משנה: הַמִּתְכַּוֵּין לְהוֹצִיא לְפָנָיו וּבָא לוֹ לְאַחֲרָיו פָּטוּר. לְאַחֲרָיו וּבָא לוֹ לְפָנָיו חַייָב. בֶּאֱמֶת הָאִשָּׁה הַחוֹגֶרֶת בַּסִּינָר בֵּין מִלְּפָנֶיהָ וּבֵין מִלְּאַחֲרֶיהָ חַייֶבֶת שֶׁכֵּן רָאוּי לִהְיוֹת חוֹזֵר. רִבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר אַף בִּמְקַבְּלֵי פִיטְקִין כֵּן: MISHNAH: One who intends to carry on his front but it turns out that he carried on his back is not liable8Explained in Shabbat 1:1:10" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Shabbat.1.1.10">Chapter 1, Note 75.. On his back and he carried on his front he is liable. In truth9Every rule introduced by “in truth” is unquestioned practice. a woman who ties to her sinar10Cf. Sotah 1:2:7" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Sotah.1.2.7">Soṭah 1:2, Note 115. According to Rashi, leather underpants; according to Maimonides a sash covering front and back. In modern Hebrew “apron”, following Maimonides. whether in front or back is liable since it is apt to move. Rebbi Jehudah says, the same holds for messengers11פטק is Latin pittacium, Greek πιττάκιον “note delivered from one government office to another; ticket, label, patch.”.
הלכה: ד׳. תַּמָּן תַּנִּינָן. רִבִּי [שִׁמְעוֹן] הַשְּׁזוּרִי וְרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמְרִים. לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ עַל דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא מִשֵּׁם אֶחָד שֶׁהוּא חַייָב. עַל מַה נֶּחְלָקוּ. עַל דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא מִשֵּׁם שְׁנֵי שֵׁמוֹת. שֶׁרִבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מְחַיֵּיב חַטָּאת וְרִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ פּוֹטֵר. רִבִּי אִילָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. כְּמָאן דְּאָמַר. בִּשְׁנֵי שֵׁמוֹת נֶחְלְקוּ. בְּרַם כְּמָאן דְּאָמַר. בְּשֵׁם אֶחָד נֶחְלְקוּ. וְכָאן שְׁנֵי שֵׁמוֹת הֵן וְהוּא פָטוּר. לְאַחֲרָיו וּבָא לוֹ לְפָנָיו חַייָב. כְּמָאן דְּאָמַר. בְּשֵׁם אֶחָד נֶחְלְקוּ. בְּרַם כְּמָאן דְּאָמַר. בִּשְׁנֵי שֵׁמוֹת. וְכָאן בְּשֵׁם אֶחָד הוּא וְהוּא חַייָב. רִבִּי אִילָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. תַּנָּיִין אִינּוּן. מָאן דְּאָמַר תַּמָּן. חַייָב. אוּף הָכָא. חַייָב. מָאן דְּאָמַר תַּמָּן. פָּטוּר. אוּף הָכָא. פָּטוּר. HALAKHAH: There, we have stated43Keritot 4:3" href="/Mishnah_Keritot.4.3">Mishnah Keritut 4:3. A purification offering is possible only for the awareness that an inadvertent sin punishable with extirpation has been committed. In the interpretation of R. Simeon fron Shezur and R. Simeon (ben Yoḥai), for R. Eliezer, the awareness of a sin generates the liability, for R. Joshua only the awareness of the exact circumstances of the transgression causes liability, even if the category of the sin is not in doubt.: “Rebbi Simeon from Shezur and Rebbi Simeon say, they did not disagree about anything which falls under the same appellation that he is liable. Where did they disagree? About something which is because of two appellations, where Rebbi Eliezer holds him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua holds him not liable.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Following him who said that they disagreed about two appellations, but not following him who said that they disagreed about one appellation. Here there are two appellations and he is not liable44R. Eleazar rejects the interpretation of Mishnah 4 that a person who intended to carry something in front but in fact carried it on his back did not execute his intention whereas one who intended to carry something on his back but in fact carried it in front did better than intended. Then the question arises why in one case is there liability but not in the other. If we say that carrying in front or back are two different appellations within the one category of “taking out”, then we should expect R. Eliezer to declare liability in both cases and R. Joshua no liability in either case. Therefore the Mishnah follows R. Eliezer in its first statement, R. Joshua in the second. Since both statements are anonymous, one would expect consistency. The text has to be read as follows:
Following him who said that they disagreed about two appellations, it is clear that R. Eliezer declares liable but not R. Joshua. But not following him who said that they disagreed about one appellation. Since the distinction is made only by two authors it is clear that there is an assumption that there is an opposing opinion which holds that R. Joshua frees from liability in any case where there is a doubt even if it is only in the way an intention was executed. Here there are two appellations and he is not liable according to both interpretations of R. Joshua (whose opinion is followed in general against R. Eliezer.). “On his back and he carried on his front he is liable;” following him who said that they disagreed about one appellation. But following him who said two appellations? Here it is one appellation and he is liable45Here one reads: “On his back and he carried on his front he is liable;” following him who said that they disagreed about one appellation there is a problem to explain this following R. Joshua. But following him who said two appellations it is obvious that this Mishnah cannot follow R. Joshua. Here it is one appellation and he is liable, according to everybody in the interpretation of RR. Simeon from Shezur and R. Simeon.. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: it is a case of Tannaim46It is possible to read the entire Mishnah as following R. Joshua as required by our practice, but the second statement follows RR. Simeon from Shezur and R. Simeon in their interpretation of R. Joshua’s position and the first statement follows their opponents.. He who says there “liable”, also here “liable”; he who says there “not liable”, also here “not liable”.
בֶּאֱמֶת. אָמַר רִבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. כָּל־מָקוֹם שֶׁשָּׁנוּ בֶּאֱמֶת הֲלָכָה לְמֹשֶׁה מִסִּינַי. “In truth.” Rebbi Eliezer said, any place where “in truth” was stated it is practice going back to Moses on Sinai48Shabbat.92b">Babli 92b. In the two other quotes of this statement, Kilayim 2:1:9" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Kilayim.2.1.9">Kilaim 2:2 Note 36, Terumot 2:1:5" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Terumot.2.1.5">Terumot 2:1 Note 16, the tradent is R. Eleazar..