משנה: בֶּגֶד שֶׁצְּבָעוֹ בִּקְלִיפֵּי עָרְלָה יִדָּלֵק. נִתְעָרֵב בַּאֲחֵרִים כּוּלָּן יַדָּלֵקוּ דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים יַעֲלֶה בְּאֶחָד וּמָאתַיִם. MISHNAH: Cloth dyed with ‘orlah shells1For example, walnut shells and pomegranate skin; cf. Mishnah Ševi‘it 7:3. should be burned2Since ‘orlah is forbidden for all usufruct, any product obtained by using ‘orlah is also forbidden.. If it became mixed up with others, all should be burned, the words of Rebbi Meїr3R. Meїr holds that anything sold by the piece is important and cannot become insignificant (Mishnah 7); the Sages hold that anything forbidden for usufruct becomes insignificant if it is less than half a percent of the total, except for a very limited list of items. In order to avoid having monetary gain from forbidden things, an amount of cloth equal in size to the forbidden piece has to be taken out and burned. For the notion of lifting, cf. Terumot 4, Note 64.; but the Sages said, it should be lifted by one in 200.
הלכה: בֶּגֶד שֶׁצְּבָעוֹ בִּקְלִיפֵּי עָרְלָה יִדָּלֵק כול׳. כְּתִיב וַעֲרַלְתֶּם עָרְלָתוֹ אֶת פִּרְיוֹ. אִית תַּנָּיֵי תַנֵּי בְּסָמוּךְ לְפִירְיוֹ. אִית תַּנָּיֵי תַנֵּי בְּעוֹרֵל אֶת פִּרְיוֹ. מָאן דְּאָמַר בְּעוֹרֵל אֶת פִּרְיוֹ קְלִיפִּין וְגַרְעִינִין בְּמַשְׁמַע. מָאן דְּאָמַר בְּסָמוּךְ לְפִרְיוֹ קְלִיפִּין בְּמַשְׁמַע וְלֹא גַרְעִינִין. וְגַרְעִינִין מְנַיִין. הֲוִי סוֹפָךְ מֵימָר אֶת פִּרְיוֹ בְּסָמוּךְ לְפִרְיוֹ. אִית דְּבָעֵי נִישְׁמְעִינָהּ מִן הָדָא. וַעֲרַלְתֶּם עָרְלָתוֹ אֶת פִּרְיוֹ דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא עוֹרֵל אֶת פִּרְייוֹ וּפִרְייוֹ עוֹרְלוֹ. HALAKHAH: “Cloth dyed with ‘orlah shells should be burned,” etc. It is written (Lev. 19:23): “You shall treat its foreskin with its fruit as foreskin.4The problem is the word ערלתו. It seems that the verse would be perfect without it, וערלתם את פריו “you shall treat its fruit as foreskin.”” Some Tannaїm state: What is close to the fruit. Some Tannaїm state: What envelopes the fruit. He who says what envelopes the fruit, understands shells and pits5The foreskin is an envelope around the male organ which has the shape of a solid cylinder. In the opinion of this Tanna, usually a fruit has the shape of a torus, bounded at the outside by the shell or skin and at the inside by the pit. Therefore, the envelope of the fruit must have two parts, an inner and an outer one, and “envelope” designates the union of both.
“Foreskin” as applied to fruits is only a metaphor since human foreskin is permanently forbidden but fruits of trees only the first three years.. He who says what is close to the fruit understands shells but not pits6He will not agree that the foreskin is an envelope but rather an outer shell since the human foreskin is only an outer shell if the male organ is considered as a cylindrical shell bounded at the inside by the urinary duct.. From where pits7Since practice includes pits, where is a hint of the inclusion found in the biblical text?? You must finally conclude that “its fruit” means “What touches its fruit.”8This is the opinion of the Babli (Berakhot 36b). Some want to understand it from here: “You shall treat its foreskin with its fruit as foreskin,” anything which envelopes its fruit or its fruit envelopes it.9The definition of the envelope in Note 5 is natural for modern mathematics. For Euclidean mathematics, for which all geometric figures are compact and connected [cf. H. Guggenheimer, The Axioms of Betweenness in Euclid, Dialectica 31(1977) 187–192], the two-sheeted hyperboloid is composed of two separate surfaces. Therefore, in the spirit of the times the reformulation is appropriate.
The discussion here is hinted at in Ma‘serot 4:6, Note 88. The Amora quoted there, Samuel, is known as strict adherent of Ptolemaic astronomy but it seems that in the quote, he prefers the modern formulation (Note 5) to the classical. This fits with his acceptance of infinite decimal expansions as numbers (Demay 7:8, Note 104).
רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ בְשֵׁם רִבִּי לָֽעְזָר. כָּל־מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר לֹא תֹאכַל לֹא תֹאכְלוּ לֹא יֵאָֽכְלוּ אַתְּ תּוֹפֵס אִיסּוּר הֲנָייָה בְּאִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה עַד שֶׁיָּבוֹא הַכָּתוּב וִיפָרֵשׁ לָךְ כְּשֵׁם שֶׁפִּירֵשׁ לָךְ בְּאֵבֶר מִן הַחַי וּבִנְבֵילָה. מַה פִּירֵשׁ לָךְ בְּאֵבֶר מִן הַחַי. וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵיפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ. וּמַה פִּירֵשׁ בִּנְבֵילָה. לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כָּל־נְבֵילָה לַגֵּר אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ תִּתְּנֶנָּה וַאֲכָלָהּ. תַּנֵּי חִזְקִיָּה וּפַלִּיג. וְכִי מָה אָֽסְרוֹ לַכֶּלֶב. 10The text from here to Note 44 is also in Pesaḥim 2:1, fol. 28c; the parallel in the Babli is Pesaḥim 21b–23a. The discussion is about the prohibition of usufruct of ‘orlah fruits. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar11In the Babli, R. Eleazar is not mentioned. [But the name appears in the Munich ms. of the Babli; added from Addenda and Corrigenda by Guggenheimer]: Everywhere it is written “do not eat, do not eat12Singular or plural., it shall not be eaten”, you understand a prohibition of usufruct included in the probition of eating unless the verse comes and explains to you as it did explain about limbs of a living animal and a carcass. What did it explain about limbs of a living animal? (Ex. 22:30) “Flesh torn in the field you shall not eat13The verse ends: You shall throw it to the dog. Why is it necessary to permit torn limbs as dog food? R. Eleazar argues that this shows that without such permission the limb would be forbidden for all usufruct..” And what did it explain about a carcass? (Deut. 14:21) “Do not eat any carcass; to the sojourner in your gates you shall give it and he may eat it.” Hizqiah stated a disagreement14In the Babli (Pesaḥim 21b), Ḥizqiah accepts the statement of R. Eleazar only for the passive formulation; later (Note 31) this is clarified to be the position of Ḥizqiah and R. Joḥanan in a second version. In this first version, Ḥizqiah must hold that an inference from a verse is only valid if there is no second verse leading to the same result. The theoretical basis is the recognition that the legal texts in the Torah are incomplete and sometimes contradictory as a system. In addition, it is held that words do not change their meaning in legal contexts. Therefore, a mechanism of translation of the Torah text into a coherent and reasonably complete system must exist. The rule appealed to by Ḥizqiah is one of the translation rules; cf. H. Guggenheimer, Logical Problems in Jewish Tradition, in: Ph. Longworth (ed.), Confrontations with Judaism (London 1966) pp. 171–196.
Since here the torn limb and the carcass both lead to the same argument, one of them would be superfluous and, therefore, both must be needed for other inferences. The argument of R. Eleazar is refuted.. What does one forbid to the dog?
וְהָא כְתִיב כָּל־חֵלֶב שׁוֹר וְכֶשֶׂב וָעֵז לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ. מֵעַתָּה אַתָּה תוֹפֵשׂ אִיסּוּר הֲנָייָה לְאִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה. שַׁנְייָא הִיא דִּכְתִיב וְחֵלֶב נְבֵילָה וְחֵלֶב טְרֵיפָה. וְהָֽכְתִיב רַק אֶת הַדָּם. מֵעַתָּה אַתְּ תוֹפֵשׂ אִיסּוּר הֲנָייָה כְאִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה. שַׁנְייָא הִיא דִּכְתִיב עַל הָאָרֶץ תִּשְׁפְּכֶנּוּ כַּמָּיִם. מַה מַיִם מוּתָּרִין בַּהֲנָייָה אַף הַדָּם מוּתָּר בַּהֲנָייָה. וְהָֽכְתִיב עַל כֵּן לֹא יֹאכְלוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת גִּיד הַנָּשֶׁה. אָמַר רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ קִייַמְתִּיהָ בְּגִיד הַנָּשֶׁה שֶׁלַּנְּבֵילָה. וְהָֽכְתִיב וְלֶחֶם וְקָלִי וְכַרְמֶל לֹא תֹאכְלוּ. אָמַר רִבִּי אַבָּא מָרִי אַחֲוָה דְּרִבִּי יוֹסֵי. שַׁנְייָא הִיא שֶׁקָּבַע לֹו הַכָּתוּב זְמָן. וְהָֽכְתִיב לֹא תֹאכְלוּם כִּי שֶׁקֶץ הֵם. אָמַר רִבִּי מָנָא מִיעֵט אִיסּוּר הֲנָייָה שֶׁבּוֹ. But is it not written (Lev. 7:23): “Any fat of cattle, sheep, or goats you shall not eat”? Do you not have to understand the prohibition of usufruct from the prohibition of eating? There is a difference, for it is written (Lev. 7:24): “But fat of a carcass and fat of a torn animal”15“But fat of a carcass and fat of a torn animal may be used for any work, only you shall not eat it.” This paragraph discusses verses which present a difficulty for R. Eleazar.
In the opinion of the Babli, Pesaḥim 23a, the verse is needed to permit any use of profane fat since otherwise one would argue that since fat is forbidden for humans but required for the altar, fat of animals unfit for the altar should be permitted for use in the Temple but forbidden for profane use. In the Sifra(Ẓaw Paraša 10), the argument of the Babli is attributed to R. Yose the Galilean; R. Aqiba concludes that fat of domesticated animals is not food and not subject to the impurity of food.
In the opinion of the Yerushalmi, since some fat is permitted for unrestricted use, no fat can be forbidden for usufruct in the absence of an explicit verse. For Ḥizqiah, this is a third verse that could be used for R. Eleazar’s argument; nobody will contest that three parallel verses invalidate the argument. In the second version of Ḥizqiah’s position (below, after Note 33), he needs the verse to permit use of fat for work on Temple property.. But is it not written (Deut. 12:16): “Only the blood”? There is a difference, for it is written: “You shall pour it on the ground like water.”16“Only the blood you shall not eat; pour it on the ground like water.” The Babli, Pesaḥim 22b, deduces from here that animal blood is a fluid which prepares for impurity only if it is spilled on the ground (cf. Demay 2:3, Note 136). The argument of the Yerushalmi, and an argument that animal blood prepares for impurity in all cases, is in Sifry Deut. 73 and later here, in the second version of Ḥizqiah. Since water is permitted for use, so blood is permitted for use. But is it not written (Gen. 32:33): “Therefore, the Children of Israel do not eat the sinew of the schiatic muscle”? Rebbi Abbahu said, I explained it by the sinew of a carcass or a torn animal17The argument is more explicit in the Babli, Pesaḥim 22a. R. Abbahu holds that when carcass and torn meat was permitted for the sojourner (a monotheistic Gentile adhering to the Seven Commandments observed by Noe) and the pagan, the entire animal was permitted, including the fat. Then the last paragraph of Note 15 establishes that the schiatic sinew cannot be forbidden for usufruct.. But is it not written (Lev. 23:14): “Bread, parched or fresh grains you shall not eat”18“Bread, parched or fresh grains you shall not eat until that very day” referring to new grains before the ‘omer ceremony.? Rebbi Abba Mari the brother of Rebbi Yose said there is a difference since the verse fixed a time for it. But is it not written (Lev. 11:42): “Do not eat them for they are abominations”? Rebbi Mana said, that excludes their prohibition of usufruct19The argument seems to be that the verse has to be read: “For they are abominations”, they (snakes and centipedes) are abominations but not anything manufactured from them. (Explanation of R. H. Kanievski.).
רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. הָעוֹשֶׂה אִיסְפְּלֵנִית מִשּׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל וּמֵחָמֵץ שֶׁעָבַר עָלָיו הַפֶּסַח אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה. שֶׁאֵין לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁלּוֹ מְחוּוָּר. מִכִּלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם לוֹקֶה. דְּאָמַר רִבִּי חֲנִינָא פֶּן תִּקְדַּשׁ פֶּן תּוּקָּד אֵשׁ. מֵעָרְלָה צְרִיכָה. עֲשֶׂה לְרָחֲקוֹ כְּתִיב. לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה לְאוֹכְלוֹ כְּתִיב. לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה לְרָחֲקוֹ לֵית כְּתִיב. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who makes a wound dressing20Latin splenium, Greek σπληνίον, τό, “pad, wound dressing.” from a stoned ox21The Babli, Pesaḥim 24b, explains that one might use fat from the stoned ox to cover a wound.
The ox was stoned by order of the court because it killed humans (Ex.21:28,29). Its meat is forbidden for usufruct; this is derived from Ex. 21:28, cf. Mekhilta Mišpaṭim 10 (p. 282). or from leftover sour matter after Passover cannot be whipped since its prohibition is not clear. For vineyard kilaim he is whipped since Rebbi Ḥanina said (Deut. 22:9): “Lest it be sanctified”, lest fire should be kindled22Cf. Kilaim 8:1, Note 6.. For ‘orlah it is problematic. A prescriptive commandment to remove is written23Since Lev. 19:23 requires that the (budding) fruit is treated as “foreskin” and the foreskin has to be removed, one may take the verse as prescribing the removal of any ‘orlah fruit., a prohibition to eat is written24Last two words of Lev. 19:23. Since R. Joḥanan reads לא יאכל as prohibition of eating, not of usufruct, he follows his teacher Ḥizqiah in rejecting the argument of R. Eleazar., a prohibition to remove it is not written25Transgression of a prescriptive commandment is not prosecutable..
בְּמַתְנִיתָא פְלִיגָא עַל רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. מְמַשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר סָקוֹל יִסָּקֵל הַשּׁוֹר וְכִי אֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין שֶׁבְּשָׂרוֹ אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה. וּמַה תַלְמוּד לוֹמַר לֹא יֵאָכֵל אֶת בְּשָׂרוֹ. לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ שֶׁכְּשֵׁם שֶׁאָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה כָּךְ הוּא אָסוּר בַּהֲנָייָה. מַה עָבַד לָהּ רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. פָּתַר לָהּ בְּשֶׁקָּֽדְמוּ הַבְּעָלִים וּשְׁחָטוּהוּ עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִגְמַר דִּינוֹ. In a baraita26The baraita as stated here is not found in any other source except the Yerushalmi parallels Pesaḥim 28c, Avodah Zarah 45b. In Mekhilta Mišpaṭim 19; quoted in Babli Pesaḥim22b, Qiddušin 56b, Baba Qama 41a the text explicitly notes that, since “its meat shall not be eaten” is included in the statement of the sentence to be passed by the court, only after judgment is rendered does slaughter become ineffective. This may also be the rule implied by the Yerushalmi Targum to Ex. 21:28: וְלָא יִתְנְכַס לְמֵיכוּל יַת בִּשְׂרֵיהּ “it should not be slaughtered to make its flesh edible.” Since the Babli follows R. Eleazar, no discussion of the prohibition of usufruct is necessary. one disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “What does one understand from what has been said (Ex. 21:28): ‘The ox shall certainly be stoned’? Do we not know that its meat is forbidden as food27As carcass meat.? Then why does the verse say, ‘its meat shall not be eaten’? To tell you that just as it is forbidden as food so it is forbidden for usufruct.” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explained it if the owners slaughtered it before sentence was pronounced28This statement directly contradicts the position of the Babli. R. Yoḥanan will hold that the prescriptive commandment to stone the ox after judgment has been passed automatically makes any slaughter invalid; that would not need a proof from the verse..
רִבִּי זְעִירָה בָּעֵא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ. הָכָא אַתְּ אָמַר הָכֵין וְהָכָא אַתְּ אָמַר הָכֵין. אָמַר לֵיהּ. חָדָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרִבִּי לָֽעְזָר. וְחָדָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. Rebbi Zeïra asked before Rebbi Abbahu: Here you say so, there you say so29He states contradictory theses, whether or not prohibition as food implies prohibition of usufruct.? He said to him, one in the name30In the parallel in Pesaḥim, Hebrew בשם instead of משמיה. The latter is an inadvertent Babylonism characteristic of learned scribes. of Rebbi Eleazar, one in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan.
רַבָּנִין דְּקַיְסָרִין רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. כָּל־מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר לֹא תֹאכְלוּ אֵין אַתְּ תּוֹפֵס אִיסּוּר הֲנָייָה כְּאִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה. בִּנְייַן אָב שֶׁבְּכוּלָּן וְכָל־חַטָּאת אֲשֶׁר יוּבָא מִדָּמָהּ אֶל אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד לְכַפֵּר בַּקּוֹדֵשׁ לֹא תֵאָכֵל בָּאֵשׁ יִשָּׂרֵף. תַּנֵּי חִזְקִיָּה מְסַייֵעַ לְרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. מְמַשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר כָּל־חֵלֶב שׁוֹר וְכֶשֶׂב וָעֵז לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ. לְאֵי זֶה דָבָר נֶאֱמַר וְחֵלֶב נְבֵילָה וְחֵלֶב טְרֵיפָה יֵעָשֶׂה לְכָל־מְלָאכָה. בָּא לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ אֲפִילוּ לִמְלֶאכֶת הַגָּבוֹהַּ. מְמַשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר רַק הַדָּם לֹא תֹּאכֵלוּ. לְאֵי זֶה דָבָר נֶאֱמַר עַל הָאָרֶץ תִּשְׁפְּכֶנּוּ כַּמָּיִּם. בָּא לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ. מָה הַמַּיִם מַכְשִׁירִין אַף הַדָּם מַכְשִׁיר. מְמַשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כָל־נֲבֵילָה. לְאֵי זֶה דָבָר נֶאֱמַר לַגֵּר אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ תִּתְּנֶנָּה וַאֲכָלָהּ. בָּא לְהוֹדִיעֲךְ שֶׁגֵּר תּוֹשָׁב אוֹכֵל נְבֵילוֹת. מְמַשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵיפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ. לְאֵי זֶה דָבָר נֶאֱמַר לַכֶּלֶב תַּשְׁלִיכוּן אוֹתוֹ. אוֹתוֹ אַתָּה מַשְׁלִיךְ לַכֶּלֶב וְאֵי אַתָּה מַשְׁלִיךְ חוּלִין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בָעֲזָרָה. The rabbis of Caesarea31A second version of the position of R. Joḥanan, differing from what was stated earlier., Rabbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Nowhere do you understand a prohibition of usufruct included in the probition of eating if it is written “do not eat”32The text is incomplete; it refers to the statement of R. Eleazar (Note 11). If the prohibition of food is in the active voice it does not imply prohibition of usufruct. That implies that the passive voice does imply prohibition of usufruct.. The paradigm33This proves that the passive voice implies prohibition of usufruct; since it is the only such case where the inference is valid according to everybody. The verse is understood [Sifra Ẓaw Pereq 8(5), quoted in Babli Zebaḥim 82a, Yerushalmi Pesaḥim 7:9, fol. 35a] following a punctuation which differs from the masoretic: “Any purification offering, some of whose blood was brought into the Tent of Meeting to purify, in the Sanctuary it shall not be eaten, in fire it shall be burned.” This is a possible reading since purification offerings can be eaten only in the Sanctuary. Then “Sanctuary” is taken also to refer to the last clause, “(in the sanctuary) in fire it shall be burned.” This excludes all sacred and profane usufruct after purification. for all cases is (Lev. 6:23): “Any purification offering of whose blood was brought into the Tent of Meeting to purify the sanctuary shall not be eaten, in fire it shall be burned.” Ḥizqiah stated support for Rebbi Joḥanan: If one understands what has been said (Lev. 7:23): “Any fat of cattle, sheep, or goats you shall not eat,” why has it been said (Lev. 7:24): “But fat of a carcass and fat of a torn animal may be used for any work”? It comes to tell you, even for the work of Heaven15“But fat of a carcass and fat of a torn animal may be used for any work, only you shall not eat it.” This paragraph discusses verses which present a difficulty for R. Eleazar.
In the opinion of the Babli, Pesaḥim 23a, the verse is needed to permit any use of profane fat since otherwise one would argue that since fat is forbidden for humans but required for the altar, fat of animals unfit for the altar should be permitted for use in the Temple but forbidden for profane use. In the Sifra(Ẓaw Paraša 10), the argument of the Babli is attributed to R. Yose the Galilean; R. Aqiba concludes that fat of domesticated animals is not food and not subject to the impurity of food.
In the opinion of the Yerushalmi, since some fat is permitted for unrestricted use, no fat can be forbidden for usufruct in the absence of an explicit verse. For Ḥizqiah, this is a third verse that could be used for R. Eleazar’s argument; nobody will contest that three parallel verses invalidate the argument. In the second version of Ḥizqiah’s position (below, after Note 33), he needs the verse to permit use of fat for work on Temple property.. If one understands what has been said (Lev. 12:16): “But the blood you shall not eat,” why has it been said “you shall pour it on the ground like water”? It comes to tell you, as water prepares, so blood prepares16“Only the blood you shall not eat; pour it on the ground like water.” The Babli, Pesaḥim 22b, deduces from here that animal blood is a fluid which prepares for impurity only if it is spilled on the ground (cf. Demay 2:3, Note 136). The argument of the Yerushalmi, and an argument that animal blood prepares for impurity in all cases, is in Sifry Deut. 73 and later here, in the second version of Ḥizqiah.. If one understands what has been said (Deut. 14:21) “Do not eat any carcass;” why has it been said “to the sojourner in your gates you shall give it and he may eat it”? To tell you that the resident sojourner may eat carcass meat34The resident sojourner, in order to receive the full protection of the law, has only to follow the “precepts of the descendants of Noe”, to abstain from idolatry, murder, incest and adultery, eating limbs torn from living animals, blasphemy, robbery, and anarchy.. If one understands what has been said (Ex. 22:30): “Flesh torn in the field you shall not eat,” why has it been said “throw it to the dog”? This you throw to the dog but not profane meat slaughered in the Temple precinct35In the Babli, Pesaḥim 22a, this is quoted as the opinion of R. Meïr. It is forbidden to slaughter anything but sacrifices in the Temple precinct, Lev. 17:4..
מַתְנִיתָא מְסַייְעָא לְדֵין וּמַתְנִיתָא מְסַייְעָא לְדֵין. מַתְנִיתָא מְסַייְעָא לְרִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. לֹא יֵאָכֵל חָמֵץ. לַעֲשׂוֹת אֶת הַמַּאֲכִיל כְּאוֹכֵל. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר לְכָךְ. אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לְאוֹסְרוֹ בַּהֲנָייָה. כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר לֹא תֹאכַל עָלָיו חָמֵץ לָמַדְנוּ שֶׁהוּא אָסוּר בַּהֲנָייָה. הָא מָה תַלְמוּד לוֹמַר וְלֹא יֵאָכֵל חָמֵץ. לַעֲשׂוֹת אֶת הַמַּאֲכִיל כְּאוֹכֵל דַּבְרֵי רִבִּי יֹאשַׁיָּה. רִבִּי יִצְחָק אוֹמֵר אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ. מָה אִם שְׁרָצִים קַלִּין עָשָׂה בָהֶן מַאֲכִיל כְּאוֹכֵל. חָמֵץ הֶחָמוּר אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁנַּעֲשֶׂה בוֹ מַאֲכִיל כְּאוֹכֵל. הָא מָה תַלְמוּד לוֹמַר לֹא יֵאָכֵל חָמֵץ. לֹא בָא הַכָּתוּב אֶלָּא לְאוֹסְרוֹ בַּהֲנָייָה. בְּגִין דִּכְתִיב לֹא יֵאָכֵל. הָא מִלֹא תֹאכַל לֵית שְׁמַע מִינָהּ כְּלוּם. וְהָדָא מְסַייְעָא לְרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. A baraita38Mekhilta dR. Ismael, Bo 16, p. 51. supports both of them. The baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar39The disagreement between R. Eleazar and R. Joḥanan is an old tannaïtic disagreement between Rabbis Josia and Isaac of the fourth tannaïtic generation.. “(Ex. 13:3) ‘Sour bread shall not be eaten’, to make the feeder equal to the eater40The person who serves sour matter to a Jew on Passover is guilty as if he ate it, to be punished by extirpation. If the server acts intentionally and the eater unintentionally, the server alone is punishable.. You say for this, or is it only to forbid its usufruct? Since it says (Deut. 16:3): ‘You shall not eat sour bread with it,’ we learned that usufruct is forbidden41This is the position of R. Eleazar.. Therefore, why does the verse say, sour bread shall not be eaten? To make the feeder equal to the eater, the words of Rebbi Josia. Rebbi Isaac says, this is unnecessary. Since for crawling things, a minor prohibition42Eating forbidden living things is punished by whipping by the earthly court; but eating sour matter on Passover is punished by Heaven with extirpation., He made the feeder equal to the eater43Sifra Šemini Pereq 5(1). R. Abraham ben David in his commentary notes that this is not the position of the Babli; he does not refer to the Yerushalmi.; regarding sour bread which is a major prohibition it should only be logical that he feeder be equal to the eater. Therefore, why does the verse say, sour bread shall not be eaten? The verse comes only to forbid its usufruct.” Since it is written “sour bread shall not be eaten.” Therefore, from “you shall not eat” one cannot infer anything. This supports Rebbi Joḥanan.44Here ends the parallel with Pesaḥim 2:1.
פְּשִׁיטָא שֶׁאֵין קַרְקַע נֶאֱסַר. צָר צוּרָה בְּקַרְקַע נֶאֱסַר. צָבַע דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ רוּחַ חַייִם. אִילּוּ הִשְׁתַּחֲװֶה לוֹ לֹא אָסוּר. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁצְּבָעוֹ אָֽסְרוֹ. מִיכָּן שֶׁצְּבָעוֹ צְרִיכָה. It is obvious that the gound cannot be forbidden45Here starts the discussion of the prohibition of usufruct from ‘orlah dyes. It is the position of the Yerushalmi that natural ground cannot be forbidden. In the case of pagan worship of sacred grounds, this means that the ground itself is always permitted but that any building or offerings deposited on the ground are forbidden for all usufruct. In that case also, the Yerushalmi (Avodah Zarah3:6, fol. 42d) takes the exemption of the bare ground as obvious but the Babli (Avodah Zarah 51b) needs a verse to exempt worshipped bare ground.. If one painted a figure on the ground it is forbidden46The bare ground cannot be used unless the painting is disfigured first.. If he colored a living being, if he worshipped it, it is not forbidden47Both Talmudim (Avodah Zarah, Yerushalmi 3:6 fol. 41d, Babli 51b) agree that living beings cannot become forbidden even by being worshipped (but they will be disqualified from becoming sacrifices.); because he colored it48Are the rules of ‘orlah more strict than those of idolatry? did he make it forbidden? Hence, if he colored it it is of questionable status.
בֶּגֶד גְּדוֹל שֶׁצְּבָעוֹ עַל מְנָת לְחוֹתְכוֹ מַה אַתְּ עֲבַד לָהּ כְּמוּסְגָּר אוֹ כְּמוּחְלָט. אִין תַּעֲבְדִּינֵיהּ כְּמוּסְגָּר מוּתָּר. אִין תַּעֲבְדִּינֵיהּ כְּמוּחְלָט אָסוּר. How do you treat a large piece of cloth dyed with the intention that it should be cut into pieces? As one locked up or declared absolute49Cloth which shows a sudden change in color that cannot be eliminated by washing may be “leprous”, Lev. 13:47–59. When shown to a Cohen, it first has to be locked up for seven days. If in these days the discoloration has spread, the cloth is declared absolutely leprous, it must be burned and, therefore, all usufruct is forbidden. Mishnah Nega‘im 11:12 states that large pieces of cloth both locked up and absolute are impure. A large piece covers at least three fingers square. The difference is that if the locked-up cloth is cut into pieces none of which is “large”, all are pure since no cloth covering less than 3 fingers square can become impure. But if the large cloth is absolutely “leprous”, the impurity is not eliminated by cutting the cloth into small pieces.
The comparison of leprosy of cloth to the prohibition of ‘orlah does not lead to a clear result.? If you treat it as locked up it is permitted, as declared absolute it will be forbidden.
צְבָעוֹ וְחָזַר וּצְבָעוֹ וְהִקְדִּיחַ. נֹאמַר אִם הָיָה צְרִיכָה לִצְבִיעָה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה אָסוּר. וְאִם לָאו מוּתָּר. צְבָעוֹ בִּקְלִיפֵּי אֱגוֹז שֶׁלְעָרְלָה וְחָזַר וּצְבָעוֹ בִּקְלִיפֵּי אֱגוֹז שֶׁלְחוּלִין. מָאן דְּאָמַר נוֹתְנֵי טַעַם לִפְגָּם מוּתָּר. אוֹף הָכָא מוּתָּר. וּמָאן דְּאָמַר נוֹתְנֵי טַעַם לִפְגָּם אָסוּר. אוֹף הָכָא אָסוּר. צְבָעוֹ בִּקְלִיפֵּי אֱגוֹז שֶׁלְעָרְלָה וְחָזַר וּצְבָעוֹ בִּקְלִיפֵּי רִימּוֹן שֶׁלְחוּלִין. ייָבֹא כְהָדָא. עִיגּוּלֵי דְבֵילָה הַגְּדוֹלִים מַעֲלִין אֶת הַקְּטַנִּים וְהַקְּטַנִּים מַעֲלִין אֶת הַגְּדוֹלִים. רַב הוּנָא אָמַר כֵּינִי מַתְנִיתָא הַגְּדוֹלִים מַעֲלִין אֶת הַקְּטַנִּים בְּמִשְׁקָל וְהַקְּטַנִּים מַעֲלִין אֶת הַגְּדוֹלִים בְּמִינְייָן. תַּמָּן מִין בְּמִינוֹ. בְּרַם הָכָא מִין בְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מִינוֹ. צְבָעוֹ בִּקְלִיפֵּי אֱגוֹז שֶׁלְעָרְלָה וְחָזַר וּצְבָעוֹ בִּקְלִיפֵּי חוּלִין מִין אֶחָד. ייָבֹא כְהָדָא. רִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר תְּאֵנִים שְׁחוֹרוֹת מַעֲלוֹת אֶת הַלְּבָנוֹת וְהַלְּבָנוֹת מַעֲלוֹת אֶת הַשְּׁחוֹרוֹת. תַּמָּן הוּא רָאוּי לְחַתְּכָן. בְּרַם הָכָא אֵינוֹ רָאוּי לְחַתְּכוֹ. מָה דָמִי לָהּ. גְּזִים גְזִיזִית. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן. מָה דָמִי לָהּ. בֶּגֶד גְּדוֹל שֶׁצְּבָעוֹ עַל מְנָת לְחַתְּכוֹ. מֵיעַבְּדִינֵיהּ דּוֹדְּרְסִין. If he dyed it50With ‘orlah dye both times. and then dyed a second time and spoiled it51The cloth could not be sold even if it were made with permitted dyes. If the cloth was well dyed before the second dipping, it is forbidden and anything done later cannot change its status. But if the cloth did need a second dying anyhow, if then it was spoiled it was spoiled by the second action, both dyings were damaging and do not prohibit its use following R. Simeon (Terumot 10, Note 21)., if it needed the first dye it is forbidden, otherwise it is permitted. If he dyed with ‘orlah walnut shells and then dyed again with profane walnut shells. According to him who said, if its taste spoils it is permitted, here also it is permitted, but according to him who said, if its taste spoils it is forbidden52Rebbi Meïr (Terumot 10, Note 21)., here also it is forbidden. If he dyed with ‘orlah walnut shells and then dyed again with profane pomegranate skins, can it be compared to: “Large fig cakes lift small ones and small ones lift the large53Terumot 4:8, Note 68. The implication is that the cloth should be permitted if the amount of pomegranate dye is more than 200 times that of the forbidden walnut dye.?” Rav Huna54In Terumot 4 (Note 86), Rebbi Ḥuna. The reading in Terumot is preferable. It is not clear what the quote should prove if not that in these cases one uses all possible ways of saving the cloth. said, so is the Mishnah: “Large fig cakes lift small ones” by weight, “and small ones lift the large” by count. There, it is the same kind; here, different kinds. If he dyed with ‘orlah walnut shells and then dyed again with profane shells of the same kind55This case should be treated by the rules of insignificance; cf. Terumot10, Notes 115 ff., can it be compared to56Terumot 4:8, Note 67.: “Rebbi Joshua says, black figs lift the white ones, and white ones the black”? There, he may cut them57If all figs are cut into small pieces, the entire mixture is simply figs. It follows that if the cloth is not dyed whole but cut into little pieces, of which a small number is dyed with ‘orlah dye but a 200 times larger number is dyed with profane dye, the mixture will be permitted., but here he cannot cut. To what can that be compared? He cuts it into little pieces. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, to what can that be compared? A large piece of cloth dyed with the intention that it should be cut to make socks58He will permit use if only a small part of the cloth was dipped into the vat of forbidden dye, then the larger part was dyed with profane dye, and only after that was made into strips which could be sewn into a kind of socks (which in Medieval rabbinic Hebrew are called בתי רגלים “houses for the feet”.).
אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן סַמְמָנִין בְּסַמְמָנִין בְּטֵילִין בְּמָאתַיִם. מֵי צְבָעִים בְּמֵי צְבָעִים בְּטֵילִין בְּרוֹב. Rebbi Joḥanan said, pigments in pigments become insignificant in 200. Fluid dyes in fluid dyes by a majority59The permitted dyes plus the water used in both fluids are more than 200 times the forbidden dissolved pigment..
אָמַר רִבִּי בָּא בַּר מָמָל. הֲנָייַת עָרְלָה בְּטִיבֵּרִיָּא בְּרוֹב. מַתְנִיתָא פְלִיגָא עַל רִבִּי בָּא בַּר מָמָל. תַּבְשִׁיל שֶׁבִּישְּׁלוֹ בִּקְלִיפֵּי עָרְלָה יִדָּלֵק. פָּתַר לָהּ קְרִיוָה בִקְדֵירוֹת. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי מִיסְבּוֹר סָבַר רִבִּי בָּא בַּר מָמָל. שֶׁמּוּתָּר לַעֲשׂוֹת כֵּן בִּתְחִילָּה לֹא לְשֶׁעָבַר. מַיי כְדוֹן. אִם יֵשׁ בּוֹ כְדֵי לִצְבּוֹעַ. אַתְּ רוֹאֶה אֶת הַהֵיתֵר כְּמִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ. אוֹתוֹ הָאִיסּוּר שֶׁבּוֹ כְדֵי לֶאֱסוֹר. אִם אֵין בּוֹ כְדֵי לִצְבֹּעַ. אַתְּ רוֹאֶה הַהֵיתֵר כְּמִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ. אוֹתוֹ הָאִיסּוּר אֵין בּוֹ כְדֵי לֶאֱסוֹר. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, the use of ‘orlah in Tiberias60We are not informed about the special techniques used by Tiberian dyers. Therefore, the meaning of this statement cannot be determined. The meaning of the sentence seems to be, not that ‘orlah may be used if mixed with a larger amount of permitted dye, but that dyestuff prepared by cooking profane pigment with ‘orlah fuel, whose prohibition is only secondary, can be used if mixed with a larger amount of regular profane dyestuff. [is judged] by a majority. A Mishnah61Mishnah 3:4. If ‘orlah prohibits even as fuel, the leniency of R. Abba bar Mamal is hard to understand. In this respect, there is no difference between cooking food and boiling for dyeing. disagrees with Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “A dish cooked with ‘orlah shells must be burned.” He explains it by a clay vessel62Explanation of Maimonides in Mishnah Šabbat 17:6. The word is explained by Rashi and R. Ḥananel to mean “gourd”; in particular a hollowed gourd used as a vessel. Only Maimonides’s explanation makes sense here. One (smaller?) vessel was used with ‘orlah fuel; many larger pots were used for the other dyestuffs. among pots. Rebbi Yose said, does Rebbi Abba bar Mamal say that it is permitted to do so from the start? No, to correct the past63The previous explanation is unacceptable. It is forbidden to remove a prohibition by intentionally mixing forbidden and permitted matter. It is only a problem if the mixture was done inadvertently. Then R. Abba bar Mamal permits if a majority is permitted, as explained in Note 60. The argument used to prove this legitimate is modelled on that explained in ‘Orlah 2:7, Note 162; cf. also Notes 114, 118 in Chapter 2.. How is that? If it is enough to dye, you consider the permitted [dye] as nonexistent. The prohibited is enough to prohibit. If it is not enough to dye, you consider the permitted [dye] as nonexistent. The prohibited is not enough to prohibit.
תַּמָּן תַּנִּינָן אֵילּוּ דְּבָרִים שֶׁלְגּוֹיִם אֲסוּרִין וְאִיסּוּרָן אִיסּוּר הֲנָייָה. הַיַּיִן. וְהַחוֹמֶץ שֶׁלְגּוֹיִם שֶׁהָיָה מִתְּחִילָּתוֹ יַיִן. וְחֶרֶס הַדְרִייָנִי. רִבִּי זְעִירָה בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה. רִבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא. דְּתַנֵּי חֶרֶס הַדְרִייָנִי אָסוּר וְאִיסּוּרוֹ אִיסּוּר הֲנָייָה. מַה נָן קַייָמִין. אִם בְּשֶׁנְּתָנוֹ בְתַבְשִׁיל דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אָסוּר. אִם בְּשֶׁמְּכָרוֹ חוּץ מִדְּמֵי יַיִן נֶסֶךְ שֶׁבּוֹ דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מוּתָּר. אֶלָּא כִי נָן קַייָמִין בְּשֶׁנְּתָנוֹ עַל גַּבֵּי תַבְשִׁיל. 64This and the following paragraph have parallels in Avodah Zarah 2:3, fol. 41b. Neither of the two text is without problems. There65Mishnah Avodah Zarah 2:3., we have stated: “The following things from Gentiles are forbidden even for usufruct: Wine66Since wine might have been used for a Gentile libation, it is forbidden as ancillary to idolatreous practices. Once it is forbidden, it cannot become permitted even if the wine spoils and becomes vinegar., Gentiles’ vinegar which originally was wine, and Hadrianic pottery67The Babli (Avodah Zarah 32a) explains that this is very porous pottery which Roman soldiers used to soak in wine and carry with them, so it could be soaked in water and provide a taste of wine. There is no explanation of the term in the Yerushalmi.
Perhaps the word has nothing to do with Adria, Adrianoi in Mysia, or the emperor Hadrian, and should be read הֻדְרִייָני “wine pots”, from Greek ὑδρία, ἡ, “water pot; vessel, wine pot” (Liddel & Scott) (E. G.)..” Rebbi Zeïra in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah68This name tradition, also preserved in Avodah Zarah, is impossible since R. Jeremiah was R. Zeïra’s student. Either the two names should be switched, or the second author is Rav Jeremiah (an unlikely scenario given the difference in time), or it should be “R. Joḥanan” instead of “R. Jeremiah”. The original formulation cannot be recovered.: This is Rebbi Meïr’s, as we have stated: Hadrianic pottery is forbidden even for usufruct68This name tradition, also preserved in Avodah Zarah, is impossible since R. Jeremiah was R. Zeïra’s student. Either the two names should be switched, or the second author is Rav Jeremiah (an unlikely scenario given the difference in time), or it should be “R. Joḥanan” instead of “R. Jeremiah”. The original formulation cannot be recovered.. Where do we hold? If one put it into a dish, everybody agrees that it is forbidden69Since the forbidden wine will leach out into the dish.. If he sells it excluding the value of libation wine contained in it, everybody agrees that it is permitted. But we deal with the case that he put it on top of a dish70As a pan-cover..
מָהוּ לִסְמוֹךְ בּוֹ כַרְעֵי הַמִּיטָּה. רִבִּי לָֽעְזָר אוֹמֵר אָסוּר. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר מוּתָּר. רִבִּי יוֹנָה בָּעֵה קוֹמֵי רִבִּי זְעִירָא. הָהֵן בֶּגֶד דְּתַנִּינָן הָכָא מָהוּ לִסְמוֹךְ בּוֹ אֶת הַמִּיטָּה. וְאִיקְפִּד לְקוֹבְּלֵיהּ. אָמַר לֵיהּ אֲפִילוּ לְמָאן דְּאָמַר תַּמָּן מוּתָּר. הָכָא אָסוּר. תַּמָּן אֵין אִיסּוּרוֹ נִיכָּר. בְּרַם הָכָא אִיסּוּרוֹ נִיכָּר. May it71“Hadrianic” pottery. The feet of a couch were often standing in vessels filled with water to protect the sleeper from worms and insects. be used to support the legs of a couch? Rebbi Eleazar says it is forbidden72It certainly is usufruct.; Rebbi Joḥanan said it is permitted73It is a use of the pottery, not of the absorbed wine, and therefore legitimate.. Rebbi Jonah74In Avodah Zarah: R. Jeremiah. While the reading here is not impossible, the one in Avodah Zarah is more probable. asked before Rebbi Zeïra: May one use the cloth75Died in ‘orlah dyes., which was discussed here, to support the legs of a couch? The latter was offended by this. He said to him, even for him who permits there, here it is forbidden. There, the prohibition is not visible76The legs of the couch do not touch the forbidden particles of wine., here the prohibition is visible.
אָמַר רִבִּי חַגַּיי. כַּד נַחְתִּית מִן אִילְפָא שְׁמָעִית קָלֵיהּ דְּרִבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אָחָא יְתִיב מַתְנֵי. בֶּגֶד שֶׁצְּבָעוֹ בִּקְלִיפֵּי עָרְלָה יִדָּלֵק. וְתַנִּינָן נָטַל הִימֶינָה כֶּרְכִּד אָסוּר בַּהֲנָייָה. אָרַג בּוֹ אֶת הַבֶּגֶד אָסוּר בַּהֲנָייָה. יַיִן נֶסֶךְ שֶׁנָּפַל לַבּוֹר כּוּלּוֹ אָסוּר בַּהֲנָייָה. וְתַנִּינָן רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר. יִימָּכֵר כּוּלּוֹ לְגוֹי חוּץ מִדְּמֵי יַיִן נֶסֶךְ שֶׁבּוֹ. אָמַר רִבִּי אָחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב. חַגַּיי קְשָׁתָיהּ רִבִּי חַגַּיי קִייְמָהּ. מַיי כְדוֹן. תַּמָּן אֵין דֶּרֶךְ בְּנֵי אָדָם לִיקַּח יַיִן מִן הַגּוֹי. בְּרַם הָכָא דֶּרֶךְ בְּנֵי אָדָם לִיקַּח בֶּגֶד מִן הַגּוֹי. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, when I descended from a ship I heard the voice of Rebbi Jacob stating: “Cloth dyed with ‘orlah shells should be burned.” But did we not state78Mishnah Avodah Zarah 3:9.: “If one took from it79A tree in a Gentile holy grove, whose wood is forbidden as accessory to idolatry. {wood to make] a weaver’s shuttle, it is forbidden for usufruct. If he used it to weave cloth it is forbidden for usufruct. 80Mishnah Avodah Zarah 5:10. The question is: Why are textiles produced or processed with forbidden materials totally forbidden but wine mixed with forbidden wine, while unusable for Jews, can be sold if only the Jewish owner is not paid for the forbidden part? Why could the cloth not be sold for its value minus the cost of dying? If libation wine fell into a cistern, all is forbidden for usufruct.” But did we not state80Mishnah Avodah Zarah 5:10. The question is: Why are textiles produced or processed with forbidden materials totally forbidden but wine mixed with forbidden wine, while unusable for Jews, can be sold if only the Jewish owner is not paid for the forbidden part? Why could the cloth not be sold for its value minus the cost of dying?: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, it should all be sold to a Gentile except for the value of the libation wine contained in it.” Rebbi Aḥa ben Jacob said, Ḥaggai raised the question, Rebbi Ḥaggai resolved it. What is it? There people do not buy wine from Gentiles81Gentile wine is automatically forbidden. It might be possible to sell the cloth for the price of undyed cloth; but it is forbidden to bring into circulation anything which might cause a Jew to commit an inadvertant sin. That would be transgressing the commandment “not to put an obstacle into the path of a blind person” (Lev. 19:14).; but here people do buy cloth from Gentiles.