A widow who has to divide the estate with the heirs of her late husband according to the guidelines of the takana (ordinance) of Tulitula (probably Toledo, Spain. Part of the ordinance limits a ketuba to no more than half of the late husband's estate, see Tur and also Chelkat Mechokek) we assess the value of the Sabbath clothing she is wearing, but not her weekday clothing. Note: The conditions of the remainder ordinance (another part of the takana above) apply only if she dies in the lifetime of her husband ; but if she dies while awaiting levirate marriage, the yavam (living brother) is not restricted by the remainder ordinance (Tur).
A man who divorced his wife as he neared death, even though he divorced her only so that she would not need to undergo levirate marriage, with respect to her ketubah the decree of Tulitula (Toledo) still applies as with [any] divorcee. Note: But if he did not actually divorce her, as in a case where there was never a rumor of her divorce while he was still alive, but she was generally understood to be a widow, but after his death she produced a get (writ of divorce) and said, "I was divorced," she is not believed and needs to bring [additional] proof of divorce, for this get was certainly written only to allow her to escape from levirate marriage (Beit Yosef in the name of R. Yuda ben haRosh).
If she delayed dividing [the estate] with the orphans in accordance with the ordinance a little while, she did not lose her sustenance of that time, even though the orphans have the power to dismiss the widow['s claim] in half the property (Tur in the name of the Teshuvah of the Rosh).
A widow who pays a gentile debt from her husband's property not through the [Jewish] court so that they don't denigrate the property when his land goes up for sale, she did well.
A widow who goes to Beit Din with half of her assets from the dead person [her husband] already in her possession, and the dead man has lands that are mortgaged to another, even though the assets are free for the taking, she [the widow] takes possession of the mortgaged land, because of the tradition that was put into place by the decree, [which said that] everything is split in half.
If their is a matter that is not dealt with by a previous religious decree, the Halacha goes by the rule of the Torah. The Halacha is similar if their is a doubt about the meaning of the decree, about the inheritance of a woman and the proof that she brings, we do not give the inheritance of her husband to her if there is a doubt. (בֵּית יוֹסֵף in place of the תְּשׁוּבַת הָרַ''ן)
In any case that involves the collection of a woman's ketuvah [the money her husband gives her when he divorces her] that is in accordance with the laws of the Torah, the woman getting divorced gets half of the assets that she is entitled to seize by way of this decree [of ketuvah].
If the wife consigned to her husband or to another the rights to collect after her death one half of her dowry which her heirs had been entitled to inherit according to the decree of Toledo, the act is void. But if, effective immediately, she relinquished to her husband her rights in all of his debts that she is holding, her relinquishment is valid. Rama: It is appropriate to follow the language of the decree, that if it implies that she may not relinquish her rights without the consent of the heir, or the grantor gave her the dowry with that condition (that she could not relinquish the rights unilaterally), she may not change the disposition of the monies. If she herself gave the dowry (from her own property), she can relinquish to the husband or to make a condition to give it to another howsoever she desires, as long as she does so before witness, or else the heirs inherit [the dowry] according to the usual custom (all this is explained in Beit Yosef in the name of Responsa Rosh and Rashbatz). In locales where there is a decree that the heirs of the woman divide with the husband should she predecease him, they first pay off all debts owed by the husband. The husband is trusted to say how much he owes, with a "migo" argument that he could have denied and said that he left even less (Responsa Rosh rule 55).
A man who writes, at the time of their marriage, a debt document with a known amount, and he makes a condition that she can collect it whenever she desires, if she does collect it, land can be taken by him and he can eat the fruit(the byproduct of that land). And if she has a debt that she borrowed after she was married, he cannot collect on that. But if she took on a loan before she got married, he can collect on it. But if he only stands to collect from if she becomes widowed or divorced, the debtor cannot collect it from him. Rather, the Beit Din can sell the prospective benefit(the ability to decide to whom the money will go) to him or to another, but not to the husband, and this is not correct. Rather, the Beit Din should not sell this prospective benefit, not to him or others, because everything regarding her husband she forgave(remitted). For we do not trouble the court for nothing.
If the husband gives her a gift, even if the debtor made a loan to her after she was married, he can collect it(the gift) from him.
A document written as follows: Be for me witnesses and write and sign for me in any language that is beneficial, and give it to "Leah" my wife at such and such a place as a full gift, this counts for nothing. Since he did not write that he was giving it to her. And that which he said: "give it," counts for nothing.
the custom that the woman brings land [when she gets married as a dowry] to her [future] husband; a conditional document is written for her and it is a promissory note that she will have in her possession all the time that she wants. [In a situation where] there is no recollection of the land ownership document that she gave him, he does not have [legal ownership of that] land as inalienable assets [brought into the marriage as a dowry], rather its just like regular assets:
If the husband says: she died first and then the son, and the inheritors say: No, rather the son died first, they must bring proof.
One who stipulates in the ketubah that he will not marry another woman after his first wife, is not making a stipulation against that which is written in the Torah.
A man who marries a woman who has stopped being able to give birth, and has taken an oath that he will not marry any other woman against [the first wife's will] they cannot release him from his oath except with her consent.
If someone swore to give his friend half his earnings, and he will be unable to support his wife if he gives him half his earnings, even so he has to fulfill his oath.
A woman who forgave her ketubah and her dowry to her husband, and then she claimed that she forgave under duress for he was threatening to divorce her or to marry another woman because she hadn't given birth, this is not a claim of duress to annul her having forgiven the debt.
A widow who collected all of the property in her ketubah is not liable to bury her husband. Hagah: And even if all there is is enough money for the burial, she collects her ketubah and he is buried from charity funds (Responsa of the Rosh, 15, and Hagahot Maymoni, ch. 17, and Responsa of the Ramban siman 64, and Rashba, siman 1113). But if the orphans seized the movable property, and used to bury him, they need not pay [it back to her] (Ribash, siman 104).
A woman who makes a condition with her husband at the time of her marriage that if she should die without viable issue while married to him, 1/3 of her dowry should flow to her heirs, and then he divorced her and subsequently remarried her per se [without making any qualifications], he has remarried her with the same inheritance conditions. Rama: The decree of the "Shu"m" communities (Speyer, Worms, and Mayence) which are accepted custom nowadays with respect to the dowries of grooms, as explained supra end of chapter 53, some authorities say that the decree was promulgated only with respect to dowry, but not with respect to inheritance received by the woman while married to him (Responsa Rosh rule 54), and similarly with respect to gifts given to the groom. At the time that the properties are returning as per the guidelines of the decree, some say that they return to the grantors of the dowry (Responsa Maimoni to Hilchot Ishut, and so implied in the language of the decree), and some say that the properties fall to the heirs (Responsa Maimoni #35), and this [latter rule] is the custom of our communities. There is no difference whether the father gives the dowry or others grant the dowry (Terumat haDeshen chapter 321). But with respect to women who bring in the dowry [from their own property], they did not make this decree (Mahariv 64). Every place there is a custom, we follow the custom. Even if they did not explicitly make the [customary] conditions at the time of the marriage, it is as if they did make the conditions, for all who marry, do so with the understanding that they will follow the local customs (Rama's own opinion, and so also in Responsa Rashba chapter 1307 and Responsa Maimoni end of Ishut #35). Even if he went to a place which does not follow the customs of the [Shu"m] communities, we follow the customs prevalent in the locale in which the marriage took place (Rivash chapter 105). If the son or daughter did not die a natural death but were murdered or became apostate, some say that in these circumstances the rule of grooms does not apply in these circumstances, and even if the father did not already give the dowry he must still do so (according to GR"A this is referring to the customs described in Even haEzer siman 53:3). But if there is no viable issue that the money needs to return according to the decree [of Shu"m] there is no difference whether they were murdered or died, but if they became apostate, the monies do not need to be returned. And it is appropriate to consider these matters well [when issuing a court ruling].