Mishnah Berachot 1:1
From when may one recite Shema in the evening? From the time when the Kohanim go in to eat their Terumah [produce consecrated for priestly consumption], until the end of the first watch – so says Rabbi Eliezer. And the Sages say: Until midnight. Rabban Gamliel says: Until the break of dawn.
Berachot 4a
Rav Yitzḥak bar Adda, and some say Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Idi, said: From what verse is it derived that David’s lyre would wake him at midnight? “Awake, my glory; awake, harp and lyre; I will wake the dawn” (Psalms 57:9). This means that the playing lyre has already woken, and now I must engage in Torah study until dawn.
Rabbi Zeira offered a different solution to the question of whether Moses and David knew exactly when it was midnight and said: Moses certainly knew when it was midnight, and David also knew.
The Gemara asks: If David knew, then why did he need the lyre? The Gemara answers: He needed the lyre to wake him from his sleep.
Similarly with regard to Moses, since Moses knew the precise moment of midnight, why did he say: About midnight, instead of: At midnight? Moses did so because he maintained: Lest Pharaoh’s astrologers err and believe midnight to be earlier. Since no disaster would have occurred, they would say: Moses is a liar. Moses spoke in accordance with the principle articulated by the Master: Accustom your tongue to say: I do not know, lest you become entangled in a web of deceit.
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Why was Ish Boshet referred to as Mefivoshet? Because he would embarrass [mevayesh] David in matters of halakha. According to this approach, Mefivoshet is an abbreviation of boshet panim, embarrassment. Because David was not embarrassed to admit his errors, he merited that Kilav, who, according to tradition, was exceedingly wise, would descend from him. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: His name was not Kilav; rather, his name was Daniel, as it appears in a different list of David’s descendants.
Discussion Questions
The text states that one should accustom their tongue to say I don't know, lest you become entangled in a web of deceit.
- Do you agree that this strategy of feeling comfortable saying "I don't know" can help us avoid deceit? What are other examples of this in our world today?
- Do you find it difficult to say "I don't know?" How do you typically respond when someone asks you a question that you don't know the answer to... how is it different when the person asking is a:
- Colleague
- Close friend or spouse
- Child
- Parent
- Stranger or acquaintance
The text goes on to state that David was not embarrassed to admit his errors and it is for this reason that he merited a wise son.
- Why would the quality of not being embarrassed to admit errors result in a wise son?
- How is admitting an error similar/different to saying "I don't know?" Does the text suggest that the two are equally important or that one approach is desired over the other?
Discuss the extent to which you feel confident in your own Jewish education, particularly when it comes to questions that arise from your children? What do you hope conversations about Judaism will look like with your children and how can Bet Shalom support you in this effort?
Berachot 33b
There are conflicting opinions with regard to reciting havdala over the cup of wine after reciting it in the Amida prayer. One opinion holds that it is appropriate to recite havdala a second time, while the other holds that it is prohibited. Ravina said to Rava: What is the halakha? Rava said to him: The halakha in the case of havdala is like the halakha in the case of kiddush. Just as in the case of kiddush, although one recited kiddush in the Amida prayer he must, nevertheless, recite kiddush again over the cup of wine, so too with havdala, although one recited havdala in the Amida prayer he must recite havdala again over the cup of wine. The mishna states that Rabbi Eliezer says: It is recited in the seventeenth blessing of the Amida prayer, the blessing of thanksgiving. The Gemara cites the conclusion with regard to this halakha by relating a story: Rabbi Zeira was riding a donkey while Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin was coming and walking after him. He said to him: Is it true that you said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the case of a Festival that occurs directly after Shabbat? Since in that case, one cannot recite havdala in the blessing of Who graciously grants knowledge, as it is not included in the Amida prayer on the Festival, there is no alternative but to adopt Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling. He said to him: Yes. The Gemara wonders: Saying that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, indicates that his peers dispute his opinion. Where do we find that dispute? The Gemara rejects this: And don’t they dispute his opinion? Don’t the Rabbis dispute his opinion, as, in their opinion the blessing of havdala is recited in the blessing: Who graciously grants knowledge? The Gemara replies: Say that the Rabbis dispute Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion during the rest of the days of the year, when the option to recite havdala in the blessing: Who graciously grants knowledge exists, but in the case of a Festival that occurs directly after Shabbat, do they dispute his opinion? The Rabbis would agree with him in that case. The Gemara continues: Doesn’t Rabbi Akiva dispute his opinion? He holds that havdala is recited as an independent fourth blessing, in which case there is a dispute. The Gemara responds: Is that to say that throughout the entire year we act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in this matter, so that now, on a Festival that occurs directly after Shabbat, we will stand and act in accordance with his opinion? What is the reason that throughout the whole, entire year, we do not act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva? Because the Sages instituted eighteen blessings, they did not institute nineteen blessings. Here, too, the Sages instituted seven blessings, they did not institute eight blessings. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is not taken into consideration in this case. In response to these questions, Rabbi Zeira said to him that it was not that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that was stated in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan, from which one could infer that there was in fact a dispute; rather it was that one is inclined to favor the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that was stated in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan. As indeed it was stated that there is a dispute among the Sages in this matter. Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said in the name of Rabbeinu, Rav: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. And some say this statement: One is inclined to favor the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yoḥanan said that there is no dispute here, and the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Eliezer. And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that it was established that Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion appears to be correct. With regard to this difference of opinion Rabbi Zeira said: Take this statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba in your hand, as he is scrupulous and he learned the halakha well from the mouth of its originator, like the Sage Raḥava from the city Pumbedita. Raḥava was famous for the precision with which he would transmit material that he learned from his teacher. Rav Yosef said the conclusive halakha on this topic: I don’t know this and I don’t know that, but I do know from the statements of Rav and Shmuel they have instituted a pearl for us in Babylonia. They established a version that combines the first blessing of the Festival with the formula of havdala, parallel to the opinion of the Rabbis who include havdala in the first blessing that follows the first three blessings.
Shabbat 66a
And Rabbi Yosei prohibits going out into the public domain with the wooden leg, since he does not consider it to have the legal status of a shoe. And if the wooden leg has a receptacle for pads, a concave space at the top of the leg into which pads are placed to cushion the amputated leg, it assumes the status of a wooden vessel and can become ritually impure. And his supports, which are shoes that one who had both of his feet amputated places on his knees in order to walk on his knees, if a zav wears them, they are subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading. A zav is a primary source of ritual impurity. If he touches a vessel it assumes first-degree ritual impurity status. However, vessels on which he treads, sits, lies, or leans become primary sources of ritual impurity, provided they are designated for that purpose. These supports are vessels designated for treading. And one may go out with them into the public domain on Shabbat since they have the legal status of shoes. And one may enter the Temple courtyard with them. Although, generally, wearing shoes in the Temple courtyard is prohibited, in this regard, the supports do not have the legal status of shoes. However, if one who is crippled to the extent that he cannot walk at all sits on a chair that is attached to him, places supports on his hands, and propels himself along with his hands, his chair and supports are subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading. And one may not go out with them on Shabbat, and one may not enter the Temple courtyard with them. Loketamin, which will be explained in the Gemara, are ritually pure in the sense that they cannot become ritually impure because they are not vessels, and one may not go out with them on Shabbat. GEMARA: Rava said to Rav Naḥman: How did we learn the dispute in our mishna? Does Rabbi Meir rule that the amputee may go out with a wooden leg and foot and Rabbi Yosei prohibits him from doing so? Or is it Rabbi Meir who prohibited him from doing so, and Rabbi Yosei’s opinion is the lenient one? Rav Naḥman said to him: I don’t know. And Rava asked: What is the halakha in this matter? Rav Naḥman said to him: I don’t know.
It was stated: Shmuel said that the correct reading of the mishna is: An amputee may not go out, and Rabbi Yosei permits him to do so. And, likewise, Rav Huna said that the correct reading of the mishna is: An amputee may not. Rav Yosef said: Since Shmuel said that the correct reading of the mishna is: An amputee may not, and Rav Huna said: An amputee may not, we will also learn the mishna: An amputee may not. Rava bar Shira strongly objects to this: And did they not hear that Rav Ḥanan bar Rava taught the mishna to Ḥiyya bar Rav before Rav in a small room [kituna] in the school of Rav: An amputee may not go out on Shabbat with his wooden leg; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Yosei permits going out with it. And Rav signaled him with a hand gesture to reverse the opinions, Rabbi Meir permits going out and Rabbi Yosei prohibits doing so. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: And the mnemonic to remember which tanna permits and which tanna prohibits is samekh samekh. The letter samekh appears both in the name Yosei and in the Hebrew word for prohibits [oser]. In that way, one remembers that Rabbi Yosei is the one who prohibits it.