יעבור? יהרג?

אפ

א"ר יוחנן משום ר"ש בן יהוצדק נימנו וגמרו בעליית בית נתזה בלוד כל עבירות שבתורה אם אומרין לאדם עבור ואל תהרג יעבור ואל יהרג חוץ מעבודת כוכבים וגילוי עריות ושפיכות דמים ועבודת כוכבים לא והא תניא א"ר ישמעאל מנין שאם אמרו לו לאדם עבוד עבודת כוכבים ואל תהרג מנין שיעבוד ואל יהרג ת"ל (ויקרא יח, ה) וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם יכול אפילו בפרהסיא תלמוד לומר (ויקרא כב, לב) ולא תחללו את שם קדשי ונקדשתי אינהו דאמור כר"א דתניא ר"א אומר (דברים ו, ה) ואהבת את ה' אלהיך בכל לבבך ובכל נפשך ובכל מאדך אם נאמר בכל נפשך למה נאמר בכל מאדך ואם נאמר בכל מאדך למה נאמר בכל נפשך אם יש לך אדם שגופו חביב עליו מממונו לכך נאמר בכל נפשך ואם יש לך אדם שממונו חביב עליו מגופו לכך נאמר בכל מאדך גילוי עריות ושפיכות דמים כדרבי דתניא רבי אומר (דברים כב, כו) כי כאשר יקום איש על רעהו ורצחו נפש כן הדבר הזה וכי מה למדנו מרוצח מעתה הרי זה בא ללמד ונמצא למד מקיש רוצח לנערה המאורסה מה נערה המאורסה ניתן להצילו בנפשו אף רוצח ניתן להצילו בנפשו ומקיש נערה המאורסה לרוצח מה רוצח יהרג ואל יעבור אף נערה המאורסה תהרג ואל תעבור רוצח גופיה מנא לן סברא הוא דההוא דאתא לקמיה דרבה ואמר ליה אמר לי מרי דוראי זיל קטליה לפלניא ואי לא קטלינא לך אמר ליה לקטלוך ולא תיקטול מי יימר דדמא דידך סומק טפי דילמא דמא דהוא גברא סומק טפי

Sanhedrin 74a

Rav Pappa says: The ruling of the mishna, which lists his sister among those for whom he must pay a fine, is stated with regard to a young woman who was seduced, and in the case of seduction all agree that the woman is not saved at the cost of the seducer’s life, as the intercourse was consensual. Abaye says: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a young woman who was raped in a case where one was able to save her by injuring the pursuer in one of his limbs, so that it was not necessary to kill him in order to achieve her rescue, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul says: If a pursuer was pursuing another to kill him, and one was able to save the pursued party without killing the pursuer, but instead by injuring him in one of his limbs, but he did not save him in this manner and rather chose to kill him, he is executed on his account as a murderer. The Gemara explains: What is the reason of Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul? As it is written: “If men strive and strike a woman with child, so that her fruit departs, and yet no further harm ensues, he shall be punished, according to the demands that the woman’s husband makes on him; and he shall pay it as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:22). And concerning this Rabbi Elazar says: The verse is speaking of striving to kill, where each man was trying to kill the other. The proof is that it is written: “But if any harm ensues, then you shall give life for life” (Exodus 21:23), and if there was no intention to kill, why should he be executed? And even so, the Merciful One states: “And yet no further harm ensues, he shall be punished,” teaching that he must pay the monetary value of the fetus to the woman’s husband. Granted, if you say that in a case where one is able to save the pursued party by injuring the pursuer in one of his limbs, he may not save the pursued party at the cost of the pursuer’s life, and if he killed the pursuer rather than injure him he is liable to receive the death penalty, that is how you find the possibility that the one who ultimately struck the woman would be punished. This would be in a case where it was possible to save the man under attack, i.e., one of the men who were fighting, by injuring the pursuer, i.e., the other man, who ultimately struck the woman, in one of his limbs. In this case, the one who ultimately struck the woman was not subject to being killed. Therefore, he is subject to pay a fine. But if you say that even if one is able to save the pursued party by injuring the pursuer in one of his limbs, he can also save him at the cost of the pursuer’s life, how can you find the possibility that the one who ultimately struck the woman would be punished? When he was going to strike the other man, he was at risk of being killed, as anybody could have killed him at that time, and the halakha is that anybody who commits an act warranting death exempts himself from any monetary obligation ensuing from that act. The Gemara tries to refute this reasoning: Perhaps it is different here because his two liabilities are not on account of the same person; rather, his liability to be put to death is on account of this person, the man with whom he fought, while his liability to give payment is on account of that person, the woman he ultimately struck. Consequently, he is liable to receive both punishments. The Gemara rejects this distinction: There is no difference. As Rava says: If a pursuer was pursuing another to kill him, and during the course of the chase the pursuer broke vessels belonging either to the person being pursued or to anyone else, he is exempt from paying for the broken vessels. What is the reason for this? The reason is that he is liable to be killed, since everyone is entitled to kill him in order to save the victim’s life, and one who commits an act rendering himself liable to be killed is exempt from any monetary obligation arising from that act, even if the payment were to be made to a person not connected to the act for which he is liable to be killed. Rava continues: And if the pursued party broke vessels while fleeing from the pursuer, if those vessels belonged to the pursuer, the pursued party is exempt. But if they belonged to anyone else, he is liable to pay for them. The Gemara explains: If the vessels belonged to the pursuer, he is exempt. The reason for this is so that the pursuer’s property should not be more precious to the pursuer than his own body. Were the one being pursued to cause the pursuer bodily harm, he would be exempt; all the more so when the pursued one breaks the pursuer’s vessels. And if the vessels belonged to anyone else, he is liable, as he saved himself at the expense of another’s property, and that other person should not have to suffer a loss on his account. Rava continues: But if one pursuer was pursuing another pursuer in order to save him, i.e., if he was trying to save the person being pursued by killing the pursuer, and while doing so he broke vessels belonging either to the pursuer or to the one being pursued, or to anyone else, he is exempt from paying for them. The Gemara comments: This is not by strict law, as if one who saves himself at another’s expense is liable to pay for the damage, certainly one who saves another at the expense of a third party should bear similar liability. Rather, it is an ordinance instituted by the Sages. This is because if you do not say that he is exempt, it will be found that no person will save another from a pursuer, as everyone will be afraid of becoming liable to pay for damage caused in the course of saving the pursued party. § The mishna teaches: But with regard to one who pursues an animal to sodomize it, or one who seeks to desecrate Shabbat, or one who is going to engage in idol worship, they are not saved at the cost of their lives. It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: One who seeks to worship idols may be saved from transgressing at the cost of his life. This is derived through an a fortiori inference: If to avoid the degradation of an ordinary person, such as in the case of a rapist who degrades his victim, he can be saved even at the cost of his life, all the more so is it not clear that one may kill the transgressor to avoid the degrading of the honor of God through the worship of idols? The Gemara asks: But does the court administer punishment based on an a fortiori inference? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai maintains that the court administers punishment based on an a fortiori inference. It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: One who seeks to desecrate Shabbat may be saved from transgressing even at the cost of his life. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of his father, Rabbi Shimon, who says: The court administers punishment based on an a fortiori inference, and the halakha with regard to one who desecrates Shabbat is derived from the halakha with regard to idol worship by way of a verbal analogy between the word “desecration” mentioned in the context of Shabbat and the word “desecration” mentioned in the context of idol worship. § The Gemara now considers which prohibitions are permitted in times of mortal danger. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: The Sages who discussed this issue counted the votes of those assembled and concluded in the upper story of the house of Nitza in the city of Lod: With regard to all other transgressions in the Torah, if a person is told: Transgress this prohibition and you will not be killed, he may transgress that prohibition and not be killed, because the preserving of his own life overrides all of the Torah’s prohibitions. This is the halakha concerning all prohibitions except for those of idol worship, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed. Concerning those prohibitions, one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress them. The Gemara asks: And should one not transgress the prohibition of idol worship to save his life? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael said: From where is it derived that if a person is told: Worship idols and you will not be killed, from where is it derived that he should worship the idol and not be killed? The verse states: “You shall keep My statutes and My judgments, which a person shall do, and he shall live by them” (Leviticus 18:5), thereby teaching that the mitzvot were given to provide life, but they were not given so that one will die due to their observance. The baraita continues: One might have thought that it is permitted to worship the idol in this circumstance even in public, i.e., in the presence of many people. Therefore, the verse states: “Neither shall you profane My holy name; but I will be hallowed among the children of Israel: I am the Lord Who sanctifies you” (Leviticus 22:32). Evidently, one is not required to allow himself to be killed so as not to transgress the prohibition of idol worship when in private; but in public he must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress. The Gemara answers: Those in the upper story of the house of Nitza stated their opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: It is stated: “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might” (Deuteronomy 6:5). If it is stated: “With all your soul,” why is it also stated: “With all your might,” which indicates with all your material possessions? And if it is stated: “With all your might,” why is it also stated: “With all your soul”? One of these clauses seems to be superfluous. Rather, this serves to teach that if you have a person whose body is more precious to him than his property, it is therefore stated: “With all your soul.” That person must be willing to sacrifice even his life to sanctify God’s name. And if you have a person whose property is more precious to him than his body, it is therefore stated: “With all your might.” That person must even be prepared to sacrifice all his property for the love of God. According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, one must allow himself to be killed rather than worship an idol. From where is it derived that one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations and the prohibition of bloodshed? This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to the rape of a betrothed young woman it is written: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). But why would the verse mention murder in this context? But what do we learn here from a murderer? Now, the mention of murder came in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case. The Torah juxtaposes the case of a murderer to the case of a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her at the cost of the rapist’s life, so too, in the case of a murderer, one may save the potential victim at the cost of the murderer’s life. And conversely, the Torah juxtaposes a betrothed young woman to a murderer to indicate that just as with regard to a potential murderer, the halakha is that if one was ordered to murder another, he must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of bloodshed, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman, if she is faced with rape, she must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha with regard to a murderer himself, that one must allow himself to be killed rather than commit murder? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another, and therefore there is no need for a verse to teach this halakha. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: As when a certain person came before Rabba and said to him: The lord of my place, a local official, said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you, what shall I do? Rabba said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. Who is to say that your blood is redder than his, that your life is worth more than the one he wants you to kill? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. This logical reasoning is the basis for the halakha that one may not save his own life by killing another. § When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The Sages taught that one is permitted to transgress prohibitions in the face of mortal danger only when it is not a time of religious persecution. But in a time of religious persecution, when the gentile authorities are trying to force Jews to violate their religion, even if they issued a decree about a minor mitzva, one must be killed and not transgress. When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even when it is not a time of religious persecution, the Sages said that one is permitted to transgress a prohibition in the face of mortal danger only when he was ordered to do so in private. But if he was ordered to commit a transgression in public, even if they threaten him with death if he does not transgress a minor mitzva, he must be killed and not transgress. The Gemara asks: What is a minor mitzva for this purpose? Rava bar Yitzḥak says that Rav says:

סנהדרין ע״ד ב

כי אתא רב דימי א"ר יוחנן לא שנו אלא שלא בשעת גזרת המלכות) אבל בשעת גזרת המלכות אפי' מצוה קלה יהרג ואל יעבור כי אתא רבין א"ר יוחנן אפי' שלא בשעת גזרת מלכות לא אמרו אלא בצינעא אבל בפרהסיא אפי' מצוה קלה יהרג ואל יעבור מאי מצוה קלה אמר רבא בר רב יצחק אמר רב אפילו לשנויי ערקתא דמסאנא וכמה פרהסיא אמר ר' יעקב אמר רבי יוחנן אין פרהסיא פחותה מעשרה בני אדם פשיטא ישראלים בעינן דכתיב (ויקרא כב, לב) ונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל בעי רבי ירמיה תשעה ישראל ונכרי אחד מהו תא שמע דתני רב ינאי אחוה דרבי חייא בר אבא אתיא תוך תוך כתיב הכא ונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל וכתיב התם (במדבר טז, כא) הבדלו מתוך העדה הזאת מה להלן עשרה וכולהו ישראל אף כאן עשרה וכולהו ישראל והא אסתר פרהסיא הואי אמר אביי אסתר קרקע עולם היתה רבא אמר הנאת עצמן שאני דאי לא תימא הכי הני קוואקי ודימוניקי היכי יהבינן לה אלא הנאת עצמן שאני הכא נמי הנאת עצמן שאני ואזדא רבא לטעמיה דאמר רבא עכו"ם דאמר ליה להאי ישראל קטול אספסתא בשבתא ושדי לחיותא ואי לא קטילנא לך ליקטיל ולא לקטליה שדי לנהרא ליקטליה ולא ליקטול מ"ט לעבורי מילתא קא בעי בעו מיניה מר' אמי בן נח מצווה על קדושת השם או אין מצווה על קדושת השם אמר אביי ת"ש שבע מצות נצטוו בני נח ואם איתא תמני הויין א"ל רבא אינהו וכל אבזרייהו מאי הוי עלה אמר רב אדא בר אהבה אמרי בי רב כתיב (מלכים ב ה, יח) לדבר הזה יסלח ה' לעבדך בבא אדני בית רמון להשתחות שמה והוא נשען על ידי והשתחויתי וכתיב (מלכים ב ה, יט) ויאמר לו לך לשלום

Sanhedrin 74b

Even to change the strap of a sandal. There was a Jewish custom with regard to sandal straps. If the gentile authorities were to decree that Jews must change their practice and wear sandal straps like those worn by the gentiles, one would be obligated to give up his life rather than veer from the accepted custom. The Gemara asks: And the presence of how many people is required so that it should be deemed a public act? Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: An action is not considered a public act if it is performed in the presence of fewer than ten people. The Gemara clarifies this point: It is obvious that we require that these ten people be Jews, as it is written in the verse from which we derive the requirement of ten for the sanctification of God’s name: “And I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22:32). Rabbi Yirmeya asks: What is the halakha if there were nine Jews and one gentile present? The Gemara answers: Come and hear an answer from what Rav Yannai, the brother of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, teaches in a baraita: This is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the word “among” written with regard to the sanctification of God’s name, and the word “among” written with regard to Korah and his assembly. Here, with regard to the sanctification of God’s name, it is written: “And I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel,” and there, with regard to Korah, it is written: “Separate yourselves from among this congregation” (Numbers 16:21). The meaning of the word “congregation” written with regard to Korah is derived by means of a verbal analogy to the word “congregation” written with regard to the spies sent out by Moses to scout the land: “How long shall I bear with this evil congregation” (Numbers 14:27). Just as there, the congregation of spies numbered ten, and all were Jews, so too here, concerning the sanctification of God, there must be ten, all of them being Jews. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But wasn’t the incident involving Esther, i.e., her cohabitation with Ahasuerus, a public sin? Why then did Esther not surrender her life rather than engage in intercourse? The Gemara answers: Abaye says: Esther was merely like natural ground, i.e., she was a passive participant. The obligation to surrender one’s life rather than engage in forbidden sexual intercourse applies only to a man who transgresses the prohibition in an active manner. A woman who is passive and merely submits is not required to give up her life so that she not sin. Rava says that there is another justification for Esther’s behavior: When gentiles order the transgression of a prohibition not in order to persecute the Jews or to make them abandon their religion, but for their own personal pleasure, it is different. In such a situation there is no obligation to sacrifice one’s life, even when the sin is committed in public. Rava explains: As if you do not say so, then how do we give them coal shovels [kevakei vedimonikei]? The Persian priests would take coal shovels from every house, fill them with coals, and use them to heat their temples on their festival days. Although this involved assisting idol worship in public, Jews would not sacrifice their lives in order not to do so. Rather, the reason they cooperated is certainly that a measure enacted for the gentiles’ personal pleasure is different. Here too, concerning Esther, Ahasuerus engaged in intercourse with her for his personal pleasure, and a measure enacted for a gentile’s personal pleasure is different, and there is no obligation to sacrifice one’s life to avoid it. The Gemara comments: And Rava follows his own line of reasoning, as Rava says: If a gentile said to a certain Jew: Cut grass [aspasta] on Shabbat and throw it before the cattle, and if you do not do this I will kill you, he should cut the grass and not be killed. But if the gentile said to him: Cut the grass and throw it into the river, he should be killed and not cut the grass. What is the reason for the latter ruling? Because it is clear that the gentile is not seeking his own personal pleasure, but rather he wants to force the Jew to violate his religion. § The Sages raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ami: Is a descendant of Noah, who is commanded to refrain from idol worship, also commanded about the sanctification of God’s name, or is he not commanded about the sanctification of God’s name? Abaye says: Come and hear an answer to this question from a baraita in which it was taught: Descendants of Noah were commanded to observe seven mitzvot: To establish courts of law, to refrain from cursing God, idol worship, adultery, bloodshed, robbery, and from eating the limb of a living animal. And if it is so that they are commanded about the sanctification of God’s name, then there would be eight mitzvot in which they are commanded. Rava said to him: There is no proof from here, as when the baraita speaks of seven mitzvot it means the seven mitzvot themselves with all their associated [avzaraihu] obligations. The mitzva to sanctify God’s name can be understood as a detail of the prohibition of idolatry. The Gemara asks: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? Rav Adda bar Ahava says that they say in the school of Rav: It is written that Naaman, commander of the army of the king of Aram, said to the prophet Elisha: “For this matter may the Lord pardon your servant, that when my master goes into the house of Rimmon to bow down there and he leans on my hand, and I bow myself down in the house of Rimmon” (II Kings 5:18). That is, he was forced to bow down before an idol out of fear of his master, the king of Aram. And it is written in the following verse: “And he said to him: Go in peace,” indicating that Elisha did not criticize him for acting in this manner.

סנהדרין ע״ה א

ואם איתא לא לימא ליה הא בצנעה הא בפרהסיא אמר רב יהודה אמר רב מעשה באדם אחד שנתן עיניו באשה אחת והעלה לבו טינא ובאו ושאלו לרופאים ואמרו אין לו תקנה עד שתבעל אמרו חכמים ימות ואל תבעל לו תעמוד לפניו ערומה ימות ואל תעמוד לפניו ערומה תספר עמו מאחורי הגדר ימות ולא תספר עמו מאחורי הגדר פליגי בה ר' יעקב בר אידי ור' שמואל בר נחמני חד אמר אשת איש היתה וחד אמר פנויה היתה בשלמא למאן דאמר אשת איש היתה שפיר אלא למ"ד פנויה היתה מאי כולי האי רב פפא אמר משום פגם משפחה רב אחא בריה דרב איקא אמר כדי שלא יהו בנות ישראל פרוצות בעריות ולינסבה מינסב לא מייתבה דעתיה כדר' יצחק דא"ר יצחק מיום שחרב בית המקדש ניטלה טעם ביאה וניתנה לעוברי עבירה שנאמר (משלי ט, יז) מים גנובים ימתקו ולחם סתרים ינעם:

Sanhedrin 75a

And if it is so that a descendant of Noah is commanded about the sanctification of God’s name, he should not have said to him: “Go in peace.” The Gemara answers: This situation, where Elisha permitted Naaman’s conduct, happened in private. When Naaman bowed down in the house of Rimmon, he did not do so in the presence of ten Jews. Whereas that question that was raised is whether or not a descendant of Noah must sanctify God’s name in public, in the presence of ten Jews. Consequently, the question remains without a solution. § Apropos the discussion of the obligation to allow oneself to be killed rather than engage in forbidden sexual intercourse, the Gemara notes that Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: There was an incident involving a certain man who set his eyes upon a certain woman and passion rose in his heart, to the point that he became deathly ill. And they came and asked doctors what was to be done with him. And the doctors said: He will have no cure until she engages in sexual intercourse with him. The Sages said: Let him die, and she may not engage in sexual intercourse with him. The doctors said: She should at least stand naked before him. The Sages said: Let him die, and she may not stand naked before him. The doctors suggested: The woman should at least converse with him behind a fence in a secluded area, so that he should derive a small amount of pleasure from the encounter. The Sages insisted: Let him die, and she may not converse with him behind a fence. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi and Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani disagree about this issue. One of them says: The woman in question was a married woman, and the other one says: She was unmarried. The Gemara tries to clarify the issue: Granted, according to the one who says that she was a married woman, the matter is properly understood. Since the case involved a severely prohibited forbidden relationship, the Sages did not allow any activity hinting at intimacy. But according to the one who says that she was unmarried, what is the reason for all this opposition? Why did the Sages say that the man must be allowed to die, rather than have the woman do as was requested? Rav Pappa says: This is due to the potential family flaw, i.e., harm to the family name, as it is not permitted to bring disgrace to the entire family in order to save the lovesick man. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, says: This is so that the daughters of Israel should not be promiscuous with regard to forbidden sexual relations. Were they to listen to the doctors’ recommendations, Jewish women might lose moral restraint. The Gemara asks: But if the woman was unmarried, let the man marry her. The Gemara answers: His mind would not have been eased by marriage, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak. As Rabbi Yitzḥak says: Since the day the Temple was destroyed, sexual pleasure was taken away from those who engage in permitted intercourse and given to transgressors, as it is stated: “Stolen waters are sweet, and bread eaten in secret is pleasant” (Proverbs 9:17). Therefore, the man could have been cured only by engaging in illicit sexual interaction. MISHNA: And these are the transgressors who are burned in the implementation of the court-imposed death penalty: One who engaged in intercourse with a woman and her daughter, and one who is the daughter of a priest and who committed adultery. Included in the category of the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with a woman and her daughter and the resulting execution by burning, there are: His daughter, and the daughter of his daughter, and the daughter of his son. Likewise, the following are also included in this category: Intercourse with the daughter of his wife, even though she is not his daughter, and the daughter of her daughter, and the daughter of her son, as well as intercourse with his mother-in-law, and the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law. The prohibition and punishment apply both in cases where a man marries a woman and then engages in intercourse with her daughter, and in cases where a man marries a woman and then engages in intercourse with her mother. GEMARA: The tanna does not teach the case of one who engaged in intercourse with a woman whose daughter he previously married. Rather, the tanna teaches the case of one who engaged in intercourse with a woman and her daughter. By inference, one may conclude that both the woman and her daughter are mentioned in the mishna for the purpose of establishing that there is a prohibition of intercourse with either of them, and when he engages in intercourse with the first of them he is liable to be executed. And who are these women? The reference is to his mother-in-law and the mother of his mother-in-law. And the tanna teaches: Additional women are included in the category of the prohibition of and the punishment for engaging in intercourse with a woman and her daughter. By inference, one may conclude that with regard to both his mother-in-law and the mother of his mother-in-law, the prohibition and punishment are written explicitly in the Torah, and with regard to those additional women enumerated in the mishna, the prohibition and punishment are derived by means of interpretation. The Gemara comments: This works out well according to Abaye, who says that with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva cited later in the Gemara (76b), the difference between their opinions is only concerning the interpretation of the meaning of the verse, but there is no practical difference between their opinions. According to Abaye, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Abaye explains that Rabbi Akiva maintains that the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with the mother of one’s mother-in-law is stated explicitly in the Torah. But according to Rava, who says that the difference between their opinions is with regard to the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with one’s mother-in-law after the death of his wife, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? The opinion of the tanna of the mishna corresponds neither to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva nor to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, as they both maintain that the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with the mother of one’s mother-in-law is not stated explicitly in the Torah. The Gemara answers: Rava could say to you: Emend the mishna and teach: One who engaged in intercourse with a woman whose daughter he previously married. The mishna teaches: Included in the category of the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with a woman and her daughter and the resulting execution by burning, there are: His mother-in-law, and the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law. The Gemara comments: Abaye holds that everyone agrees that the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with one’s mother-in-law is stated explicitly in the Torah, and the tanna enumerates his mother-in-law together with relatives concerning whom the prohibition is derived by means of interpretation. Therefore, according to Abaye, since the tanna seeks to teach that the mother of his father-in-law is included in the prohibition, he teaches the halakha of his mother-in-law and the mother of his mother-in-law as well, despite the fact the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with one’s mother-in-law is stated explicitly in the Torah. By contrast, Rava holds that the woman and her daughter mentioned in the first clause of the mishna are his wife and his mother-in-law. Therefore, according to Rava, since the tanna seeks to teach that the mother of his father-in-law and the mother of his mother-in-law are included in the prohibition, he teaches the halakha of his mother-in-law in the latter clause as well, despite the fact that it is stated explicitly in the Torah. § The mishna enumerates several women with whom intercourse is forbidden who are included in the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with a woman and her daughter, which is punished by execution by burning. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? They are derived as the Sages taught: “And if a man takes a woman and her mother, it is lewdness; they shall be burned with fire both him and them, and there shall be no lewdness among you” (Leviticus 20:14). I have derived only that this punishment applies to one who engages in intercourse with a woman and with her mother. From where is it derived that one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of the woman married to him, or with the daughter of her daughter, or with the daughter of her son, is also liable to be executed by burning? The baraita continues: Lewdness is stated here, with regard to the punishment: “There shall be no lewdness among you” (Leviticus 20:14), and lewdness is stated there, with regard to the prohibition: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter, to uncover her nakedness; they are near kinswomen, it is lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17). It is derived by means of a verbal analogy that just as there the prohibition applies to the woman’s daughter, and the daughter of her daughter, and the daughter of her son, so too here, the punishment of burning applies to one who engages in intercourse with the woman’s daughter, and to the daughter of her daughter, and to the daughter of her son. The baraita continues: From where is it derived to render the status of males like that of females with regard to this punishment? Lewdness is stated here and lewdness is stated there. Just as there, the Torah renders the status of males like that of female relatives, so too here, the Torah renders the status of males like that of females. From where is it derived to render the status of relatives below like the status of relatives above? Lewdness is stated here and lewdness is stated there. Just as there, the Torah renders the status of relatives below like that of relatives above, so too here, the Torah renders the status of relatives below like that of relatives above. And just as here, the Torah renders the status of relatives above like that of relatives below, so too there, the Torah renders the status of relatives above like that of relatives below. The Gemara proceeds to elaborate on the derivations cited in the baraita. The Master says: From where is it derived to render the status of males like that of females? The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: The status of males like that of females? If we say that it means that one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of the son of his wife is executed by burning like one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of her daughter, the status of the daughter of her son and the daughter of her daughter are derived together in the first clause of the baraita, as both are written explicitly in the prohibition. Rather, this clause in the baraita means that one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his father-in-law is executed by burning like one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his mother-in-law. The Gemara asks: Now, we have not yet established the halakha of one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his mother-in-law, and the baraita is seeking to derive the halakha of one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his father-in-law from the halakha of the mother of his mother-in-law?

משנה תורה, הלכות יסודי התורה ה׳

(א) כָּל בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל מְצֻוִּין עַל קִדּוּשׁ הַשֵּׁם הַגָּדוֹל הַזֶּה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא כב לב) "וְנִקְדַּשְׁתִּי בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל". וּמֻזְהָרִין שֶׁלֹּא לְחַלְּלוֹ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא כב לב) "וְלֹא תְחַלְּלוּ אֶת שֵׁם קָדְשִׁי". כֵּיצַד. כְּשֶׁיַּעֲמֹד עוֹבֵד כּוֹכָבִים וְיֶאֱנֹס אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל לַעֲבֹר עַל אַחַת מִכָּל מִצְוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בַּתּוֹרָה אוֹ יַהַרְגֶּנּוּ יַעֲבֹר וְאַל יֵהָרֵג שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בַּמִּצְוֹת (ויקרא יח ה) "אֲשֶׁר יַעֲשֶׂה אוֹתָם הָאָדָם וָחַי בָּהֶם". וָחַי בָּהֶם וְלֹא שֶׁיָּמוּת בָּהֶם. וְאִם מֵת וְלֹא עָבַר הֲרֵי זֶה מִתְחַיֵּב בְּנַפְשׁוֹ:

(ב) בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת חוּץ מֵעֲבוֹדַת כּוֹכָבִים וְגִלּוּי עֲרָיוֹת וּשְׁפִיכַת דָּמִים. אֲבָל שָׁלֹשׁ עֲבֵרוֹת אֵלּוּ אִם יֹאמַר לוֹ עֲבֹר עַל אַחַת מֵהֶן אוֹ תֵּהָרֵג. יֵהָרֵג וְאַל יַעֲבֹר. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בִּזְמַן שֶׁהָעוֹבֵד כּוֹכָבִים מִתְכַּוֵּן לַהֲנָאַת עַצְמוֹ. כְּגוֹן שֶׁאֲנָסוֹ לִבְנוֹת לוֹ בֵּיתוֹ בְּשַׁבָּת אוֹ לְבַשֵּׁל לוֹ תַּבְשִׁילוֹ. אוֹ אָנַס אִשָּׁה לְבָעֳלָהּ וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. אֲבָל אִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַעֲבִירוֹ עַל הַמִּצְוֹת בִּלְבַד. אִם הָיָה בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין עַצְמוֹ וְאֵין שָׁם עֲשָׂרָה מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל יַעֲבֹר וְאַל יֵהָרֵג. וְאִם אֲנָסוֹ לְהַעֲבִירוֹ בַּעֲשָׂרָה מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל יֵהָרֵג וְאַל יַעֲבֹר. וַאֲפִלּוּ לֹא נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַעֲבִירוֹ אֶלָּא עַל מִצְוָה מִשְּׁאָר מִצְוֹת בִּלְבַד:

(ג) וְכָל הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלּוּ שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַגְּזֵרָה אֲבָל בִּשְׁעַת הַגְּזֵרָה וְהוּא שֶׁיַּעֲמֹד מֶלֶךְ רָשָׁע כִּנְבוּכַדְנֶצַּר וַחֲבֵרָיו וְיִגְזֹר גְּזֵרָה עַל יִשְׂרָאֵל לְבַטֵּל דָּתָם אוֹ מִצְוָה מִן הַמִּצְוֹת. יֵהָרֵג וְאַל יַעֲבֹר אֲפִלּוּ עַל אַחַת מִשְּׁאָר מִצְוֹת בֵּין נֶאֱנָס בְּתוֹךְ עֲשָׂרָה בֵּין נֶאֱנָס בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין עוֹבְדֵי כּוֹכָבִים:

(ד) כָּל מִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בּוֹ יַעֲבֹר וְאַל יֵהָרֵג וְנֶהֱרַג וְלֹא עָבַר הֲרֵי זֶה מִתְחַיֵּב בְּנַפְשׁוֹ. וְכָל מִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בּוֹ יֵהָרֵג וְאַל יַעֲבֹר וְנֶהֱרַג וְלֹא עָבַר הֲרֵי זֶה קִדֵּשׁ אֶת הַשֵּׁם. וְאִם הָיָה בַּעֲשָׂרָה מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל הֲרֵי זֶה קִדֵּשׁ אֶת הַשֵּׁם בָּרַבִּים כְּדָנִיֵּאל חֲנַנְיָה מִישָׁאֵל וַעֲזַרְיָה וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וַחֲבֵרָיו. וְאֵלּוּ הֵן הֲרוּגֵי מַלְכוּת שֶׁאֵין מַעֲלָה עַל מַעֲלָתָן. וַעֲלֵיהֶן נֶאֱמַר (תהילים מד כג) "כִּי עָלֶיךָ הֹרַגְנוּ כָל הַיּוֹם נֶחְשַׁבְנוּ כְּצֹאן טִבְחָה". וַעֲלֵיהֶם נֶאֱמַר (תהילים נ ה) "אִסְפוּ לִי חֲסִידָי כֹּרְתֵי בְרִיתִי עֲלֵי זָבַח". וְכָל מִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בּוֹ יֵהָרֵג וְאַל יַעֲבֹר וְעָבַר וְלֹא נֶהֱרַג הֲרֵי זֶה מְחַלֵּל אֶת הַשֵּׁם. וְאִם הָיָה בַּעֲשָׂרָה מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל הֲרֵי זֶה חִלֵּל אֶת הַשֵּׁם בָּרַבִּים וּבִטֵּל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהִיא קִדּוּשׁ הַשֵּׁם וְעָבַר עַל מִצְוַת לֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהִיא חִלּוּל הַשֵּׁם. וְאַף עַל פִּי כֵן מִפְּנֵי שֶׁעָבַר בְּאֹנֶס אֵין מַלְקִין אוֹתוֹ וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר שֶׁאֵין מְמִיתִין אוֹתוֹ בֵּית דִּין אֲפִלּוּ הָרַג בְּאֹנֶס. שֶׁאֵין מַלְקִין וּמְמִיתִין אֶלָּא לְעוֹבֵר בִּרְצוֹנוֹ וּבְעֵדִים וְהַתְרָאָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בְּנוֹתֵן מִזַּרְעוֹ לַמּלֶךְ (ויקרא כ ה) "(וְנָתַתִּי) [וְשַׂמְתִּי] אֲנִי אֶת פָּנַי בָּאִישׁ הַהוּא". מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה לָמְדוּ הַהוּא לֹא אָנוּס וְלֹא שׁוֹגֵג וְלֹא מֻטְעֶה. וּמָה אִם עֲבוֹדַת כּוֹכָבִים שֶׁהִיא חֲמוּרָה מִן הַכּל הָעוֹבֵד אוֹתָהּ בְּאֹנֶס אֵינוֹ חַיָּב כָּרֵת וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר מִיתַת בֵּית דִּין. קַל וָחֹמֶר לִשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בַּתּוֹרָה. וּבַעֲרָיוֹת הוּא אוֹמֵר (דברים כב כו) "וְלַנַּעֲרָה לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה דָבָר". אֲבָל אִם יָכוֹל לְמַלֵּט נַפְשׁוֹ וְלִבְרֹחַ מִתַּחַת יַד הַמֶּלֶךְ הָרָשָׁע וְאֵינוֹ עוֹשֶׂה הִנֵּה הוּא כְּכֶלֶב שָׁב עַל קֵאוֹ. וְהוּא נִקְרָא עוֹבֵד עֲבוֹדַת כּוֹכָבִים בְּמֵזִיד וְהוּא נִטְרָד מִן הָעוֹלָם הַבָּא וְיוֹרֵד לַמַּדְרֵגָה הַתַּחְתּוֹנָה שֶׁל גֵּיהִנֹּם:

(ה) נָשִׁים שֶׁאָמְרוּ לָהֶם עוֹבְדֵי כּוֹכָבִים תְּנוּ לָנוּ אַחַת מִכֶּן וּנְטַמֵּא אוֹתָהּ וְאִם לָאו נְטַמֵּא אֶת כֻּלְּכֶן יִטָּמְאוּ כֻּלָּן וְאַל יִמְסְרוּ לָהֶם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל. וְכֵן אִם אָמְרוּ לָהֶם עוֹבְדֵי כּוֹכָבִים תְּנוּ לָנוּ אֶחָד מִכֶּם וְנַהַרְגֶּנּוּ וְאִם לָאו נַהֲרֹג כֻּלְּכֶם. יֵהָרְגוּ כֻּלָּם וְאַל יִמְסְרוּ לָהֶם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל. וְאִם יִחֲדוּהוּ לָהֶם וְאָמְרוּ תְּנוּ לָנוּ פְּלוֹנִי אוֹ נַהֲרֹג אֶת כֻּלְּכֶם. אִם הָיָה מְחֻיָּב מִיתָה כְּשֶׁבַע בֶּן בִּכְרִי יִתְּנוּ אוֹתוֹ לָהֶם. וְאֵין מוֹרִין לָהֶם כֵּן לְכַתְּחִלָּה. וְאִם אֵינוֹ חַיָּב מִיתָה יֵהָרְגוּ כֻּלָּן וְאַל יִמְסְרוּ לָהֶם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל:

(ו) כָּעִנְיָן שֶׁאָמְרוּ בָּאֳנָסִין כָּךְ אָמְרוּ בָּחֳלָאִים. כֵּיצַד. מִי שֶׁחָלָה וְנָטָה לָמוּת וְאָמְרוּ הָרוֹפְאִים שֶׁרְפוּאָתוֹ בְּדָבָר פְּלוֹנִי מֵאִסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה עוֹשִׂין. וּמִתְרַפְּאִין בְּכָל אִסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה בִּמְקוֹם סַכָּנָה חוּץ מֵעֲבוֹדַת כּוֹכָבִים וְגִלּוּי עֲרָיוֹת וּשְׁפִיכַת דָּמִים שֶׁאֲפִלּוּ בִּמְקוֹם סַכָּנָה אֵין מִתְרַפְּאִין בָּהֶן. וְאִם עָבַר וְנִתְרַפֵּא עוֹנְשִׁין אוֹתוֹ בֵּית דִּין עֹנֶשׁ הָרָאוּי לוֹ:

(ז) וּמִנַּיִן שֶׁאֲפִלּוּ בִּמְקוֹם סַכָּנַת נְפָשׁוֹת אֵין עוֹבְרִין עַל אַחַת מִשָּׁלֹשׁ עֲבֵרוֹת אֵלּוּ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים ו ה) "וְאָהַבְתָּ אֵת ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּכָל לְבָבְךָ וּבְכָל נַפְשְׁךָ וּבְכָל מְאֹדֶךָ" אֲפִלּוּ הוּא נוֹטֵל אֶת נַפְשְׁךָ. וַהֲרִיגַת נֶפֶשׁ מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל לְרַפְּאוֹת נֶפֶשׁ אַחֶרֶת אוֹ לְהַצִּיל אָדָם מִיַּד אַנָּס דָּבָר שֶׁהַדַּעַת נוֹטָה לוֹ הוּא שֶׁאֵין מְאַבְּדִין נֶפֶשׁ מִפְּנֵי נֶפֶשׁ. וַעֲרָיוֹת הֻקְּשׁוּ לִנְפָשׁוֹת שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כב כו) "כִּי כַּאֲשֶׁר יָקוּם אִישׁ עַל רֵעֵהוּ וּרְצָחוֹ נֶפֶשׁ כֵּן הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה":

(ח) בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים שֶׁאֵין מִתְרַפְּאִין בִּשְׁאָר אִסּוּרִים אֶלָּא בִּמְקוֹם סַכָּנָה. בִּזְמַן שֶׁהֵן דֶּרֶךְ הֲנָאָתָן כְּגוֹן שֶׁמַּאֲכִילִין אֶת הַחוֹלֶה שְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים אוֹ חָמֵץ בְּפֶסַח אוֹ שֶׁמַּאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים. אֲבָל שֶׁלֹּא דֶּרֶךְ הֲנָאָתָן כְּגוֹן שֶׁעוֹשִׂין לוֹ רְטִיָּה אוֹ מְלוּגְמָא מֵחָמֵץ אוֹ מֵעָרְלָה. אוֹ שֶׁמַּשְׁקִין אוֹתוֹ דְּבָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן מַר מְעֹרָב עִם אִסּוּרֵי מַאֲכָל שֶׁהֲרֵי אֵין בָּהֶן הֲנָאָה לַחֵךְ הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר וַאֲפִלּוּ שֶׁלֹּא בִּמְקוֹם סַכָּנָה. חוּץ מִכִּלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם וּבָשָׂר בְּחָלָב שֵׁהֵן אֲסוּרִים אֲפִלּוּ שֵׁלֹּא דֵּרֵךְ הֲנָאָתָן. לְפִיכָךְ אֵין מִתְרַפְּאִין מֵהֶן אֲפִלּוּ שֶׁלֹּא דֶּרֵךְ הֲנָאָתָן אֵלָּא בִּמִקוֹם סַכָּנָה:

(ט) מִי שֶׁנָּתַן עֵינָיו בְּאִשָּׁה וְחָלָה וְנָטָה לָמוּת וְאָמְרוּ הָרוֹפְאִים אֵין לוֹ רְפוּאָה עַד שֶׁתִּבָּעֵל לוֹ. יָמוּת וְאַל תִּבָּעֵל לוֹ אֲפִלּוּ הָיְתָה פְּנוּיָה. וַאֲפִלּוּ לְדַבֵּר עִמָּהּ מֵאֲחוֹרֵי הַגָּדֵר אֵין מוֹרִין לוֹ בְּכָךְ וְיָמוּת וְלֹא יוֹרוּ לְדַבֵּר עִמָּהּ מֵאֲחוֹרֵי הַגָּדֵר שֶׁלֹּא יְהוּ בְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל הֶפְקֵר וְיָבוֹאוּ בִּדְבָרִים אֵלּוּ לִפְרֹץ בַּעֲרָיוֹת:

(י) כָּל הָעוֹבֵר מִדַּעְתּוֹ בְּלֹא אֹנֶס עַל אַחַת מִכָּל מִצְוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בַּתּוֹרָה בִּשְׁאָט בְּנֶפֶשׁ לְהַכְעִיס הֲרֵי זֶה מְחַלֵּל אֶת הַשֵּׁם. וּלְפִיכָךְ נֶאֱמַר בִּשְׁבוּעַת שֶׁקֶר (ויקרא יט יב) "וְחִלַּלְתָּ אֶת שֵׁם אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֲנִי ה'". וְאִם עָבַר בַּעֲשָׂרָה מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל הֲרֵי זֶה חִלֵּל אֶת הַשֵּׁם בָּרַבִּים. וְכֵן כָּל הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מֵעֲבֵרָה אוֹ עָשָׂה מִצְוָה לֹא מִפְּנֵי דָּבָר בָּעוֹלָם לֹא פַּחַד וְלֹא יִרְאָה וְלֹא לְבַקֵּשׁ כָּבוֹד אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי הַבּוֹרֵא בָּרוּךְ הוּא כִּמְנִיעַת יוֹסֵף הַצַּדִּיק עַצְמוֹ מֵאֵשֶׁת רַבּוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה מְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת הַשֵּׁם:

(יא) וְיֵשׁ דְּבָרִים אֲחֵרִים שֶׁהֵן בִּכְלַל חִלּוּל הַשֵּׁם. וְהוּא שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה אוֹתָם אָדָם גָּדוֹל בַּתּוֹרָה וּמְפֻרְסָם בַּחֲסִידוּת דְּבָרִים שֶׁהַבְּרִיּוֹת מְרַנְּנִים אַחֲרָיו בִּשְׁבִילָם. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָן עֲבֵרוֹת הֲרֵי זֶה חִלֵּל אֶת הַשֵּׁם כְּגוֹן שֶׁלָּקַח וְאֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן דְּמֵי הַמִּקָּח לְאַלְתַּר. וְהוּא שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ וְנִמְצְאוּ הַמּוֹכְרִים תּוֹבְעִין וְהוּא מַקִּיפָן. אוֹ שֶׁיַּרְבֶּה בִּשְׂחוֹק אוֹ בַּאֲכִילָה וּשְׁתִיָּה אֵצֶל עַמֵּי הָאָרֶץ וּבֵינֵיהֶן. אוֹ שֶׁדִּבּוּרוֹ עִם הַבְּרִיּוֹת אֵינוֹ בְּנַחַת וְאֵינוֹ מְקַבְּלָן בְּסֵבֶר פָּנִים יָפוֹת אֶלָּא בַּעַל קְטָטָה וְכַעַס. וְכַיּוֹצֵא בַּדְּבָרִים הָאֵלּוּ הַכּל לְפִי גָּדְלוֹ שֶׁל חָכָם צָרִיךְ שֶׁיְּדַקְדֵּק עַל עַצְמוֹ וְיַעֲשֶׂה לִפְנִים מִשּׁוּרַת הַדִּין. וְכֵן אִם דִּקְדֵּק הֶחָכָם עַל עַצְמוֹ וְהָיָה דִּבּוּרוֹ בְּנַחַת עִם הַבְּרִיּוֹת וְדַעְתּוֹ מְעֹרֶבֶת עִמָּהֶם וּמְקַבְּלָם בְּסֵבֶר פָּנִים יָפוֹת וְנֶעֱלָב מֵהֶם וְאֵינוֹ עוֹלְבָם. מְכַבֵּד לָהֶן וַאֲפִלּוּ לַמְקִלִּין לוֹ. וְנוֹשֵׂא וְנוֹתֵן בֶּאֱמוּנָה. וְלֹא יַרְבֶּה בַּאֲרִיחוּת עַמֵּי הָאָרֶץ וִישִׁיבָתָן. וְלֹא יֵרָאֶה תָּמִיד אֶלָּא עוֹסֵק בַּתּוֹרָה עָטוּף בְּצִיצִית מֻכְתָּר בִּתְפִלִּין וְעוֹשֶׂה בְּכָל מַעֲשָׂיו לִפְנִים מִשּׁוּרַת הַדִּין. וְהוּא שֶׁלֹּא יִתְרַחֵק הַרְבֵּה וְלֹא יִשְׁתּוֹמֵם. עַד שֶׁיִּמָּצְאוּ הַכּל מְקַלְּסִין אוֹתוֹ וְאוֹהֲבִים אוֹתוֹ וּמִתְאַוִּים לְמַעֲשָׂיו. הֲרֵי זֶה קִדֵּשׁ אֶת ה' וְעָלָיו הַכָּתוּב אוֹמֵר (ישעיה מט ג) "וַיֹּאמֶר לִי עַבְדִּי אָתָּה יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲשֶׁר בְּךָ אֶתְפָּאָר":

Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 5

(1) It is mandatory upon the whole house of Israel to sanctify this Great Name, for it is said: "And I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel" (Lev. 22.32). They are also charged not to blaspheme Him, for it is said: "And ye shall not profane My holy Name" (Ibid.). How are these commandments to be observed? If an idolater will force an Israelite to transgress one of the commandments of the Torah and threaten him with death for disobedience, it is mandatory that he transgress the commandment and be not put to death, for it is said concerning the commandments: "That which a man may do and live by it" (Ibid. 18.5)—"live by it, but not die for it". ¹Sanhedrin, 74a; Yoma 85a; Abodah Zarah, 26b. C. G.Thus, if he chose death and did not transgress, his blood be upon his own head.

(2) Whereat are these words directed? Concerning all other commandments, save idolatry, adultery and blood-shed. For respecting these three commandments, if one will say to him: "Transgress one of the three, or die," he shall die, and not transgress. Whereat are these words directed? When the idolater intends to have a personal enjoyment, as when he forces an Israelite to build his house, or cook his meals on a Sabbath, or when he forces a Jewish woman, and in like matters; but if he merely intended to make him violate commandments, then, if it happen between themselves, and there be no ten Israelites present, it is mandatory to transgress and not die; but if he forces him to go astray from one of the commandments in the presence of ten Israelites, he must suffer death and not transgress, even though the idolater did not intend to lead him astray save from one of the rest of the commandments.

(3) And all these words are directed at a time which is not under pressure of arbitrary edicts, but at a time of arbitrary edicts such as when a wicked king, like Nebuchadnezzar and his associates arise and issue an edict against Israel to violate their religion, or one of the commandments, then he should die and not transgress even one of the other commandments, whether he is forced to do the transgression in the presence of ten, or whether the compulsion will be between himself and the idolater.

(4) Whosoever, of whom it is said that he shall transgress and not die, if he die and did not transgress, the guilt thereof be upon his soul;²Ibid. 27. Tosfot commends such act. C. G. and whosoever, concerning whom it is said that he shall die and not transgress, and he did die and did not transgress, he sanctified the Name of God; and if this happened in the presence of ten Israelites, he sanctified the Name of God among many, even like unto Daniel, Hananiah, Mishael and Azariah and Rabbi Akiba and his associates, who have been slain by decree of a tyrannical government to which degree of martyrdom there is no parallel, concerning whom it is said: "But for Thy sake we are killed all the day; we are accounted as sheep for the slaughter" (Ps. 44.23); and concerning whom it is moreover said: "Gather my saints together unto me, those that have made a covenant with Me by sacrifice" (Ibid. 50.5). And whosoever, concerning whom it is said that he shall die and not transgress, did transgress and did not die, blasphemed the Name of God, and if he did this in the presence of ten Israelites, he blasphemed the Name of God in the presence of many, violated the mandatory commandment of the sanctification of God, and transgressed the prohibitive commandment of blasphemy. Nevertheless, because he committed the transgression in duress, he is not lashed, needless to say that no punishment of death is inflicted upon him by a tribunal, even though he commit murder in duress; for no punishment of either lashes or death is inflicted unless one commits the crime willfully in the presence of witnesses, and received a warning not to do it, even as it is said of one who sacrifices his children to Mollech: "And I will set my face against that man" (Lev. 20.3), which is traditionally understood to mean that that man was not under duress, nor in error, nor in ignorance. Now, if idolatry, which is the capital offense of them all, yet whosoever worships it in duress, is not guilty to be cut off from among his people, not to say of being put to death by a tribunal, a minori ad majus that an offense against the other commandments enumerated in the Torah should remain as the major premise. Furthermore, concerning adultery it is said: "But unto the damsel thou shalt do nothing" (Deut. 22. 26).³She was under duress. G. But if he can save his life and flee from the jurisdiction of such a wicked king, and he does it not, he is likened unto a dog that returneth to his vomit, and is called a willful worshipper of idolatry, and is deprived of the world to come, for he will descend into the nethermost level of the Gehenna.

(5) If idolaters will demand one of a group of women, saying: "Yield us one of among you and we will defile her, if not we will defile you all", let all be defiled, rather than surrender to them one soul in Israel.⁴Terumot, 8.12. C. G. Likewise, if idolaters will say to a group of men: "Yield us one of you and we will kill him, if not we will kill you all", let all of them be killed rather than surrender to them one soul in Israel. If, however, they single out the one, saying: "Give us that man, if not we will kill you all", if he be guilty of a capital crime, as, for example, Sheba son of Bichri⁵See Second Samuel; 20. 1. G., they may surrender him to them, but it is not commendable to advise them to do so; if he be not guilty of a capital crime, they all must submit rather than surrender them one soul in Israel.

(6) As they said on the subject of duress, so they said of sickness. How so? For example: One who takes sick and his life is despaired of, and doctors prescribe a remedy for him consisting of a certain thing which is forbidden, the doctor's orders are followed. Healing is effected by everything that the Torah forbids, where there is danger of death⁶Pesahim, 25a. C., save only idolatry, adultery and murder, which even in case of danger, must not be employed as means of healing. If he transgress and be cured by such means, the tribunal may visit upon him due punishment.

(7) Whence do we know that even when life is in danger, none of these prohibitive commandments may be violated? From what it is said: "And thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy might" (Deut. 6.5), even though He taketh thy life.⁷Berakot 65b. G. And, the taking of one life in Israel to give healing to another life, or to save a man from an assassin is a thing which reason dictates not to do, for one life must not be sacrificed for another life. As for adultery, it is likened unto life itself, as it is said: "For as when a man riseth against his neighbor and slayeth him, even so is this matter" (Ibid. 22.26).

(8) Whereat are these words against using other forbidden things as remedies, save where there is danger of life, directed? When given in a manner to enjoy it, as for example, feeding a sick person oysters or frogs, or leavened bread on Passover, or any food on the Day of Atonement; but when administered not in a manner to enjoy it, as, for example, to apply a plaster or poultice of leaven on Passover, or of uncircumcized fruit,⁸Fruit of a tree before the fourth year after it was planted. G. or a drink containing a mixture of forbidden ingredients of food, which is not at all palatable, is permissible, even when there is no danger, save only of grafted fruit from a vineyard, and milk together with meat, which are forbidden even when not enjoying them. Therefore, healing therewith is forbidden even in a manner not to enjoy it, unless there is danger of death.

(9) One who coveted a certain woman and became dangerously sick so that his life was despaired of, and the doctors declared that for him there was no remedy save that she be with him, he shall die even though she be not wedded and even though the remedy be for him to talk to her from behind a screen, no permission shall be given to him; let him die⁹Sanhedrin, 74b. C. but no permission be given him to talk to her from behind a screen, so that the daughters in Israel shall not be without protection, and thereby become accustomed to consider unchastity lightly.

(10) Whosoever willfully, without duress, will transgress one of the commandments of the Torah, because he despises it and does so spitefully, behold, he is blaspheming the Name. Therefore, it is said of false swearing: "Thou hast hereby defiled the name of thy God; I am the Lord" (Lev. 19. 12). And if he commits the offense in the presence of ten Israelites, he is guilty of public blasphemy. Conversely, if one abstains from sin, or fulfills a commandment without ulterior motive, not because of terror or fear, nor in pursuit of honor, but merely for the sake of the Creator, blessed is He! Even as Joseph the Pious did resist the temptation of his master's wife, behold, he doth sanctify the Name of God.

(11) There are other things included in blasphemy, although they are not of themselves either among the mandatory or prohibitive commandments, as for example, when a great man, famed for his learning and piety, will do something that the public will suspect him on account thereof, even though such deeds be not transgressions, yet he has committed blasphemy, as for example: if he makes a purchase and does not pay for it at once,¹⁰Yoma, 86a. C. Baba Mezia, 83b. G. although he has the money and the vendors are claiming it and he delays them; or if he indulges in frivolity, or doth eat and drink with and among the ignorant,¹¹Pesahim, 49a. C. or if his speech with his fellow men be not polite, or if he does not receive them pleasantly, but acts as one looking for strife and shows anger. In such and like matters, all measured by the standard of the greatness of such scholar, he must take particular care, and act exceedingly better than the law requires. Conversely, if the scholar restrains himself, speaks politely to his fellow men, and when among them acts like one of them, and receives them pleasantly, takes abuse from them but never gives abuse to them in return, respects them, even those who do not respect him, acts in business honestly, does not remain in company with the unlearned, nor visits their assemblies, and is rarely seen otherwise than to be engaged in the study of the Torah, wrapt in the prayer-garment and adorned with phylacteries, and performs his duties exceedingly more than the law requires, provided he does not go to extremes and does not act so ridiculously, so that all praise him and love him and crave to imitate his actions, behold he doth sanctify the Lord, and concerning him, the verse speaks, saying: "And He said unto me, thou art my servant, Israel, in whom I am glorified." (Is. 49.3).

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