פרק חמישי- חובות מהתורה סוגיה 17- "שארה כסותה ועונתה"

(ז) וְכִֽי־יִמְכֹּ֥ר אִ֛ישׁ אֶת־בִּתּ֖וֹ לְאָמָ֑ה לֹ֥א תֵצֵ֖א כְּצֵ֥את הָעֲבָדִֽים׃

(ח) אִם־רָעָ֞ה בְּעֵינֵ֧י אֲדֹנֶ֛יהָ אֲשֶׁר־לא [ל֥וֹ] יְעָדָ֖הּ וְהֶפְדָּ֑הּ לְעַ֥ם נָכְרִ֛י לֹא־יִמְשֹׁ֥ל לְמָכְרָ֖הּ בְּבִגְדוֹ־בָֽהּ׃

(ט) וְאִם־לִבְנ֖וֹ יִֽיעָדֶ֑נָּה כְּמִשְׁפַּ֥ט הַבָּנ֖וֹת יַעֲשֶׂה־לָּֽהּ׃

(י) אִם־אַחֶ֖רֶת יִֽקַּֽח־ל֑וֹ שְׁאֵרָ֛הּ כְּסוּתָ֥הּ וְעֹנָתָ֖הּ לֹ֥א יִגְרָֽע׃

(יא) וְאִם־שְׁלָ֨שׁ־אֵ֔לֶּה לֹ֥א יַעֲשֶׂ֖ה לָ֑הּ וְיָצְאָ֥ה חִנָּ֖ם אֵ֥ין כָּֽסֶף׃ \

Exodus 21:7-11

(7) When a man sells his daughter as a slave, she shall not be freed as male slaves are. (8) If she proves to be displeasing to her master, who designated her for himself, he must let her be redeemed; he shall not have the right to sell her to outsiders, since he broke faith with her. (9) And if he designated her for his son, he shall deal with her as is the practice with free maidens. (10) If he marries another, he must not withhold from this one her food, her clothing, or her conjugal rights. (11) If he fails her in these three ways, she shall go free, without payment.

מכילתא דרבי ישמעאל, מַסֶּכְתָּא דִנְזִיקִין ג׳:כ׳-כ״א

כמשפט הבנות וכי מה למדנו על משפט הבנות.

אלא, הרי הוא בא ללמד, ונמצא למד.

מה זה שארה כסותה ועונתה לא יגרע,

אף בת ישראל שארה כסותה ועוונתה לא יגרע, דברי ר' יאשיה.

Mekhilta DeRabbi Yishmael, Tractate Nezikin 3:20-21

"according to the ordinance of the daughters shall he provide for her": Now what do we learn from "the ordinance of the daughters? __ It (apparently) comes to "teach" (about a maid-servant), but it ends up "learning" (about daughters in general), viz.: Just as this one (the maid-servant), (10) "her food, her clothing, and her (conjugal) time he shall not diminish," so, a Jewish daughter (in general), her food, her clothing, and her time he shall not diminish. These are the words of R. Yoshiyah. R. Yonathan says: It ("according to the ordinance, etc.") speaks of a Hebrew (maid-servant, i.e., that he is to do with his maid-servant according to the ordinance of the Jewish daughters.) You say this, but perhaps the intent of the verse is to shed light upon a Jewish daughter (in general, as per R. Yoshiyah)! __ (This is not so, for [10]) "If another wife he take for himself, etc." already speaks about a Jewish daughter (in general). What, then, is the intent of "according to the ordinance of the daughters"? Scripture speaks of a Hebrew maid-servant (as per R. Yonathan).

כתובות מ״ז ב

דתניא:

"שארה" - אלו מזונות

וכן הוא אומר "ואשר אכלו שאר עמי" (מיכה ג , ג).

[...] רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר

שארה- כסותה: לפום שארה תן כסותה

שלא יתן לה לא של ילדה לזקינה

ולא של זקינה לילדה

כסותה ועונתה- לפום עונתה תן כסותה

שלא יתן חדשים בימות החמה

ולא שחקים בימות הגשמים:

תני רב יוסף

שארה זו קרוב בשר

שלא ינהג בה מנהג פרסיים

שמשמשין מטותיהן בלבושיהן

מסייע ליה לרב הונא,

דאמר רב הונא

האומר אי אפשי אלא אני בבגדי והיא בבגדה

יוציא ונותן כתובה:

Ketubot 47b

The reason is that he wrote that she would be entitled to the additional amount only on the condition that he would marry her, and since he did not marry her, she is not entitled to the extra amount. The Gemara compares the respective opinions: The one who says that the husband does not have the right to her dowry holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and therefore he rules that just as a husband guarantees his wife an extra sum in her marriage contract only if they actually get married, the wife’s father also gives the dowry only the condition that the couple marries. And the one who said that the husband does have the right to her dowry holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, because the document is fully in effect even before marriage. The Gemara refutes this suggestion: No, everyone agrees that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and the explanation is as follows: The one who said that he does not have the right to the dowry clearly holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, as stated above; and the one who says the husband does have the right to her dowry would distinguish between the two cases: Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya states that the marriage contract is not fully in effect until marriage only with regard to a bestowal from him to her, i.e., the extra sum that the husband adds to her marriage contract, as he wrote it for her only on the condition that he would marry her, and he did not intend to give her anything before she became his wife. However, with regard to that which is given from her father to him, i.e., the dowry, even Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya concedes that the husband is entitled to this money, as the gift of a father is due to marriage, i.e., he wants the families to be joined in matrimony, and they have already become linked in marriage. The dowry given by the father has nothing to do with the transition from betrothal to actual marriage. § The mishna teaches that a husband is obligated to provide his wife with sustenance, redemption from captivity, and burial. The Sages taught in a baraita: The Rabbis instituted that a husband must provide his wife with her sustenance in exchange for his rights to her earnings, and similarly they decreed that a husband must tend to her burial in exchange for the fact that he inherits the dowry that she brought into the marriage and which is written in her marriage contract. Consequently, the husband may consume the produce of her property. The Gemara expresses surprise at this last statement: Produce, who mentioned anything about that? The baraita did not previously mention produce at all, so how did it arrive at a halakhic conclusion with regard to produce? The Gemara explains that the baraita is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: They instituted that a husband must provide his wife with her sustenance in exchange for his rights to her earnings; and it is his duty to provide her with redemption from captivity in exchange for his right to consume the produce of her property; and it is his obligation to attend to her burial in exchange for the fact that he inherits the dowry that she brought into the marriage and which is written in her marriage contract. Consequently, a husband may consume the produce of her property. Although the Gemara has explained how the tanna came to speak about produce, the wording of the baraita remains problematic. What is the significance of the word consequently in this context? The Gemara explains: Lest you say that the husband should not consume the produce but leave it so that if he requires funds to redeem his wife he will have them available, as, if he is not compelled to do so he will refrain from redeeming her, as he will be unwilling to spend his own money for that purpose; the tanna therefore teaches us that this arrangement is preferable, because sometimes the produce will not amount to the funds necessary to redeem her from captivity, and he would not redeem her if he was expected to use the funds produced by her property. Consequently, the Sages decreed that he consumes the produce immediately and that he must redeem her from his own funds if she is taken into captivity. After analyzing the language of the baraita, the Gemara turns its attention to the halakha itself. But I can reverse these connections; why does the baraita say that a husband’s obligation to provide his wife with sustenance was instituted in exchange for his right to her earnings, as opposed to another of his rights, e.g., his right to consume the produce of her property? Abaye said: The Sages instituted a common obligation in exchange for a common right, and they instituted an uncommon obligation in exchange for an uncommon right. In other words, the Sages instituted a husband’s obligation to provide his wife with sustenance, which is relevant on a regular basis, in exchange for his right to her earnings, which also applies regularly. The other obligations and rights of a husband are relevant less frequently. § Rava said: This tanna, in the baraita cited below, maintains that the obligation of a husband to provide his wife’s sustenance applies by Torah law, as it is taught with regard to the verse pertaining to a husband’s obligations toward his wife: “If he takes another wife for himself, her food [she’era], her clothing [kesuta], and her conjugal rights [onata], he shall not diminish” (Exodus 21:10). “She’era”; this is sustenance, and it likewise states: “Who also eat the flesh [she’er] of my people” (Micah 3:3). “Kesuta” is understood in its literal sense as referring to clothing. “Onata”; this is her conjugal rights, which is stated in the Torah, and so it says: “If you shall afflict [te’aneh] my daughters” (Genesis 31:50), which indicates that a husband may not deprive his wife of her conjugal rights. The baraita continues: Rabbi Elazar says: “She’era”; this is her conjugal rights, and so it says: “None of you shall approach to any who is near [she’er] of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness” (Leviticus 18:6), which demonstrates that the word she’er is used in the context of sexual relations. “Kesuta” is understood in its literal sense as referring to clothing. “Onata”; this is sustenance, and so it says: “And He afflicted you [vayanekha], and made you suffer hunger, and fed you with manna” (Deuteronomy 8:3).

תוספתא כתובות ד׳:ז׳

נושא אדם אשה

על מנת שלא לזון על מנת שלא לפרנס

ולא עוד אלא שפוסק עמה

שתהא זנתו ומפרנסתו ומלמדתו תורה.

מעשה ביהושע בנו של רבי עקיבא

שנשא אשה ופסק עמה

על מנת שתהא זנתו ומפרנסתו ומלמדתו תורה.

היו שני [שנות] בצורת,

עמדו וחלקו (את הנכסים ביניהם, כדי להתפרנס)

התחילה קובלת עליו לחכמים

וכשבא לבית דין אמר להם:

היא נאמנת עלי יתר מכל אדם.

אמרה להם: ודיי כך התנה עמי.

אמרו לה חכמים: אין כלום אחר הקיצה (הקניין)

כתובות נ״ו א:ט״ז

דתניא:

האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי

על מנת שאין ליך עלי שאר כסות ועונה

הרי זו מקודשת ותנאו בטל

- דברי רבי מאיר.

רבי יהודה אומר:

בדבר שבממון

תנאו קיים

Ketubot 56a:16

In any case, it has been established that Rav also follows the principle of assessing one’s intention, which calls into question the conclusion that Rabbi Natan is the one who said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rather, the Gemara concludes: Both Rav and Rabbi Natan follow the principle of assessing intention, and the debate can be explained in a different way. According to the one who says the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, this works out well. According to the one who says the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, here too, this is an assessment of his intention. Why did he give her the additional sum of the marriage contract? It was due to a sense of intimacy between them, as they were betrothed and were planning to get married. Since he did demonstrate a sense of intimacy with her, the assessment is that he intended to give her the additional sum. Rav Ḥanina, who was known for teaching biblical verses, sat before Rabbi Yannai and said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rabbi Yannai said to him: Go out and read your verses outside. Your area of expertise is biblical verses, not halakha. What you said is incorrect and should not be said in the study hall, as the halakha is actually not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said in the name of our teacher, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. And Rav Naḥman also said his own statement: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. And the Sages of Neharde’a say in the name of Rav Naḥman: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. The Gemara comments: And although Rav Naḥman cursed them and said: Any judge who rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, such and such unspecified misfortune will happen to him, even so the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Since the Gemara presented a number of different opinions, it concludes: And the practical halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. § Since the practical halakha is that a woman who was divorced or widowed after betrothal receives the main sum of her marriage contract but not the additional sum, Ravin asks: What is the halakha with regard to a woman who entered the wedding canopy and is then widowed or divorced without having had sexual intercourse? Does the affection manifest in the wedding effect the marriage, and therefore she receives the additional sum as a married woman? Or, is it the affection manifest in the intercourse that effects the marriage, and consequently this woman is no different than a betrothed woman for the purpose of this halakha? Come and hear that Rav Yosef taught the following baraita: He wrote the additional sum in the marriage contract for her only on account of the affection characteristic of the first night of the marriage. The Gemara asks: Granted, if you say that the affection manifest in the wedding effects the marriage, this is why it says the affection characteristic of the first night, as the wedding ceremony is performed on the first night only. But if you say that the affection manifest in the intercourse effects the marriage, is there intercourse only on the first night and then from this point forward there is none? Consequently, the baraita implies that the affection manifest in the wedding effects the marriage, and from that point on she is entitled to the additional sum of the marriage contract. The Gemara rejects this proof: But rather, what is the advantage of interpreting the expression: Affection characteristic of the first night, as a reference to the wedding? Is there a wedding only at night and not during the day? The Gemara responds: And according to your reasoning, is there intercourse only at night and not during the day? Didn’t Rava say that although the Sages generally prohibited engaging in intercourse during the day, if it was in a dark house it is permitted? The Gemara rejects this question: This is not difficult. By employing this phrase, it teaches us the ordinary mode of behavior, i.e., that intercourse generally takes place at night. Rather, the opinion that the expression is a reference to the wedding is difficult, as a wedding does not have to take place at night. The Gemara responds: The wedding reference is also not difficult, since a reference to a wedding without specification means a wedding that takes place in order to lead directly to intercourse. By using this phrase, it similarly teaches us the ordinary mode of behavior, i.e., that intercourse generally takes place at night. Consequently, this baraita cannot be used as a proof for either possibility. Rav Ashi asks a question similar to Ravin’s: If the bride entered the wedding canopy and began menstruating, and the husband then died without ever engaging in intercourse with his wife, what is the halakha with regard to the additional sum of the marriage contract? If you say that the affection manifest in the wedding effects the marriage, does this refer specifically to a wedding in which the couple is fit to engage in intercourse, which involves greater affection, and a wedding in which the couple is not fit to engage in intercourse does not effect the marriage? Or, perhaps it is not different. The Sages could not answer this, so the question shall stand unresolved. § The mishna states: Rabbi Yehuda says: If he wishes, he may write a marriage contract for a virgin for two hundred dinars, and she may then write a receipt as if he had paid part of that sum. They ask: And did Rabbi Yehuda hold that one writes a receipt for partial payment of a debt? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Bava Batra 170b): In the case of one who repaid part of his debt, Rabbi Yehuda says: He should exchange the original promissory note for a new one that states the amount still owed, and Rabbi Yosei says: The lender should write him a receipt for the money he received? According to Rabbi Yehuda, a new note is preferable to a receipt because if the borrower loses the receipt, the lender is still in possession of a promissory note for the full amount and can collect a second time. Rabbi Yirmeya said: In the mishna, Rabbi Yehuda is referring to a case where the receipt is written within the marriage contract itself and not as a separate document. The husband is therefore not required to hold on to a receipt, and consequently Rabbi Yehuda’s restriction against writing a receipt is not necessary. Abaye said: Even if you say that the mishna is referring to a case where the receipt is not written within it, it is logical that Rabbi Yehuda would make an exception in this case. Granted, there, in an ordinary case of a receipt, it is certain that the borrower repaid part of the loan, and consequently there is concern that perhaps he will lose the receipt and the lender will take out the promissory note and return and collect the entire payment again. But here, in the mishna, did the husband definitely give the wife part of the payment for the marriage contract? The receipt merely amounts to something she said to him in order to waive part of the payment, although she did not actually receive it. If he saved the receipt, he saved it; if he did not save it, it is he himself who will lose. Therefore, in this case, Rabbi Yehuda agrees that one writes a receipt. They ask: Granted, it is understandable why Abaye did not say his explanation in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya, as the mishna does not teach explicitly that the receipt is written within the marriage contract. However, what is the reason that Rabbi Yirmeya did not say an explanation in accordance with the opinion of Abaye? Why does Rabbi Yirmeya limit the mishna to a case where the receipt was written within the marriage contract? The Gemara responds: Although this is an unusual case, as there is no concern that the receipt may be lost, there is nevertheless a rabbinic decree with regard to this receipt due to the typical case of receipts. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda would not allow a receipt unless it was written into the marriage contract itself. With regard to the crux of the issue, the Gemara notes: The reason that Rabbi Yehuda holds that the wife can waive part of the main sum of her marriage contract is specifically because she wrote him a receipt. However, if she said it verbally, no, it is not effective, even according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara asks: Why not? This is a monetary matter, and we have heard that Rabbi Yehuda said: With regard to monetary matters in which someone makes a verbal stipulation, his stipulation stands. This is as it is taught in the Tosefta (Kiddushin 3:7): In the case of one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that you have no ability to claim from me food, clothing, or conjugal rights, she is betrothed and his stipulation is void; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to monetary matters, such as food and clothing, his stipulation stands; therefore, if she verbally waives part of the marriage contract, and thereby makes a stipulation about a monetary matter, it should be effective. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda holds: The marriage contract is a rabbinic law, and the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with greater force than Torah law. Therefore, if the wife waives part of the main sum of the marriage contract, Rabbi Yehuda holds that her declaration has no force unless it is written down. However, a Torah obligation, such as food and clothing, does not require this reinforcement, and consequently the wife may waive it with a verbal stipulation. The Gemara challenges this answer: The husband’s entitlement to the produce of his wife’s property is a rabbinic decree, and nevertheless the Sages did not reinforce his rights to them, as we learned in a mishna (83a): Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the husband wrote that he waived his rights to the produce of his wife’s property, he may actually consume the produce of the produce of her property, meaning that he could invest the produce in additional property, which would also belong to his wife, but he would consume its produce. This applies unless he explicitly writes to her: I do not have any claim to your property, its produce, or the produce of its produce, forever.

אבן העזר ע׳:ג׳

כַּמָּה מְזוֹנוֹת פּוֹסְקִים לָאִשָּׁה,

לֶחֶם שְׁתֵּי סְעֻדּוֹת בְּכָל יוֹם, וּפַרְפְּרוֹת לֶאֱכֹל בָּהּ הַפַּת, וְשֶׁמֶן לַאֲכִילָה וּלְהַדְלָקַת הַנֵּר,

וּמְעַט יַיִן לִשְׁתּוֹת, אִם הָיָה מִנְהַג הַמָּקוֹם שֶׁיִּשְׁתּוּ הַנָּשִׁים יַיִן.

וּבְשַׁבָּת שְׁלשָׁה סְעֻדּוֹת וּבָשָׂר אוֹ דָּגִים; ...

בַּמֶּה דְבָרִים אֲמוּרִים, בְּעָנִי שֶׁבְּיִשְׂרָאֵל;

אֲבָל אִם הָיָה עָשִׁיר, הַכֹּל לְפִי עָשְׁרוֹ.

וְאִם הָיָה עָנִי בְּיוֹתֵר וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִתֵּן לָהּ אֲפִלּוּ לֶחֶם שֶׁהִיא צְרִיכָה, כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לְהוֹצִיא.

הגה: וּתְהֵא כְּתֻבָּתָהּ עָלָיו חוֹב עַד שֶׁיִּמְצָא וְיִתֵּן. ...

Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer 70:3

(3) How much sustenance is allocated to the wife? Bread for two meals per day and appetizers to eat with the bread, oil for eating and lighting candles, and a little wine to drink, if it was the custom in that place for women to drink wine. Rama: If she was breastfeeding, we give her wine (Tur). Mechaber: For the Sabbath [she receives] 3 meals and meat or fish. Additionally he gives her 1 ma'ah (1/6 of a Tyrian dinar) every week for her needs. Rama: And we give her wood for cooking her food (Ran chapter Af Al Pi in Ketuboth). Mechaber: With what case are we dealing? With a poor man in Israel. But if he was rich, [her allocation is] according to his wealth. Rama: If she scrimped and had left over from the sustenance, it belongs to the husband (Tur). Mechaber: If he was extremely poor and could not afford to give her even the bread she needs, we force him to divorce her. Rama: The ketuba monies remain as his debt until he finds [the wherewithal] to pay (Tur in the name of Rambam). Some authorities say we do not force him to divorce since he does have [the money to give] (Ri in the name of Rabbenu Tam). He who has food for only one day must give it to his wife or to eat it along with her (Tur in the name of haRamah - R. Meir Halevi). Some authorities say additionally that he must hire himself out as a worker and to feed his wife (Tur in the name of R. Eliyah and Moharam in the name of the Rabbis in France). If he had lands, the woman has the right to take her sustenance from the usufruct of the land or the capital value of the land itself, or he has to sell them (Responsa Rashba chapter 890).

אבן העזר ע״ג:א׳-ה׳

כְּסוּתָהּ כֵּיצַד,

חַיָּב לִתֵּן לָהּ בְּגָדִים הָרְאוּיִים לָהּ בִּימוֹת הַגְּשָׁמִים וּבִימוֹת הַחַמָּה,

בְּפָחוֹת שֶׁלּוֹבֶשֶׁת כָּל אִשָּׁה בַּעֲלַת בַּיִת שֶׁבְּאוֹתָהּ הַמְּדִינָה.

וְאִם בְּאוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם אֵין דֶּרֶךְ לָצֵאת אִשָּׁה לַשּׁוּק עַד שֶׁיִּהְיֶה עָלֶיהָ רְדִיד הַחוֹפֶה אֶת כָּל גּוּפָהּ,

נוֹתֵן לָהּ רְדִיד הַפָּחוּת שֶׁבְּכָל הָרְדִידִין.

וּבִכְלַל הַכְּסוּת שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב לִתֵּן לָהּ, כְּלֵי בַיִת, וּמָדוֹר שֶׁיוֹשֶׁבֶת בּוֹ. וּמַה הֵם כְּלֵי בַיִת, מִטָּה מֻצַּעַת וּמַפָּץ (פֵּרוּשׁ, כְּעֵין מַחְצֶלֶת) אוֹ מַחְצֶלֶת לֵישֵׁב עָלֶיהָ, וּכְלֵי אֲכִילָה וּשְׁתִיָּה כְּגוֹן קְדֵרָה וּקְעָרָה וְחָבִית וּפַךְ וְנֵר וְכוֹס וּבַקְבּוּק וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן.

הַמָּדוֹר שֶׁשּׂוֹכֵר לָהּ, בַּיִת שֶׁל אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת עַל אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, וְתִהְיֶה רְחָבָה חוּצָה לוֹ, וְיִהְיֶה לוֹ בֵּית הַכִּסֵא חוּץ מִמֶּנּוּ.

וּמְחַיְּבִין אוֹתוֹ לִתֵּן לָהּ תַּכְשִׁיטִים, כְּגוֹן בִּגְדֵי צִבְעוֹנִים לְהַקִּיף עַל רֹאשָׁהּ וּפַדַּחְתָּהּ, וּפוּךְ (פֵּרוּשׁ, כַּחַל שָׁחֹר) וְשָׂרָק.

בַּמֶּה דְבָרִים אֲמוּרִים, בְּעָנִי שֶׁבְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.

אֲבָל בְּעָשִׁיר, כָּל דְּבָרִים הַלָּלוּ נוֹתֵן לָהּ לְפִי עָשְׁרוֹ.

אִם קָצְרָה יָדוֹ לִתֵּן לָהּ, אֲפִלּוּ כְּעָנִי שֶׁבְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לְהוֹצִיא.

Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer 73:1-5

(1) How [is he obligated] for her clothing? He must give her clothes fit for the rainy months and for the sunny months, according to the lowest value that a woman would wear when her husband is in the same region. And if in that particular place a woman would not go out to the market until she has a veil covering her whole body, he must give her a veil whose value is lowest among veils. And a woman shouldn't accustom herself to go out a lot, for it is not becoming of a woman to sit in street corners [Tur]. And among the clothes that he must give her is included her household vessels, and the stool she sits on. And what are these household vessels: A bed with a spread, and a mat or a mat to sit on, and utensils for food such as a dish and a pot and a jug and a flask, a lamb, a cup, a bottle and other such things.

(2) The residence that he rents for her, must be a house measuring four by four cubits, with a courtyard outside of it, and a toilet room is not considered part of this measure.

(3) And we make him give her adornments like colorful clothing to put around her head and forehead, and eyeshadow (black coloring) and rouge (cotton that is colored with safflower and they apply it to the face of the bride so that she looks read, Arukh), and other such things.

(4) To what does this refer? To a poor Jew. But a rich person must provide her with all of these things in accord with his wealth.

(5) If he was cheap in providing for her, even a poor Jew, we force him to divorce her. And the ketubah will be a debt over his head until he grows wealthier (Tur). And see above siman 70, seif 3.