אל תעש עצמך כעורכי הדיינים. פירש הר"ב כאותן האנשים שעורכים ומסדרין טענות בעלי הדין לפני הדיינים שאסור לאדם לגלות דינו לאחד מבעלי הדין ולומר לו עשה כך וכו'. ואע"פ שתחלת דבריו נראין שמפרש עורכי דיינין שהם עצמן מסדרין כך לפני הדיינים. וכך פירש"י בפרק בתרא דסוטה דף מ"ז [ע"ב] לוחשי לחישות מתלחשים עם הדיינים לפתוח להם פתח בזכותו של זה ובתובתו של זה. ע"כ. וכפירש"י בפרק ד' דכתובות דף נ"ב. אבל מסוף דבריו אתה למד שגם תחלת דבריו שעורכין ומסדרין טענות בעלי הדין לפני הדיינים. לא שהם מטעימים בעצמם לפני הדיינים אלא ע"י שמגלין לבעל דין לומר לו עשה כך הרי זה כאילו הם טוענים בפני הדיינים. וכך פירש"י בכאן. גם בפ"כ דשבת דף קל"ט. וז"ל הרמב"ם עורכי הדיינים הם אנשים שלומדים הטענות והדינין עד שיהיו בקיאים בני אדם בדיניהם שהם מחברים שאלות כשיאמר הדיין כך. ענה כך. וכשיטעון בעל הדין כך. תהיה תשובתך כך. כאילו הם עורכי הדין ובעלי הדין לפניהם. ולזה קוראים עורכי הדיינים כאילו ערכו הדינין לפניהם ע"כ. ולפי זה מלת עורכי מושכת שתי מלות הדינין לפני ואינה נסמכת למלת הדיינים בלבד. ובספר לב אבות כתב ששמע דהכי פירושו שהוא כעורך הדיינים עצמן כי הדין שפסקו הדיינים לזכות לזה הוא בסבת מה שסידר זה טענותיו וא"כ זה עורך את הדיינים לדון דין זה. ע"כ. וכתב במדרש שמואל בשם הר"ר מתתיה היצהרי וז"ל לא סלקא דעתך שיטעון לבעל דין דברי און ומרמה שאלה הם רשעים גמורים. אלא אפי' דברי אמת. וישתנה הדין בעבור מה שיעשה כההיא דפרק נערה שנתפתתה (כתובות דף נ"ב) בדין רפואה שאין לה קצבה שהיא כמזונות ונפרעין מנכסי הבעל ויעץ להם רבי יוחנן קוצו לה מידי לרפואה כדי שיהיה דבר שיש לה קצבה. ע"כ. ויצא לי מזה פירוש דברי הר"ב שכתב ולומר לו עשה כך וה"ל למימר תהא טוען כך כדברי הרמב"ם. אלא שדעתי דלהשיאו עצה לעשות מעשה כההוא דר' יוחנן וכן עוד לר"נ בפרק הכותב (כתובות דף פ"ו) שהשיא עצה למחול לכתובתה. אבל ללמדו סדור דבריו וטענותיו כל שאין בו שקר אפשר דלהר"ב אין להתחסד ולהשמט מזה. אבל ודאי דלהרמב"ם אינו כן אלא דאף סדור דברים בעלמא נמי אסור. וז"ל הר"ר יונה הובא במדרש שמואל לא דבר כאן במלמד טענות של שקר לחברו. כי אדם כזה הוא רשע גמור ועבירה גדולה היא זו. והכא במילי דחסידותא עסקינן. אלא במי שמסדר לו טענותיו שבפיו ומטעים אותם. ועורך לפני הדיינים ומגלה לו את הדין. ואמר שאין ראוי לעשות כן כי יחשדוהו. ע"כ. ומדברי כולם למדנו דהיינו דאמר התנא כעורכי בכ"ף שאילו אמר אל תעש עצמך עורך הדיינים. היה במשמע שהעריכה אסורה מצד הדין ואיננה. ועוד נ"ל בדקדוק עצמך שאמר התנא ולא שנה בלשון קצרה אל תהיה וכו' משום ההוא דר"י דאמרינן בגמ' דלהכי יהיב עצה שהיה קרובו וסבר מבשרך אל תתעלם. ואחר כך נתחרט ואמר עשינו עצמנו כעורכי הדיינים. דסבר אדם חשוב שאני. ושמעינן מהכא דאילו לא היה אדם חשוב. יפה היה עושה משום מבשרך אל תתעלם. והיינו דקאמר התנא אל תעש עצמך כלומר כפי עצמך שאתה אדם חשוב. אל תעשה אותך כעורכי אבל זולת זה משרי שרי. ולפי זה אפי' שלא לקרובו שרי כשאינו אדם חשוב והא דאמר רבי יוחנן משום מבשרך היינו דאי לאו הכי למה לו לעשות כן להפסיד שכנגדו דמאי חזא דדמא דהאי סומק טפי. וכן אזהרת התנא לא בא אלא על אדם חשוב מדדייק למתני עצמך. אבל כשאינו אדם חשוב אפילו מדת חסידות אין כאן כיון שאינו מלמדו לטעון שקר. אלא דלמדנו מרבי יוחנן שאמר משום מבשרך אל תתעלם. דאי לאו הכי היה מתעלם ולא מצד חסידות אלא דמה לו להרויח לזה. ולהפסיד לזה. ואם הוא קרובו ואינו אדם חשוב יקיים נמי ומבשרך אל תתעלם. כך נראה בעיני. [*אבל לשון רש"י אדם חשוב שאני שלומדים הימנו ויש שיעשו אף שלא לקרובים. ע"כ. א"כ כל שלא לקרובים הוא בכלל האזהרה דאל תעש וכו']: DO NOT ACT [lit. “make yourself”] LIKE `ORCHEI DAYANIM. Rav: like those people who put together and present the arguments of the litigants before the judges, as one is forbidden to offer legal advice of the type “do such-and-such in order to secure the judgment.” It seems from the beginning of his comment that he understands `orchei dayanim as themseles presenting these arguments before the judges, and this is indeed how Rashi explains a passage in Sotah 47b, commenting on the term “whisperers of whispers”: they whisper back and forth with the judges, finding them a legal opening to rule in favor of one party and against another. And so Rashi on page Ketubot 52b (s.v. Ke`orchei hadayanim).
But from the end of Rav’s comment it is clear that even at the beginning, where he writes “who put together and present the arguments of the litigants before the judges,” he does not mean that they themselves argue these points before the judges, but that in revealing these arguments to the litigant and saying “do such-and-such” it is as though they themselves were arguing before the judges. And this is how Rashi explains it in his commentary here and on Shabbat 139a (s.v. ‘Orchei hadayanim).
Now Rambam writes: “`Orchei hadayanim”—these are individuals who study legal arguments so that people should be familiar with them. They write textbooks in question-and-answer format: “When the judge says such-and-such, answer such and such,” and “when the opposing party says such-and-such, your answer should be such-and-such,” as if the litigants are before them and they are presenting [Heb. `orchei] the arguments. This is why they are called `orchei hadayanim, for it is as if they have presented [Heb. `archu] the arguments before them. According to this reading, the word `orchei, “those who present,” has a hidden object, for it really means “those who present arguments before the judges.”34Some clarification is in order. The phrase `orchei hadayanim is in what is known as the construct state, a feature of Hebrew grammar in which two words x y are read as “the x of y.” Accordingly, `orchei hadayanim should be read as “the `orchim (non-construct plural of the singular `orech) of the dayanim.” Two interpretive questions present themselves: how to understand `orchim, and how to understand the sense in which these `orchim are “of” the dayanim. Rashi in the first approach quoted by the author understands `orchim as a noun meaning “laywers,” more or less, and they are “of” the dayanim, judges, in the sense that they stand before them. The phrase then reads “lawyers arguing before judges.” Rashi and Rav in the second approach quoted by the author differ from the first approach only in that they do not see the `orchei hadayanim as actually present in the courtroom. In what sense, then, are they “of the judges?” To answer this, the author explains that it is as if they have actually presented the arguments before the judges, and for this reason they are called “lawyers arguing before the judges.” Rambam quoted in the third approach sees `orchei as a participle meaning “presenting.” The Hebrew verb here is strictly transitive and as such the participle requires an object, which the Rambam explains as “legal arguments.” The author notes that this object must be supplied by the reader and is therefore a “hidden object,” i.e. not present in the actual phrase `orchei hadayanim, which is now read as “[those who are] presenting (the arguments) before the judges.”
Lev Avot writes that he heard the following explanation: it is as if he has arranged [Heb. `arach] the judges themselves, for when the judges rule in one party’s favor it is because he has presented that party’s arguments, in which sense he has set up [Heb. `arach] the judges to issue this ruling.35I have been translating the verb `arach thusfar as “present.” Although it has the literal meaning “to arrange,” the equivalent English idiom has the lawyers “presenting arguments” rather than “arranging arguments.” The approach of Lev Avot takes the construct `orchei hadayanim to mean “those who arrange the judges” (see above note) or, in more idiomatic English, those who “set up” the judges.
Midrash Shmuel writes in the name of R. Matityah HaYitzhari: the mishna is certainly not discussing one who aids the litigant in presenting deceitful arguments, for such a one is a completely evil person. Rather, it refers even to presenting true arguments that will change the course of the proceedings, as per the passage in Ketubot 52b concerning the law of indefinite medical expenses, which are considered “sustenance” and are paid from the estate of the husband. Rabbi Yochanan advised the heirs to pay a fixed sum to a doctor, making them definite medical expenses.36By Jewish law, before marriage the husband signs a kind of pre-nuptial agreement called a ketubah, which specifies the husband’s obligations to the wife both during marriage and in case of divorce or death. The law dictates that a widow be allowed to choose between collecting the sum specified in her ketubah or receiving basic sustenance from the heirs, which she can do indefinitely until she chooses to collect the ketubah. Some needs, however, are not considered “sustenance” and are deducted from the sum of the ketubah. The question in Ketubot revolves around medical treatment. There, it is the opinion of R. Shimon ben Gamliel that indefinite medical treatment (i.e. for a chronic illness) is considered “sustenance” and must be paid out of the husband’s estate without being deducted from the sum of the ketubah, while definite medical treatment is not considered “sustenance” and is deducted from the sum in the ketubah. Some relatives of Rabbi Yochanan asked for advice concerning a case of indefinite medical treatment. He advised them to find a doctor who would be willing to care for the widow indefinitely for a fixed sum, making the treatment legally definite and therefore deductable from the sum of the ketubah. Rabbi Yochanan afterwards declared that he had erroneously acted like the `orchei hadayanim, in violation of our mishna. Using this commentary, I have arrived at an understanding of what Rav meant when he wrote that the `orchei dayanim offer advice of the type “do such-and-such”. For had he meant, as Rambam means, that they instruct a person in which arguments to put forth, he ought to have written that they advise the person to “argue such-and-such”. I think, rather, that according to Rav, the prohibition is to advise him to act in some way, as in the case of Rabbi Yochanan and the widow, and the case of Rav Nachman, who advised a woman to forgo her ketubah in Ketubot 86a. Rav might agree, however, that one need not be overly pious and avoid even instruction in wording and presenting arguments. Of course, Rambam forbids even wording and presenting arguments.
Midrash Shmuel quoting Rabbenu Yonah: the mishna is not discussing a case of teaching one to use false arguments, for one who would do so is completely evil and this thing is a great sin, and our tractate is devoted to people interested in matters of piety. It is rather discussing a case of improving the strength and order of arguments that the litigant is already planning on using, going through how they will be received in court and showing him the anticipated outcome. The mishna says one should not do this because it will arouse suspicion.
One thing, at least, is clear according to all the commentaries, and that is the reason for the mishna’s use of the word “like” in “do not act like `orchei dayanim”. Had the mishna simply said “do not be `orchei dayanim” it would have sounded like it is actually forbidden to be an `orech dayanim, and it is not.37Rather, it does not befit a pious person to act like they do.
I also think that the wording al ta`as atzmecha, literally “do not make yourself,”38Which we have rendered idiomatically as “do not act like.” as opposed to simply lo tihyeh, “do not be,” is meant to reflect the point made in the abovementioned case of Rabbi Yochanan. There, the Talmud says that he offered his advice because it was his relative that consulted him, and he felt this was a case of “do not turn away from your own flesh and blood” (Isaiah 58:7). He afterwards regretted it and said “we have made ourselves like the `orchei dayanim” because he held that prominent rabbinic figures should not do so. The implication is that were he not a prominent rabbinic figure, he would’ve been correct in doing what he did on account of “do not turn away from your own flesh and blood.” The language of our mishna, “do not make yourself,” is making this point: because of “yourself,” i.e. because you are a prominent rabbinic figure, do not make yourself into an `orech dayanim; otherwise, one may do so. If this is the issue, then it follows that anyone who is not a prominent rabbinic figure may do so even for someone who isn’t a relative, and Rabbi Yochanan only quoted the verse “do not turn away from your own flesh and blood” because otherwise he simply would’ve had no reason to help one party over another, as “who can say whose blood is redder.”39A play on a Talmudic phrase in Sanhedrin 74a.
To sum up, the tanna’s injunction only concerns a prominent rabinic figure, for which reason he used the language “do not make yourself.” One who is not a prominent rabbinic figure need not avoid this even as a matter of piousness, as he is not giving instruction in how to present false arguments. What we learn from the incident with Rabbi Yochanan, who had to quote the verse “do not turn away from your own flesh and blood,” is that otherwise he wouldn’t have gotten involved, not as a matter of piousness but because he had no reason to act to the benefit of one party and loss of another; whereas for a relative, as long as one is not a prominent rabbinic figure, one should act in order to uphold the verse “do not turn away from your own flesh and blood.”
Rashi, however, writes ad loc.: a prominent rabbinic figure is different, because people will learn from his actions and some of them will do this even for non-relatives. If so, the injunction of our mishna would apply to any case involving non-relatives.
יהיו בעיניך כרשעים. אבל שניהם כצדיקים לא שא"כ לא יחפש בטענותיהם וידין כל אחד לכף זכות ולא ירד לאמיתת הדין. אבל כששניהם בעיניו כרשעים יחפש בטענותיהם של כל אחד וברמאות של כל אחד ובשביל כך ירד לאמתת הדין. גם יש לומר דכיון שעכ"פ הא' מן הבעלי דינין הוא עושה שלא כדין וכן בעל הדין השני שיש לו דין עמו הרי הוא כמוהו שכך אמרו [שבועות לט.] לענין שבועה העומדים שם אומרים זה לזה סורו נא מעל אהלי האנשים הרשעים וגו' ואמרו שם [ע"ב ומ"ז ע"ב] שבועת ה' תהיה בין שניהם מלמד שהשבועה חלה על שניהם. וכל זה כיון שיש לזה דין עמו. שניהם נקראו רשעים עד שקבלו את הדין. ואז שניהם צדיקים. כי קבלת הדין אחר המחלוקת שהיה להם. הוא מחמת הצדקות שיש בהם. דרך חיים: YOU SHOULD IMAGINE THEM TO BE WICKED. But do not imagine the two of them to be righteous people, because then you will not thoroughly examine their claims and will charitably interpret everything they say without investigating the case in depth. When one imagines them both to be wicked, one thoroughly examines each one’s claims and considers possible avenues of deception, thereby getting to the truth of the matter.
Another possible interpretation. One of the parties has certainly acted unlawfully, and the Talmud considers the other party similarly implicated, as per the passage discussing oaths in court (Shavuot 39a): those standing there then say to one another, “Step away from the tents of these evil men!” (Numbers 16:26), and there also (ibid. 39b): “The oath of G-d will be taken between them” (Exodus 20:10), this teaches that the oath falls on both of them, i.e., even the party in the right, all because he is involved in a case with the criminal party. They are thus both called “wicked.” When they accept the court’s ruling, however, they are both called “righteous,” because accepting a ruling after their quarrel with one another is an act of righteousness on their part—Maharal in Derech Chaim.
כשקבלו עליהם את הדין. כתב הר"ב שלא תחשוד וכו'. דהוי אמינא כיון דאיכא למחשד. אין זה בכלל והוי דן את כל האדם לכף זכות. צריכא: ONCE THEY HAVE ACCEPTED THE RULING. Rav: you should not look at the guilty party and suspect him of being a thief; rather say that perhaps he was in error and did not intentionally steal. It was necessary to point this out. Since there are valid grounds to suspect him of this, one might have thought to exclude him from the dictum “judge every man favorably” (Avot 1:6).