ON THE CONFUSION OF TONGUES (DE CONFUSIONE LINGUARUM)
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION
Philo begins by stating the objections which the sceptical critics had brought against the story. They had said that the project of building a tower to reach heaven was really the same as the Homeric myth of the Aloeidae (2–4), and had pointed out the absurdity of the idea (5). Secondly they had said that the story of the confusion of tongues was much the same as the fable that all animals originally understood each other’s language and lost the privilege by presumption (6–8), and though the story in Genesis was a little more rational, still the idea that the multiplication of languages would serve to prevent co-operation in sin was absurd (9–13). Philo will leave the literalists to answer these criticisms as they can. His own answer is to give an allegorical interpretation of the whole story (14–15).
By “one lip and one voice” Moses is indicating a “symphony” of evils, which is seen not only in the multitude, but in the individual (16), where it sometimes takes the form of the external calamities of fortune (16–20), but still more in the passions which beset the soul (21–22), of which the deluge story is an allegory (23–25), as also the alliance against Abraham (26), and the attack of the whole people of Sodom upon the angel visitors (27–28). The illustration which follows leads to a meditation on the word “lip” (χεῖλος) which also means “edge.” Moses met Pharoah on the “lip” of the river. The Egyptians lay dead on the “lip” of the sea (29–36), and since “lip” means speech, we may see in this death the silencing of convicted falsehood (37–38), though here a caution is needed. There are many unskilled in refuting falsehood and they can only do so with God’s help (39).
The “symphony” of evil suggests the “symphony” of good, and this appears in the words of the patriarchs “we are men of peace, sons of one man.” The one man is the Divine Logos, and only those who acknowledge him are men of peace, while the opposite creed of polytheism breeds discord (40–43). Yet this peace is also a war against the symphony of evil. This thought leads to an exposition of Jeremiah 15:10, particularly of the description by the prophet of himself as a “man of war” (43–51), and hence to the “symphony” gained by the Captains who fought against Midian (52–57), and the highest of all symphonies, when Israel would “do and hear,” that is would do God’s will even before they heard the commandment (58–59).
The next verse of the text is “as they march from the east (or “rising”) they found a plain in the land of Shinar (interpreted as shaking off) and dwelt there.” “Rising” and “shaking off” being applicable to good and ill lead to illustrations from other texts where these words occur (60–74). “Finding” suggests that the wicked actually seek evil (75), and “dwelling there” suggests the contrast (illustrated from sayings of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and Moses) of the good man regarding himself as only a sojourner in the body (76–82).
We now come to the building of the city and tower. The third verse is “come let us make bricks and bake them with fire.” By “brick-making” is meant the analysing and shaping of evil-minded thoughts (83–90), and we are reminded that such brick-making is also imposed upon the Israel-soul, when once it is in bondage to Egypt (91–93). This last thought gives rise to a very loosely connected meditation on the vision of the Divine granted to the liberated Israel in Ex. 24. and the interpretation of its details (94–100). The “baking with fire” signifies the solidarity which sophistical argument gives to their vices, and so too we have “their brick became a stone” (101–102). But on the other hand the “asphalt became clay,” that is, God subverts their evil designs, before they attain the safety (ἀσφάλεια) of “asphalt” (103–104). Two thoughts on “asphalt” follow suggesting that its “safety” is rather the safety of bodily than of spiritual things (105–106).
“Let us build ourselves a city and tower whose head shall reach to heaven.” Our souls are cities and the fool summons all his senses and passions to help him build his city with its tower or acropolis to his taste (107–112). When the tower seeks to rise to heaven, it signifies the impious attempt of theological falsities (especially the denial of providence) to attack celestial truths (113–115). On the next words “let us make our name” Philo bursts into invective against the madness of the wicked in actually flaunting their wickedness (116–118). It is true indeed that they have an inkling that there is a divine judgement awaiting them as they shew by the next words “before we are scattered abroad” (119–121). But this is only in the background of their thoughts. In general they are of Cain’s lineage and believe in the self-sufficiency of man, the folly of which Philo denounces in his usual way, and this self-sufficiency gives a second meaning to the words “its head shall reach to heaven” (122–128). But this tower will be overthrown even as Gideon overthrew the tower of Penuel (turning away from God), not in war but when he returned in peace—the true peace (129–132). By a third interpretation “heaven” may mean “mind,” and the attempt to reach it be the attempt to exalt sense above mind (133).
The words “the Lord came down to see the city and the tower” call for the usual protest against anthropomorphism, and Philo again emphasizes the truth that God’s Potencies are everywhere, while His essential nature is not in space at all (134–139). The intention of Moses in using the phrase is to shew us by God’s example the need of close examination before we dogmatize, and the superiority of sight to hearsay (140–141). As for the phrase the “sons of men,” some may scoff at it as a pleonasm, but the true meaning is that these builders are not, like the pious, “sons of God” (141–145), nor yet sons of “one man,” that is the Logos (146–147). Son-ship in fact is often in the scriptures used in this spiritual sense (148–149). The next words, “behold they are all one race and one lip,” give rise to the thought that there may easily be unison in the worst disharmony (150–151), while in “they have begun to do this” “this” is the impiety against heaven which crowns their misdeeds to men. They only “began,” for heaven is inviolable and blasphemies recoil upon the blasphemer (152–154), yet they are treated as though they succeeded, which is indicated by the words “the tower which they built” (155). (At this point Philo interpolates a curious piece of literalism; not only is it a physical impossibility to build such a tower, but anyone who attempted it would be blasted by the heat of the sun) (156–157). That the punishment entailed by the accomplished sin falls upon the undertaken sin is shewn in Balaam’s fate (158–159), and the law which refuses sanctuary to him who has attempted murder (160). (Incidentally this law is given the spiritual meaning that the mind which believes God to be the author of evil as well as good and thus throws the responsibility for its own sins upon Him, is essentially unholy) (161). The next words, “nothing shall fail them of all they attempt,” teach us that the greatest punishment God can give is to give the sinner opportunity without restraint, and this is illustrated (as in Quod Det. 141 ff.) by Cain’s word “that I should be let free is the greater indictment (or punishment)” (162–167).
When we come to the words “let us go down and confound their tongues” we have first to explain the plural in God’s mouth, of which he gives other examples (168–169). He then puts forward, as in De Op. 75, the theory (based on the Timaeus) that God committed certain tasks to his lieutenants, the Potencies and the spiritual beings called “Angels” (170–175). As man also has free will and is therefore capable of sin God shared the work of man’s creation with His ministers, that He Himself should not be the cause of evil (176–179). So too He calls upon His subordinates (here definitely called Angels) to bring the punishment of “confusion” upon the impious (180–182). As for the word “confusion” (σύγχυσις) we may accept the philosophic usage in which it stands for a mixing so complete that the original properties of the ingredients are destroyed, in contrast to μίξις where the ingredients are merely juxtaposed, and κρᾶσις where though chemically combined they can still be analysed (183–188). Thus σύγχυσις of the impious means that their powers are so annihilated that neither separately nor in combination they can work mischief (189). The literalist interpretation that the story merely describes the differentiation of languages may not be untrue, but it is inadequate. Had such differentiation been intended we should have expected some such term as separation or distribution rather than confusion, and moreover differentiation of function, as we see in the human organism, is beneficial rather than the reverse (190–195). That σύγχυσις implies destruction in this passage is confirmed by the words which follow, “the Lord dispersed them thence,” for dispersion conveys a similar idea (196). The dispersion of the wicked will imply the reassembling of the good whom they had dispersed, in fact establish the “symphony” of virtues in the place of the “symphony” of evil. Viewed in this double light of “destruction” and “dispersion” the name σύγχυσις well describes the fool whose life is as worthless as it is unstable (197-end).