Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:1

משנה: שְׁבוּעוֹת שְׁתַּיִם שֶׁהֵן אַרְבַּע שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל וְשֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל שֶׁאָכַלְתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא אָכַלְתִּי. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל וְאָכַל כָּל־שֶׁהוּא חַייָב דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי עֲקִיבָה. אָֽמְרוּ לוֹ לְרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה אֵיכָן מָצִינוּ בְּאוֹכֵל כָּל־שֶׁהוּא שֶׁהוּא חַייָב שֶׁזֶּה חַייָב. אָמַר לָהֶן אֵיכָן מָצִינוּ בִּמְדַבֵּר וּמֵבִיא קָרְבָּן שֶׁזֶּה מְדַבֵּר וּמֵבִיא קָרְבָּן. MISHNAH: There are two kinds of oaths¹Mishnah 1:1. This Chapter treats “blurted oaths” (Leviticus.5.4">Lev. 5:4) where a person makes an oath that he shall do or not do certain things, which do not involve others. A breach of such an oath triggers a liability for a variable sacrifice (or if made before witnesses, punishment by flogging.) The liability for a variable sacrifice is subject to the usual conditions for such a sacrifice, prior knowledge, oblivion, and remembrance. which are four kinds: An oath that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat; that I ate, or that I did not eat. An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate the most minute amount, he is liable, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. They said to Rebbi Aqiba, where do we find that one who eats the most minute amount should be liable, that this one be liable²In all other matters, only food in the volume of an average olive triggers obligations.? He told them, where do we find that a person talks and has to bring a sacrifice; but this one talks and has to bring a sacrifice³In general, only actions, not words, trigger obligations; but an oath is simply words (Shevuot 3:10:3" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Shevuot.3.10.3">Note 166). In commercial transactions an obligation is enforceable only when it was confirmed by an action, such as a signature or a handshake. But there are other possible exceptions, such as blasphemy and apostasy (Shevuot 3:1:4" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Shevuot.3.1.4">Note 21).!

הלכה: שְׁבוּעוֹת שְׁתַּיִם שֶׁהֵן אַרְבַּע כול׳. נִיחָא שֶׁאוֹכַל וְשֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל. שֶׁאָכַלְתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא אָכַלְתִּי. מָה נָן קַייָמִין. אִם בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁאָכַל וְנִשְׁבַּע שֶׁלֹּא אָכַל. שְׁבוּעַת שֶׁקֶר הוּא. וְאִם סָבוּר שֶׁאָכַל וְנִשְׁבַּע שֶׁלֹּא אָכַל. רִבִּי בָּא רַב יְהוּדָה בְשֵׁם רַב. בְּשׁוֹגֵג בְּקָרְבָּנָהּ וּבְמֵזִיד בְּקָרְבָּנָהּ. אֲבָל. סָבוּר הָיִיתִי שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ שְׁבוּעָה. מוּתָּר. אֶלָּא בְמֵזִיד בָּהּ וּבְשׁוֹגֵג בְּקָרְבָּנָהּ. וְלֹא כֵן אָמַר רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. מֵזִיד בְּחֵלֶב וְשׁוֹגֵג בְּקָרְבָּן מַתְרִין בּוֹ וְלוֹקֶה וּמֵבִיא קָרְבָּן. לֵית יְכִיל. דָּמַר רִבִּי לָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי לָֽעְזָר. כָּךְ מֵשִׁיב רִבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל לְרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה. מָצִינוּ דָּבָר שֶׁחַייָבִין בִּזְדוֹנוֹ מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּעַת שֶׁקֶר וּבְהֶעֱלֵימוֹ מִשּׁוֹם בִּיטּוּי. וִיתִיבִינֵיהּ רִבִּי עֲקִיבָה. מָצִינוּ דָבָר שֶׁחַייָבִין בִּזְדוֹנוֹ מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּעַת שֶׁקֶר וּמֵבִיא קָרְבָּן. אֶלָּא כִי נָן קַיּיָּמִין בְּבָרִיא לוֹ שֶׁאָכַל וְנִשְׁבַּע וְנִמְצָא שֶׁלֹּא אָכַל. לֹא בְאוֹמֵר. אֵין זוֹ שְׁבוּעָה. תַּמָּן בָּאוֹמֵר. אֵין זוֹ שְׁבוּעָה. בְּרַם הָכָא בְּיוֹדֵעַ בָּהּ שֶׁשְּׁבוּעָה הִיא אֶלָּא שֶׁהוּא בְטוֹעֶה מַחְמַת דָּבָר אַחֵר. HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”⁵We do not talk here about judicial oaths which by necessity are about past events, but “blurted oaths”. How can a statement about past events ever lead to a variable sacrifice? For a future directed oath it is possible that he had the honest intention of keeping what he swore to but later he forgot. But for the past we must assume that he knows what he did.? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath⁶Under the right conditions he can be punished for it, but there can be no atoning sacrifice.. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice⁷A sacrifice is possible only for an inadvertent sin. In this context, “inadvertent” may mean that the perpetrator was not aware that his act was criminal or sinful, or that he was not aware that the act if inadvertent requires a sacrifice.. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted⁸A statement qualifies as an oath only if it is pronounced as such, not as a simple statement.. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice⁷A sacrifice is possible only for an inadvertent sin. In this context, “inadvertent” may mean that the perpetrator was not aware that his act was criminal or sinful, or that he was not aware that the act if inadvertent requires a sacrifice.. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan⁹Terumot7:1 Notes 5,6; Šabbat11:5 (13b), Ketubot 3:1:7" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Ketubot.3.1.7">Ketubot3:1 Note 30, Bava Qamma7:2 Note 29; Shabbat.69a">Babli Šabbat69a.: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice¹⁰Sacrifices are possible only for inadvertent deadly sins. If a person knew that eating fat was forbidden but did not know that it was a deadly sin, he simultaneously committed an intentional sin and an unintentional deadly sin. If he had been duly warned by two witnesses not to break the law, he can be flogged for the intentional sin and has to bring a sacrifice for the unintentional deadly sin even though there cannot be two penalties for one crime (Terumot 7:1:4-14" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Terumot.7.1.4-14">Terumot7:1 Notes 19–70).. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael¹¹Who is R. Aqiba’s opponent. All of Mishnah 1 is R. Aqiba’s teaching. R. Ismael opposes adding backward looking oaths as blurted oaths. answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting¹²A future directed oath, where it cannot be verified instantly whether it will be kept or violated, is an actionless crime and cannot be prosecuted (cf. Shevuot 3:1:1" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Shevuot.3.1.1">Note 3). The preconditions of a sacrifice for a blurted oath negate the possibility of judicial penalties.? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice¹³If R. Aqiba did accept R. Joḥanan’s argument, it would be possible for a person to be flogged for violating the prohibition of perjury (Leviticus.19.12">Lev. 19:12) and still be liable for a sacrifice. This would make R. Ismael’s objection irrelevant.? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There¹⁴If he denies that he intended or pronounced an oath, there is no oath and the entire discussion is irrelevant., if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else¹⁵He made the oath in good faith but his mind was distracted by other things. It is an inadvertent sin which qualifies for a sacrifice..

מָה נָן קַייָמִין. אִם בְּאוֹמֵר. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל אֲכִילַת תּוֹרָה. אַף רִבִּי עֲקִיבָה מוֹדֶה. וְאִם בָּאוּמֵר. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֶטְעוֹם. אַף רַבָּנִן מוֹדוּ. אֶלָּא כִי נָן קַייָמִין כָּל־שֶׁהוּא. כָּל־שֶׁהוּא אֲכִילָה. פָּתַר לָהּ כְּרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה דְּאָמַר. כָּל־שֶׁהוּא אֲכִילָה. מַה מַפְקָה מִבֵּינֵיהוֹן. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ. וַאֲכָלָהּ חָסֵר כָּל־שֶׁהוּא. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה חַייָב. עַל דַעְתִּין דְּרַבָּנִין פָּטוּר. שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל כִּכָּר זֶה. וַאֲכָלָהּ חָסֵר כָּל־שֶׁהוּא. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה פָטוּר. עַל דַעְתִּין דְּרַבָּנִין חַייָב. אַף בִּשְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי כֵן. שְׁבוּעָה אִשְׁתִּי נֶהֱנִית לִי אִם אוֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ. וַאֲכָלָהּ חָסֵר כָּל־שֶׁהוּא. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה אִשְׁתּוֹ אֲסוּרָה. עַל דַעְתִּין דְּרַבָּנִין אִשְׁתּוֹ מוּתֶּרֶת. שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ. וַאֲכָלָהּ חָסֵר כָּל־שֶׁהוּא. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה אִשְׁתּוֹ מוּתֶּרֶת. עַל דַעְתִּין דְּרַבָּנִין אִשְׁתּוֹ אֲסוּרָה. אוּף בִּנְכָסִין כֵּן. שְׁבוּעַת נְכָסַיי עָלַי אִם אוֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ. וַאֲכָלָהּ חָסֵר כָּל־שֶׁהוּא. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה אֲסוּרִין. עַל דַעְתִּין דְּרַבָּנִין נְכָסִים מוּתָּרִין. שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ. וַאֲכָלָהּ חָסֵר כָּל־שֶׁהוּא. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה נְכָסָיו מוּתָּרִין. עַל דַעְתִּין דְּרַבָּנִין אֲסוּרִין. Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards¹⁶The standard minimal amounts of food which in biblical rules either are needed for the validity of an act or may lead to prosecution of a criminal act. This is the volume of an average olive. R. Aqiba must agree that if somebody insists that his food intake be measured by biblical standards, the minimum is an olive-sized piece. The Shevuot.21b">Babli disagrees (21b) and holds that R. Aqiba agrees with R. Simeon that there is no lower limit for prosecutable offenses (Pesaḥim3:1 29d l. 61)., even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree¹⁷Tasting by definition involves minute amounts (Shevuot.22a">Babli 22a).. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them¹⁸Between R. Aqiba and his opponents in the second part of the Mishnah.? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable¹⁹Let ε denote the volume of an olive. If somebody swore that he would (or would not) eat a certain amount m, for R. Aqiba he fulfilled (or violated) his oath if he ate exactly amount m. But for the rabbis he fulfilled (or violated) his oath if he ate more than m-ε but less than m+ε. This is the basis of the subsequent examples. If he had sworn to eat exactly one loaf, for R. Aqiba he violated his oath by eating a minute quantity less than a whole loaf but for the rabbis he swore truly.. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths²⁰This expression is difficult to understand and may be a copyist’s error since the preceding two examples are prime examples of blurted oaths. Maybe one should read “vows”, since the example uses the language of vows denying usufruct. it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

וַהֲרֵי הַמְגַדֵּף מֵבִיא קָרְבָּן. חֲבֵרַייָא אָֽמְרֵי בְשֵׁם רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ. כְּשִׁיטָּתוֹ הֵשִׁיבוּהוּ. כְּשִׁיטָּתָךְ שֶׁאַתָּה אוֹמֵר. אֵין הַמְגַדֵּף מַעֲשֶׂה. אֵיכָן מָצִינוּ בִמְדַבֵּר וּמֵבִיא קָרְבָּן שֶׁזֶּה מְדַבֵּר וּמֵבִיא קָרְבָּן. רִבִּי בָּא קַרְתִּיגְנָאָה בָעֵי. מִחְלְפָה שִׁיטַּת רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ. תַּמָּן מָר. לְרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה אֵין הַמְגַדֵּף מַעֲשֶׂה. וְהָכָא מָר. מְגַדֵּף מַעֲשֶׂה כְרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה. רִבִּי לָא בְשֵׁם רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ. תְּרֵין תַּנָיִין אִינּוּן עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה. חַד אָמַר. אֵין הַמְגַדֵּף מַעֲשֶׂה. וְחַד אָמַר. הַמְגַדֵּף מַעֲשֶׂה. Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice²¹This is a matter of contention. In Keritot 1:1" href="/Mishnah_Keritot.1.1">Mishnah Keritut1:1, the anonymous Tanna, supposed to represent the school of R. Aqiba, lists the blasphemer as one who has to bring a purification sacrifice for inadvertent sin but the Sages insist that the blasphemer cannot bring a sacrifice since a sacrifice is restricted to atone for actions.? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his²²The anonymous Tanna in our Mishnah here, who also is supposed to represent the school of R. Aqiba. argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There²³In Sanhedrin 7:9:8" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Sanhedrin.7.9.8">Sanhedrin7:13 (Note 282) R. Simeon ben Laqish explains that for R. Aqiba the conjurer of magical spells does not act since he simply speaks, but here he attributes the same opinion to the opponents of R. Aqiba. he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm²⁴The inconsistency is not R. Simeon ben Laqish’s but is the Mishnah’s choice of representatives of the reputed teachings of R. Aqiba. Since R. Aqiba’s students were scattered by the Hadrianic persecutions and only a few survived, the divergence of traditions is easily explained. following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.