משנה: הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין לַעֲקוֹר אֶת כָּל הַגּוּף אָֽמְרוּ אֵין נִידָּה בַתּוֹרָה אֵין שַׁבָּת בַּתּוֹרָה. אֵין עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בַתּוֹרָה הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ פְטוּרִין. הוֹרוּ לְבַטֵּל מִקְצָת וּלְקַייֵם מִקְצָת הֲרֵי אֶילּו חַייָבִין. כֵּיצַד אָֽמְרוּ יֵשׁ נִידָּה בַתּוֹרָה אֲבָל הַבָּא עַל שׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם פָּטוּר. יֵשׁ שַׁבָּת בַּתּוֹרָה אֲבָל הַמּוֹצִיא מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים פָּטוּר. יֵשׁ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בַתּוֹרָה אֲבָל הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה פָטוּר הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ חַייָבִין שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר וְנֶעְלַם דָּבָר. דָּבָר וְלֹא כָל־הַגּוּף׃ MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject; if they said, the menstruating woman is not mentioned in the Torah, Sabbath is not mentioned in the Torah, idolatry is not mentioned in the Torah, they are not liable98Since anything written in the Torah is public knowledge and nobody would listen to them.. If they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part, they are liable. How is that? If they said, the menstruating woman is mentioned in the Torah but one who copulates with one who is watching a day to the next day is not liable99In rabbinic medical theory, the minimum time which must elapse between one menstrual period and the next is the seven days of the niddah(Leviticus.15.19">Lev.15:19) followed by another 11 days. If a woman has a discharge on one of these 11 days, she is not classified as niddah but as zavah, whose rules are spelled out in Leviticus.15.25-30">Lev.15:25–30. Since the verse speaks of a discharge of many days, it is concluded that the full rules of zavah only apply after 3 days. For the first and second discharges in that 11 day period, the woman is called “watching one day to the next day”. For a day she is under the rules of niddah(Leviticus.15.25">Lev. 15:25) and therefore forbidden to her husband. But since the verse uses the expression all the days of the flow of her impurity shall be like the days of her menstruation, one could think that she is impure only during the day and not during the following night, or that a discharge during the night does not make her impure. This is clearly a matter of rabbinic interpretation.; Sabbath is mentioned in the Torah but one who brings from a private domain to a public domain is not liable100The pentateuchal root of the prohibition to carry from a private to the public domain is Exodus.16.29">Ex. 16:29, nobody should go out from his place, which is explained in Jeremiah.17.22">Jer. 17:22 by do not move a load from your houses. Since as a matter of principle prophetic utterances should not be used as legal texts, the ruling of the Court could not be dismissed out of hand.; idolatry is mentioned in the Torah but one who prostrates himself is not liable101This is more difficult to understand since Deuteronomy.17.3">Deut. 17:3 clearly defines prostrating oneself in idolatry as a capital crime. Therefore, one has to agree with Maimonides’s Commentary that the Court changed the definition of “prostration”, e. g., ruling that kneeling down, bowing the head to the ground, is not punishable as long as one does not lie on the ground with outstretched hands and feet.; these are liable for it is said102Leviticus.4.13">Lev. 4:13. Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah4(7–8). something was hidden, something but not an entire subject.
הלכה: הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין לַעֲקוֹר אֶת כָּל הַגּוּף כול׳. רִבִּי חִזְקִיָּה אָמַר. מִדָּבָר. לֹא כָל־דָּבָר. אָמַר רִבִּי הִילָא. מִמִּצְוֹת. לֹא כָל־מִצְוֹת. וְכָתוּב כֵּן. כַּיי דָּמַר רִבִּי אִמִּי בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. גּוֹרְעִין לִדְרוֹשׁ מִתְּחִילַּת הַפָּרָשָׁה עַד סוֹפָהּ. רִבִּי חֲנַנְיָה בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה. וַאֲפִילוּ בְאֶמְצַע תֵּיבָה. וְיָֽצַקְתָּ֥ עָלֶי֖הָ שָׁ֑מֶן מִנְחָה֭ הִיא׃ לְרַבּוֹת כָּל־הַמְּנָחוֹת לִיצִיקָה. HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, “of a subject,” not the entire subject. Rebbi Hila said, “of the commandments”, not entire commandments103In Leviticus.4.13">Lev. 4:13, R. Hizqiah reads דָּבָר וְנֶעֱלַם as וְנֶעֱלַם מִדָּבָר, presupposing a script which does not differentiate between regular and final mem. R. Hila’s comment is really unnecessary since מִכָּל־מִצְוֹת already means “of any commandments” but not entire commandments. In all situations, prefix mem is read as partitive, some but not all; cf. Nazir 5:2:3" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Nazir.5.2.3">Nazir 5:4 Note 105.. 104The following text also is found in Sotah 5:1:2-5" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Sotah.5.1.2-5">Sotah 5:1, explained in Horayot 1:1:10" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Horayot.1.1.10">Notes 8–10, Nazir 5:1:8" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Nazir.5.1.8">Nazir5:1 Note 56. Is that written? As Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: For interpretation, one removes from the beginning of the paragraph to its end. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Even a middle word. You have to pour oil on it, it is a flour offering, to include all flour offerings for pouring105Sifra Wayyiqra 1 Pereq 12 on Lev.2:6. The ms. text follows the argument of Sifra while B reproduces the text of Sotah and Nazir. The argument of Sifra has no connection with the theories of RR. Johanan and Jeremiah; it is a straightforward reading of the verse. Since it is stated that one has to pour oil on the bread crumbs because it is a flour-offering, it follows that a flour-offering requires pouring oil over it unless it be explicitly excluded as in the purification offering of v. 5:11..
וְלֹא נִמְצֵאתָ עוֹקֵר כָּל־שֵׁם שׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם. בְּשֶׁאָֽמְרוּ. הַלַּיְלָה מוּתָּר וְהַיּוֹם אָסוּר. וְלֹא נִמְצֵאתָ עוֹקֵר כָּל־שְׁחִיחָה. שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר. בְּשֶׁאָֽמְרוּ. אַמָּה מוּתֶּרֶת וּשְׁתֵּי אַמּוֹת אֲסוּרוֹת. וְלֹא נִמְצֵאתָ עוֹקֵר כָּל־שֵׁם הִשְׁתַּחֲוָייָה. בְּשֶׁאָֽמְרוּ. מוּתָּר לְהִשְׁתַּחֲוֹת וְאָסוּר לָשׁוּחַ. וְלֹא נִמְצֵאתָ עוֹקֵר כָּל־שֵׁם הוֹצָאָה. אָמַר רִבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק. בְּשֶׁאָֽמְרוּ. גְּרוֹגֶרֶת מוּתֶּרֶת וּשְׁתֵּי גְרוֹגְרוֹת אֲסוּרוֹת. וְאַתְייָא כְּמָאן דָּמַר. הַכְנָסָה וְהוֹצָאָה אַחַת הִיא. בְּרַם כְּמָאן דָּמַר. הַכְנָסָה וְהוֹצָאָה שְׁתַּיִם הֵן. וְלֹא נִמְצֵאתָ עוֹקֵר כָּל־שֵׁם הַכְנָסָה. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. לֹא שֶׁהוֹרוּ מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל חֵלֶב. יוֹדְעִין הָיוּ שֶׁאָסוּר לוֹכַל חֵלֶב. וְהַתּוֹרָה נָֽתְנָה רְשׁוּת לְבֵית דְּין לְהוֹרוֹת. רִבִּי בּוּן בַּר חִייָה בָּעֵי. כְּזַיִת הַיּוֹם וְכִשְׁנֵי זֵיתִים לְמָחָר. הֵיךְ עֲבִידָא נָביא וּמַדִּיחַ. יָכוֹל אִם יֹאמְרוּ לָךְ. אַל תִּתֵּן תְּפִילִּין הַיּוֹם תֵּן לְמָחָר. תִּשְׂמַע לָהֶם. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר לָלֶ֣כֶת בָּהֶם. בְּכוּלָּן לֹא בְמִקְצָתָן. הֲרֵי עָקַרְתָּ שֵׁם כָּל־אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם. וַתֵּ מַר אֵין כָּאן עֲקִירַת הַגּוּף. וְכָא אֵין כָּאן עֲקִירַת גּוּף. רִבִּי מָנָא שָׁמַע לָהּ מִן דְּבַתְרָה. שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר בָּא אָמַר. בְּשֶׁאָֽמְרוּ. אַמָּה מוּתֶּרֶת וּשְׁתֵּי אַמּוֹת אֲסוּרוֹת. הֲרֵי עָקַרְתָּ שֵׁם כָּל אוֹתָּה הָאַמָּה. וְתֵי מַר אֵין כָּאן עֲקִירַת גּוּף. וָכָא אֵין כָּאן עֲקִירַת גּוּף. But would you not have eliminated the entire notion of one who watches a day for the next day106The literal text of the Mishnah could be read as a hypothetical ruling that there be no restriction on relations between a man and a temporary zavah. But since the verse declares the one who watches a day for the next day as being under the rules of niddah for whom such relations are forbidden (Leviticus.18.19">Lev. 18:19), such a ruling would in effect eliminate all rules for the one who watches a day for the next day. Cf. Horayot 1:3:1" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Horayot.1.3.1">Note 99. Horayot.4a">Babli 4a.? If they said, the night is permitted but the day is forbidden. Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of bending? Samuel bar Abba said, if they said, one cubit is permitted but two are forbidden107It is not at all clear to what the hapaxשחיחה refers. Since in the Mishnah the Sabbath is mentioned in second place, a reasonable reference would be to Mishnah Šabbat 1:1 which describes forbidden transactions on the Sabbath as, e. g., a person standing behind a window handing a parcel to another who is standing outside. While the distance by which the parcel is moved is irrelevant in practice since only the fact counts that it is transported across the border line between public and private domains, a ruling that a minimum distance be required for the transfer to be a violation of Sabbath law is thinkable.. Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of prostrating? If they said, it is permitted to prostrate oneself but forbidden to sink down108While prostrating oneself before an idol is certainly subject to a biblical prohibition, there is no biblical definition of what constitutes prostrating. Since 1K.19:18 shows that going down on one’s knees is forbidden worship, it is possible to imagine a ruling that going down onone’s knees is prosecutable but other forms of prostration are not.. Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of taking out? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, if they said, one dried fig is permitted but two dried figs are forbidden109This refers to the prohibitions of the Sabbath. While the prohibition of moving things from one place to another is only one of the 49 categories of forbidden actions, its rules in effect cover half of Tractate Šabbat and all of Tractate ˋEruvin. Moving minute quantities from domain to domain is not punishable. For example, transporting vegetable seeds in a volume less that of a dried fig is not punishable (Mishnah Šabbat 9:7). The long list of minimal quantities is traditional, not biblical. A wrong ruling in these matters does not abolish the principle that some minimal quantity is defined for everything.. This follows him who said that bringing in and taking out are the same110Everybody agrees that “transporting” for the rules of the Sabbath comprises taking up, moving, and putting down. There is a discussion at the start of Tractate Šabbat (1:1, 2b l.11 ff.) whether the inclusion of putting down is scriptural or is a matter of indirect inference. If one accepts that “taking up” implies “putting down”, then the formulation of the Mishnah covers rulings both about taking up and putting down; but if the biblical status of “putting down” is different from “taking up”, the latter should have been mentioned. An answer is unnecessary since the consensus is that “taking up” implies “putting down”.. But for him who said that bringing in and taking out are two notions, would you not have eliminated the entire notion of bringing in? Rebbi Yose said, not that they said that it was permitted to eat fat; they knew that it is forbidden to eat fat, but the Torah gave permission to the Court to instruct111While fat is not mentioned in the Mishnah, R. Yose explains how the Court might be liable for a false ruling concerning fat. The only fat (חֵלֶב) forbidden for consumption is (a) fat of domestic animals which for any sacrifice would be burned on the altar and (b) the fat in which the hip tendons are embedded. All other fat is permitted (שׁוּמָן). The exact definition of each category is a matter of rabbinic tradition and as such within the purview of the Court.. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, the [amount of] an olive today and of two olives tomorrow112He asks whether the entire discussion about abolishing an entire commandment or only a detail makes any sense. If they would permit eating one olive-sized piece of ḥēlev today, two tomorrow, etc., they might come to disestablish the entire commandment by a succession of steps, none of which can be classified as total negation of the commandment.? What about a prophet and seducer113To whom the distinction between abolishing a commandment and modifying it also applies, Horayot.4b">Babli 4b, Sanhedrin 11:6:2" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Sanhedrin.11.6.2">Sanhedrin11:8, Note 112 (Sanhedrin 14:4" href="/Tosefta_Sanhedrin.14.4">Tosephta Sanhedrin14:13).? I could think that if they said to you, do not put on phylacteries today, put them on tomorrow114This would be a situation in which the accredited prophet could eliminate a commandment in steps, similar to the Court ruling on fat. Since phylacteries are mentioned in connection with the study of Torah (Deuteronomy.6.8">Deut. 6:8,Deuteronomy.11.18">11:18), wearing them is a daily biblical commandment., that you should listen to them. The verse says115There is no such verse. The reference is to Deuteronomy.13.6">Deut. 13:6 where the reading is בָּ֑הּ לָלֶ֣כֶת., to walk in them, in all of them, not only in part of them; you would have eliminated the notion of that entire day. You can say that this is not elimination of the entire subject. And here it is not elimination of the entire subject116Since R. Bun bar Hiyya’s question could have been asked about any example in the Mishnah, but the Mishnah makes a distinction between eliminating and modifying a commandment. It is true that a modification is only a modification even if its open-ended iteration could result in eliminating the commandment.. Rebbi Mana understood it from the following107It is not at all clear to what the hapaxשחיחה refers. Since in the Mishnah the Sabbath is mentioned in second place, a reasonable reference would be to Mishnah Šabbat 1:1 which describes forbidden transactions on the Sabbath as, e. g., a person standing behind a window handing a parcel to another who is standing outside. While the distance by which the parcel is moved is irrelevant in practice since only the fact counts that it is transported across the border line between public and private domains, a ruling that a minimum distance be required for the transfer to be a violation of Sabbath law is thinkable.; Samuel bar Abba said, if they said, one cubit is permitted but two are forbidden. You can say that this is not elimination of the entire subject. And here it is not elimination of the entire subject.