APPENDIX TO DE SOMNIIS, I
§§ 1–2. Wendland calls attention to the resemblance between these sections coupled with De Som. ii. 1–2, and the classification ascribed to Posidonius in Cic. De Div. i. 64: “Tribus modis censet (sc. Posidonius) deorum adpulsu homines somniare, uno, quod provideat animus ipse per sese, quippe qui deorum cognatione teneatur, altero, quod plenus aer sit inmortalium animorum, in quibus tamquam insignitae notae veritatis appareant, tertio, quod ipsi di cum hominibus colloquantur.” Of these the first agrees fairly well with Philo’s third: “When the soul, setting itself in motion and agitation of its own accord, becomes frenzied, and with the prescient power due to such inspiration foretells the future.”
There are also distinct points of contact between Posidonius’ second kind and the dreams of this book. In the first vision it is the Logos which Jacob “meets,” and the Logoi are described in § 127 in words which recall the “animi immortales” of Posidonius. Also the point is made in § 241 that it was God’s “image,” not God Himself, which the dreamer beheld. In the second vision it is the Angel who speaks, and the point that God uses His ministers for this purpose is stressed in § 190. Whether any such connexion can have been made between Posidonius’s third kind and Philo’s first, i.e. the dreams treated in the lost book, seems to me more doubtful. If, as Wendland supposes, these were the warnings sent to Abimelech (Gen. 20:3–7), and to Laban (Gen. 31:24), it is true that in both these cases “God” is said to have come and spoken, but would Philo have admitted that these were real visions of the Self-existent? Moreover the main ideas underlying the two classifications are different. With Posidonius it is the distinction between the natures of the divine monitors, with Philo the presence or absence of human volition. The conclusion seems to be that while he probably had the Stoic classification in mind, he has put it into a very different shape.
§§ 21–23. The illustrations which follow are mostly drawn primarily from Wendland’s article in Sitzungsberichte der Königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1897, pp. 1074–1079. Wendland refers usually to Diels’s Doxographi, to which I subjoin the references as well as to the sources from which Diels took them.
§ 21. Crystal (or ice?). Empedocles said στερέμνιον εἶναι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐξ ἀέρος παγέντος ὑπὸ πυρὸς κρυσταλλοειδῶς (Stobaeus, Ecl. i. 23, p. 500 H., Diels p. 339).
Pure fire. Parmenides, Heracleitus, Strato, Zeno, said πύρινον εἶναι τὸν οὐρανόν (Stob. ib., Diels p. 340).
Fifth substance. Aristotle ἐκ πέμπτου σώματος (οὐρανόν) (Stob. i. 23, p. 502 H., Diels ib.).
§ 22. Lumps of earth. Thales γεώδη μέν, ἔμπυρα δὲ τὰ ἄστρα (Stob. i. 24, p. 506 H., Diels p. 342).
Dells and glades. Wendland quotes from Diels p. 356 (Stob. i. 26, p. 552 H.) that Anaxagoras and Democritus said that the moon was στερέωμα διάπυρον ἔχον ἐν ἐαυτῷ πέδια καὶ ὄρη καὶ φάραγγας. But a better illustration would be that Democritus called its face an ἀποσκίασμα τῶν ὑψηλῶν ἐν αὐτῇ μερῶν. ἄγκη γὰρ αὐτὴν ἔχειν καὶ νάπας (Stob. ib. p. 564 H., not in Diels). But apart from both these being said of the moon and not of the stars, the statement that they were “dells and glades” is totally different from saying that they have them. I should suggest that Philo misunderstood Democritus and supposed him to mean that the stars were fiery hollows in the plain of heaven.
Masses of fiery metal. Archelaus said that they were μύδρους διαπύρους δέ (Stob. i. 24, p. 508 H., Diels p. 342). The same was said by Anaxagoras and Democritus of the sun (Stob. i. 25, pp. 528 and 532 H., Diels p. 349). See footnote.
Unbroken and close harmony. No illustration is forthcoming for this, and I can make no clear suggestion as to the meaning. πυκνός (Lat. spissus) is a term used in music with compounds ἄ-, βαρύ-, ὀξύ-, μεσό-πυκνός, and applied to φθόγγος. Whether there can be any connexion with this, I must leave to others. Stephanus also quotes from Pollux, as epithets of a flute-player, εὕστομος, πυκνός, ξυνεχής. That the stars produced a harmony is of course a well-known Pythagorean belief.
Indissoluble compresses of ether. Anaximander called them πιλήματα ἀέρος τροχοειδῆ, πυρὸς ἔμπλεα (Stob. i. 24, p. 510 H., Diels p. 342). As there seems little connexion between this view and that of the “harmony” one is tempted to insert ἢ before πιλήματα.
Living and intelligent. Zeno said that each of the stars is νοερὸν καὶ φρόνιμον (Stob. i. 25, p. 538 H., Diels p. 467).
§ 23. Borrowed light. Ascribed to Thales in the first instance and held by Pythagoras, Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Metrodorus (Stob. i. 26, p. 558 H.). A light of its own to Anaximander, Xenophanes, Berosus (Stob. i. 26, p. 556, Diels p. 358).
§ 28. Genera … systems. On this section I have consulted two high musical authorities, Professor Percy Buck and Dr. Rootham, though neither of them must be considered responsible for the choice of words in these two cases. As γένη is the technical term in Greek music for the three “modifications,” enharmonic, diatonic and chromatic (see Aristides Quintilianus i. 9), I have followed the Dictionary of Antiquities in translating it “genera.” Other words suggested are “groupings” or “scales.” Again as to στάσεσι (or τάσεσι) as applied to conjunct and disjunct tetrachords the same authorities shew that the regular term is συστήματα (A. Q. i. 8), and I have sought safety in adhering to this. Professor Buck suggests “relationships (of tetrachords).” As to the reading, while στάσις is certainly not a full equivalent for σύστημα, it seems possible here in the sense of “placing” or “setting.” τάσις is a “pitch.” Professor Buck notes that the word is so far appropriate that conjunct and disjunct tetrachords can be placed at any “pitch” you like, but could we say that the συνημμένον in general is one τάσις and διεζευγμένον another? I am inclined to suggest συστάσεσι. In σύστασις we have a fairly near synonym for σύστημα, easily corrupted into στάσις or τάσις, and perhaps preferred by Philo as avoiding the jingle with διαστήμασι. (Or again τάξεσι might be possible, though textually less satisfactory.)
§§ 30–32. Illustrations mostly drawn, as those on §§ 21–23, from Diels are as follows. It should be noted that, properly speaking, they apply to the ψυχή rather than to the νοῦς.
§ 30. Breath. “Zeno concretum corpori spiritum (dixit animam)” (Cicero, Somn. Scip. i. 14. 19, Diels p. 213). Much the same is said of Hippocrates and Democritus, ibid.
Blood. “Empedocles et Critias sanguinem,” ibid.
Boundary-line. Or “limit”? Wendland cites Iamblichus quoted in Stob. Ecl. i. 41, p. 858 H. to the effect that Aristotle reduced the properties of the soul to three, thus πέρας τῶν ἀπείρων ἀνευρών. But does this mean more than that the properties of the soul are really infinite? I should imagine the opinion to be Pythagorean and to embody to some extent the idea of πέρας as it appears in Philolaus’s dictum that all things are composed ἐξ ἀπείρων τε καὶ περαινόντων, cf. Plato, Philebus, 16 and 23.
Form. “Posidonius ideam (animam dicit)” (Cic. ibid.). Perhaps more to the point ὡς δὲ τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν τινες ὑφηγοῦνται, εἶδός ἐστι τὸ (ἐπὶ?) περὶ τοῖς σώμασι (Stob. i. 41 from Iamblichus). See also definition of ἐντελέχεια.
Number. Pythagoras ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν κινοῦντα (Stob. i. 41, p. 794 H., Diels p. 386); Cicero, Somn. Scip. i. 14. 19, Diels p. 213, “Xenocrates numerum se moventem.”
Continuity. I have retained ἐνδελέχειαν in the text, as Wendland, with grave doubt. The somewhat slight arguments in its favour are (1) the unanimous authority of the MSS., (2) Cic. Tusc. i. 22 “Aristoteles … animum ἐνδελέχειαν appellat novo nomine quasi quandam continuatam motionem et perennem.” And if this is as it seems a mistake of Cicero’s it is one which Philo may easily have made. On the other hand Diog. Laert. v. 32 of Aristotle is clear for ἐντελέχεια. The soul is incorporeal, ἐντελέχειαν οὖσαν τὴν πρώτην σώματος φυσικοῦ καὶ ὀργανικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. λέγει δʼ ἐντελέχειαν, ἦς ἐστιν εἶδός τι ἀσώματον. And so also Stob. i. 41, p. 796 H., Diels p. 387. If ἐντ- has to be translated I should prefer to keep “entelechy” rather than “realization” (Hicks), or “actuality” (L. & S.).
Harmony. Pythagoras and Philolaus, Cic. ibid., Diels ibid.
§ 31. Introduced … from without. Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Plato, Xenocrates, Cleanthes, θύραθεν εἰσκρίνεσθαι τὸν νοῦν (Stob. i. 40, p. 790 H., Diels p. 392).
The air … impart hardness, etc. Cf. S. V. F. ii. 804–808, where this theory is mentioned with the use of the same verb στομοῦται and the same derivation of ψυχή from ψῦξις (originally given by Plato. Crat. 399 E).
§ 32. Head … heart. See note on De Sac. 136. “Citadel” from Timaeus 70 A, where Archer-Hind quotes from Galen, De Plac. Hipp. et Plat. ii. 230 καθάπερ ἐν ἀκροπόλει τῇ κεφαλῇ δίκην μεγάλου βασιλέως ὁ ἐγκέφαλος ἵδρυται.
§ 44. Sails of the sovereign mind … oars of sense-perception. I have retained Mr. Whitaker’s translation which brings out the original meaning of the proverbial δεύτερος πλοῦς (see L. & S.). Philo’s insistence on the nautical idea, as shewn in εὐπλοῆσαι, suggests that he is not using the phrase casually, as no doubt it often was used. But since πρός suggests the goal of the sailor rather than the means he employs, it may perhaps be thought better to translate “those voyagers who have failed to reach the sovereign mind can always take the ‘second-best voyage’ to sense.” Philo again uses the phrase, which Plato had made familiar to him, in § 180 below and De Dec. 84, but with no special emphasis on the metaphor.
§ 47. Grandfather … of his knowledge. I take this opportunity of making good an omission in earlier volumes. The Oxyrhynchus Papyrus of Philo (P. Oxy. ix. 1173, xi. 1356), to which my attention has been called by a paper by Mr. W. G. Waddell (Etudes de Papyrologie, tom. i., Le Caire, 1932), had entirely escaped our notice, though published some twenty years ago. Though of about the same date as the Paris Papyrus (see Introductions to De Sac. and Quis Rerum), it appears to be exceedingly fragmentary, and I doubt whether it would have influenced our text, with the possible exception to be now mentioned. One of the pieces (Fr. 3) contains fragments of that part of De Sac. (§ 43) in which the parallel phrase πάππῳ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ παιδείας occurs, and on which, following Cohn, we threw some suspicion. It now appears from Mr. Waddell’s analysis of this Papyrus that in a lacuna between μεμάθηκε δὲ ταῦτα and ἑαυτοῦ παιδείας there is room for about seven letters more than what appears in the other authorities, viz. παρὰ τῷ πάππῳ τῆς, and he suggests παρὰ τῷ πάππῳ <τῷ πατρὶ> τῆς. The fact is noticeable, and standing by itself would certainly increase the natural suspicion of this odd phrase. But, on the other hand, the recurrence here of an almost identical expression applied to the same two persons, Abraham and Jacob, points to the conclusion that “grandfather of his education” (or “knowledge”) is right, and that some other explanation is needed for the phenomena of the Papyrus. Cohn himself (Hermes, 1897, p. 140) cast doubt on his own suspicions, basing himself on Quod Deus 92. But the far more conclusive evidence of this phrase in De Som. i. seems still to have escaped his notice; unless indeed, which I can hardly think possible, he took ἐπιστήμης as dependent on ὄνομα, as Mangey does.
§ 53. Whether it is a foot in diameter. So Heraclitus εὖρος ποδὸς ἀνθρώπου (Stob. i. 25, p. 526 H., Diels p. 351).
Many times its size. Perhaps referring to Anaximander’s opinion that the circle of the sun is 28 times that of the earth, though the visible portion which we call the sun is equal to the earth (Stob. i. 25, p. 524, Diels ibid.). Cf. Cic. Acad. ii. 82 “quem mathematici amplius duodeviginti (? duodetriginta) partibus confirmant maiorem esse quam terram. Mihi quidem pedalis videtur.” For other opinions which Philo may have in mind see Reid’s note in loc.
§ 54. What is above … close to yourself. Wendland compares with this the words ascribed by Tertullian to Epicurus (Usener, Epicurea, p. 229). Other writers assign the saying to Socrates.
§ 57. All that existeth, etc. This quotation, which has already been made by Philo in a similar context, De Mig. 195, has special appropriateness because it was said to have been applied by Socrates himself to his own inquiries (Diog. Laert. ii. 21).
Ibid. The exact meaning of § 57 is not very clear. The thought suggested in the translation is that the meteorologist is ironically told that he may mount to heaven if he will, but the only good he can do by this is to get hold of the “explorer” and bring him down to earth. Philo seems to forget that the whole speech is addressed to the κατάσκοπος, see § 53.
Again, if γνῶθι σαυτόν, or, as we should certainly expect, <τὸ> γ. σ., is the object of ἀντισπάσας, the passage has a curious resemblance to the “e caelo descendit γνῶθι σεαυτόν” of Juv. xi. 27. This phrase receives no illustration from the commentators on Juvenal, and I suspect may be founded on some proverbial line, which Philo also makes use of. If on the other hand γ. σ. is the principal verb and ἀντισπάσας governs τὸν κατάσκοπον, it will be almost necessary to omit εἶτα, as Mangey and indeed the majority of the MSS. do.
§ 99. ἀνείμονα. The only quotation given for this word either in Stephanus or the revised L. & S. is Od. iii. 348:
ἀνείμονος ἠὲ πενιχροῦ,
ᾧ οὔ τι χλαῖναι καὶ ῥήγεα πόλλʼ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ,
οὔτʼ αὐτῷ μαλακῶς οὔτε ξείνοισιν ἐνεύδειν.
The fact that in both passages the word is used of sleeping with inadequate covering suggests that we have here a distinct reminiscence of Homer. Note also the appearance of πενιχρός, a rare word in Philo, just above. But he also uses the word in De Spec. i. 83 of the priests when clad ἐν μόνοις τοῖς χιτωνίσκοις, and perhaps in De Gig. 53, where I have suggested ἀνείμονι for the MSS. ἀνειμένῃ.
§ 101. Explanatory statement. L. & S. 1927 give this passage as an example of ἀφορισμός = “a pithy sentence,” “aphorism.” I do not see anything pithy in it, or, if there is, how it bears on Philo’s view that the form of the passage favours an allegorical rather than a literal interpretation. The argument is clearly very similar to, and I believe identical with, that of 82 above, De Fuga 171 and De Ebr. 138, where stress is laid on the use of the future indicative instead of the imperative. In all these cases the thought was that the words indicated not a personal prohibition but a fact in spiritual life. I suggest that here it is the same, though it is true that it is not a universal fact that the “taker” of “reason” will restore it before the spiritual sunset.
In the other cases the verb used is ἀποφαίνεται or ἀποφαίνεται γνωμήν. That here we have ἀφορισμός and ἀφοριζόμενος will cause little difficulty if it is remembered that ἀποφαντική and ὁριστική are convertible terms for the indicative mood. The latter word is generally used by Apollonius Dyscolus (see index to Grk. Gramm. voi. i.). Thus after mentioning that both terms are used he adds ἰδίας μέντοι ἐννοίας ἔχεται ἡ ὀριστική, διὰ γὰρ ταῦτης ἀποφαίνομενοι ὁριζόμεθα (Syn. 25 b), i.e. the name ὁριστική carries with it the idea not only of a fact stated, but of a particular fact parted off from others. So too the statement itself is regularly called ὁρισμός. That we have here the prefix ἀφ- cannot weigh, I think, against the otherwise overwhelming evidence that the words are used in this grammatical sense.
I have followed Wendland’s suggestion of inserting ἀποδώσεις αὐτῷ because it seems almost impossible that Philo would have failed to make the point. But the continuation of the quotation is by no means otiose. The verbs are all in the indicative and (except the last) state facts, while in the hortatory form we have the subjunctive expressing purpose. It is a possible conjecture that in some grammatical terminology, otherwise unknown, a sentence containing several indicatives was called an ἀφορισμός instead of an ὁρισμός.
§ 126. Princely abundance of materials. As the text stands the sense is presumably that the conditions described are as good as those of royal state. But a comparison with Quod Det. 13, where Jacob is spoken of as possessing βασίλεως περιουσίαν, leaves the possibility that Philo is contrasting his simple living with the patriarchal wealth. If this is the meaning we might conjecture that καίτοι has fallen out after καὶ νῦν.
§ 134. First of those which are related to us (or near to us?). I do not understand what this expression, which implies two sets of κύκλοι, means, or know of any cosmological theory which would justify them. As τῶν for MSS. τοῖς or τῆς is purely conjectural, I should prefer to omit it or substitute τό. We should then get the natural statement that the moon-sphere is the last of the Eight, taking them down from the top, but first if they are taken up from the earth.
§ 138. The numbers and periods determined by nature. What is the reference in these words, called in De Plant. 14 “certain fixed periods”? Have we an allusion to the three περίοδοι χιλιετεῖς of Phaedrus 248 E ff., assigned to the philosophical souls, while the unjust remain on earth for 10,000 years? Compare also Rep. x. 617, and the proem of Empedocles quoted by Thompson on the Phaedrus passage.
§ 145. Aristotle speaks of the moon as ἐν μεθορίοις ἀέρος τεταγμένην καὶ τῆς πέμπτης οὐσίας μετέχουσαν (Stob. i. 26, p. 564 H., Diels p. 356). Also μὴ εἶναι αὐτῆς ἀκήρατον τὸ σύγκριμα διὰ τὰ πρόσγεια ἁερώματα τοῦ αἰθέρος, ὃν προσαγορεύει σῶμα πέμπτον (Stob. 16, Diels p. 361). For the last part compare the Stoic opinion, τοῦ ἀέρος διαμελαίνοντος ἔμφασιν γίνεσθαι μορφοειδῆ <προσώπου> S. V. F. ii. 673.
§ 153. εἴδωλον. This use of the word is very strange. The nearest parallel for its use as an “idea” or “mental conception” is Xen. Symp. 4. 21 οὕτω σαφὲς ἔχω εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὡς, εἰ πλαστικὸς ἢ ζωγραφικὸς ἦν, οὐδὲν ἄν ἧττον ἐκ τοῦ εἰδώλου ἢ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁρῶν ὁμοῖον αὐτῷ ἀπειργασάμην. But both the genitive following and the context put this on a different footing. Wendland suggests ἐμφαίνει δʼ ἔτι καὶ τοιοῦτον <τὸ> or ἐμφαίνεται … τῷ εἰδώλῳ. Both these assume that εἴδωλον can be used for a dream in general. If the word is to stand I should prefer to read τοιούτου εἴδωλον, “an image or picture of the following idea.”
§ 158. ἐπερείδοντος. The MSS. have this word in the active here and § 241, and De Plant. 7 in the sense of “support” or “establish.” In each case editors have suggested ὑπερείδω (Mr. Whitaker in De Plant. 7 ἀπ-). The lexica certainly give no evidence for this meaning for ἐπ-, which would naturally mean “to make to rest upon” (something in the dative), and Philo frequently uses it so in the passive. As, however, stability is generally given in this way, it is not unnatural that the word should get this extended meaning, and it seems hardly wise to overrule the repeated evidence of the MSS.
§ 164. Prompter. This is perhaps as near as we can get to the meaning of ὑπήχει. But the word, which is frequently used by Philo, seems to carry with it the thought of a voice heard inwardly and not audible in the ordinary sense. Thus it is sometimes coupled with ἔνδοθεν, and several times (e.g. De Mut. 139) applied to the divine voice which speaks to the prophet, to the memories or echoes of the lecturer’s words which the student carries away with him (De Cong. 67), and to the “haunting” voice of enticing pleasure (De Post. 155). Other examples in this volume are De Som. ii. 2 and 252. This usage is entirely ignored in L. & S. Stephanus quotes some of these passages, but inadequately translates by “succinere.”
§ 184. A space outside it in the interval between worlds. An allusion to the Epicurean doctrine that the gods’ habitation was the μετακόσμα (intermundia). Cf. (Ἐπίκουρός φησι) καθῆσθαι τὸν θεὸν ἐν τοῖς μετακοσμίοις οὕτω καλουμένοις ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, Usener, Epicurea, p. 240 (quoted from Hippolytus); “deos induxit Epicurus … habitantes tamquam inter duos lucos sic inter duos mundos propter metum ruinarum,” Cic. De Div. ii. 40.
§§ 186–188. The two chief difficulties are the phrases ἐν τῷ χειροτονηθέντι and ὁ κόσμος μετακληθήσεται. Mr. Whitaker’s theory as to the first, that the “appointed one” is the Logos, may be tenable in so far as there is good evidence for the thought that the intelligible world is in the Logos or is itself the Logos, see De Op. 17 and 20, and it has the great merit that it takes the text as it stands. But the application of “Him who was appointed in accordance with divine bounties” (or “elections,” reading χειροτονίας for χορηγίας as Mr. Whitaker proposed) to the Logos does not seem to me natural, and at any rate it does not lead up to any explanation of the difficulty in § 188.
My alternative suggestion cannot, of course, claim to be more than a guess, but I think it has the merit that without any great change of the text it provides an explanation of the whole passage which is consistent throughout and is thoroughly after Philo’s manner.
I will take § 188 first. Wendland excludes the whole of the last sentence as a Christian interpolation describing the Celestial City. I see little grounds for this. The New Jerusalem of the Revelation has walls and gates, though it is true that the latter are always open. Possibly Wendland took μετακληθήσεται as meaning “shall receive a new name” in allusion to Rev. 2:17, and though this sense of the word has little evidence recorded in the lexica it is a quite possible and natural meaning, and has been adopted in the translation. But this carries us but a little way to Wendland’s theory of Christian interpolation.
On the supposition that the passage is genuine, the general sense is clear enough that while ordinarily we can only know the intelligible world through our experience of the sensible world, there are conditions in which, or persons to whom, it is known directly. As I have said, the only difficulty is the phrase ὁ κόσμος μετακληθήσεται. If μετακ. is taken as “shall change its name” I can see no sense that Philo could have meant. If we give the word its usual sense of “summoned” we expect a person instead of ὁ κόσμος for the subject, and presumably that person will be Moses, and the higher type of soul that Moses represents. This will be quite consistent with other passages, e.g. De Mut. 7, where the darkness which Moses enters is the contemplation of the incorporeal and invisible substance, and there is a very close analogy in Leg. All. iii. 100: “There is a mind more perfect and more thoroughly cleansed which has been initiated into the great mysteries, a mind which gains its knowledge of the first cause not from created things, as one may learn the substance from the shadow, but lifting its eyes above and beyond creation obtains a clear vision of the uncreated. This mind is Moses.” Here there is the difference that the thing directly seen is God Himself, not the world of mind, but otherwise the thought is the same. I propose then to correct κόσμος to κοσμολόγος, “the world explorer,” whose world is that of intelligible substance or reality. That the word is not given in the lexica matters not at all; it is a perfectly natural formation which anyone might make on the analogy of μετεωρολόγος, etc., and the phrase κοσμολόγος νοητῆς ὑποστάσεως is as natural at any rate as κόσμος ν. ὑ. The only other emendation actually needed is ἐν τῷ <νῷ> διαχαραχθεῖσα for ἐν τῷ διαχαραχθέντι, though it is possible that μακρόθεν may have fallen out before or after θεαθέν, cf. Ex. 20:21, “the people stood afar off (μακρόθεν), but Moses entered the darkness.” I should explain the corruption in the first case by supposing that νῷ dropped out and that then -θείσης was altered to -θέντι for grammatical reasons.
The translation of the first half of the sentence will then be: “But the world-explorer whose world is intelligible reality will need no sight of outward shapes, but only the archetypal ‘idea’ engraved in the mind, and by this he will be summoned to the Form (or Vision), which he sees not in shadow but in substance” (or “will be summoned with no intervening shadow to the Form which he has beheld from afar”). μετακληθήσεται will be an echo of ἐκάλεσα Κύριος τὸν Μωυσῆν, Ex. 24:16, and εἶδος of εἶδος, ibid. 17.
In § 186 the only difficult words are ἐν τῷ χειροτονηθέντι. I suggest that here we have the foreshadowing of the next section, i.e. that they state the exception to the general sense of this section. This can be obtained by correcting ἐν to πλήν, an easy correction in itself, though it is a more serious difficulty that κόσμον νοητόν can hardly stand in that position and some rearrangement is required, the simplest being to transfer the words to after συσταθέντα.
§ 205. ῥυθμοὺς καὶ μέτρα κτλ. Wendland puts no comma after μέτρα but one after διατονικά, thus implying that enharmonic, etc., are μέτρα. This, which perhaps is a mere slip, is quite impossible. μέτρα must be used in the sense which it regularly bears in the accepted division of music into melody, rhythm, metre, viz. what we mean by metre, cf. Aristides Quintilianus i. 4, where we have μελῳδία, ῥυθμός, λέξις followed at once by περὶ τὴν λέξιν τὸ μέτρον, and later (i. 10) by a full discussion of μετρική. The triple division is given by Philo in De Cher. 105, De Sob. 36, and De Agr. 137, where the enharmonic, etc., are given as subdivisions of μέλος.
Ibid. From rhetoric, etc. Here we have the fundamental divisions of rhetoric which appear in the same form in most of the rhetorical treatises, except that it is perhaps unusual to find both τάξις and οἰκονομία, the latter, which covers the management and organization of the material, either superseding the former, or including it as a subdivision. Synonyms for φράσις are λέξις, ἀπαγγελία, ἑρμήνεια, the last named of which is used by Philo in De Cher. 105, and, I believe, in De Mig. 35. See notes on those two passages.
§ 214. Ashes. As the point is essential to Philo’s illustration, one must suppose that he found, or thought he had found, some authority for the statement that ashes were used in purificatory ritual. The nearest evidence I can find is the use of the “ashes of the heifer” in Num. 19:9, alluded to in Hebrews 9:13. Possibly τέφρα, like κονία, may have been a name for some kind of lye or soap, but I know of no evidence for it.
§ 230. Not from any superstitious nicety, etc. The explanation I should prefer to give to this passage is that Philo feels that his distinction between θεός and ὁ θεός might subject him to the charge of giving the name of θεός to inferior beings, which would constitute δεισιδαιμονία in the ordinary sense. What then is the meaning of πραγματολογεῖν? Judging from the sequel it is not so much “to use words to express facts” as “to accommodate language to practical needs.” The course of thought seems to be: (1) any name for God is a κατάχρησις permitted for the needs of men (§ 230), a point further illustrated in § 231 (the spacing should perhaps be placed at the end of that section rather than at the beginning); (2) God allows men to think that He has been really seen by them (§ 234), and this is illustrated by the pagan legend (§ 233), and the anthropomorphic language of the law (§§ 234–237); (3) He in the same way speaks here of the Angel or Logos as God, though it really was God’s image which was seen, and thus πραγματολογεῖ, etc., suits His words to the capacity of His hearers.
It may be thought that this strains the meaning of πραγματολογεῖν. The fact is that this word, which has been used in De Fug. 54, is rare and of uncertain meaning. Besides these two instances only two others are quoted. In Diog. Laert. ix. 52 it appears to mean “argue,” or make a business of arguing, and so possibly in De Fug. 54 (see note). In Anaximenes, Rhet. ad Alex. 32 (31) ἵνα πραγματολογοῦντες ἁπλοῦν τὸν λόγον καὶ μὴ ποικίλον ποιῶμεν, it seems to mean “speaking plainly and intelligibly,” and this is not far from the sense suggested by the context here.
§ 244. Erecting. It is a pity that the impossibility of using the phrase “make to stand” prevents the translator from bringing out fully the insistence with which Philo harps on the thought of “standing” in connexion with στήλη. He finds the idea, no doubt, in the word itself, and repeats it not only in the ἕστηκα of § 241 and στάσις of § 242, but also in ἱστάς § 244, στήσεις § 245, ἀνίστησι, ἀναστήσας § 249.
§ 247. Set up. Similarly the thought of ἀνάθεσις is repeated in ἀνετέθη here, and ἀνακείσεται (κεῖμαι as often being treated as the passive of τίθημι, though in these cases the idea of “dedication” seems to be reduced to the literal “set up,” unless, as perhaps is possible, it is used in the sense of “devoted” under a curse, cf. the common use of ἀνάθεμα, or (in the first case) unless there is an allusion to models of wrecked ships or pieces of the actual wreck being dedicated as votive offerings by the saved. For votive pictures of this kind see Mayor on Juv. xii. 27.
§ 254. 1 Sam. 1:11.—Wendland erroneously gives the reference as to v. 28 (“I lend him as a loan”), as also in Quod Deus 6, on which passage, carelessly following Wendland, I suggested in a note that Philo in v. 28 had a different version of the text from the LXX. A German reviewer pointed out the mistake.