bava Metzia 62), "Your life comes before the life of your fellow." Rather, the Torah here enjoins us that one should love his neighbor with every item with which he loves himself, [to receive] every benefit [that he wish upon himself]. It is likely that this is the reason for the dative (literally, "to your neighbor") instead of the accusative form of the verb phrase; we find the same in "and you shall love to him as yourself" (Leviticus 19:34) regarding the convert - the understanding of which is to equalize the love of both of them in his mind. As sometimes a person may wish upon his neighbor certain benefits, but only wealth, not wisdom and the like. But even if he wishes his cherished friend well in everything, i.e. wealth, honor, knowledge, and wisdom, he will not make him equal to him, but rather he will still desire in his heart a larger share of all the benefits. And [so] the Torah commanded that there not be this petty jealousy in his heart. Rather, a man should wish his fellow well in everything, just as he does in his own case, and place no limitations on his love. Therefore, in the case of Yonatan and David (I Samuel 20:17), it stated that Yonatan "loved him as his own soul," since he had removed all jealousy from his heart, and stated "and you shall rule over Israel, etc." (I Samuel 23:17). And our Rabbis have already explained the matter of vengeance and grudges (Sifra, Kedoshim Chapter 4 10-11), that it is with something that has no monetary liability [such as if he says], "Lend me your sickle, lend me your spade." As with something that his fellow has a monetary liability to him, such as with damages and similar to it, he is not obligated to leave him alone. Rather, he should make a claim against him in court and be paid by him, from the verse (Leviticus 24:19), "as he has done, so shall it be done to him." And when he pays that which he borrowed or which he stole, he himself is obligated to pay [it]. And all the more so with the matter of souls, that he take vengeance and a grudge through a court that instructs with the laws of the Torah, until he redeems the blood of his brother from his hand.
1. בשני מובנים שונים – במובן רחב ובמובן מצומצם – מפרש הרמב"ן את מצוות "הוכח תוכיח".
הסבר מה ביניהם.
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2. מה ראה הרמב"ן לבכר פירושו השני על הראשון ("והנכון בעיני")?
תנו רבנן... מניין לרואה בחברו דבר מגונה שחייב להוכיח? שנאמר: "הוכח תוכיח"... הוכיחו ולא קיבל – מנין שיחזור ויוכיחנו? תלמוד לומר: "תוכיח" – מכל מקום.
לאיזה משני המובנים המובאים ברמב"ן מתאים דין הגמרא?
ג. "ולא תשא עליו חטא"
"וְלֹא תִשָּׂא עָלָיו חֵטְא"
Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart; thou shalt surely rebuke thy neighbour, and not bear sin because of him.
ד"ה ולא תשא עליו חטא: לא תלבין את פניו ברבים.
ולא תשא עליו חטא [THOU SHALT IN ANY WISE REBUKE THY COMPANION] AND NOT BEAR A SIN ON ACCOUNT OF HIM — i. e. though rebuking him thou shalt not expose him to shame (lit., make his face grow pale) in public, in which case you will bear sin on account of him (cf. Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 4 8; Arakhin 16b).
ראה גם הציטוט מן הרמב"ן לעיל בשאלה הקודמת.
1. מהם שני הפירושים הניתנים ברמב"ן למילים "לא תשא עליו חטא"?
2. האם מסכים רש"י לאחד משניהם, או הלך בדרך אחרת?
ד. מצוות "הוכח תוכיח" (2)
עד היכן החמירו רבותינו במצוות הוכח תוכיח, ראה בגמרא:
כל מי שאפשר למחות באנשי ביתו ולא מיחה, נתפס על אנשי ביתו; באנשי עירו – נתפס על אנשי עירו; בכל העולם כולו – נתפס על כל העולם כולו... דאמר ר' אחא בר חנינא: מעולם לא יצתה מידה טובה מפי הקב"ה וחזר בה לרעה חוץ מדבר זה, דכתיב (יחזקאל ט'): "ויאמר ה' אליו: עבר בתוך העיר, בתוך ירושלם, והתוית תיו על מצחות האנשים הנאנחים והנאבקים על כל התועבות הנעשות בתוכה". אמר ליה הקב"ה לגבריאל: לך ורשום על מצחות הצדיקים תיו של דיו, שלא ישלטו בהם מלאכי חבלה. אמרה מידת הדין לפני הקב"ה: ריבונו של עולם, מה נשתנו אלו מאלו? אמר לה הקב"ה: הללו צדיקים גמורים! אמרה לפניו (מידת הדין): ריבונו של עולם, היה בידם למחות ולא מחו! אמר לה: גלוי וידוע לפניו, שאם מחו בהם – לא יקבלו מהם! אמרה לפניו: ריבונו של עולם, אם לפניך גלוי – להם מי (האם) גלוי?! והיינו דכתיב (יחזקאל ט'): "זקן בחור ובתולה טף ונשים תהרוגו למשחית ועל כל איש אשר עליו התיו אל תגשו – וממקדשי תחלו"... תני רב יוסף: אל תקרי "ממקדשי" אלא "ממקודשי" אלו בני אדם שקיימו התורה מאלף עד תו.
with the attire of a harlot [shit zona] and wily of heart” (Proverbs 7:10). Sheḥuzot can be interpreted as an acronym of the words shit zona, attire of a harlot, with the letters tav and ḥet, which are similar in form, interchanged. We learned in the mishna: Ewes may go out kevulot. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of kevulot? It means that they bind their tails down with animal hide so that the males will not mount them. The Gemara explains: From where may it be inferred that this word kavul is a term meaning does not produce fruit? As it is written, when Solomon gave a portion of land to Hiram, he complained: “What cities are these which you have given me, my brother? And he called them the land of Kavul to this day” (I Kings 9:13). What is the meaning of the land of Kavul? Rav Huna said: That the people living there were bound [mekhubalin] and surrounded by silver and gold. Rava said to him: If so, is that what is written: “And Hiram came out of Tyre to see the cities which Solomon had given him, and they pleased him not” (I Kings 9:12)? Because the people there were bound in silver and gold, the cities were not pleasing in his eyes? Rav Huna said to him: Yes, indeed, it was precisely the abundant wealth that displeased Hiram. Since the people were wealthy and delicate, they did not perform labor. Hiram was seeking people whom he could enlist in the service of the king. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It was a sandy [ḥomton] expanse of land. And why was it called Kavul? It is because the leg sinks into it up to the ankle [kavla]. And people say in describing poor quality land: Land that is bound [mekhabela] shut, i.e., that does not produce fruit. We learned in the mishna: Ewes may go out kevunot. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of kevunot? It is that they covered [mekhabnin] the animal to produce fine wool. Sheep were wrapped in cloth from the day they were born so that their wool would remain perfectly clean and it could be used in fashioning especially fine wool garments. As we learned in a mishna: The color of a leprous sore [se’et] is like that of white wool. The Gemara asked: What is white wool? Rav Beivai bar Abaye said: Like the clean wool of a newborn lamb, which they cover from birth to produce fine wool. Our mishna continues: And the she-goats may go out with their udders bound. Rabbi Yosei prohibits doing so. Rabbi Yehuda distinguishes between a case where the udders were bound to dry the milk supply and a case where they were bound to conserve the milk. It was stated that the amora’im disagreed with regard to the ruling in this dispute: Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. And there are those who teach this halakha independent of the mishna. Rav said: If the udders were bound to dry the milk supply it is permitted, and not if they were bound to conserve the milk. And Shmuel said: Both this and that are prohibited. And there are those who taught this dispute with regard to this baraita: Goats may go out with their udders bound to dry the milk supply but not to conserve the milk. In the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira they said: That is the halakha, based on the letter of the law, but who can cast lots to determine by sight alone which udder is bound to dry the milk supply and which was bound to conserve the milk? And since one cannot distinguish between them, the Sages said: Both this and that are prohibited. Shmuel said, and some say Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira. In terms of practical halakha, according to all versions of the disagreement, Shmuel holds that it is prohibited in both cases. When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the anonymous first tanna of the mishna. He permits goats to go out with their udders bound in all cases. MISHNA: And with what may an animal not go out into the public domain on Shabbat? A camel may not go out with a saddlecloth, nor may it go out akud or ragul, which are different ways of tying its legs together, as will be explained in the Gemara. And likewise, tying all other animals in those manners is prohibited. And likewise, one may not tie camels one to the other and pull the lead camel, thereby pulling the others after it. However, he may place the ropes tied to each of the camels in his hand and pull them all, provided that he does not intertwine the ropes. GEMARA: It was taught in the Tosefta: A camel may not go out with a saddlecloth tied to its tail alone. However, it may go out with a saddlecloth tied to both its tail and its hump, as in that case one can assume that the saddlecloth will not fall off. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: A female camel may go out with a saddlecloth tied to its afterbirth. Because any movement of the saddlecloth will cause pain, the animal will not attempt to detach it. Therefore, there is no room for concern lest it fall. We learned in the mishna: A camel may not go out akud or ragul. Rav Yehuda said: Akud means that the animal’s foreleg and hind leg are bound together, similar to the binding of Isaac, son of Abraham, with regard to whom the term vaya’akod is employed. Ragul means that one may not bend the lower part of the foreleg onto the upper foreleg and tie it. That was done so that the camel would have the use of only three legs and would be unable to run away. The Gemara raises an objection from the following baraita: Akud means that the animal’s two forelegs and two hind legs are bound together. Ragul means that one may not bend the lower part of the foreleg onto the upper foreleg and tie it. The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda holds in accordance with this tanna, as it was taught in a baraita: Akud means that either the animal’s foreleg and hind leg or its two forelegs and two hind legs are bound together. Ragul means that one may not bend the lower part of the foreleg onto the upper foreleg and tie it. The Gemara asks: And this baraita and Rav Yehuda’s statement are still not the same. Granted, the first clause, the first case of akud, and the last clause, the case of ragul, work out well. The baraita and the opinion of Rav Yehuda correspond. However, the middle clause is difficult. According to the baraita, when the animal’s two forelegs and two hind legs are bound together, that is also considered akud, contrary to Rav Yehuda’s opinion. Rather, Rav Yehuda stated his opinion in accordance with this tanna, who said in a baraita: Akud means that the animal’s foreleg and hind leg are bound together, similar to the binding of Isaac, son of Abraham. Ragul means that one may not bend the lower part of the foreleg onto the upper foreleg and tie it. We learned in the mishna: And one may not tie camels one to the other and pull the lead camel, thereby pulling the others after it. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Rav Ashi said: Because he appears like one going to the market [ḥinga] to sell merchandise or to deliver a caravan of camels. In deference to Shabbat, one may not create that impression. The mishna continues: However, he may place the ropes tied to each of the camels in his hand and pull them all, provided that he does not intertwine the ropes. Rav Ashi said: This prohibition was taught not with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat but only with regard to the halakhot of prohibited mixtures of diverse kinds. The Gemara asks: Diverse kinds of what? If you say that it is referring to the prohibited mixture of the diverse kinds of man and animal, i.e., a person may not be tied to an animal, just as plowing with the diverse kinds of an ox and a donkey is prohibited, that is difficult. Didn’t we learn in a mishna: A person is permitted to plow and to pull a wagon together with all animals, as the prohibition is limited to diverse kinds of animals? Rather, the problem here is one of diverse kinds of ropes. If one rope is made of wool and another of linen, it is prohibited to intertwine them because that would create a forbidden mixture of the diverse kinds of wool and linen. However, this too is difficult, as, wasn’t it taught in a baraita: One who attaches a swatch of wool and a swatch of linen with a single stitch or knot, it is not considered a connection with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds? All the more so in this case, where the ropes are not tied together at all but are merely intertwined, it should not be considered a connection. The Gemara answers: Actually, the problem here is one of diverse kinds of ropes, and the mishna is saying as follows: Provided that he does not intertwine the ropes and tie them together. Ropes that are intertwined and tied together constitute a double knot, which is considered a connection with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds of wool and linen. Shmuel said that there is another restriction that applies to pulling camels with ropes on Shabbat. It is only permitted provided that a handbreadth of the rope does not hang below his hand to avoid the appearance that he is carrying a rope in his hand on Shabbat. The Gemara raises an objection: Didn’t a Sage of the school of Shmuel teach a baraita: Provided that two handbreadths of the rope do not hang below his hand? Abaye said: Now that Shmuel said one handbreadth, and a Sage of the school of Shmuel taught two handbreadths, it is reasonable to conclude that Shmuel came to teach us the practical halakha. Even though the tanna’im permitted pulling the camel as long as there is less than two handbreadths of rope hanging below his hand, in practice, one should be stringent and not leave even one handbreadth hanging.
רש"י:
מעיקרא "על כל איש אשר עליו התיו אל תגשו" – ולבסוף "ממקדשי תחלו", שהודה הקב"ה למקטרג מידת הדין, וחזר מן הטוב.
1. לפי איזו משלוש הדעות המובאות בשאלה ג' מבינים חז"ל כאן את "ולא תשא עליו חטא"?
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2. אילו שתי דעות מסומלות כאן בויכוח שבין הקב"ה לבין מידת הדין שבה – כביכול – מנצחת מידת הדין את הקב"ה?