פרשת בחקותי תשכ"ה - הפטרה - ירמיהו ט"ז
להפטרה זו עיין גם גיליון בחוקותי תשי"ט.
א. הקשר בין פסוקי ההפטרה
מהו הקשר שראו מסדרי ההפטרות בין ט"ז י"ט-כ"א לבין פסוקי הפרק הבא (י"ז)?
ב. "שקר נחלו אבותינו" - שאלות ברש"י
"אַךְ שֶׁקֶר נָחֲלוּ אֲבוֹתֵינוּ הֶבֶל וְאֵין בָּם מוֹעִיל"
O LORD, my strength, and my stronghold, And my refuge, in the day of affliction, Unto Thee shall the nations come From the ends of the earth, and shall say: ‘Our fathers have inherited nought but lies, Vanity and things wherein there is no profit.’
רש"י:
ד"ה נחלו: לשון נחלה.
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מה פירש בדבריו אלה?
ג. "היעשה לו אדם אלהים"
"הֲיַעֲשֶׂה לּוֹ אָדָם אֱלֹהִים וְהֵמָּה לֹא אֱלֹהִים"
Shall a man make unto himself gods, And they are no gods?
ד"ה אליך גויים יבואו: סוף האומות לשוב אליך ולעבוד שכם אחד. ועמך איך עשו להם אלוהים והמה לא אלוהים.
היעשה לו אדם אלוהים, והנה אדם אינו אלוקים, ואיך אם כן יעשה אלוקים.
Shall a man make unto himself gods, And they are no gods?
1. מה ההבדל בין שני הפירושים?
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2. התוכל להכריע בין שני הפירושים בעזרת דברי ירמיהו במקום אחר?
ד. "חטאת יהודה כתובה"
"חַטַּאת יְהוּדָה כְּתוּבָה בְּעֵט בַּרְזֶל בְּצִפֹּרֶן שָׁמִיר..."
The sin of Judah is written With a pen of iron, and with the point of a diamond; It is graven upon the tablet of their heart, And upon the horns of your altars.
חובות הלבבות, שער התשובה, פרק ז':
אבל מפסידי התשובה (=המעכבים התשובה) רבים מאד, וממפסידיה עוד ההסכם על העברה והוא הוא ההתמדה על עשותה והאיחור מהניח אותה... ...וכבר נאמר: אל תביט לקטנות מה שעשית, אך תביט לגדולת מי שחטאת לו, ואל תשמח לסכלות בני אדם ברוע מצפונך וראוי שתאבל לידיעת הבורא במה שאתה צופן והשקפתו על נסתרותיך ונגלותיך, ושהוא זוכר אותם לך יותר ממה שאתה זוכר. מפני שאתה תשכח, והוא לא ישכח, ותתעלם ולא יתעלם, כמו שכתוב (ישעיהו ס"ה ו') "הנה כתובה לפני", ואמר ירמיהו (פרק י"ז א') "חטאת יהודה כתובה".
הסבר כיצד מפרש רבנו בחיי את פסוקנו ובמה הוא סוטה מפשוטו של מקרא.
ה. "כזכור בניהם מזבחותם"
"כִּזְכֹּר בְּנֵיהֶם מִזְבְּחוֹתָם וַאֲשֵׁרֵיהֶם עַל עֵץ רַעֲנָן עַל גְּבָעוֹת הַגְּבֹהוֹת"
ר' יוסף קרא:
כאדם שכל שעה זוכר את בנו מחיבובו, כך הם מחבבין לקטר על מזבחותם שבנו לעבודה זרה, וכן פירשו רבותינו "כאדם שיש לו געגועין"... (עיין מקטע ו'). זהו מדרשו. ופשוטו, כשזוכרין בניהם מזבחותם שבנו לעבודה זרה, מיד הולכין ומקטרים הם לעבודה זרה.
רוב פרשנינו (רש"י, רד"ק, אברבנאל, שד"ל) סוברים שפשוטו של מקרא הוא כאותו פירוש שקראו ר' יוסף קרא "מדרשו". הסבר במה עדיף פירושו זה (שהוא קוראו "מדרש") על חברו (שהוא קוראו "פשוטו")!
ו. יצר עבודה זרה
"כִּזְכֹּר בְּנֵיהֶם מִזְבְּחוֹתָם וַאֲשֵׁרֵיהֶם עַל עֵץ רַעֲנָן עַל גְּבָעוֹת הַגְּבֹהוֹת..."
אמר רב יהודה אמר רב: יודעים היו ישראל בעבודת כוכבים, שאין בה ממש, ולא עבדו עבודת כוכבים אלא להתיר להם עריות בפרהסיא.
Rabbi Ami says: If one sacrificed an animal as an idolatrous offering and burned incense and poured a libation, all in the course of one lapse of awareness, he is obligated to bring only one sin-offering. Abaye says: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Ami? The verse states: “Nor worship them” (Exodus 20:5). The verse renders all the various rites of worship as one rite. The Gemara asks: And does Abaye actually say this? But doesn’t Abaye say: Why are there three mentions in the Torah of the prohibition against bowing to an object of idol worship? The prohibition against bowing to an idol appears three times: “You shall not bow to them nor worship them” (Exodus 20:5), “You shall not bow to their gods nor worship them” (Exodus 23:24), and “For you shall bow to no other god” (Exodus 34:14). The reason is that one mention is for an idol for which bowing is its standard manner of worship, and one mention is a prohibition against bowing to an idol even if bowing is not its standard manner of worship, and one mention is to divide idol worship into categories, as one is obligated to bring an offering for every type of worship that he performed. Evidently, Abaye’s opinion is not in accordance with Rabbi Ami’s statement that one is obligated to bring one sin-offering for all of his acts of idol worship. The Gemara answers: Abaye stated his reason in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ami, but he himself does not hold accordingly. The Gemara discusses the matter itself that Abaye says: Why are there three mentions of the prohibition against bowing to an object of idol worship? One is for an idol for which bowing is its standard manner of worship, and one is a prohibition against bowing to an idol even if bowing is not its standard manner of worship, and one mention is to divide idol worship into categories. The Gemara asks: Why is a verse necessary for the prohibition against bowing to an idol for which bowing is its standard manner of worship? That prohibition is already derived from the verse: “Take heed to yourself that you not be ensnared to follow them…saying, how do these nations serve their gods, so I will do likewise” (Deuteronomy 12:30), which indicates that one is liable for worshipping an idol in the manner that the gentiles worship it. Rather, Abaye’s statement should be understood as follows: One mention of the prohibition is for an idol for which its typical manner of worship is similar to bowing in that the idol is worshipped in an honorable manner, but bowing is not its typical manner of worship, as it is not typically worshipped by bowing. And one mention is a prohibition against bowing to an idol even if it is not similar to its standard manner of worship at all. And one mention is to divide idol worship into categories. § The mishna includes among those liable for idol worship one who declares that he accepts an idol upon himself as a god and one who says to an idol: You are my god. Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: Once a person said to an idol: You are my god, he is liable even if he did not worship it. The Gemara asks: The transgressor is liable to receive what punishment? If he is liable to receive the death penalty, Rav’s statement is superfluous, as this is stated in the mishna. Rather, Rav means that one who does so unwittingly is obligated to bring an offering. The Gemara asks: And is this statement true even according to the opinion of the Rabbis? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: One is obligated to bring a sin-offering for unwitting idol worship only for a matter, a transgression, that involves an action, e.g., sacrificing an offering, or burning incense, or pouring a libation, or bowing? And Reish Lakish says: Who is the tanna who taught bowing among these examples? It is Rabbi Akiva, who says that we do not require a significant action in order to render one liable to bring a sin-offering; a minimal action is sufficient. By inference, the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Akiva, maintain that we require a significant action. If bowing is not considered a significant action, then all the more so speech alone is not considered a significant action. The Gemara answers: Rav, too, when he states that one who says to an idol: You are my god, is obligated to bring a sin-offering, he states this according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara asks: If Rav states this according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, isn’t it obvious that the transgressor is obligated to bring a sin-offering? This is identical to the halakha of a blasphemer, whom Rabbi Akiva obligates to bring an offering despite the lack of an action. The Gemara answers: Rav states this lest you say that Rabbi Akiva obligates one to bring an offering for a transgression that does not involve an action only in the case of a blasphemer, as it is written explicitly with regard to a blasphemer that he receives karet in the verse: “He blasphemes the Lord, and that soul shall be excised [nikhreta] from among his people” (Numbers 15:30). But here, with regard to one who accepts an idol as his god, where karet is not written explicitly, one might say that he is not obligated to bring an offering. Therefore, Rav teaches us that he is obligated to bring an offering, as the Torah compares the acceptance of an idol as a god to a case of active idol worship; as it is written: “They have made themselves a molten calf, and have bowed to it, and have sacrificed to it, and said: These are your gods, Israel, which brought you up out of the land of Egypt” (Exodus 32:8). With regard to the aforementioned verse, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Were it not for the vav in the term: “Which brought you up [he’elukha],” giving it a plural form, the haters of the Jewish people, a euphemism used to refer to the Jewish people themselves, would have been sentenced to destruction for their idol worship. Since they recognized that God had taken them out of Egypt, and thought that He had merely made the golden calf His partner, the Jewish people were spared. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion is like one side of the following dispute between tanna’im: Others say: Were it not for the vav in the term: “Which brought you up [he’elukha],” the haters of the Jewish people would have been sentenced to destruction. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai to him: But isn’t anyone who links the name of Heaven and something else, a euphemism for an idol, uprooted from the world? As it is stated: “He who sacrifices to the gods, save to the Lord only, shall be utterly destroyed” (Exodus 22:19). The fact that the Jewish people included God in their idolatrous statement could not have saved them from destruction. Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Which brought you up” in the plural? The verse teaches that the Jewish people desired many gods; they were not satisfied with the golden calf alone. § The mishna teaches: But with regard to one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who cleans it, or one who sprays water before it, he transgresses a prohibition but is not liable to receive capital punishment. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Elazar says: For all of these actions one is flogged, with the exception of the cases stated later in the mishna of one who vows in an idol’s name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name. The Gemara asks: What is different about these cases, one who vows in an idol’s name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name, that the transgressors are not flogged? It is because they are each an example of a prohibition that does not involve an action. These actions too, namely, hugging or kissing an idol and the like, are not punishable by lashes; one who performs them violates a general prohibition, and one is not flogged for violating a general prohibition, i.e., one that contains several prohibitions. As this principle is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that one who eats from an animal before its soul departs is in transgression of a prohibition? The verse states: “You shall not eat with the blood” (Leviticus 19:26), meaning, you shall not eat from the animal while its soul, which is referred to in the Torah as blood, is still within it. The baraita adds: Another matter is derived from the verse “You shall not eat with the blood”: You shall not eat the meat of an offering while its blood is still in the bowl, as it has not yet been sprinkled on the altar. The meat of an offering may be eaten by the priests only after its blood is sprinkled. The baraita continues: Rabbi Dosa says: From where is it derived that although in general, after a deceased person is buried, the mourners are provided by others with a meal, others do not provide the mourners with a meal after the burial of those executed by the court? The verse states: “You shall not eat with the blood,” which is interpreted to mean: You shall not eat a mourners’ meal after the burial of one who was executed. Rabbi Akiva says: From where is it derived with regard to a Sanhedrin that killed a soul, i.e., that sentenced a person to death, that the judges may not taste anything that entire day that they sentenced him? The verse states: “You shall not eat with the blood.” Rabbi Yoḥanan says: From where is the prohibition against the behavior of a stubborn and rebellious son derived? While the Torah states the punishment given to a stubborn and rebellious son, the prohibition against his actions, namely, stealing money from his parents in order to eat a gluttonous meal of meat and wine in the company of lowly men, is not explicit. The verse states: “You shall not eat with the blood,” which is interpreted to mean that one may not eat in a manner that is punishable by death. This concludes the baraita. And Rabbi Avin bar Ḥiyya says, and some say it is Rabbi Avin bar Kahana who says this: For all of the prohibitions that the Sages derive from this verse, one is not flogged for transgressing them, as it is a general prohibition that is referring to several different actions. Therefore, since the prohibition against hugging or kissing an idol is also derived from a general prohibition, it should not be punishable by lashes, contrary to the opinion of Rav Dimi. Rather, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he related a different version of what Rabbi Elazar says: For all of the transgressions listed in the mishna one is not flogged, with the exception of one who vows in an idol’s name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name. The Gemara asks: What is different about transgressing those prohibitions for which one is not flogged? It is that they are each an example of a general prohibition, as explained previously. These cases too, namely, one who vows or takes an oath in the name of an idol, are included in a prohibition that does not involve an action, and therefore the transgressors are not punishable by lashes. The Gemara answers: That halakha of Rabbi Eliezer’s is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says with regard to a prohibition that does not involve an action that one is flogged for violating it. As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the Paschal offering: The verse states: “And you shall not leave any of it until morning; but that which remains of it until morning you shall burn with fire” (Exodus 12:10). The verse comes to provide a positive mitzva to burn the leftover meat after the prohibition against leaving it over was violated,
רש"י:
ד"ה אלא להתיר להם עריות בפרהסיא: שהיה יצרן תוקפן על עריות, אמרו: נפרוק כל עול תורה מעלינו ואל יוכיחונו על העריות, אבל עבודה זרה לא תקפו יצרם.
מתיב רב משרשיא (ירמיהו י"ז): "כזכור בניהם מזבחותם וגו'"?!
ד"ה כזכור בניהם: משמע שהיו להם געגועים עליהם, כאדם שיש לו געגועים על בנו ובזוכרו נאנח, והכי משמע "כזכור בניהם" דומה להם זכירת מזבחותם ואשריהם.
ואמר ר' אלעזר: כאדם שיש לו געגועים על בנו. – בתר דאביקו ביה.
רש"י:
ד"ה בתר דאביקו ביה: אחר שנקשרו בה מעצמן, תקפה חיבתן עליהם.
1. כיצד מתפרש פסוקנו בדברי רב משרשיא?
2. על מה מתנהל הויכוח בדברי הגמרא לעיל?
ז. הצדיק והרשע במשל העץ
"וְהָיָה כְּעַרְעָר בָּעֲרָבָה וְלֹא יִרְאֶה כִּי יָבוֹא טוֹב וְשָׁכַן חֲרֵרִים בַּמִּדְבָּר אֶרֶץ מְלֵחָה וְלֹא תֵשֵׁב"
For he shall be like a tamarisk in the desert, And shall not see when good cometh; But shall inhabit the parched places in the wilderness, A salt land and not inhabited.
אבן כספי, אדני כסף:
ד"ה ולא יראה: "ולא יראה" כינוי לערער שהוא המשל ואחר בנמשל, והעד אמרו בהיפוכו על העץ הלח "ולא יראה כי יבוא חום", והטעם לא ישיגהו טוב. והטוב לעץ הוא הלחות והקור מטבע המים, היפך החום שהוא רע לו. ובכאן היו "טוב" ו"חום" מתנגדים מצד המתחייב. ורבים כן לאין מספר בספר משלי, ואחד מהם (משלי י' טז) "פעולת צדיק לחיים, תבואת רשע לחטאת". וכן "ושכן חררים במדבר"... נופל תחילה לערער, ואחר לנמשל. וכן "ובשנת בצורת לא ידאג" נופל תחילה לעץ הלח ואחר לנמשל, וזה כי שנת בצורת הוא מצד הפסדים רבים יבואו בצמחים, כמו השדפון והירקון וזולת זה. ואין קושיה מאומרו על העץ "לא ידאג", כי זה נכון מאד בלשונות, ואין זה יותר זר מהניחו עליהם והדומים להם שם המות, כמו (בראשית מ"ז י"ט) "למה נמות לעיניך גם אנחנו גם אדמתנו". וכתב בהיפך (נחמיה ט' ו') "ואתה מחיה את כלם". ובכלל כי דרך העברי וגם כן ראוי בהגיון לקרוא ולתאר בכל תואר החי הצמחים, כי הצמח כולל לכל חי, ולכן נהגו הנביאים כולם לתאר האיש השלם בעץ לח, והסכל בעץ יבש. ויחזקאל ביאר זה יותר, והראש משה.
1. מהו הקושי בפסוקנו שעוררו לומר כל אלה?
2. הסבר את הביטוי החוזר בדבריו "ואחר בנמשל"!
3. מה פירוש: "טוב וחום מתנגדים מצד המתחייב"?
4. במה דומה משלי י' ט"ז המובא בדבריו לפסוקנו?
5. באמרו "ואין קושיה מאומרו על העץ ולא ידאג" – לאיזו קושיה הוא מתכוון, ולמה הוא מבטלה?
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6. לאיזה פסוק ביחזקאל התכוון באמרו "ויחזקאל ביאר זה יותר"?
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7. לאיזה מקום בתורה התכוון באמרו "והראש משה", ולמה יקרא למקום ההוא "הראש" בעניין זה?
ח. פירוש "מבטחו"
"בָּרוּךְ הַגֶּבֶר אֲשֶׁר יִבְטַח בַּה' וְהָיָה ה' מִבְטַחוֹ"
Blessed is the man that trusteth in the LORD, And whose trust the LORD is.
ד"ה והיה ה' מבטחו: אם יבטח בו הוא יהיה מבטחו ולא יירא מכל רע.
ד"ה מבטחו: המ"ם הנוסף על השם מציין הדבר והמקום שבו סיבת הבטחון, כמו מעון, מקדש, משכן וכדומה.
ד"ה ברוך הגבר: אשר לא לבד יבטח בה' כי גם "והיה ה' מבטחו", כי הבוטח בה' שיצילהו ע"י אמצעים טבעיים, הגם שיבטח בה' בכל זאת המבטח שלו – היינו הדבר שעל ידו יושג בטחונו – אינו ה', רק האמצעים הטבעיים, שמקווה על ידם יושיעהו ה'. והגם שאיננו "ארור", אחר שבוטח בה', אינו "ברוך" גם כן; רק אם יבטח בה' שיושיעהו בלא שום אמצעי כלל, עד שה' הוא הוא (=עצמו) המִבְטָח שלו, והיה זה דומה כעץ השתול על מים ושולח שרשיו על יובל.
1. מה הקושי שרצו שניהם ליישב?
2. מה ההבדל ביניהם בתפישתם את המבנה התחבירי של פסוקנו?
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3. הסבר את הרעיון המובע בדברי המלבי"ם.