APPENDIX TO DE MIGRATIONE
§ 5. Soul as soul. This phrase, which occurred in Quod Det. 9, belongs, as Posner points out, to Stoic usage. See Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. vii. 233. The Stoics call the φαντασία a τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ ὡς ἂν ἐν ψυχῇ, because “impression on the soul” might in itself be applied to a pain felt in any part of the living organism. The addition, ὡς ἂν ἐν ψυχῇ signifies that it is “no chance part” which is affected, but the mind or dominant principle.
§ 17. Untouched by corruption and worthy of perpetual memory. What is the distinction between ἀξιομνημόνευτα and ἄφθαρτα or ἀδιάφθορα? Apparently the former are Joseph’s vision of, or hope for, the future, while the latter are the record of his life, so far as it is good. Philo may mean that while the record remains in the background as an example, the hope becomes the inspiring principle of the succeeding generations. If so, “ever to be borne in mind” might perhaps give better the sense of ἀξιομνημόνευτα.
§ 21. He derided lusts, etc. Neither Mangey nor Wendland give the reference to Gen. 39:14 and 17, where Potiphar’s wife says “Lo, he hath brought in a Hebrew servant to mock at us” (ἐμπαίζειν ἡμῖν). Presumably they supposed the words to be a general description of Joseph’s continence. But the form shews that it is a separate item in Joseph’s virtues, each based on a separate text. “Us” is interpreted as meaning “all the passions.” That in the story the “mocking” referred to Joseph’s alleged misconduct matters little or nothing to Philo.
§ 23. ἀνέχεται … ἐνθάπτεται … παρέπεται. I have no hesitation in rejecting Mangey’s and Wendland’s emendation of these to infinitives. Not only would these require, as Wendland indeed saw, the insertion of τὸ (or rather οἷον τὸ to agree with πολλά), and perhaps the change of οὐ to μή, but the sense seems to me quite inferior. This particular “trait” has already been given as one of the ἀξιομνημόνευτα in § 18. I understand the sentence to sum up all that has been said and to assert that the good deeds and words are the “bones,” which themselves cry to be taken from Egypt, and in fact never have been buried at all, a phrase quite inapplicable to Joseph himself. There would of course from this point of view be no objection to reading ἐνθάπτεσθαι dependent on ἀνέχεται, but no sufficient reason for the alteration.
§ 24. διακρίνει παρελθών. The text is very perplexing. As H has παρελθόντα, Wendland suggests as a possibility διακρίνεται παρʼ ἐλπίδα. This seems to me out of place. Mangey suggested διακρίνεται παραλυθέντα. The reading which Wendland actually prints, and which has been reproduced here, is not satisfactory, as the παρελθών is very pointless. I should hesitatingly suggest either διακρίνει παρελών, “removes” and “separates,” or better, as retaining the διακρίνεται of all MSS., διακρίνεται παρεισελθόντων, “is separated from adventitious accretions.” παρεισέρχομαι in the sense of “invading surreptitiously” is used by Philo, De Op. 150, De Ebr. 157.
§ 32. Release. An allusion to the ordinance by which in the sabbatical year the land (here compared to the mind) was to be left fallow, Ex. 33:11 τῷ δὲ ἑβδόμῳ ἄφεσιν ποιήσεις καὶ ἀνήσεις αὐτήν, καὶ ἔδονται οἱ πτωχοὶ τοῦ ἔθνους σου. In Lev. 25:4–7 we have the same ordinance, but with ἀνάπαυσις for ἄφεσις. Philo understands that the land by divine grace will bear plentifully of itself. Compare his φορὰ τῶν αὐτοματιζομένων ἀγαθῶν with τὰ αὐτόματα ἀναβαίνοντα of Lev. He may also be thinking of the somewhat similar ordinance of the Jubilee year, ἐνιαυτὸς ἀφέσεως, though there ἄφεσις means release for the people rather than for the land. On ὥσπερ τῶν ἑκουσίων Mangey wrote “omnino male” and proposed ὡς φόρτων τῶν ἐτησίων. But ἑκούσιος is in Philo’s thought the direct antithesis of αὐτόματος.
§ 35. ἔσχον γὰρ ἑρμηνείαν, εὕρεσιν. I have adopted Markland’s ἔσχον for σχεδόν, but see every reason against changing εὕρεσιν. The five elements of composition are εὕρεσις, τάξις or οἰκονομία, ἑρμηνεία (otherwise called φράσις, λέξις, ἀπαγγελία), μνήμη, ὑπόκρισις. Philo enumerates them in De Som. i. 205. Of these terms the two last belong entirely to spoken oratory, and τάξις would be out of place. When inspiration comes, the two things that come are “ideas” and “language.” These two (in Latin inventio and elocutio) are often given as the kernel of composition, e.g. Quintilian, Pr. 12 “omnia inventione atque elocutione explicanda sunt.” See note on De Cher. 105.
§ 42. Insight. The not very common word εἴδησιν is evidently introduced with reference to εἶδεν. So in the other place where Philo uses it (De Plant. 36), it is connected with the tree of knowledge, which in Gen. 2:9 is the tree τοῦ εἰδέναι.
Ibid. To give teaching … to the ignorant, etc. Or it might be taken “to give teaching … is proper not for the ignorant, but only for the One who knows.” Mangey translates the reading he adopted (see critical note), “decebat igitur ignorantes docere, commonstrareque illis singula, non vero scientem,” apparently meaning that it is right to teach the ignorant, but not to teach God who knows. But apart from the question whether εἶχε εὐπρεπές can mean “decebat,” this has no bearing on the proof that it is God who “shews.”
§ 49. The various parts of speech. By Philo’s time the primitive division into verbs, nouns, and conjunctions (the first two often standing alone in popular language) had been greatly developed and this is recognized in the συνόλως of § 48. The phrase οἱ εἰς ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἰδέας μεριζόμενοι may recur to the primitive division and suggest that there are only two main ἴδεαι (so the translation), or he may mean that verbs and nouns have their various ἴδεαι or subdivisions, the pronoun being a form of the noun and the adverb of the verb. See the loci classici in Quintilian, i. 4. 18, and Dion. Hal. De Comp. 2.
§ 54. Both in conduct of life and in principle. Philo’s conception of moral “greatness,” as shewn by his illustrations in § 55, is a full development and intensification of each particular virtue, and this he equates with the power to understand and know. Possibly, therefore, here τὰ περὶ τὸν βίον κατορθώματα = πλῆθος, and τὰ περὶ λόγον = μέγεθος. If so, the former will represent the καθήκοντα or “daily duties” of the Stoics, and the latter their κατορθώματα proper, which connoted to them inwardness and sustained moral purpose. See note on Quod Deus 100.
§ 69. ἐπιγραφόμενος. This correction of Wendland’s for αἰνιττόμενος is based on the close imitation of the passage in Clem. Alex. Protrept. 25 αἰνίττεται δε … τὸν πολλοὺς ἐπιγραφόμενον ψευδωνύμους θεοὺς ἀντὶ τοῦ μόνου ὄντος θεοῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐκ τῆς πόρνης τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπιγράφεται πατέρας ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν πατρός. Mangey suggested ἀναπλαττόμενος, which is not as good sense, though nearer to the MSS.
§ 79. Mints them … before. The paraphrastic translation is an attempt to bring out Philo’s play upon ἄσημος and ἐπίσημος as signifying (1) uncoined and coined money, (2) obscure and clear or conspicuous.
Ibid. In it. Philo quotes Ex. 4:14 in three other places. In De Mut. 168 the MSS. have as here ἐν αὐτῷ. In Quod Det. 126 and 135, they have, as the LXX itself, ἐν ἑαυτῷ and the comment on the latter of these shews that this is what Philo wrote. While printing ἐν αὐτῷ I feel very doubtful as to its correctness here and in De Mut.
§ 94. Realities. For the philosophical use of ὑπαρκτά cf. τεκμήριον τοῦ ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν, Diog. Laert. vii., and ἔστι μὲν ὑπαρκτὸν πρᾶγμα σοφία, De Mut. 37. Compare the same point in De Sac. 43, where the force of ὑπαρκτά was unfortunately not properly recognized in the translation. Similarly in Leg. All. iii. 197 Ἀβραὰμ … τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχοντα … κατέχει, ἀποπέμπεται δὲ τὴν ἵππον τοῦ βασιλέως Σοδόμων ὡς καὶ τὰ ὑπαρκτὰ τῶν παλλακῶν, it now seems clear to me that we should read τὰ <μὴ> ὑπαρκτά, perhaps also τῶν <υἵων τῶν> παλλακῶν.
§ 125. The threefold divisions of eternity. Or “time.” This curious interpretation of the three patriarchs is perhaps explained in § 154. “The clear sight of things present,” and the “expectation of things to come,” fit in fairly well with the αὐτομαθής and the προκόπτων, the characters regularly assigned to Isaac and Jacob, while the “memory of the past” suits, though not so well, the διδακτικὴ ἀρετή of Abraham. He may also be thinking of Ex. 3:15, where “God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob” is God’s αἰώνιον ὅνομα.
§ 138. Spin your airy fables. The word ἀερομυθεῖτε need not mean more than talk windily, cf. the use of ἀερόμυθος in the list of vices in De Sacr. 33. But there may be a special significance in it here, as the moon at any rate bordered on the ἀήρ (S.V.F. ii. 527).
§ 140. It does not say, etc. This amazing argument admits of no satisfactory explanation. It clearly demands that παιδίον may be nominative, but Mangey’s suggestion to read Σάρραν is out of the question. Apart from other difficulties, the natural negation would be οὐχὶ Σάρρα. Nor can Philo be supposed to have really thought that Σάρρα was indeclinable, seeing that he uses Σάρρας in the same sentence and elsewhere Σάρραν itself. The least unsatisfactory explanation I can give is that he means that Σάρρα, like other O.T. names, which though capable of being declined in Greek are not declined, e.g. Ἀαρών, might conceivably be undeclinable and that therefore Moses, wishing to suggest that, though literally Sarah suckles Isaac, spiritually Isaac suckles Sarah, uses this form rather than the passive, in which no ambiguity would be possible. Possibly also he puts some reliance on παιδίον preceding Σάρρα. See on De Conf. 102.
§ 150. The allusions in this section are (1) to Lot’s settling in Sodom (Gen. 13:12), which naturally signifies his “old complaint” of ἀμαθία, cf. De Conf. 27, (2) to his capture (14:12) by the Four Kings, signifying the four passions, cf. De Congressu 22, (3) the quarrel between the shepherds of Lot and Abraham (13:7), which Philo unfairly turns into a conflict between the two men.
§ 160. The idol of Egyptian vanity. The meaning of this is not clear. In the other places where Philo uses Αἰγυπτιακὸς τῦφος it is with reference to the Golden Calf as being a return to Egyptian idolatry. The meaning therefore here may be that by riding behind Pharaoh he acknowledges him as a god. But in De Som. ii. 46, where this incident is referred to, Joseph himself is ὑποτυφόμενος, and ibid. 16 we have ἀναβαίνει ἐπὶ τὴν κενὴν δόξαν ὡς ἐφʼ ἅρμα. This suggests that ἱδρύεται here may mean “seats himself on,” but no real parallel is forthcoming. Mangey suggested ἐνδύεται.
§ 164. μελιττῶν. The μὲν αὐτῶν of the MSS. seems to me to break down in two ways. There is no antithesis for the μέν. Philo’s μέν indeed is occasionally not followed by δέ, but in these cases there is, wherever I have noted them, an antithesis to something which has gone before. Again, the plural αὐτῶν is quite out of place where both the people concerned are in the singular, and the one cannot be supposed to have any share in the labours of the other. It will be admitted that μελιττῶν makes excellent sense. Textually the ΛΙ of ΜΕΛΙΤΤΩΝ passes very easily into Ν, and Τ with no great difficulty into Υ, and when ΜΕΝΥΤΩΝ had thus been obtained the insertion of Α to make sense would naturally follow.
§ 165. ὑπʼ εὐθυμίας. It is not clear what cheerfulness has to do with the φιλοθεάμων or why it opens the eyes of the soul. As all MSS. (except H) have ὑπὲρ εὐθυμίας, it is possible, I think, that the true reading may be ὑπʼ ἐρεύνης θείας, which exactly describes the φιλοθεάμων. Compare τῆς τῶν θείων ἐρεύνης, Leg. All. iii. 71 and (for the objective use of θεῖος) τῆς θεὶας θεωρίας, § 150 above, and θεῖος ἵμερος, § 157.
§ 167. Arts copying Nature’s works, etc. Cf. De Ebr. 90, where art is the μίμημα and ἀπεικόνισμα of nature, on which Adler remarks that, as the context shews, it does not mean that art imitates natural objects, but that it follows Nature’s methods. So here ἔργων may be “ways of working,” “processes.”
§ 174. ὑποστείληταί σε … The Hebrew and E.V. have “will not pardon thy transgression.” Did the LXX. mean much the same “he will not shrink (from punishing)”? At any rate Philo would seem to have taken it in some such sense, for where the text is quoted in the Quaestiones (in Exod. 2:13) the Latin version of the Armenian has “non enim verebitur te.”
§ 180. For if it came into being and is one, etc. Philo takes ἕν in the full sense of the Stoic ἡνωμένον (cf. note on Quod Det. 49) and argues that if the world is ἡνωμένον, it must be composed of the same elements throughout and this, it is implied, will in itself effect συμπάθεια. Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. ix. 78 (S.V.F. ii. 1013) puts the Stoic argument in much the same way but in reverse order. Only ἡνωμένα exhibit συμπάθεια, and since there is συμπάθεια between the parts of the Cosmos, the Cosmos must be an ἡνωμένον σῶμα.
§ 206. διανιστάμενον. My suggestion of διανεσταμένον is made provisionally subject to better knowledge as to this perfect passive in the compounds of ἵστημι. In Timaeus 81 D there is at any rate some authority for διεσταμένοι. So the LXX in Num. 31:48 καθεσταμένοι. Here a few MSS. have διενιστάμενον. The present must mean “waking up,” as in Quod Deus 97. Cohn’s suggestion of διασυνιστάμενον (presumably meaning “proved to be such,” i.e. μνημονικόν) does not give much point to ἅτε.
§ 207. That does not call for our censure. The application of the adjective ἀνεπιλήπτον, which usually denotes high praise, to the hybrid number seventy-five is at first sight strange, and Mangey’s proposal <οὐκ> ἀνεπιλήπτου is textually, considering our experience of the omissions of the negative in Philo, quite sound. But it would really give an inferior sense. The stress is here laid on the virtues of seventy-five, not on its shortcomings, and if we give ἀνεπίληπτος a somewhat reduced sense as in the translation (cf. ταμιείας ἀνεπιλήπτου § 89, and De Cong. 138), that stress is well brought out. Midway between Joseph and Moses stands the Jacob soul, ὁ προκόπτων, and in its progress the seventy-five is a necessary and therefore “blameless” stage. This is immediately illustrated by §§ 208 ff., where Jacob even in victory is well-advised to return to Haran, that is, to the world of sense and even (§ 209), of opportunism.
§ 210. ζωοτροφεῖ. Mr. Whitaker was inclined to adopt Mangey’s suggestion of ζωπυρεῖ, which is in accordance with ζέον καὶ πεπυρωμένον. On the other hand ζωοτροφεῖ serves to carry on the parable in which the passions are the wild cattle reared by the κτηνοτρόφοι of Haran.
§§ 210, 211 (footnote). De Som. ii. 85 ff. looks as if the advice to temporize with angry people is to be taken more literally than I have suggested in the note.
§ 221. τῇ ἑτέρᾳ. Further consideration shews beyond doubt that in De Sac. 37 where we printed, following Cohn and Mangey, οὐ τῇ ῥαστώνῃ ταῦτα ληπτά we should have put τῇ ἑτέρᾳ or θατέρᾳ. There one MS. has ῥαστώνη, others οὐ τη and οὐχ ἁπλῶς, while by far the best authority, the Papyrus, has ουθετερα, the origin of which is obvious. The phrase seems for some reason to have puzzled the scribes. It is strange that the two German scholars also failed to understand it, for even the old editions of Liddell & Scott record τῇ ἑτέρᾳ λαμβάνειν “ ‘to get with little trouble,’ a proverb,” and give the reference to Plato.