חיוב נשים בקידוש
DA
ByDaphna Ansel
קידושין כ״ט א:ו׳-ז׳

מתני׳ כל מצות הבן על האב - אנשים חייבין ונשים פטורות, וכל מצות האב על הבן -אחד אנשים ואחד נשים חייבין, וכל מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא - אנשים חייבין ונשים פטורות, וכל מצות עשה שלא הזמן גרמא - אחד האנשים ואחד הנשים חייבין , וכל מצות לא תעשה - בין שהזמן גרמא בין שלא הזמן גרמא, אחד האנשים ואחד הנשים חייבין, חוץ מבל תקיף, ובל תשחית, ובל תטמא למתים:

Kiddushin 29a:6-7
until he pulls or takes possession of it. Additionally, the Temple treasury has the following advantage: If a commoner pulled a consecrated item for the purpose of acquiring it with one hundred dinars, and he did not manage to redeem it by paying the one hundred dinars to the Temple treasurer before the item’s price stood at two hundred dinars, he gives two hundred dinars. What is the reason for this? It states: He will give the money and it will be assured to him (see Leviticus 27:19). This indicates that one can acquire an item from the Temple treasury only by the actual transfer of money. By contrast, in the reverse case, when the commoner pulled an item when it was worth two hundred dinars, and he did not manage to redeem it before the value of the item stood at one hundred dinars, he gives two hundred dinars. What is the reason for this? The power of a commoner should not be greater than that of the Temple treasury of consecrated property. Since a commoner completes his acquisition by pulling, the item is acquired by him at that price, and the Temple treasury should not suffer a loss in a case where the commoner could not have reneged on his commitment had he been dealing with another commoner. Similarly, if the commoner redeemed it at two hundred dinars, but he did not manage to pull it before its value stood at one hundred dinars, he gives two hundred dinars. What is the reason? It states: He will give the money and it will be assured to him, which indicates that the redemption of consecrated property is effected with money. By contrast, if he redeemed it at one hundred dinars and did not manage to pull it before it stood at two hundred dinars, what he redeemed is redeemed, and he gives only one hundred dinars. The Gemara asks: Why is this the halakha? So too, let us say: The power of a commoner should not be greater than that of the Temple treasury of consecrated property, and if this occurred in a case where he was dealing with another commoner he would need to pay the full two hundred dinars, which was the value of the item when he pulled it. Shouldn’t the Temple treasury have as much power as a common person? The Gemara answers: There is an additional impediment to reneging on an agreement with another commoner. Is that to say that a commoner who gave a seller money and changed his mind before acquiring the item is not forced to accept upon himself the curse of: He Who exacted payment from the generation of the flood (see Genesis, chapter 7) and the generation of the dispersion (see Genesis, chapter 11) will punish one who does not keep his word? Although a commoner can legally renege on his agreement at this stage, the Sages disapproved of such dishonest conduct, and one who did so would be cursed in this manner. Consequently, the power of a commoner is not greater than that of the Temple treasury, as it is not a simple matter to renege on an agreement with another commoner. MISHNA: With regard to all mitzvot of a son with regard to his father, men are obligated to perform them and women are exempt. And with regard to all mitzvot of a father with regard to his son, both men and women are obligated to perform them. The mishna notes an additional difference between the obligations of men and women in the performance of mitzvot: With regard to all positive, time-bound mitzvot, i.e., those which must be performed at specific times, men are obligated to perform them and women are exempt. And with regard to all positive mitzvot that are not time bound, both men and women are obligated to perform them. And with regard to all prohibitions, whether they are time-bound or whether they are not time-bound, both men and women are obligated to observe them, except for the prohibitions of: Do not round the corners of your head, and: Do not destroy the corners of your beard, which are derived from the verse: “You shall not round the corners of your head and you shall not destroy the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27), and a prohibition that concerns only priests: Do not contract ritual impurity from a corpse (see Leviticus 21:1). These mitzvot apply only to men, not women, despite the fact that they are prohibitions. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: All mitzvot of a son with regard to his father? If we say that it is referring to all mitzvot that the son is obligated to perform with regard to his father, are women exempt from obligations of this kind? But isn’t it taught in a baraita concerning a verse that deals with the mitzva of honoring one’s father and mother: “A man shall fear [tira’u] his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3)? I have derived only that a man is obligated in this mitzva. From where do I derive that a woman is also obligated? When it says in the same verse: “A man shall fear [tira’u] his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3), employing the plural form of the verb, this indicates that there are two that are obligated here, both a man and a woman. Rav Yehuda said that this is what the mishna is saying: With regard to all mitzvot of a son that are incumbent upon his father to perform for his son, men are obligated in them and women are exempt. The Gemara comments: According to this interpretation, we learn in this mishna that which the Sages taught in a baraita: A father is obligated with regard to his son to circumcise him, and to redeem him if he is a firstborn son who must be redeemed by payment to a priest, and to teach him Torah, and to marry him to a woman, and to teach him a trade. And some say: A father is also obligated to teach his son to swim. Rabbi Yehuda says: Any father who does not teach his son a trade teaches him banditry [listut]. The Gemara expresses surprise at this statement: Can it enter your mind that he actually teaches him banditry? Rather, the baraita means that it is as though he teaches him banditry. Since the son has no profession with which to support himself, he is likely to turn to theft for a livelihood. This baraita accords with Rav Yehuda’s interpretation of the mishna. § The baraita teaches that a father is obligated to circumcise his son. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers that this is as it is written: “And Abraham circumcised his son Isaac” (Genesis 21:4). The Gemara comments: And in a case where one’s father did not circumcise him the court is obligated to circumcise him, i.e., if this obligation is not fulfilled by the father it applies to the community as a whole, as it is written: “Every male among you shall be circumcised” (Genesis 17:10), in the form of a general mitzva that does not apply only to the father. And in a case where the court did not circumcise him the son is obligated to circumcise himself when he reaches adulthood, as it is written: “And the uncircumcised male, who is not circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Genesis 17:14). From where do we derive that his mother is not obligated to circumcise her son? As it is written: “And Abraham circumcised his son Isaac when he was eight days old, as God commanded him” (Genesis 21:4). The verse emphasizes that God commanded him, and not her. We found a source for this mitzva immediately, i.e., when it was given to Abraham; from where do we derive that this is the halakha for the men of all generations? The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that any place where it is stated: “Command,” it is nothing other than an expression of galvanization both immediately and for generations. The mitzva of circumcision is presented by means of this term. The Gemara elaborates: From where is it derived that the term “command” indicates a galvanization? As it is written: “And command Joshua, and encourage him and strengthen him” (Deuteronomy 3:28). In this context, the term “command” is not referring to a specific command but is a general expression of galvanization. From where is it derived that this applies immediately and for generations? As it is written: “From the day that the Lord commanded and onward throughout your generations” (Numbers 15:23). This shows that whenever the word “command” is used it is referring to that day onward for all generations. § The baraita teaches that a father is obligated to redeem his son. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers that this is as it is written: “All the firstborn of your sons you shall redeem” (Exodus 34:20). And in a case where one’s father does not redeem him he is obligated to redeem himself, as it is written: “You shall redeem [pado tifde]” (Numbers 18:15). The repetition of the verb indicates that a firstborn is required to be redeemed in any case, even if his father neglects to do so. And from where do we derive that a mother is not commanded to redeem her son? As it is written: “You shall redeem [tifde]” which can be read as: You shall be redeemed [tippadeh]. This indicates that whoever is commanded to redeem himself is commanded to redeem others, and whoever is not commanded to redeem himself is not commanded to redeem others. Since a woman is not commanded to redeem herself, she is not commanded to redeem her son either. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that she is not obligated to redeem herself? The Gemara answers that this is as it is written: “You shall redeem [tifde],” which can be read as: You shall be redeemed [tippadeh]. This indicates that any person whom others are commanded to redeem is commanded to redeem himself, and any person whom others are not commanded to redeem is not commanded to redeem himself. Since there is no mitzva for a parent to redeem his daughter, there is similarly no mitzva for a daughter to redeem herself. And from where is it derived that others are not commanded to redeem a daughter? As the verse states: “All the firstborn of your sons you shall redeem” (Exodus 34:20), i.e., your sons and not your daughters. The Sages taught: If a firstborn has not yet been redeemed and he himself has a firstborn son, he is obligated to redeem himself and he is also obligated to redeem his firstborn son, and he takes precedence over his son. If he does not have enough money to redeem both of them, he redeems himself. Rabbi Yehuda says: His son takes precedence over him. Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning is that with regard to this one, the father, the mitzva of his redemption was upon his father, and only when his father did not observe the mitzva did it apply to the adult son. And that mitzva of the redemption of his firstborn son applies to him directly. Consequently, he should first fulfill the mitzva that applies to him by redeeming his son. Rabbi Yirmeya says: Everyone agrees
ברכות כ׳ ב:ח׳-י׳

אמר רב אדא בר אהבה נשים חייבות בקדוש היום דבר תורה. אמאי? מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא הוא, וכל מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא נשים פטורות! אמר אביי מדרבנן. אמר ליה רבא והא דבר תורה קאמר, ועוד כל מצות עשה נחייבינהו מדרבנן! אלא אמר רבא אמר קרא "זכור" ו"שמור" - כל שישנו בשמירה ישנו בזכירה, והני נשי הואיל ואיתנהו בשמירה, איתנהו בזכירה.

Berakhot 20b:8-10
Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Women are obligated to recite the sanctification of the Shabbat day [kiddush]by Torah law. The Gemara asks: Why? Kiddush is a time-bound, positive mitzva, and women are exempt from all time-bound, positive mitzvot. Abaye said: Indeed, women are obligated to recite kiddush by rabbinic, but not by Torah law. Rava said to Abaye: There are two refutations to your explanation. First, Rav Adda bar Ahava said that women are obligated to recite kiddush by Torah law, and, furthermore, the very explanation is difficult to understand. If the Sages do indeed institute ordinances in these circumstances, let us obligate them to fulfill all time-bound, positive mitzvot by rabbinic law, even though they are exempt by Torah law. Rather, Rava said: This has a unique explanation. In the Ten Commandments in the book of Exodus, the verse said: “Remember Shabbat and sanctify it” (Exodus 20:8), while in the book of Deuteronomy it is said: “Observe Shabbat and sanctify it” (Deuteronomy 5:12). From these two variants we can deduce that anyone included in the obligation to observe Shabbat by avoiding its desecration, is also included in the mitzva to remember Shabbat by reciting kiddush. Since these women are included in the mitzva to observe Shabbat, as there is no distinction between men and women in the obligation to observe prohibitions in general and to refrain from the desecration of Shabbat in particular, so too are they included in the mitzva of remembering Shabbat.
משנה תורה, הלכות עבודה זרה וחוקות הגויים י״ב:ג׳

(ג) כָּל מִצְוֹת לֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה אֶחָד אֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד נָשִׁים חַיָּבִים חוּץ מִ"בַּל תַּשְׁחִית" וּ"בַל תַּקִּיף" וּ"בַל יִטָּמֵא כֹּהֵן לַמֵּתִים" (משנה קידושין א ז). וְכָל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהִיא מִזְּמַן לִזְמַן וְאֵינָהּ תְּדִירָה נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת חוּץ מִקִּדּוּשׁ הַיּוֹם וַאֲכִילַת מַצָּה בְּלֵילֵי הַפֶּסַח וַאֲכִילַת הַפֶּסַח וּשְׁחִיטָתוֹ וְהַקְהֵל וְשִׂמְחָה שֶׁהַנָּשִׁים חַיָּבוֹת:

Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 12:3

(3) Both men and woman are obliged to observe all of the prohibitive commandments in the Torah, save destroying a beard, rounding the corners of the head, and a priest's contamination for the dead which refer only to men; and, pertaining to mandatory commandments, every such commandment the performance of which takes place only at stated times, and not continuously women are exempted, save the sanctification of the Sabbath day with words of prayer, eating of Mazzah on the first (two) night(s) of Passover, the eating of the Paschal lamb, its slaughter, to be present when all Israel assemble once in seven years, and rejoicing on the festivals wherein women's participation is obligatory.4Kiddushin, 29a; Ibid. 31a; Berakot, 20b; Pesahim, 87a. C. G.

ראש השנה כ״ט א:ו׳-ח׳

מתני׳ ...זה הכלל כל שאינו מחוייב בדבר אינו מוציא את הרבים ידי חובתן:

Rosh Hashanah 29a:6-8
Have intent to sound the shofar on my behalf and sound it for me. The Gemara infers: Apparently, Rabbi Zeira maintains that he who sounds the shofar for others is required to have intent to discharge the hearer’s obligation. The Gemara raises an objection from the mishna: If one was passing behind a synagogue, or his house was adjacent to the synagogue, and he heard the sound of the shofar or the sound of the Scroll of Esther being read, if he focused his heart to fulfill his obligation, he has fulfilled his obligation, but if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation. It may be asked: And, according to Rabbi Zeira, even if the hearer focused his heart, what of it? The other one, i.e., the one sounding the shofar, did not focus his intent to sound the shofar with him in mind? If indeed the intent of the one sounding the shofar is required, how does the passerby fulfill his obligation? The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with the representative of the community, i.e., one who sounds the shofar for the entire congregation and has everyone in mind. He does not sound it for a specific individual, but rather on behalf of the entire community, and therefore anyone who hears him sound the shofar fulfills his obligation. The Gemara raises another objection: Come and hear that which was taught in a baraita: If the hearer of the shofar had intent, but the sounder of the shofar did not have intent, or if the sounder of the shofar had intent, but the hearer did not have intent, he has not fulfilled his obligation, until both the hearer and the sounder have intent. The baraita teaches the halakha governing the sounder of the shofar in similar fashion to the halakha governing the hearer. From this it may be inferred that just as the hearer hears for himself, having intent to fulfill his own obligation, so too, the sounder sounds for himself, having intent to fulfill his own obligation, and not that of others. And the baraita teaches that if the sounder did not have this intent, the hearer has not fulfilled his obligation. But this indicates that if the sounder had intent to sound the shofar for himself, he need not have intent to sound it for others, therefore contradicting Rabbi Zeira’s opinion. The Gemara answers: This is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: The hearer hears for himself, and the sounder sounds the shofar in his usual way, i.e., he need not intend to sound it for the sake of the hearer. Rabbi Yosei said: In what case is this statement said? It was said in the case of a representative of the community. But in the case of an ordinary individual, the hearer does not fulfill his obligation until both the hearer and the sounder have intent to discharge the hearer’s obligation, as argued by Rabbi Zeira. MISHNA: Incidental to the discussion of the required intent when sounding the shofar, the mishna cites the verse: “And it came to pass, when Moses held up his hand, that Israel prevailed; and when he let down his hand, Amalek prevailed” (Exodus 17:11). It may be asked: Did the hands of Moses make war when he raised them or break war when he lowered them? Rather, the verse comes to tell you that as long as the Jewish people turned their eyes upward and subjected their hearts to their Father in Heaven, they prevailed, but if not, they fell. Similarly, you can say: The verse states: “Make for yourself a fiery serpent, and set it upon a pole; and it shall come to pass, that everyone that is bitten, when he sees it, he shall live” (Numbers 21:8). Once again it may be asked: Did the serpent kill, or did the serpent preserve life? Rather, when the Jewish people turned their eyes upward and subjected their hearts to their Father in Heaven, they were healed, but if not, they rotted from their snakebites. Returning to its halakhic discussion, the mishna continues: A deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor who sounds the shofar cannot discharge the obligation on behalf of the community. This is the principle with regard to similar matters: Whoever is not obligated to do a certain matter cannot discharge the obligation on behalf of the community. GEMARA: The Sages taught the following baraita: All are obligated to sound the shofar: Priests, Levites, and ordinary Israelites; converts; freed slaves; a tumtum, i.e., one whose sexual organs from birth are concealed or are so undeveloped that it is impossible to determine whether the individual is male or female; a hermaphrodite [androginos], i.e., one with both male and female reproductive organs; and a half-slave, half-freeman. A tumtum who sounds the shofar cannot discharge the obligation of one of his kind, i.e., a fellow tumtum, since men are bound by the obligation, whereas women are not, and it is possible that the sounder is female and the hearer is male, nor can he discharge the obligation of one who is not of his kind, an ordinary man or woman. A hermaphrodite can discharge the obligation of one of his kind, a fellow hermaphrodite, since if the sounder is treated as a female, the hearer is also considered a female, but he cannot discharge the obligation of one who is not of his kind. One who is half-slave and half-freeman cannot discharge the obligation of one of his kind, as the slave component of the sounder cannot discharge the obligation of the free component of the hearer, and he certainly cannot discharge the obligation of one who is not of his kind, i.e., a completely free individual. The Master said above in the baraita: All are obligated to sound the shofar: Priests, Levites, and ordinary Israelites. The Gemara asks in astonishment: Isn’t that obvious? If these people are not obligated to perform the mitzva, who then is obligated to perform it? The Gemara answers: It was necessary to say that priests are obligated to fulfill the mitzva, for it may enter your mind to say as follows: Since it is written: “It is a day of sounding the shofar to you” (Numbers 29:1), you might have said that with regard to one who is obligated to sound only one day, he is obligated to sound the shofar on Rosh HaShana. But with regard to these priests, since they are obligated to sound all year long, because they sound trumpets when they offer the sacrifices in the Temple, as it is written: “And you shall sound the trumpets over your burnt-offerings, and over the sacrifices of your peace-offerings” (Numbers 10:10), you might say that they are not obligated to sound the shofar on Rosh HaShana. Therefore, the baraita comes to teach us that this is not true, and that even priests are obligated to fulfill the mitzva. The Gemara asks: Are these things comparable? There, the priests sound trumpets, and here, we are dealing with the sounding of a shofar. Rather, it was necessary to say that priests are obligated to fulfill the mitzva for a different reason, for it may enter your mind to say as follows: Since we learned in a mishna: Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year is the same as Rosh HaShana, with regard to both the shofar blasts and the additional blessings that are recited in the Amida prayer, I might have said: One who is fully included in the mitzva of the Jubilee is also included in the mitzva of Rosh HaShana. But these priests, since they are not fully included in the mitzva of the Jubilee, as we learned in a mishna: Priests and Levites may sell their fields forever and they may also redeem their lands forever, and they are not bound by the halakhot of the Jubilee Year, I might say that they should also not be obligated to fulfill the mitzva of Rosh HaShana. Therefore, the baraita comes to teach us that this is not so, and that even priests are obligated to fulfill the mitzva. § It was taught in the same baraita: A half-slave, half-freeman cannot discharge the obligation on behalf of one of his kind, and he certainly cannot discharge the obligation on behalf of one who is not of his kind. Rav Huna said: Even though he cannot discharge the obligation on behalf of others, he can discharge the obligation on behalf of himself. Rav Naḥman said to Rav Huna: What is the difference whereby he may discharge the obligation on behalf of himself but not on behalf of others? Because his slave component cannot come and discharge the obligation on behalf of the free component of the other. If so, with regard to himself as well, his slave component should not be able to come and discharge the obligation on behalf of his free component. Rather, Rav Naḥman said: Even on behalf of himself he cannot discharge the obligation. The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita: A half-slave, half-freeman cannot discharge the obligation even for himself. Continuing the discussion of performing an obligation on behalf of others, Ahava, son of Rabbi Zeira, taught the following ba-raita: With regard to all the blessings, even if one already recited a blessing for himself and has consequently fulfilled his own obligation, he can still recite a blessing for others and thereby discharge their obligation, as all Jews are responsible for one another. This is true with regard to all blessings except for the blessing recited over bread and the blessing recited over wine, both before and after their consumption. With regard to these blessings, if he has not yet fulfilled his own obligation, he can discharge the obligation of others as well, but if he already fulfilled his own obligation, he cannot discharge the obligation of others, as these blessings are recited in appreciation of physical enjoyment, and can only be recited by one who is actually deriving pleasure at the time. Rava raised a dilemma:
ברכות כ׳ ב:י״א-י״ד

אמר ליה רבינא לרבא נשים בברכת המזון דאורייתא או דרבנן? למאי נפקא מינה? לאפוקי רבים ידי חובתן. אי אמרת (בשלמא) דאורייתא, אתי דאורייתא ומפיק דאורייתא, אלא אי אמרת דרבנן, הוי שאינו מחוייב בדבר, וכל שאינו מחוייב בדבר אינו מוציא את הרבים ידי חובתן. מאי? תא שמע: באמת אמרו בן מברך לאביו, ועבד מברך לרבו, ואשה מברכת לבעלה, אבל אמרו חכמים תבא מארה לאדם שאשתו ובניו מברכין לו. אי אמרת בשלמא דאורייתא, אתי דאורייתא ומפיק דאורייתא, אלא אי אמרת דרבנן, אתי דרבנן ומפיק דאורייתא?! ולטעמיך קטן בר חיובא! הוא אלא הכא במאי עסקינן? כגון שאכל שיעורא דרבנן, דאתי דרבנן ומפיק דרבנן:

Berakhot 20b:11-14
Ravina said to Rava: We learned in the mishna that women are obligated in the mitzva of Grace after Meals. However, are they obligated by Torah law or merely by rabbinic law? What difference does it make whether it is by Torah or rabbinic law? The difference is regarding her ability to fulfill the obligation of others when reciting the blessing on their behalf. Granted, if you say that their obligation is by Torah law, one whose obligation is by Torah law can come and fulfill the obligation of others who are obligated by Torah law. However, if you say that their obligation is by rabbinic law, then from the perspective of Torah law, women are considered to be one who is not obligated, and the general principle is that one who is not obligated to fulfill a particular mitzva cannot fulfill the obligations of the many in that mitzva. Therefore, it is important to know what is the resolution of this dilemma. Come and hear from what was taught in a baraita: Actually they said that a son may recite a blessing on behalf of his father, and a slave may recite a blessing on behalf of his master, and a woman may recite a blessing on behalf of her husband, but the Sages said: May a curse come to a man who, due to his ignorance, requires his wife and children to recite a blessing on his behalf. From here we may infer: Granted, if you say that their obligation is by Torah law, one whose obligation is by Torah law can come and fulfill the obligation of others who are obligated by Torah law. However, if you say that their obligation is by rabbinic law, can one who is obligated by rabbinic law, come and fulfill the obligation of one whose obligation is by Torah law? The Gemara challenges this proof: And according to your reasoning, is a minor obligated by Torah law to perform mitzvot? Everyone agrees that a minor is exempt by Torah law, yet here the baraita said that he may recite a blessing on behalf of his father. There must be another way to explain the baraita. With what we are dealing here? With a case where his father ate a quantity of food that did not satisfy his hunger, a measure for which one is only obligated by rabbinic law to recite Grace after Meals. In that case, one whose obligation is by rabbinic law can come and fulfill the obligation of another whose obligation is by rabbinic law.
כל בו ל״א:ער״ח

(רעח)...ואשה היודעת לקדש מקדשת ואם לאו מקדישין לה. יבאר הר״ש ז״ל ואפי׳ להוציא אחרים ידי חובתם שאינן יודעין לקדש...

Kol Bo 31:278
...
אורח חיים ער״א:ב׳

(ב) נשים חייבות בקידוש אע"פ שהוא מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא (פי' מצות עשה התלויה בזמן) משום דאתקש "זכור" ל"שמור", והני נשי הואיל ואיתנהו בשמירה איתנהו בזכירה, ומוציאות את האנשים הואיל וחייבות מן התורה כמותם:

Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 271:2

(1) ...When he arrives at his home, he should hurry to eat the meal immediately...

(2) Women are obligated in Kiddush, even though it is a positive commandment that time causes (meaning, a positive commandment dependent on time), because Remember is compared to Guard. And these women since they are included in watching, they are include in remembering. And they can discharge men (from their obligation) since they are obligated biblically, like them.

(3) If he has not the means (finances) at hand to purchase wine for Kiddush and to prepare the needs of the meal for both the meal at night, the meal on Shabbat day and Kiddush for Shabbat day, it is better to purchase wine for the night Kiddush rather than to purchase needs for meals or wine for Kiddush on Shabbat day. For as it is taught: "The honour of the day precedes the honour of the night, this is only with regards to other needs of the meal. However if he does not have more than one cup for Kiddush, then the honour of the night is prioritised over the honour of the day.

(4) It is forbidden to taste anything before one makes Kiddush [at night], even water. And even if one began eating while it was still day, he needs to stop eating, spread out a tablecloth [to set up the meal] and make Kiddush. And if they were drinking wine first, they only need to say the Bracha of Kiddush and not a Bracha on the wine. Afterward they will make a Bracha on the bread. And if he does not have wine, he can make Kiddush on bread, he need not make a Bracha on bread [because he has already been part of a meal where bread was eaten]. There are those who say that even if he makes a Bracha on wine, he also need not make a Bracha on the bread.

(5) Two people who were drinking and then said "Come, let us make Kiddush", they are forbidden from drinking more until they make Kiddush. If they want to return and drink before they make Kiddush, even if they are required, need to again make the Bracha on the wine and then they can drink. Edit: A person who forgot to make Kiddush and realised only after he make the Bracha on the bread, and yet remembered before he ate; should make Kiddush on the bread and then eat it. But, if it was Havdalah, he should first eat the bread - for we do not make Havdalah on bread.

(7) ...Even if it is forbidden for one to taste food before Kiddush, if they did taste food, they should still make Kiddush.

(8) If one did not make Kiddush at night - whether it was unintentional or intentional, he must make up for it the next day. Edit: And he should say all of the text of Kiddush of the night, except for "Vayechulu"

(9) There needs to be a tablecloth on the table underneath the bread and another cloth spread out on top of the bread.

(10) One should make Kiddush on a full cup of wine that is not

(13) One must drink a cheekful from the Kiddush cup, i.e. if one moves all the wine to one side of their mouth and their cheek appears full, and this is the majority of a Revi'it.

ב"ח, אורח חיים ער״א:ג׳:א׳

ואחד אנשים ונשים חייבים בקידוש היום. וז"ל הכל בו וביאר הר"ש ז"ל ואפילו להוציא אחרים ידי חובתם שאינן יודעין לקדש עכ"ל ומביאו ב"י ופסק כך בשלחן ערוך (ס"ב), אבל גבי מגילה סימן תרפ"ט כתב בשלחן ערוך (ס"ב) יש אומרים שהנשים אינן מוציאות את האנשים וכת' על פי דברי בה"ג שהביא רבינו לשם החולק על פירוש רש"י [הר"ש] שכתב שהנשים מוציאות את האנשים, ותימה שכאן פסק כפירוש רש"י [הר"ש] שהביאו בספר כל בו והפסקים סותרין זה את זה דנראה דאין לחלק בין קידוש למגילה, ולפעד"נ עיקר להחמיר בקידוש כמו במגילה שאין הנשים מוציאות לאנשים וכן ראיתי שכתב מהרש"ל:

Bach, Orach Chaim 271:3:1
...

ט"ז אורח חיים סימן רעא ס"ק ב
ומוציאות את האנשים כו'. אף על גב דבסי' תרפ"ט פסק בש"ע כבה"ג דאין נשים מוציאות אנשים במקרא מגילה אף ע"ג שהם חייבות במקרא מגילה, לא דמי לכאן, דבמגילה יש דיעות דאין לנשים לברך "על מקרא מגילה" אלא "על משמע מגילה" כמ"ש שם ב"י, ע"כ בודאי לא נכון שלכתחלה יוציאו האנשים, משא"כ כאן. הכל מודים שאין חילוק כלל בין אנשים לנשים, ע"כ שפיר מוציאות אותם. ורש"ל ומו"ח ז"ל פסקו גם כאן דאין מוציאות כמו במגילה ואין זה מוכרח כלל:

מגן אברהם סימן רעא ס"ק ב
ומוציאות את האנשים. הקשה הב"ח מ"ש ממגילה דאין מוציאות וכמ"ש סימן תרפ"ט ואשתמיטתיה דברי התוס' בסוכה דף ל"ח שכתבו כיון דרבים הם זילא בהו מילתא שתוציאם אשה...

ראש השנה כ״ט א

גמ׳...תני אהבה בריה דר' זירא כל הברכות כולן - אע"פ שיצא מוציא, חוץ מברכת הלחם וברכת היין שאם לא יצא מוציא, ואם יצא אינו מוציא. בעי רבא ברכת הלחם של מצה וברכת היין של קידוש היום מהו? כיון דחובה הוא מפיק, או דלמא ברכה לאו חובה היא? ת"ש דאמר רב אשי כי הוינן בי רב פפי הוה מקדש לן, וכי הוה אתי אריסיה מדברא הוה מקדש להו.

Rosh Hashanah 29a
Have intent to sound the shofar on my behalf and sound it for me. The Gemara infers: Apparently, Rabbi Zeira maintains that he who sounds the shofar for others is required to have intent to discharge the hearer’s obligation. The Gemara raises an objection from the mishna: If one was passing behind a synagogue, or his house was adjacent to the synagogue, and he heard the sound of the shofar or the sound of the Scroll of Esther being read, if he focused his heart to fulfill his obligation, he has fulfilled his obligation, but if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation. It may be asked: And, according to Rabbi Zeira, even if the hearer focused his heart, what of it? The other one, i.e., the one sounding the shofar, did not focus his intent to sound the shofar with him in mind? If indeed the intent of the one sounding the shofar is required, how does the passerby fulfill his obligation? The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with the representative of the community, i.e., one who sounds the shofar for the entire congregation and has everyone in mind. He does not sound it for a specific individual, but rather on behalf of the entire community, and therefore anyone who hears him sound the shofar fulfills his obligation. The Gemara raises another objection: Come and hear that which was taught in a baraita: If the hearer of the shofar had intent, but the sounder of the shofar did not have intent, or if the sounder of the shofar had intent, but the hearer did not have intent, he has not fulfilled his obligation, until both the hearer and the sounder have intent. The baraita teaches the halakha governing the sounder of the shofar in similar fashion to the halakha governing the hearer. From this it may be inferred that just as the hearer hears for himself, having intent to fulfill his own obligation, so too, the sounder sounds for himself, having intent to fulfill his own obligation, and not that of others. And the baraita teaches that if the sounder did not have this intent, the hearer has not fulfilled his obligation. But this indicates that if the sounder had intent to sound the shofar for himself, he need not have intent to sound it for others, therefore contradicting Rabbi Zeira’s opinion. The Gemara answers: This is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: The hearer hears for himself, and the sounder sounds the shofar in his usual way, i.e., he need not intend to sound it for the sake of the hearer. Rabbi Yosei said: In what case is this statement said? It was said in the case of a representative of the community. But in the case of an ordinary individual, the hearer does not fulfill his obligation until both the hearer and the sounder have intent to discharge the hearer’s obligation, as argued by Rabbi Zeira. MISHNA: Incidental to the discussion of the required intent when sounding the shofar, the mishna cites the verse: “And it came to pass, when Moses held up his hand, that Israel prevailed; and when he let down his hand, Amalek prevailed” (Exodus 17:11). It may be asked: Did the hands of Moses make war when he raised them or break war when he lowered them? Rather, the verse comes to tell you that as long as the Jewish people turned their eyes upward and subjected their hearts to their Father in Heaven, they prevailed, but if not, they fell. Similarly, you can say: The verse states: “Make for yourself a fiery serpent, and set it upon a pole; and it shall come to pass, that everyone that is bitten, when he sees it, he shall live” (Numbers 21:8). Once again it may be asked: Did the serpent kill, or did the serpent preserve life? Rather, when the Jewish people turned their eyes upward and subjected their hearts to their Father in Heaven, they were healed, but if not, they rotted from their snakebites. Returning to its halakhic discussion, the mishna continues: A deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor who sounds the shofar cannot discharge the obligation on behalf of the community. This is the principle with regard to similar matters: Whoever is not obligated to do a certain matter cannot discharge the obligation on behalf of the community. GEMARA: The Sages taught the following baraita: All are obligated to sound the shofar: Priests, Levites, and ordinary Israelites; converts; freed slaves; a tumtum, i.e., one whose sexual organs from birth are concealed or are so undeveloped that it is impossible to determine whether the individual is male or female; a hermaphrodite [androginos], i.e., one with both male and female reproductive organs; and a half-slave, half-freeman. A tumtum who sounds the shofar cannot discharge the obligation of one of his kind, i.e., a fellow tumtum, since men are bound by the obligation, whereas women are not, and it is possible that the sounder is female and the hearer is male, nor can he discharge the obligation of one who is not of his kind, an ordinary man or woman. A hermaphrodite can discharge the obligation of one of his kind, a fellow hermaphrodite, since if the sounder is treated as a female, the hearer is also considered a female, but he cannot discharge the obligation of one who is not of his kind. One who is half-slave and half-freeman cannot discharge the obligation of one of his kind, as the slave component of the sounder cannot discharge the obligation of the free component of the hearer, and he certainly cannot discharge the obligation of one who is not of his kind, i.e., a completely free individual. The Master said above in the baraita: All are obligated to sound the shofar: Priests, Levites, and ordinary Israelites. The Gemara asks in astonishment: Isn’t that obvious? If these people are not obligated to perform the mitzva, who then is obligated to perform it? The Gemara answers: It was necessary to say that priests are obligated to fulfill the mitzva, for it may enter your mind to say as follows: Since it is written: “It is a day of sounding the shofar to you” (Numbers 29:1), you might have said that with regard to one who is obligated to sound only one day, he is obligated to sound the shofar on Rosh HaShana. But with regard to these priests, since they are obligated to sound all year long, because they sound trumpets when they offer the sacrifices in the Temple, as it is written: “And you shall sound the trumpets over your burnt-offerings, and over the sacrifices of your peace-offerings” (Numbers 10:10), you might say that they are not obligated to sound the shofar on Rosh HaShana. Therefore, the baraita comes to teach us that this is not true, and that even priests are obligated to fulfill the mitzva. The Gemara asks: Are these things comparable? There, the priests sound trumpets, and here, we are dealing with the sounding of a shofar. Rather, it was necessary to say that priests are obligated to fulfill the mitzva for a different reason, for it may enter your mind to say as follows: Since we learned in a mishna: Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year is the same as Rosh HaShana, with regard to both the shofar blasts and the additional blessings that are recited in the Amida prayer, I might have said: One who is fully included in the mitzva of the Jubilee is also included in the mitzva of Rosh HaShana. But these priests, since they are not fully included in the mitzva of the Jubilee, as we learned in a mishna: Priests and Levites may sell their fields forever and they may also redeem their lands forever, and they are not bound by the halakhot of the Jubilee Year, I might say that they should also not be obligated to fulfill the mitzva of Rosh HaShana. Therefore, the baraita comes to teach us that this is not so, and that even priests are obligated to fulfill the mitzva. § It was taught in the same baraita: A half-slave, half-freeman cannot discharge the obligation on behalf of one of his kind, and he certainly cannot discharge the obligation on behalf of one who is not of his kind. Rav Huna said: Even though he cannot discharge the obligation on behalf of others, he can discharge the obligation on behalf of himself. Rav Naḥman said to Rav Huna: What is the difference whereby he may discharge the obligation on behalf of himself but not on behalf of others? Because his slave component cannot come and discharge the obligation on behalf of the free component of the other. If so, with regard to himself as well, his slave component should not be able to come and discharge the obligation on behalf of his free component. Rather, Rav Naḥman said: Even on behalf of himself he cannot discharge the obligation. The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita: A half-slave, half-freeman cannot discharge the obligation even for himself. Continuing the discussion of performing an obligation on behalf of others, Ahava, son of Rabbi Zeira, taught the following ba-raita: With regard to all the blessings, even if one already recited a blessing for himself and has consequently fulfilled his own obligation, he can still recite a blessing for others and thereby discharge their obligation, as all Jews are responsible for one another. This is true with regard to all blessings except for the blessing recited over bread and the blessing recited over wine, both before and after their consumption. With regard to these blessings, if he has not yet fulfilled his own obligation, he can discharge the obligation of others as well, but if he already fulfilled his own obligation, he cannot discharge the obligation of others, as these blessings are recited in appreciation of physical enjoyment, and can only be recited by one who is actually deriving pleasure at the time. Rava raised a dilemma:

רש"י מסכת ראש השנה דף כט עמוד א
אף על פי שיצא מוציא - שהרי כל ישראל ערבין זה בזה למצות.
חוץ מברכת הלחם והיין - ושאר ברכת פירות וריחני, שאינן חובה אלא שאסור ליהנות מן העולם הזה בלא ברכה, ובזו - אין כאן ערבות, שאינו חובה על האדם; לא ליתהני ולא ליבריך.

ברכת הלחם - של אכילת מצה, שמברכין (לפני) +מסורת הש"ס: [לפניה]+ המוציא.
וברכת היין - שמברכין לפני קידוש.
כיון דחובה היא - אכילת מצה חובה עליו, וכן קידוש היום חובה עליו, ואי אפשר שלא בהנאה, והנאה אי אפשר בלא ברכה - נמצאת המצוה תלויה בברכת הנאה, ומפיק.
או דלמא - בברכת ההנאה לאו חובה למצוה אתיא, שאף בכל ההניות היא נוהגת.

מגן אברהם ער״א:א׳

(א) לאכול מיד. היינו לקדש כדי שיזכור שבת בכניסתו...ומ"ע בתשוב' כתב שאם אינו תאב לאכול יכול להמתין שכבר זכר אותו בכניסתו בבה"כ ע"ש,...כ' הרמב"ם פכ"ט קידוש היום דאורייתא בלא יין, ורבנן תקנו על היין. וכ"כ התוס' בסוכה פ"ג דף ל"ח. ונ"ל דמדאוריי' בקידוש שאמר בתפל' סגי, דקרא כתיב "זכור את יום השבת", והרי זכר אותו, וקידוש במקום סעוד' רבנן תקנוהו, כמ"ש סי' רס"ט, וכ"מ בתוס' שכתבו דלר"ת מי שאין לו יין לא יקדש כלל, וק' - וכי יעקור מ"ע דאורייתא?! אלא ע"כ דדי בתפלה...

Magen Avraham 271:1
...

דגול מרבבה אורח חיים סימן רעא
ואמנם מה שאני מסתפק, אפילו באיש המקדש ומוציא אשתו ובני ביתו, אם הנשים לא התפללו ערבית והאיש כבר התפלל ערבית, ואם כן האיש אינו מחויב מן התורה, והנשים שלא התפללו חייבות מן התורה, אם יוצאין בשמיעתן מן האיש. ואף שכל הברכות אף שיצא מוציא, כמו שכתוב במסכת ראש השנה דף כ"ט ע"א, היינו מטעם ערבות, שכל ישראל ערבים זה בזה כמו שכתב רש"י שם [ד"ה אף על פי], והרי כתב הרא"ש במסכת ברכות בפרק ג' דף כ' ע"ב [סוף סימן יג] שהאשה אינה בכלל ערבות לכך אינה מוציאה אלא מי שחיובו מדרבנן, ע"ש. ואני מסתפק, אם האשה אינה בכלל ערבות דהיינו שהיא אינה עריבה בעד אחרים, אבל האנשים שקיבלו ערבות בהר גריזים והר עיבל נתערבו גם בעד הנשים, וא"כ שפיר מוציא האיש את האשה אף שכבר יצא, או דלמא כשם שהנשים לא נכנסו בכלל ערבות כך לא קיבלו האנשים ערבות בשביל נשים. ועיין ביבמות דף מ"ז ע"ב בתוספות ד"ה קשים גרים, וצ"ע:

רבי עקיבא איגר אורח חיים סימן רעא סעיף ב
ועמ"ש רסי' קצ"ג. בס' דגול מרבבה כ' דאיש שכבר התפלל ערבית א"י להוציא בקידוש לאשה שלא התפללה ערבית, דהוא אינו מחוייב בדבר מדאורייתא, דאף דבברכות המצות אם יצא מוציא. הא הטעם משום דכולם עריבים זה בזה כמ"ש תוס' ר"ה כ"ט. והרי הרא"ש כ' בפ"ג דברכות דאשה אינה בכלל ערבות, לכך אינה מוציאה אלא למי שחיובו מדרבנן. ובזה יש להסתפק די"ל נשים אין עריבים בעד אחרים. אבל אנשים ערבים גם על הנשים עיין שם.

ולענ"ד דאין חלוק בין אנשים לנשים לענין ערבות, ולא מצינו בשום דוכתא דבנשים אין הדין דאם יצא מוציא...אבל נראה דכוונת הרא"ש דהערבות היה רק לגבי מי שמחוייב במצוה זו הוא ערב על אחרים. ואם נשים בבהמ"ז דאורייתא באמת אם יצאו מוציאים לאנשים. דכיון שהם שייכים במצוה זו, ישנם ג"כ בכלל ערבות. אבל במצוה שאין חייבים בה, דהיינו אם נשים בבהמ"ז דרבנן, אין להם דין ערבות במצוה א'... אע"כ דאין כוונת הרא"ש לחלק בין נשים לאנשים לענין ערבות. אלא דמי שאינו בר חיוב במצוה זו אינו בכלל ערבות על אחרים...

משנה ברורה ער״א:ג׳-ה׳

(ג) דאיתקש זכור לשמור - ד"זכור את יום השבת לקדשו" האמור בדברות הראשונות ו"שמור את יום השבת לקדשו" האמור בדברות אחרונות שניהם בדבור אחד נאמרו. ו"זכור" קאי על מ"ע דקידוש וכנ"ל, ו"שמור" קאי על שמירה ממלאכה. וכשם שבאיסור מלאכה בודאי גם נשים מוזהרות, דבמצות ל"ת אין חלוק בין זמן גרמא בין שאין הזמן גרמא, כן בעשה ד"זכור" גם נשים מצוות.

ופשוט דקטן אינו מוציא את האשה, דלא אתי דרבנן ומפיק דאורייתא. ואפילו אם הוא בן י"ג שנה חיישינן שמא לא הביא שתי שערות, דבמילי דאורייתא לא סמכינן אחזקה דמכיון שהגיע לכלל שנים הגיע לכלל סימני שערות[ה], עד שיתמלא זקנו כמ"ש בח"מ סימן ל"ה, ולכן תקדש האשה לעצמה. ואם אינה יודעת לקדש בעצמה, תאמר עמו מלה במלה מראשו ועד סופו, ולא תכוין לצאת בקידושו. ובאופן זה כיון שהיא אומרת הקידוש בעצמה נכון שיהא פת או יין מונח גם לפניה בעת הקידוש. ולא תסמוך על מה שהנער אוחז הכוס או הפת בידו, כיון שאינה יוצאת בקידוש שלו. ועצה זו מועילה אפילו אם הוא קטן ביותר.

וכ"ז בשלא התפללה האשה תפלת ערבית, אבל אם התפללה, דלדעת המ"א הנ"ל כבר יצאה ידי קידוש דאורייתא, בזה יש לסמוך על נער בן י"ג שנים שיוציאה אח"כ בקידוש דהיינו שיכוין להוציאה...

(ד) ומוציאות את האנשים - וכן הסכימו הט"ז ומ"א והגר"א וש"א ומ"מ יש להחמיר לכתחלה שלא תוציא אשה אנשים שאינם מבני ביתה דזילא מילתא [א"ר ודה"ח]:

(ה) הואיל וחייבות וכו' - ולכן יכולה להוציא אפילו היא כבר יצאת ידי קידוש וכמו באיש לקמן בסימן רע"ג ס"ד דלענין קידוש אנשים ונשים שוין.

Mishnah Berurah 271:3-5
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אורח חיים ער״ג:ד׳

(ד) יכול אדם לקדש לאחרים אע"פ שאינו אוכל עמהם, דלדידהו הוי מקום סעודה...ואם עדיין לא קידש לעצמו יזהר שלא יטעום עמהם שאסור לו לטעום עד שיקדש במקום סעודתו:

Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 273:4
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ערוך השולחן אורח חיים סימן רעא
סעיף ה
נשים חייבות בקידוש היום דבר תורה ואף על פי שהיא מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא...וכתב רבינו הב"י בסעי' ב' שמוציאות את האנשים הואיל וחייבות מן התורה כמותם עכ"ל. ואפילו להסוברים דקידוש על הכוס מדרבנן דמן התורה יוצאים בתפלה, מ"מ שוים האנשים והנשים וכל דתקון רבנן כעין דאורייתא תקון, וגם נשים כן הוא, דמן התורה יוצאות בתפלה, ועל הכוס חייבות מדרבנן. א"כ עומדים בחדא דרגא וביכלתן להוציאם. ויש רוצים לומר שאינן מוציאות אנשים כמו במגילה לקמן סי' תרפ"ט [רש"ל וב"ח], ואינו עיקר, דבשם כיון דברבים הוא, זילא מילתא כמ"ש התוס' בסוכה [ל"ח.], משא"כ בקידוש. וכ"כ מפרשי הש"ע [הט"ז והמג"א סק"ב]:
סעיף ו
ונראה לכאורה דאימתי מוציאין זה את זה? כששניהם התפללו או שניהם לא התפללו דחיובם שוה, אבל אם האחד התפלל והשני לא התפלל, אין המתפלל מוציא ידי חובת של מי שלא התפלל לדעת הפוסקים דמן התורה יוצאים בתפלה. וא"כ, מי שהתפלל, חיובו רק מדרבנן, ומי שלא התפלל, חיובו מן התורה, ולא אתי דרבנן ומפיק דאורייתא. אך לפ"ז לא מצאנו ידינו ורגלינו בכל המשפחות שהבעה"ב מקדש ומוציא אשתו ובנותיו וכלותיו אף על פי שלא התפללו! אמנם האמת דזהו רק בברכת הנהנין וברהמ"ז, ולא כן בברכת המצות שאחד יכול להוציא את חבירו אף שכבר יצא ידי חובתו מטעם דכל ישראל ערבים זה בזה, כדאיתא ספ"ג דר"ה. ולכן איש ואשה יכולין להוציא זא"ז בכל גווני. ויש מי שרוצה לומר דאשה אינה בכלל ערבות [דגמ"ר], ודבר תמוה הוא. והרא"ש שכתב סברא זו ברפ"ג דברכות אינו אלא במצוה שאין להאשה שייכות בזה ע"ש, אבל במה שהיא מחוייבת, שוה היא לגמרי לאיש [וכ"כ הגרע"א בגליון הש"ע ובתשו']: