Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:5

משנה: רִבִּי לִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר הַשֶּׁרֶץ וְנֶעְלַ֥ם מִמֶּ֔נּוּ. עַל הֶעֱלֵם הַשֶּׁרֶץ חַייָּב וְאֵינוֹ חַייָּב עַל הֶעֱלֵם מִקְדָּשׁ. רִבִּי עֲקִיבָה אוֹמֵר וְנֶעְלַ֣ם מִמֶּ֔נּוּ וְה֥וּא טָמֵ֖א עַל הֶעֱלֵם טוּמְאָה חַייָּב וְאֵינוֹ חַייָּב עַל הֶעְלֵם הַמִּקְדָּשׁ. רִבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר וְנֶעְלַ֣ם מִמֶּ֔נּוּ וְנֶעְלַ֣ם מִמֶּ֔נּוּ שְׁתֵּי פְעָמִים לְחַייֵּב עַל הֶעֱלֵם הַטּוּמְאָה וְעַל הֶעֱלֵם הַמִּקְדָּשׁ׃ MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer says, the crawling animal and he became oblivious⁸³Leviticus.5.2">Lev. 5:2., he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary⁸⁴The biblical text never hints at the possibility that anybody could be unaware of being in the holy precinct; therefore no penalties are spelled out for this case.. Rebbi Aqiba says, and he became oblivious while he was impure⁸³Leviticus.5.2">Lev. 5:2., he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Ismael says, and he became oblivious, and he became oblivious⁸⁵Leviticus.5.3">Lev. 5:3, speaking of impurities generated by the human body., two times to make him liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary⁸⁶This is the opinion formulated in Mishnah 1. The Mishnah is quoted Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq12(7)..

הלכה: רִבִּי לִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר כול׳. חִזְקִיָּה אָמַר. מַחֲלוֹקֶת בֵּינֵיהוֹן. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר. מַשְׁמָעוּת דּוֹרְשִׁין בֵּינֵיהוֹן. אִית תַּנָּיֵי תַנֵּי. עַל הֶעֱלֵם טוּמְאָה חַייָב וְלֹא עַל הֶעֱלֵם מִקְדָּשׁ. אִית תַּנָּיֵי תַנֵּי. עַל הֶעֱלֵם שֶׁרֶץ חַייָב וְלֹא עַל הֶעֱלֵם מִקְדָּשׁ. מִחְלְפָה שִׁיטַּת רִבִּי לִיעֶזֶר. תַּמָּן הוּא אָמַר. אֲפִילוּ לֹא יָדַע. וָכָא אָמַר. עַד שֶׁיָדַע. תַּמָּן אֲשֶׁ֥ר חָטָא֭ בָּ֑הּ. עַד שֶׁיֵּדַע בַּמֶּה נִתְחַייָב. הָכָא וְה֥וּא טָמֵא֭ מִכָּל־מָקוֹם. אָמַר רִבִּי חִינְנָא. וָכָא לֵית כְּתִיב בָּהּ. מִחְלְפָה שִׁיטַּת רִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ. תַּמָּן הוּא אָמַר. וְה֥וּא טָמֵא֭. עַד שֶׁיֵּדַע בַּמֶּה נֵיטְמָא. הָכָא אֲשֶׁ֥ר חָטָא֭ בָּ֑הּ מִכָּל־מָקוֹם. וּמַה מְקַייֵם רִבִּי לִיעֶזֶר בָּהּ. פְּרָט לְמִתְעַסֵּק. HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them⁸⁷As explained in Halakhak 1, Note 45. R. Eliezer requires awareness of the cause of his impurity, R. Aqiba only requires awareness of impurity. This is the only opinion mentioned in the Shevuot.18a">Babli, 18a.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary⁸⁸RR. Eliezer and Aqiba only differ in the way they deduce the law from the verse, not in the substance of the meaning. The formulation is just a matter of style.. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted⁸⁹This refers to Keritot 4:2" href="/Mishnah_Keritot.4.2">Mishnah Keritut4:2 where R. Eliezer and R. Joshua disagree in the case that a person knows that he has inadvertently committed a sin which if intentional is either one subject to Divine extirpation or a capital crime, but he does not know which law he broke. Examples are a person who inadvertently ate a piece of meat which either was forbidden fat or disqualified sacrificial meat, or a man who slept with a woman but he does not know whether it was his wife during her menses or his sister. R. Eliezer declares him liable for a fixed value purification sacrifice since in any case he committed a deadly sin; R. Joshua declares him not liable (and therefore prevented from sacrificing) as long as he cannot specify which prohibition he broke. It is implied that in the case of a variable value reparation sacrifice for violation of the purity of the Sanctuary the opinions are switched; R. Eliezer requires knowledge of the kind of impurity (e. g., “a crawling animal”) whereas R. Joshua only requires awareness of impurity. Ḥizqiah would trace R. Aqiba’s opinion to his teacher R. Joshua.. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. ⁹⁰The arguments quoted for R. Eliezer belong to R. Joshua and vice-versa. There, by which he sinned⁹¹Leviticus.4.23">Lev. 4:23, the purification sacrifice of the Prince. The verse insist, he became aware of his transgression by which he sinned, he can state the paragraph which he broke. But Leviticus.5.2">Lev. 5:2 only requires awareness of impurity., not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure⁸³Leviticus.5.2">Lev. 5:2., in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. ⁹²This is R. Eliezer’s argument. As formulated in the Mishnah, he reads Leviticus.5.2">Lev. 5:2 as requiring awareness of the nature of his impurity (or, taking vv. 2,3 together, at least certain knowledge of the kind of impurity, whether simple or severe.) But in v. 4:23 and certainly v. 27, the purification sacrifice of a commoner, where it is only required that he sinned inadvertently, can be read as authorization for a sacrifice if only the fact was known that a sin was committed. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied⁹³Accepting that R. Eliezer refers to 4:27, the peculiar language of 4:23 still has to be explained. He excludes a person who was intent on doing something permitted when it happened that he broke a prohibition, e. g., that he was intent of sleeping with his wife when she was permitted to him and in the dark of night his sister substituted for her. She sinned but he did not..