משנה: הַמְכַבֶּה אֶת הַנֵּר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מִתְייָרֵא מִפְּנֵי גוֹיִם מִפְּנֵי לִיסְטִים מִפְּנֵי רוּחַ רָעָה אִם בִּשְׁבִיל הַחוֹלֶה שֶׁיִּשַׁן פָּטוּר. כְּחָס עַל הַנֵּר כְּחָס עַל הַשֶּׁמֶן כְּחָס עַל הַפְּתִילָה חַייָב. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי פּוֹטֵר בְּכוּלָּן חוּץ מִן הַפְּתִילָה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא עוֹשָׂהּ פֶּיחָם׃ MISHNAH: One who extinguishes a light because he is afraid of Gentiles, of robbers, of evil spirits, or because of a sick person to let him sleep, is not liable18It is supposed that one extinguishes the light because one is afraid of an attack, whether by people or in the case of a mentally ill person who may become violent under the influence of an evil spirit. The “sick person” mentioned in the Mishnah must have a life-threatening sickness. In all these cases there is a danger to life and one is permitted (or required) to extinguish the light. The formulation mentions “not liable” which usually means “forbidden but not prosecutable” only to obtain a formulation parallel to the statement of R. Yose where the original meaning holds.. If to save the light, to save the oil, to save the wick, he is liable19Since he completed an action according to his wishes. R. Yose holds (with R. Simeon on other occasions) that if the intent was not the action itself but a consequence of it, then in general the action is not prosecutable. In this case, if the intent was to prevent the clay lamp from bursting when the oil was almost used up, extinguishing the flame is not the object of his intent; the action “was not the object of his intent”. But if the intent was to preserve the wick, extinguishing the fire will automatically produce a charred tip of the wick which is the essence of producing a usable wick (Shabbat 2:3:2" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Shabbat.2.3.2">Note 16) and the action is the object of his intent.. Rebbi Yose declares them all not liable except for the wick because he produces charcoal.
הלכה: הַמְכַבֶּה אֶת הַנֵּר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מִתְייָרֵא מִפְּנֵי גוֹיִם כול׳. אָמַר רִבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק. מִפְּנֵי גוֹיִם שֶׁלְּסַכָּנָה. מִפְּנֵי לִיסְטִים שֶׁלְּסַכָּנָה. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בָעֵי. אִי מִפְּנֵי לִיסְטִין שֶׁל סַכָּנָה נִיתְנֵי מוּתָּר. רַבָּנִין דְּקַיְסָרִין בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן חֲנִינָה. מוּתָּר. HALAKHAH: “One who extinguishes a light because he is afraid of Gentiles,141Quote from Mishnah 5.” etc. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, [so is the Mishnah:]142Added from G. because dangerous Gentiles, because of dangerous robbers. Rebbi Yose asked, if because of dangerous robbers one should have stated “it is permitted.143If extinguishing the light is needed to save a life, it is not only permitted, it is required. The formulation of the Mishnah, “he is not liable” gives the impression that the action is sinful. This might cause people to hesitate to extinguish the light when it is necessary for survival, a very bad outcome.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It is permitted144They reformulated the Mishnah. The Shabbat.30a">Babli, 30a, agrees that in these cases it is permitted; they defend the formulation “not liable” because it also refers to the cases mentioned later in the Mishnah..
מַה בֵּין הַמַּצִּיל מִמָּה שֶׁבַּנֵּר מַה בֵּין הַמַּצִּיל מִמָּה שֶׁבַּזַיִת. רַבָּנִן דְּקַיְסָרִין בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי שִׁילָא דִינָוֶה. לֹא דוֹמֶה הַמַּצִּיל מִגּוּפָהּ שֶׁלִּפְתִילָה לַמַּצִּיל חוּץ מִגּוּפָהּ שֶׁלִּפְתִילָה. What is the difference between one who saves from what is in the light and one who saves what is in the olive145This is a question about the second part of the Mishnah. Why is the person who extinguishes the light to save oil liable? The person who stores olives to press them later is not liable.? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Shila from Naveh: One who saves from the wick itself cannot be compared to one who saves away from the wick itself146The question is not well posed. If one removes oil from a burning lamp one causes the wick to be extinguished earlier; this is an act of extinguishing. But not to press olives is doing nothing. (S. Lieberman prefers to emend בבית “in the house” instead of בזית “in the olive”.).
אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שְׁנֵיהֶן אָֽמְרוּ דָבָר אֶחָד. כְּמַה דְרִבִּי יוֹסֵי אָמַר. עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא לוֹ צוֹרֶךְ בְּגוּפָהּ שֶׁלַּפְּתִילָה. כֵּן רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר. עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא לוֹ צוֹרֶךְ בְּגוּפוֹ שֶׁלְּדָבָר. מַה אִית לָךּ צוֹרֶךְ בְּגוּפָהּ שֶׁלַּפְּתִילָה. רַבָּנִן דְּקַיְסָרִין רִבִּי לָֽעְזָר בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי חֲנִינַא. שֶׁכֵּן שַׁמָּשֵׁי אוּמָּנִין מְחָֽרְכִין לֵין. כְּמַה דְתֵימַר. וּשְׂעַ֤ר רֵֽישְׁיהוֹן֙ לָ֣א הִתְחָרַ֔ךְ. מָהוּ מְחָֽרְכִין לֵין. מְפַסְפְּסִין לֵין. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon said the same thing. Just as Rebbi Yose said, not unless he needs the body of the wick147In the Mishnah, where he frees from liability all who extinguish the light except the one who does it for the wick., so Rebbi Simeon says, not unless he needs the body of the thing148Further on in Mishnah 10:5 R. Simeon frees from liability a person carrying in the public domain if the carrying was not needed for the matter, implying that work on the Sabbath implies criminal liability only if it was needed for the intent. Shabbat.105b">Babli 105b, Shabbat.107b">107b, Shabbat.141b">141b, Sanhedrin.85a">Sanhedrin 85a, Keritot.20b">Keritut 20b. In the Yerushalmi later Chap. 13 (14a l. 38), Beitzah 1:4:2-4" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Beitzah.1.4.2-4">Beṣah 1:3 (60b l. 21).. How do you need the body of the wick? The rabbis of Caesarea, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: for so the professional waiters singe in this way, as you say149Daniel.3.27">Dan.3:27., and the hair on their heads was not singed. What means “singe in this way”? They singe it150The biblical root חרך which was no longer understood is explained by the rabbinic Aramaic root פספס which means the same.
Since it would be embarrassing for the waiter if a wick failed to burn when he lights it in front of guests, singing the wicks before they are needed is professional work done for a purpose. Shabbat.31b">Babli 31b..
תַּמָּן תַּנִּינָן. כָּל־הַמְקַלְקְלִין פְּטוּרִין חוּץ מִן הַמַּבְעִיר וּמִן הָעוֹשֶׂה חַבּוּרָה. בַּר קַפָּרָא אָמַר. אֲפִילוּ אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לַדָּם אֲפִילוּ אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לָאֶפֶר. מַתְנִיתָא פְלִיגָא עַל רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. שׁוֹרוֹ שֶׁהִדְלִיק אֶת הַגָּדִישׁ בַּשַּׁבָּת חַייָב. וְהוּא שֶׁהִדְלִיק אֶת הַגָּדִישׁ בַּשַּׁבָּת פָּטוּר. שׁוֹרוֹ שֶׁהִדְלִיק אֶת הַגָּדִישׁ בַּשַּׁבָּת חַייָב. (לֹא) שֶׁלֹּא לַצוֹרֶךְ. וְהָכָא הוּא שֶׁהִדְלִיק אֶת הַגָּדִישׁ בַּשַּׁבָּת פָּטוּר. אֲפִילוּ שֶׁלֹּא לַצּוֹרֶךְ. תַּנֵּי. כָּל־הַמִּתְחַייֵב בְּנַפְשׁוֹ שׁוֹגֵג מֵבִיא חַטָּאת. אָמַר רִבִּי חֲנַנְיָה בְרֵיהּ דְּרִבִּי הִילֵּל. מֵאַחַר שֶׁלֹּא לַצּוֹרֶךְ הָיָה מִתָחַייֵב בְּנַפְשׁוֹ. וְכָאן אֲפִילוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לַצּוֹרֶךְ יְהֵא פָטוּר מִן הַתַּשְׁלוּמִין. מִן הָדָא. מַכֵּה בְהֵמָה֭ יְשַׁלְּמֶ֑נָּה וּמַכֵּ֥ה אָדָ֖ם יוּמָֽת: מַה מַכֵּה בְהֵמָה לֹא חִלַּקְתָּה בָהּ בֵּין שׁוֹגֵג לַמֵּזִיד לְחַייְבוּ מָמוֹן. אַף מַכֵּ֥ה אָדָ֖ם לֹא תַחֲלוֹק בּוֹ בֵּין שׁוֹגֵג בֵּין מֵזִיד לִפְטוֹר מָמוֹן. 151The main parallels for the first part of this paragraph are Eruvin 10:12:3" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Eruvin.10.12.3">Eruvin 10(Note 147) and Pesaḥim 6:1(33b 1.34), also Bava Kamma 3:10:2" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Bava_Kamma.3.10.2">Bava qamma3:12 (Notes 140–144); cf. Shabbat.106a">Babli Šabbat106a, Beitzah.12b">Beṣah 12b, Yevamot.16b">Yebamot 16b, Bava qamma 34b, Sanhedrin.62b">Sanhedrin 62b. There, we have stated152Shabbat 13:3:1" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Shabbat.13.3.1">Mishnah 13:3.: “All who destroy are not liable,” except the incendiary and one causing an injury. Bar Qappara said, even if he did not need the blood, even if he did not need the ashes153There is obviously a sentence missing here stating the position of R. Joḥanan. The sentence is reported in all parallel sources and is quoted by Shabbat.106a">Naḥmanides in his Novellae to Šabbat 106a (ed. M. Herschler col. 365) as text here: “R. Joḥanan says, one making a fire only if he needs the ashes, one causing a wound only if he needs the blood.”. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable.154“Liable” and “not liable” here means financial responsibility for damages. The human who sets a fire on the Sabbath does not have to pay since he has committed a capital crime and it is a principle of talmudic law that the possibility of a death penalty bars monetary claims (cf. Terumot 7:1:4" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Terumot.7.1.4">Terumot 7:1 Notes 16 ff.). The payment is excluded even if there is no possibility of criminal prosecution.” If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable. Is that not for no purpose? So here if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable, even if it was for no purpose155The statement of the Mishnah does not mention intent; it excludes payment even if the ashes from the fire are not needed. This indicates that there is potential criminal liability also in this case, disproving R. Joḥanan’s assertion.. Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel said, since it was for no purpose, did he commit a capital crime? But here even it was for no purpose156Naḥmanides (loc. cit. Note 153) quotes the text as: R. Ḥanina ben R. Hila said, this is correct. Since if it were for a purpose he would be guilty of a capital crime here even if it was for no purpose he is free from paying restitution. he should be free from paying restitution, from the following157Leviticus.23.21">Lev. 23:21. Ketubot.35a">Babli Ketubot 35a,Ketubot.38a">38a; Bava qamma 35a; Sanhedrin.74b">Sanhedrin 74b,Sanhedrin.84b">84b.: The slayer of an animal shall pay for it; the slayer of a human shall die. Since for the slayer of an animal you did not differentiate between unintentional and intentional to make him liable for money, so for the slayer of a human you cannot differentiate between unintentional and intentional to free him from liability for money158The argument based on the Mishnah in Bava qamma is disproved; there is no Mishnaic source contradicting R. Joḥanan..
וְקַשְׁיָא עַל דְּבַר קַפָּרָא. הַבְעָרָה לִימְּדָה עַל כָּל־הַמְּלָאכוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה. כּוּלְּהֹן לְצוֹרֶךְ וְהִיא שֶׁלֹּא לְצוֹרֶךְ. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. אִין יִסְבּוֹר (רִבִּי לָֽעְזָר) כְּרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּאָמַר. הַבְעָרָה לִמְּדָה עַל כָּל־הַמְּלָאכוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה. רִבִּי לָֽעְזָר אָמַר. הַבְעָרָה לִימְּדָה עַל עַצְמָהּ. וְלֵית לְרִבִּי לָֽעְזָר לְאַחַת לְחַייְבוֹ עַל כָּל־אַחַת וָאַחַת. אַשְׁכַּח תַּנֵּי בְשֵׁם רִבִּי לָֽעְזָר. הֵנָּה. לְחַייֵב עַל כּוּלְּהֹן אַחַת. נִיחָא הַבְעָרָה. חַבּוּרָה. אַב שֶׁלָּהּ לְצוֹרֶךְ וְהִיא שֶׁלֹּא לְצוֹרֶךְ. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן אָמַר. אִיתְפַּלְּגוֹן רִבִּי לָֽעְזָר וְרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. חַד אָמַר. שְׁחִיטָה עִיקָּר וַחַבּוּרָה תּוֹלֶדֶת. וְחוֹרָנָה מַחְלִף. It is difficult for Bar Qappara. Setting fire taught about all work [mentioned] in the Torah; they are all for a need, itself not for a need159As explained later, the question is asked why setting a fire is singled out in Exodus.35.3">Ex.35:3 as forbidden on the Sabbath since all work is forbidden. One opinion is that it was mentioned to indicate that doing each category of work is a separate offense on the Sabbath. The other opinion is that setting a fire on the Sabbath is no capital crime since no punishment is indicated in Chapter 35. It is clear that Bar Qappara cannot hold the first opinion since he holds that setting a fire is criminal even for no purpose while he must agree that for all (or most) other categories a purpose is needed.? Rebbi Yose said, if (Rebbi Eleazar)160The scribe wrote “R. Lazar”, the corrector crossed it out because he was of the opinion that this name is an intrusion here, referring to the Amora R. Eleazar the student and frequent opponent of R. Joḥanan. But in this paragraph “R. Lazar” means the Tanna R. Eleazar the Qappar, i. e., Bar Qappara. The proof is that later a baraita is quoted in his name and also in a disagreement with R. Joḥanan he is mentioned first, having precedence in time. would think with Rebbi Joḥanan who said, setting fire taught about all work [mentioned] in the Torah. Rebbi Eleazar said, setting fire taught about itself161In the wording of the Shabbat.70a">Babli 70a in the name of the Tanna R. Yose, “setting fire is a separate prohibition”. Yevamot.6b">Yebamot 6b,Yevamot.33b">33b; Sanhedrin.35b">Sanhedrin 35b,Sanhedrin.62a">62a; Keritot.20b">Keritut 20b.. Does Rebbi Eleazar not have about one162Leviticus.4.2">Lev. 4:2: A person who sins inadvertently about any of the commandments of the Eternal that should not be done, but he did one of these. If one stresses the “one” one infers that each single offense requires its own purification sacrifice. If one stresses “these” it follows that one sacrifice atones for multiple infractions. The harmonization of both approaches is a topic for Chapter 7; Sifra Ḥovah (Wayyiqra II) Pereq 1(7).
Naḥmanides reads אחרת instead of אחת, “does he not have another (reason)”? The reading of the ms. is preferable. to make him liable for each single one? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, of these, to make him liable once for all of them. We understand setting fire. A wound? Its main point163The actions forbidden on the Sabbath are codified in 39 categories. The heading of the category is called its main point, אָב מְלָאכָה “father of action”, anything else subsumed under the same category is תּוֹלְדָה “born from it”, derivative.
To build the Tabernacle one needed the skins of red goats and of taḥaš. Therefore slaughter of these animals was part of the building activity and defines a category of work forbidden on the Sabbath. for a need, itself not for a need? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Joḥanan disagree. One said, slaughter is the main point and a wound derivative; the other one switches164Cf. Shabbat 7:2:52" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Shabbat.7.2.52">Chapter 7, Note 422..
הִבְעִיר וְכִיבֶּה בִּנְפִיחָה אַחַת חַייָב שְׁתַּיִם. אָמַר רִבִּי אֶבְדַּיְמִי אֲחוֹי דְרִבִּי יוֹסֵה. הָדָא אָֽמְרָה. נָפַח בַּכֵּלִים וְשִׁיבְּרָן מְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם. הַחוֹתֶה גְחָלִים מִתַּחַת הַקְּדֵירָה בַּשַּׁבָּת חַייָב. רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי לָֽעְזָר בֵּירִבִּי צָדוֹק. חַייָב שְׁתַּיִם. אַחַת שֶׁכִּיבֶּה אֶת הָעֶלְיוֹנוֹת וְאַחַת שֶׁהִבְעִיר אֶת הַתַּחְתּוֹנוֹת. וְחוֹתֶה גְחָלִים וּמִתְחַמֵּם כְּנֶגְדָּן בַּשַּׁבָּת פָּטוּר. רִבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אָחָא אָמַר. בַּמַּחֲלוֹקֶת. כְּמָאן דָּמַר אֵינוֹ חַייָב אֶלָּא אַחַת. בְּרַם כְּמָאן דָּמַר חַייָב שְׁתַּיִם. חַייָב. דָּמַר רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. לֵית כָּאן חַייָב שְׁתַּיִם אֶלָּא מַעֲלִין עָלָיו כְּאִילּוּ חַייָב שְׁתַּיִם. אָמַר רִבִּי יוּדָן. תַּמָּן אֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה שֶׁיְּבַעֲרוּ וְאֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה שֶׁיִּכְבּוּ. בְּרַם הָכָא רוֹצֶה הוּא שֶׁיְּבַעֲרוּ וְרוֹצֶה הוּא שֶׁיִּכְבּוּ. If one set a fire and extinguished with the same blowing he is liable twice165These are two distinct activities. Keritot.20a">Keritut 20a.. Rebbi Eudaimon the brother of Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if he blew at vessels and broke them, he pays full damages166Blowing is like acting with one’s hands; a human always has to pay full restitution for damages he causes; Mishnah Bava qamma 2:10.. He who stirs coals under a pot on the Sabbath is liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi Ṣadoq, he is liable twice, once that he extinguished the upper layer and once that he set fire to the lower layer167He cannot hold that one is not liable if the intended result is only a side effect but must extend liability to all cases where the action is intentional. A person who stirs coals wants to increase the efficiency of the heating process; if as a side effect some coals burn less hot it certainly is the unintended side effect of an intentional act. If he nevertheless is held liable for extinguishing, the ruling disputes R. Simeon’s position. Keritot.20a">Keritut 20a.. But he who stirs coals to warm himself in front of them on the Sabbath is not liable168Because what he wants is a side effect only and for side effects one does not become liable under the laws of the Sabbath. Keritot.20b">Keritut 20b.. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is a disagreement; according to him who said that he is liable only once. But according to him who said that he is twice liable he is liable167He cannot hold that one is not liable if the intended result is only a side effect but must extend liability to all cases where the action is intentional. A person who stirs coals wants to increase the efficiency of the heating process; if as a side effect some coals burn less hot it certainly is the unintended side effect of an intentional act. If he nevertheless is held liable for extinguishing, the ruling disputes R. Simeon’s position. Keritot.20a">Keritut 20a.. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, he is not twice liable but he is considered as if twice liable169Since R. Joḥanan follows R. Simeon in freeing unintended consequences from legal sanctions he cannot sanction the unintended cooling of coals in the stirring. But this does not mean that it is not morally reprehensible.. Rebbi Yudan said, there he does not want that they be set on fire and he does not want that they be extinguished170The one who stirs in order to keep warm is not interested in the combustion process but he who stirs to cook wants to control the process. The two cases are not comparable.. But here he wants that they be set on fire and he wants that they be extinguished.
הִבְעִיר וּבִישֵּׁל. אִית תַּנָּיֵי תַנֵּי. חַייָב שְׁתַּיִם. אִית תַּנָּיֵי תַנֵּי. חַייָב אַחַת. מָאן דָּמַר. חַייָב שְׁתַּיִם. אַחַת מִשּׁוּם מַבְעִיר וְאַחַת מִשּׁוּם מְבַשֵּׁל. וּמָאן דָּמַר. אַחַת. הַיי דָא הִיא. רִבִּי יוּדָה אוֹמֵר. מִשּׁוּם מַבְעִיר. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר. מִשּׁוּם מְבַשֵּׁל. וְקַשְׁיָא עַל דְּרִבִּי יוֹסֵי. הַבְעָרָה לִימְּדָה עַל כָּל־הַמְּלָאכוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה. אֵינוֹ חַייָב מִשּׁוּם מַבְעִיר אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם מְבַשֵּׁל. If one made a fire and cooked, there are Tannaim who state, he is twice liable, and there are Tannaim who state, he is once liable. He who said that he is twice liable, once because of setting a fire and once because of cooking171This depends on categorizing actions on the Sabbath, whether cooking is subsumed under making a fire or not.. But he who said once, which one is it? Rebbi Jehudah says, because of setting a fire. Rebbi Yose says, because of cooking. It is difficult for Rebbi Yose; setting fire taught about all work [mentioned] in the Torah; he is not liable because of setting a fire but because of cooking172There is no problem for the Babli since R. Yose is the author of the opposite opinion, cf. Shabbat 2:5:6" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Shabbat.2.5.6">Note 161.?
זָר שֶׁשִּׁימֵּשׁ בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ בַּשַּׁבָּת וּבַעַל מוּם שֶׁשִּׁימֵּשׁ בְּטוּמְאָה. רִבִּי חִייָה רוֹבָה אָמַר. שְׁתַּיִם. בַּר קַפָּרָא אָמַר. אַחַת. מָתִיב בַּר קַפָּרָא לְרִבִּי חִייָא רוֹבָא. עֲבוֹדָה שֶׁהַכֹּהֵן מוּתָּר בָּהּ זָּר מְחַייֵב עָלֶיהָ. וּמוֹתִיב לָהּ וְהוּא מְתִייב לָיהּ. וַהֲרֵי קְמִיצָה עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִקְמְצַה אֲסוּרָה לָזֶה וְלָזֶה. מִשֶׁנִּיקְמְצָה אֲסוּרָה לַזָּרים וֹמוּתֶּרֶת לַכֹּהֲנִים. אָמַר לֵיהּ. שַׁנְייָא הִיא. דִּכְתִיב וְכָל־זָר֖ לֹא־יֹ֣אכַל קוֹדֶשׁ. וַהֲרֵי מְלִיקָה עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִמְלְקָה אָסוּר לָזֶה וְלָזֶה. מִשֶּׁנִמְלְקָה אֲסוּרָה לְזָרִים וּמוּתֶּרֶת לַכֹּהֲנִים. אָמַר לֵיהּ. שַׁנְייָא הִיא. דִּכְתִיב וְכָל־זָר֖ לֹא־יֹ֣אכַל קוֹדֶשׁ. הֲרֵי טֵבֵל. עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִיתְקָן אָסוּר לָזֶה וְלָזֶה. מִשֶּׁנִיתְקָן אָסוּר לְזָרִים וּמוּתָּר לַכֹּהֲנִים. אָמַר לֵיהּ. שַׁנְייָא הִיא. דִּכְתִיב וְכָל־זָר֖ לֹא־יֹ֣אכַל קוֹדֶשׁ. אָֽמְרִין. נֵצֵא לַחוּץ וְנִלְמַד. נַפְקוּן וְשָֽׁמְעוּן. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר. שְׁתַּיִם. רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר. אַחַת. מָאן דָּמַר. אַחַת. מִשּׁוּם זָרוּת. וּמָאן דָּמַר. שְׁתַּיִם. אַחַת מִשּׁוּם זָרוּת. חוֹרָנִייָתָה לָמָּה. מִשּׁוּם שְׁחִיטָה. וַהֲרֵי שְׁחִיטָה בְזָר כְּשֵׁירָה. אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם הִילּוּךְ זְרִיקָה וְקַבָּלָה. אֵינָהּ אֶלָּא שְׁבוּת. הֲוֵי לֵית טַעֲמָא אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם אִיכּוּל אֵיבָרִים וּפְדָרִים שֶׁהָיוּ מִתְאַכְּלִין עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ כָּל־הַלַּיְלָה. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי יוּדָה דּוּ אָמַר מִשּׁוּם מַבְעִיר. נִיחָא. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי יוֹסֵי דּוּ אָמַר מִשּׁוּם מְבַשֵּׁל. מַה בִישּׁוּל יֵשׁ כָּאן. מִכֵּיוָן שֶׁהוּא רוֹצֶה בְאִיכּוּלָן כִּמְבַשֵּׁל הוּא. 173Here starts another Genizah fragment edited by Ginzberg (pp. 74–75) of which very little is readable for this paragraph. An outsider who officiated in the Temple on the Sabbath174He commits a deadly sin by officiating (Numbers.18.7">Num. 18:7). In addition, the Temple service on the Sabbath requires many acts, slaughter and burning of sacrifices, which outside the Temple are capital crimes. If the act was unintentional, how many purification sacrifices are due?, or a deformed person who officiated in impurity175The deformed Cohen is barred from officiating (Leviticus.21.16-24">Lev. 21:16–24). Any impure Cohen is similarly barred (Leviticus.22.3">Lev. 22:3). Are the disabilities cumulative or is disqualification one and the same? The question is raised but neither discussed nor answered; it is treated in the parallel in the Yevamot.32a">Babli, Yebamot 32a., the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya said, two; bar Qappara said, one. Bar Qappara objected to the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: is the outsider liable for any service which is permitted to a Cohen176Everybody agrees that as an officiating outsider he is liable for a sacrifice. The question is about the Sabbath. Outside the Temple, the Sabbath prohibitions apply to Cohanim and to everybody else. They are lifted in the Temple precinct by biblical decree. Since there is no verse re-instituting the prohibition for laymen in the Temple precinct one should conclude that violating Sabbath prohibitions in the course of Temple service is not sanctionable irrespective of the person who officiates. This is Bar Qappara’s position.? He176aS. Lieberman has shown that וּמוֹתִיב should be read as הוּא מוֹתִיב. objected and he answered it. Is there not the handful177We find that prohibitions are to be lifted for Cohanim but not for laymen inside and outside the Temple. A cereal offering is forbidden for all consumption from the moment it was received in a sanctified vessel. The priest has to take a handful from the offering and burn it on the altar; this permits the remainder to be eaten by Cohanim (Leviticus.6.7-11">Lev. 6:7–11) but it remains forbidden for all outsiders.; before the handful was taken it was forbidden for both; after the handful was taken it is forbidden for outsiders and permitted to Cohanim? He said to him, there is a difference, for it is written: no outsider may eat sanctified food178Leviticus.22.10">Lev. 22:10. This is a separate decree independent of Temple or Sabbath.. Is there not the breaking of the neck179Of sacrifices of birds, Leviticus.1.15">Lev. 1:15,Leviticus.5.9">5:9. In case of a purification offering, the bird has to be eaten by Cohanim and is prohibited to laymen; the live bird is prohibited to everybody.; before the neck was broken it was forbidden for both; after the neck was broken it is forbidden for outsiders and permitted to Cohanim? He said to him, there is a difference, for it is written: no outsider may eat sanctified food. Is there not the ṭevel180Produce after the harvest of which heave and tithes were not taken. After these were taken the produce becomes profane but heave is reserved to pure Cohanim. This has no connection with Temple service.; before it was put in order it was forbidden for both; after it was put in order it is forbidden for outsiders and permitted to Cohanim? He said to him, there is a difference, for it is written: no outsider may eat sanctified food. They said, let us go outside and learn. They went outside and heard, Rebbi Yose said, two; Rebbi Simeon said, one. He who said one, because of outsider status. He who said two, one because of outsider status; why the other? Because of slaughter181Of the sacrifices.. But slaughter by an outsider is valid182The office of the Cohen starts only with receiving the victim’s blood in a sacred vessel; slaughter of sacrifices, even on the Sabbath, is legitimate for outsiders, mostly Levites. This bolsters Bar Qappara’s case. Yevamot.33b">Babli Yebamot 33b.! But because bringing, sprinkling, and receiving183The offices of the Cohen after the receiving of the blood. The blood is sprinkled on the wall of the altar.. These are only because of Sabbath rest184If there are Sabbath violations they are only of rabbinic prohibitions which as a matter of principle do not apply to the Temple precinct.. Therefore the reason may be only because of the consumption of limbs and fat which were consumed on the altar during the entire night. In the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah185As explained at the end of the preceding paragraph. This is the reason for the inclusion of this paragraph at this point. who said because of setting fire it is understandable. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose185As explained at the end of the preceding paragraph. This is the reason for the inclusion of this paragraph at this point. who said because of cooking, what cooking is here? Since he wants their being consumed it is like cooking.