חֶזְקַת הַבָּתִּים וְהַבּוֹרוֹת וְהַשִּׁיחִין וְהַמְּעָרוֹת וְהַשּׁוֹבָכוֹת וְהַמֶּרְחֲצָאוֹת וּבֵית הַבַּדִּין וּבֵית הַשְּׁלָחִין וְהָעֲבָדִים וְכָל שֶׁהוּא עוֹשֶׂה פֵרוֹת תָּדִיר, חֶזְקָתָן שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים מִיּוֹם לְיוֹם. שְׂדֵה הַבַּעַל, חֶזְקָתָהּ שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים, וְאֵינָהּ מִיּוֹם לְיוֹם, רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר, שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה וּשְׁלֹשָׁה בָּאַחֲרוֹנָה וּשְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ בָאֶמְצַע, הֲרֵי שְׁמֹנָה עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר, חֹדֶשׁ בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה וְחֹדֶשׁ בָּאַחֲרוֹנָה וּשְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ בָּאֶמְצַע, הֲרֵי אַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ. אָמַר רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, בַּמֶּה דְבָרִים אֲמוּרִים, בִּשְׂדֵה לָבָן. אֲבָל בִּשְׂדֵה אִילָן, כָּנַס אֶת תְּבוּאָתוֹ, מָסַק אֶת זֵיתָיו, כָּנַס אֶת קֵיצוֹ, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים: With regard to the presumptive ownership of houses; and of pits; and of ditches; and of caves, which are used to collect water; and of dovecotes; and of bathhouses; and of olive presses; and of irrigated fields, which must be watered by people; and of slaves; and all similar property that constantly, i.e., throughout the year, generates profits, their presumptive ownership is established by working and profiting from them for a duration of three years from day to day. If the one in possession of the property can prove that he worked and profited from it for the previous three full years, there is a presumption that it belongs to him, and would remain in his possession if another were to claim that the property belonged to him or to his ancestors. With regard to a non-irrigated field, i.e., one that is watered by rain, in which produce grows during certain seasons during the year, its presumption of ownership is established in three years, but they are not from day to day, since the fields are not worked and harvested continually throughout the three-year period. Rabbi Yishmael says: Three months of possession in the first year, three months of possession in the last year, and twelve months of possession in the middle, which are eighteen months, suffice to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to a non-irrigated field. Rabbi Akiva says: A month of possession in the first year, and a month of possession in the last year, and twelve months of possession in the middle, which are fourteen months, suffice to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to a non-irrigated field. Rabbi Yishmael said: In what case is this statement, that eighteen months are required for a non-irrigated field, said? It is said with regard to a white field [bisdeh lavan], i.e., a grain field. But with regard to a field of trees, once he gathered his produce, and then harvested his olives, and then gathered his figs, these three harvests are the equivalent of three years. Since he harvested three types of produce, this is equivalent to having possessed the field for three years.
שָׁלֹשׁ אֲרָצוֹת לַחֲזָקָה, יְהוּדָה וְעֵבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן וְהַגָּלִיל. הָיָה בִיהוּדָה וְהֶחֱזִיק בַּגָּלִיל, בַּגָּלִיל וְהֶחֱזִיק בִּיהוּדָה, אֵינָהּ חֲזָקָה, עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא עִמּוֹ בַמְּדִינָה. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, לֹא אָמְרוּ שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים אֶלָּא כְדֵי שֶׁיְּהֵא בְאַסְפַּמְיָא, וְיַחֲזִיק שָׁנָה, וְיֵלְכוּ וְיוֹדִיעוּהוּ שָׁנָה, וְיָבֹא לְשָׁנָה אַחֶרֶת: There are three independent lands in Eretz Yisrael with regard to establishing presumptive ownership: Judea, and Transjordan, and the Galilee. If the prior owner of the field was in Judea and another took possession of his field in the Galilee, or if he was in the Galilee and another took possession of his field in Judea, the possessor does not establish presumptive ownership until the one possessing the field will be with the prior owner in one province. Rabbi Yehuda says: The Sages said that establishing presumptive ownership requires three years only in order that if the owner will be in Spain [Aspamya], and another possesses his field for a year, people will go and inform the owner by the end of the next year, and the owner will come back in the following year and take the possessor to court.
כָּל חֲזָקָה שֶׁאֵין עִמָּהּ טַעֲנָה, אֵינָהּ חֲזָקָה. כֵּיצַד, אָמַר לוֹ, מָה אַתָּה עוֹשֶׂה בְתוֹךְ שֶׁלִּי, וְהוּא אָמַר לוֹ, שֶׁלֹּא אָמַר לִי אָדָם דָּבָר מֵעוֹלָם, אֵינָהּ חֲזָקָה. שֶׁמָּכַרְתָּ לִי, שֶׁנָּתַתָּ לִי בְמַתָּנָה, אָבִיךָ מְכָרָהּ לִי, אָבִיךָ נְתָנָהּ לִי בְמַתָּנָה, הֲרֵי זוֹ חֲזָקָה. וְהַבָּא מִשּׁוּם יְרֻשָּׁה, אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ טַעֲנָה. הָאֻמָּנִין וְהַשֻּׁתָּפִים וְהָאֲרִיסִין וְהָאַפּוֹטְרוֹפִּין, אֵין לָהֶם חֲזָקָה. אֵין לָאִישׁ חֲזָקָה בְּנִכְסֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְלֹא לָאִשָּׁה חֲזָקָה בְּנִכְסֵי בַעְלָהּ, וְלֹא לָאָב בְּנִכְסֵי הַבֵּן, וְלֹא לַבֵּן בְּנִכְסֵי הָאָב. בַּמֶּה דְבָרִים אֲמוּרִים, בְּמַחֲזִיק, אֲבָל בְּנוֹתֵן מַתָּנָה, וְהָאַחִין שֶׁחָלְקוּ, וְהַמַּחֲזִיק בְּנִכְסֵי הַגֵּר, נָעַל וְגָדַר וּפָרַץ כָּל שֶׁהוּא, הֲרֵי זוֹ חֲזָקָה: Any possession that is not accompanied by a claim explaining how the possessor became the owner is not sufficient to establish the presumption of ownership. How so? If the prior owner said to the possessor: What are you doing in my land? And the possessor said to him in response: I am in possession of the land because no person ever said anything to me about my being here, i.e., he states no valid claim as to why he would be the owner of the land, his mere use is not sufficient to establish the presumption of ownership. But if the possessor claimed: I am in possession of the land because you sold it to me, or: Because you gave it to me as a gift, or: Because your father sold it to me, or: Because your father gave it to me as a gift, these are valid claims to ownership. In these cases, his possession is sufficient to establish the presumption of ownership. And one who comes to claim the land based on inheritance does not need a claim explaining why his ancestors had a right to the land. Craftsmen who are in possession of items that they are repairing, and partners, and sharecroppers, and stewards [veha’apotropin] do not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to property in their possession, as their possession is not indicative of ownership. Similarly, a man does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to his wife’s property, and a wife does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to her husband’s property. And a father similarly does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to a son’s property, and a son does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to a father’s property. A husband and wife, or son and father, use each other’s property freely. Possession is therefore not indicative of ownership. The mishna continues: In what case is this statement, that one establishes the presumption of ownership after profiting from the property for a certain duration, with the exception of the above people, said? It is said in a case of one who has mere possession of the property, which does, in some cases, serve as proof of ownership. But in a case where another person gives one a gift, or there are brothers who divided their inheritance, or there is one who takes possession of the property of a convert who died without heirs and his property is now ownerless, as soon as one locked the door of the property, or fenced it or breached its fence even a bit, this is considered taking possession of the property, and it effects acquisition.
הָיוּ שְׁנַיִם מְעִידִין אוֹתוֹ שֶׁאֲכָלָהּ שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים, וְנִמְצְאוּ זוֹמְמִין, מְשַׁלְּמִין לוֹ אֶת הַכֹּל. שְׁנַיִם בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה, וּשְׁנַיִם בַּשְּׁנִיָּה, וּשְׁנַיִם בַּשְּׁלִישִׁית, מְשָׁלְשִׁין בֵּינֵיהֶם. שְׁלֹשָׁה אַחִים וְאֶחָד מִצְטָרֵף עִמָּהֶם, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שָׁלֹשׁ עֵדֻיּוֹת, וְהֵן עֵדוּת אַחַת לַהֲזָמָה: If there were two witnesses testifying on his behalf that he, the possessor of the land, worked and profited from a field for three years, and therefore has presumptive ownership, and they were found to be conspiring witnesses, as it was proven that they were not present to witness the matter about which they had testified, they must pay the true owner of the field the full value of the field that they attempted, through their testimony, to remove from his possession, as it is written in the Torah: “Then shall you do to him, as he had planned to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19). If two witnesses testify that he worked and profited from the field during the first year, another two testify that he worked and profited from it during the second year, and another two testify that he worked and profited from it during the third, and all were found to be conspiring witnesses, payment of the value of the field to the owner is divided among them. If the testimony was given by three brothers, each of whom testify about one year, and another unrelated individual joined with each of the brothers as the second witness, these are three distinct testimonies and they are accepted by the court. If they were to be considered one testimony, it would not be accepted, as brothers may not testify together. But they are one testimony for the purpose of rendering them as conspiring witnesses, and the payment is divided among them.
אֵלּוּ דְבָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶם חֲזָקָה, וְאֵלּוּ דְבָרִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם חֲזָקָה. הָיָה מַעֲמִיד בְּהֵמָה בֶחָצֵר, תַּנּוּר, וְכִירַיִם, וְרֵחַיִם, וּמְגַדֵּל תַּרְנְגוֹלִין, וְנוֹתֵן זִבְלוֹ בֶחָצֵר, אֵינָהּ חֲזָקָה. אֲבָל עָשָׂה מְחִצָּה לִבְהֶמְתּוֹ גְּבוֹהָה עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, וְכֵן לַתַּנּוּר, וְכֵן לַכִּירַיִם, וְכֵן לָרֵחַיִם, הִכְנִיס תַּרְנְגוֹלִין לְתוֹךְ הַבַּיִת, וְעָשָׂה מָקוֹם לְזִבְלוֹ עָמֹק שְׁלֹשָׁה אוֹ גָבוֹהַּ שְׁלֹשָׁה, הֲרֵי זוֹ חֲזָקָה: These are uses of property that have the means to establish the presumption of ownership, and these are uses of property that do not have the means to establish the presumption of ownership: If one would stand an animal in a courtyard; or if one would place an oven, a millstone, or a stove there; or if one raises chickens in a courtyard, or places his fertilizer in a courtyard, these actions are not sufficient to establish the presumption of ownership. But if one constructed a partition ten handbreadths high to contain his animal, and similarly if he constructed a partition for his oven, and similarly if he constructed a partition for his stove, and similarly if he constructed a partition for his millstone; or if one brought chickens into the house, or if he fashioned a place in the ground for his fertilizer that is three handbreadths deep or three handbreadths high, these actions are sufficient to establish the presumption of ownership.
הַמַּרְזֵב אֵין לוֹ חֲזָקָה, וְיֵשׁ לִמְקוֹמוֹ חֲזָקָה. הַמַּזְחִילָה יֶשׁ לָהּ חֲזָקָה. סֻלָּם הַמִּצְרִי אֵין לוֹ חֲזָקָה, וְלַצּוֹרִי יֶשׁ לוֹ חֲזָקָה. חַלּוֹן הַמִּצְרִית אֵין לָהּ חֲזָקָה, וְלַצּוֹרִית יֶשׁ לָהּ חֲזָקָה. אֵיזוֹ הִיא חַלּוֹן הַמִּצְרִית, כָּל שֶׁאֵין רֹאשׁוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם יָכוֹל לִכָּנֵס לְתוֹכָהּ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, אִם יֶשׁ לָהּ מַלְבֵּן, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין רֹאשׁוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם יָכוֹל לִכָּנֵס לְתוֹכָהּ, הֲרֵי זוֹ חֲזָקָה. הַזִּיז, עַד טֶפַח, יֶשׁ לוֹ חֲזָקָה, וְיָכוֹל לִמְחוֹת. פָּחוֹת מִטֶּפַח, אֵין לוֹ חֲזָקָה, וְאֵין יָכוֹל לִמְחוֹת: With regard to a spout protruding from one’s roof gutter draining water into another’s property, its owner has no means to establish an acquired privilege for its use, but he does have the means to establish an acquired privilege with regard to its place, as the Gemara will explain. With regard to a gutter pipe that traverses the length of the roof, one does have the means to establish an acquired privilege for its use. With regard to an Egyptian ladder, which is small and portable, one has no means to establish an acquired privilege for its use. But with regard to a Tyrian ladder, which is large and fixed in place, one does have the means to establish an acquired privilege for its use. With regard to an Egyptian window, one has no means to establish an acquired privilege for its use; but with regard to a Tyrian window, one does have the means to establish an acquired privilege for its use. What is the defining feature of an Egyptian window? It is any window that is so small that a person’s head is not able to fit inside it. Rabbi Yehuda says: If a window has a frame, even though a person’s head is not able to fit inside it, one does have the means to establish an acquired privilege for its use. With regard to a projection emerging from the wall of one’s house, overhanging a courtyard, one has the means to establish an acquired privilege for its use if it protrudes at least as far as a handbreadth, and the owner of the courtyard can protest its construction. If it protrudes less than a handbreadth, the owner of the house has no means to establish an acquired privilege for its use, and the owner of the courtyard cannot protest its construction.
לֹא יִפְתַּח אָדָם חַלּוֹנוֹתָיו לַחֲצַר הַשֻּׁתָּפִין. לָקַח בַּיִת בְּחָצֵר אַחֶרֶת, לֹא יִפְתְּחֶנָּה לַחֲצַר הַשֻּׁתָּפִין. בָּנָה עֲלִיָּה עַל גַּבֵּי בֵיתוֹ, לֹא יִפְתָּחֶנָּה לַחֲצַר הַשֻּׁתָּפִין. אֶלָּא אִם רָצָה, בּוֹנֶה אֶת הַחֶדֶר לִפְנִים מִבֵּיתוֹ, וּבוֹנֶה עֲלִיָּה עַל גַּבֵּי בֵיתוֹ וּפוֹתְחָהּ לְתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ. לֹא יִפְתַּח אָדָם לַחֲצַר הַשֻּׁתָּפִין פֶּתַח כְּנֶגֶד פֶּתַח וְחַלּוֹן כְּנֶגֶד חַלּוֹן. הָיָה קָטָן, לֹא יַעֲשֶׂנּוּ גָדוֹל. אֶחָד, לֹא יַעֲשֶׂנּוּ שְׁנָיִם. אֲבָל פּוֹתֵחַ הוּא לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים פֶּתַח כְּנֶגֶד פֶּתַח וְחַלּוֹן כְּנֶגֶד חַלּוֹן. הָיָה קָטָן, עוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ גָדוֹל. אֶחָד, עוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ שְׁנָיִם: A person may not open his windows, i.e., build an opening in a wall to use as a window, into a courtyard belonging to partners, i.e., a courtyard in which he is a partner. If he purchased a house in another, adjacent courtyard, he may not open the house into a courtyard belonging to partners. If he built a loft on top of his house, he may not open it into a courtyard belonging to partners. Rather, if he desired to build a loft, he may build a room within his house, or he may build a loft on top of his house, and open it into his house, not directly into the courtyard. A person may not open an entrance opposite another entrance or a window opposite another window toward a courtyard belonging to partners, so as to ensure that the residents will enjoy a measure of privacy. If there was a small entrance he may not enlarge it. If there was one entrance he may not fashion it into two. But one may open an entrance opposite another entrance or a window opposite another window toward the public domain. Similarly, if there was a small entrance he may enlarge it, and if there was one entrance he may fashion it into two.
אֵין עוֹשִׂין חָלָל תַּחַת רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, בּוֹרוֹת שִׁיחִין וּמְעָרוֹת. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מַתִּיר כְּדֵי שֶׁתְּהֵא עֲגָלָה מְהַלֶּכֶת וּטְעוּנָה אֲבָנִים. אֵין מוֹצִיאִין זִיזִין וּגְזֻזְטְרָאוֹת לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, אֶלָּא אִם רָצָה כּוֹנֵס לְתוֹךְ שֶׁלּוֹ וּמוֹצִיא. לָקַח חָצֵר וּבָהּ זִיזִין וּגְזֻזְטְרָאוֹת, הֲרֵי זוֹ בְחֶזְקָתָהּ: One may not form an empty space be-neath the public domain by digging pits, ditches, or caves. Rabbi Eliezer deems it permitted for one to do so, provided that he places a covering strong enough that a wagon laden with stones would be able to tread on it without breaking it, therefore ensuring that the empty space will not cause any damage to those in the public domain. One may not extend projections or balconies [ugzuztraot] into the public domain. Rather, if he desired to build one he may draw back into his property by moving his wall, and extend the projection to the end of his property line. If one purchased a courtyard in which there are projections and balconies extending into the public domain, this courtyard retains its presumptive status, i.e., the owner has the acquired privilege of their use, and the court does not demand their removal.