משנה: וְנֵדֶר אַלְמָנָה וּגְרוּשָׁה כֹּל אֲשֶׁר אָֽסְרָה עַל נַפְשָׁהּ יָקוּם עָלֶיהָ. כֵּיצַד. אָֽמְרָה הֲרֵינִי נְזִירָה אַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּישֵּׂאת בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלשִׁים יוֹם אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר. נָֽדְרָה וְהִיא בִרְשׁוּת הַבַּעַל וְהֵיפֵר לָהּ. אָֽמְרָה הֲרֵינִי נְזִירָה לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּתְאַלְמְנָה אוֹ נִתְגָּֽרְשָׁה בְּתוֹךְ שֶׁלֹשִׁים הֲרֵי זֶה מוּפָר. נָֽדְרָה בוֹ בַיּוֹם נִתְגָּֽרְשָׁה בוֹ בַיּוֹם הֶחֱזִירָהּ בּוֹ בַיּוֹם אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר. זֶה הַכְּלָל כָּל־שֶׁיָּצְָאת לִרְשׁוּת עַצְמָהּ שָׁעָה אַחַת אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר. MISHNAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee, anything she forbids to herself shall be confirmed.70For R. Meïr, anything the slave acquires becomes automatically his master’s property. Therefore, no slave can buy his freedom from his master since he cannot have money that is not his master’s. Any money needed for his manumission must be in the hand of a third party [Nedarim.88b">Babli 88b; Kiddushin 1:3:2-14" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Kiddushin.1.3.2-14">Qiddušin 1:3 (60a 1. 26), Nedarim.23b">Babli 23b; Ma‘aser Šeni 4:4, Notes 89,96; Ketubot 6:1:2-5" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Ketubot.6.1.2-5">Ketubot 6:1 (30c 1. 46); Eruvin 7:6 (24c 1. 62)]. Similarly, R. Meïr gives the husband property rights in everything his wife acquires. He will accept a contract in which the wife retains all her earnings while renouncing all support from her husband as a contract in which the wife acts by the husband’s authorization. The majority accepts separate property both for the slave and the wife.” How is that? If she said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she married within these thirty days he cannot dissolve. If she made the vow under her husband’s authority and he dissolved it, if she had said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she should become a widow or a divorcee within the next 30 days, it remains dissolved.
If she made a vow, was on the same day divorced71She was definitively married or was an adult. By divorce she became an independent adult. If he remarries her, even on the same day, the vow precedes the marriage and is out of the husband’s power., and taken back, he cannot dissolve. This is the principle: He cannot dissolve for any one who was on her own for one moment.
הלכה: וְנֵדֶר אַלְמָנָה וּגרוּשָׁה כול׳. הָדָא הִיא רִבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר. אַחֲרֵי הַנֵּדֶר. רִבִּי עֲקִיבָה אוֹמֵר. אַחַר הָאִיסָּר. הָיָה נֵדֶר וְאִסָּר כְּאַחַת. הֵיךְ עֲבִידָא. אָֽמְרָה. הֲרֵינִי נְזִירָה לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם. וְשָׁמַע בַּעֲלָהּ וְלֹא הֵיפֵר לָהּ וְגֵירְשָׁהּ וְהֶחֱזִירָהּ בְּתוֹךְ ל̇ יוֹם. הַייְנוֹ נֵדֶר וְאִיסָּר כְּאַחַת. HALAKHAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee,” etc. This refers to what Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides; Rebbi Aqiba says, prohibition decides72Cf. Nedarim 11:6:2" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Nedarim.11.6.2">Note 65. R. Aqiba says the moment she imposed the prohibition is the decisive one; since at that time she had no husband, the vow is not under the later husband’s jurisdiction. R. Ismael says that the point of activation of the vow determines; there is no vow until after 30 days and the husband then can dissolve the vow. The Mishnah follows R. Aqiba. This interpretation of the opinions of Rebbis Aqiba and Ismael is forced by the Tosephta, 7:6, and is interpreted in this way in the Nedarim.89a">Babli, 89a.. If vow and prohibition came together73It is the normal case that a woman makes a vow for immediate validity. But we are looking for a case involving a divorcee.? How is that? She said, I shall be a nazir in 30 days. Her husband heard it and did not dissolve74For R. Aqiba, he had his chance and missed it. For R. Ismael, his inaction is irrelevant since the vow is not yet activated.. He divorced her and remarried her within the 30 days. Is that when vow and prohibition come together75The Tosephta states: A widow who said: I shall be a nazir the moment I shall be married. R. Ismael says, the husband can dissolve (since the vow starts to be active in his domain, it is not a vow preceding the marriage). R. Aqiba says, he cannot dissolve (since the vow was made when she was a widow). In the case here, the remarriage was before the 30 days were over; for R. Ismael there is no question that the husband can dissolve the vow. For R. Aqiba the question is whether the divorce is counted to introduce a new domain, in which case he can dissolve, or is a continuation of the old, in which case he had his chance and did not use it. The question is not resolved.?