משנה: הָאוֹמֵר לָאִשָּׁה הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁאַדַּבֵּר עָלַיִיךְ לַשִּׁלְטוֹן וְאֶעֱשֶׂה עִמָּךְ כַּפּוֹעֵל דִּיבֵּר עָלֶיהָ לַשִׁלְטוֹן וְעָשָׂה עִמָּהּ כַּפּוֹעֵל מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת וְאִם לָאו אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. עַל מְנָת שֶׁיִּרְצֶה אָבָּא רָצָה הָאָב מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת וְאִם לָאו אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. מֵת הָאָב הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. מֵת הַבֵּן מְלַמְּדִין אֶת הָאָב לוֹמַר שֶׁאֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה. MISHNAH: If somebody says to a woman, be preliminarily married to me on condition that I speak for you to the government, or work for you as a worker, she is preliminarily married if he did speak for her to the government or did work for her as a worker; otherwise she is not preliminarily married170As the Halakhah explains, there are two possible interpretations of this Mishnah, depending on whether or not a peruṭah changes hands at the moment. The problem does not arise in the Babli, which instead of “be preliminarily married to me” reads הרי את מקודשת לי “you are preliminarily married to me”; that language implies that (a) at least a peruṭah changes hands at the moment of engagement and (b) the marriage, if valid, is in effect from the moment of giving. Both implications are absent in the Yerushalmi version.. On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. If the father died, she is preliminarily married171One interprets “on condition that my father agree” as “if my father does not object”. Since the father died, he can no longer object.; if the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree172If the father has other sons, one tells him to free the woman from the obligation of levirate by rejecting the preliminary marriage..
הלכה: הָאוֹמֵר לָאִשָּׁה הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי כול׳. רַב אָמַר. וְהוּא שֶׁנָּתַן לָהּ שָׁוֶה פְרוּטָה אֲנָן קַייָמִין. רִבִּי אִימִּי בְּעֵי קוֹמֵי רִבִּי. וְכָל־הַדְּבָרִים לֹא וְהוּא שֶׁנָּתַן לָהּ שָׁוֶה פְרוּטָה אֲנָן קַייָמִין. אָלָּא כֵּינִי. בַּמֶּה שֶׁאַדַּבֵּר עָלַיִיךְ לַשִּׁלְטוֹן. וְדִּיבֵּר עָלֶיהָ לַשִּׁלְטוֹן בְּשָׁוֶה פְרוּטָה מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת וְאִם לָאו אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. בַּמֶּה שֶׁאֶעֱשֶׂה עִמָּךְ כַּפּוֹעֵל. וְעָשָׂה עִמָּהּ כַּפּוֹעֵל שָׁוֶה פְרוּטָה מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת וְאִם לָאו אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. רִבִּי בָּא בְשֵׁם רַב. וְהוּא שֶׁייִחֲדָה לוֹ סֶלַע בַּמִּגְדָּל. בְּמַה קִידְּשָׁהּ. כְּהַהִיא דְתַנִּינָן תַּמָּן. כָּל־הַנַּעֲשֶׂה דָּמִים בְּאַחֵר כֵּיוָן שֶׁזָּכָה זֶה נִתְחַייַב זֶה בַּחֲלִיפָיו. HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to a woman, be preliminarily married to me,” etc. Rav said, we deal with the case that he gave her a peruṭah’s worth173In the Kiddushin.63a">Babli, 63a, the uncontested opinion of R. Simeon ben Laqish.. Rebbi Immi asked (before Rebbi)174This should be deleted with G.: Do we not always deal with the case that he gave her a peruṭah’s worth175In all preceding cases, if it says “be preliminarily married to me on condition”, it was understood that the proposal was accompanied by a marital gift. Then the present Mishnah would be unnecessary. But the new facet of this Mishnah is that preliminary marriage may be effected with lawyer’s or worker’s fees.? But so it is: “By what I shall speak for you to the government; if he did speak for her to the government for a peruṭah’s worth she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married.” “By what I shall work for you as a worker; if he did work for her as a worker for a peruṭah’s worth, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Only if she set aside a tetradrachma in her chest for him176The lawyer or the worker have to present the bill for their work; if the bill amounts to at least a peruṭah, she is married by the forgiving of the bill if she had the money to pay. This formulation avoids the problem of the Babli, that marriage cannot be effectuated by forgiving a loan, and the fee due a professional might be considered a loan slowly accreting through delivery of his services.. With what did he effectuate the preliminary marriage? As we have stated there: “If anything is bartered instead of money, if one party entered in possession, the other is obligated for its trade-in177Mishnah 1:6, Note 521. By writing the bill, the lawyer puts a monetary value on his services..”
עַל מְנָת שֶׁיִּרְצֶה אָבָּא רָצָה הָאָב מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לֹא רָצָה אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. סְתָמוֹ אֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה. מֵת הָאָב הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. סְתָמוֹ רוֹצֶה. מֵת הַבֵּן מְלַמְּדִין אֶת הָאָב לוֹמַר אֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה. סְתָמוֹ רוֹצֶה. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרִבִּי יַנַּאי. וְאִית מַתְנִיתָא אָֽמְרָה כֵן. אָמַר לֵיהּ. וּלְיַנַּאי עֲלִיבָא אַתְּ שְׁאִיל מִילָּה בְקִידּוּשִׁין. חָזַר רִבִּי יַנַּאי וּפָתַר מַתְנִיתָה עַל מְנָת שֶׁיִּרְצֶה אָבָּא. רָצָה הָאָב מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת וְאִם לָאו אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. בְּאוֹמֵר עַל מְנָת דּוּ אָמַר. וְהוּא לֹא אָמַר. מֵת הָאָב הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. כְּמָאן דְּאָמַר. מֵת הַבֵּן מְלַמְּדִין אֶת הָאָב שֶׁיֹּאמַר. אֵינִי רוֹצֶה. כְּמָאן דְּאָמַר. אָמַר רִבִּי זְעִירָא לְרִבִּי יוֹסֵי. יְכִיל רִבִּי יַנַּאי מִיפְתּוֹר מַתְנִיתָה הֵיךְ דּוּ בָּעֵי. אָמַר לֵיהּ. כֵּן אָמַר רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ. לֹא מִיתְמְנַע רִבִּי מִיכְּלָל בַּאֲתַר חַד וּפְרָט בַּאֲתַר חַד. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. מַתְנִיתָא אָֽמְרָה כֵן. עַל מְנָת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בֵּית כּוֹר עָפָר. כְּלָל. בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי. פְּרָט. “On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; if the father does not agree, she is not preliminarily married;” silently he does not agree178This is an example of the problem of the undistributed middle, frequently discussed in the Babli but rarely in the Yerushalmi. The Mishnah is silent on the status of the marriage if the father refuses to express an opinion. The formulation “if the father agreed” seems to imply that failure to give a positive reply is a rejection. If the formulation had been “unless the father objects,” the father’s silence would have signified assent.. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” silently he agreed179According to the argument of the preceding Note, if the father died without expressing an opinion, the marriage should be invalid. The second and third clauses of the Mishnah seem to contradict the first.. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” silently he agreed. Rebbi Joḥanan asked Rebbi Yannai, can the Mishnah say so? He answered him, do you ask wretched Yannai to explain Qiddušin? Rebbi Yannai returned and explained the Mishnah: “On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; otherwise she is not preliminarily married,” he said on condition that [the father] express his opinion but he did not180One has to read the first clause as explained in Kiddushin 3:6:3" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Kiddushin.3.6.3">Note 178, that there is no undistributed middle but the son made the validity of the marriage dependent on the explicit acceptation by his father. The father’s silence means rejection.. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” as if he had given his opinion181If the father died before he had an opportunity to react, the court may assume that he might have assented if he had lived; the woman is married to the extent that if another man married her preliminarily before the first one married her definitively, she would need a bill of divorce from both of them.. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” as if he had given his opinion182Even if the father had given his initial consent, if the son died before the definitive marriage the court will instruct the father to refuse to accept the marriage in order not to forbid the woman to a Cohen. This clause has nothing to do with the problem of the undistributed middle.. Rebbi Ze‘ira said [before Rebbi Yasa]183Reading of G. The text of L is unacceptable; R. Ze‘ira cannot ask his student’s student R. Yose but he can ask his teacher and R. Simeon ben Laqish’s student R. Yasa.: Can Rebbi Yannai explain the Mishnah as he wishes? He answered him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, Rebbi does not refrain from stating generality and detail simultaneously184The three clauses of this part of the Mishnah refer to three different situations. In the first clause, a very restrictive interpretation is appropriate, in the second a very general one, in the third even a prior acceptance is turned into a rejection. This agrees with the general style of the Mishnah.. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states thus: “On condition that I have a bet kor of arable land”, a generality; “at place X”, a detail185Kiddushin 3:3:1" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Kiddushin.3.3.1">Mishnah 3:3. The example does not quite fit the problem, but the general thrust is clear..