Papa and R. Huna now attempt to acquire the boat for themselves!
Pinchas b. Ammi now tries to invalidate their seizure by saying that the boat was acquired in the private domain, and once it is in the private domain, it belongs to the inheritors. The rabbis successfully defend themselves.
Finally, R. Papa and R. Huna come in front of Rava and he invalidates their seizure altogether. For the seizure to have been valid, they would have had to have seized it while the debtor was still alive. Once the debtor dies, the property belongs to the inheritors, and they need not pay back their father’s debts with movable property they inherited.
I should note that in this sugya we see some rabbis blatantly acting in their own self-interest, or out of fear of powerful people in the community. I think that what is important to remember is that power can corrupt anyone—rabbis too. This is one of the lessons I learn from this sugya, and especially from Rava and R. Abba who do not let them get away with it.
Introduction
This week’s sugya begins with another story where a legal claim of “migo” is staked. As a reminder, “migo” is a situation in which a person is believed to make one claim because he could have made a better claim.
After the men of Be Hoze refuse to give Hama the money they owe Abimi, Hama goes in front of R. Abbahu wanting him to force them to do so (or give back the debt bond so that the debt will be repaid). Abaye says that since Hama has no evidence that they even paid the money, the men of Be Hoze can claim that they were paying the money back in settlement of another debt, not the one over which they have the document. Had Hama wanted to make the payment over that particular debt, he should have stated so from the outset.
The agent has not successfully repaid the debt that the sender sent him to repay. So does the agent have to repay the money to the sender for not having fulfilled his agency? According to R. Ashi it depends on the particular language used to instruct the agent—if he was told to take the debt document back and only then repay the money, then he is liable because he did not fulfill his instructions. But if he was first told to repay the debt and then to take the bond, he did as he was told and he is not liable.
The Talmud disagrees with R. Ashi. The sender may in either case ask the agent to repay him for the former may claim that he did not send the agent to make things worse for him. In other words, the agent better be careful that he accomplish his job.
The woman here holds a bunch of bonds that were owed to a particular man. When the man dies his inheritors come to collect the bonds from her. She refuses to give them to the inheritors, claiming that the man owed her money and that she was going to hold on to the bonds in repayment of the debt owed her. She claims that as long as she seized the documents during the creditor’s lifetime, they now belong to her. Had she claimed them only after he was dead, then they would not be hers because a creditor (she is the creditor of the man who died) is not repaid from encumbered property. R. Nahman says that she must prove that she “seized” them while the man was still alive—meaning she must prove that someone claimed them from her and she refused to give them over. After all, in this case, mere possession is not a sign that she “seized” them because they were given to her as a deposit in the first place. Since she cannot prove this (because it did not happen—she was really claiming that she “seized” them when they were given to her as a deposit), she must give the bonds back to the inheritors.
Introduction
The Talmud continues with legal stories related to debt recovery. The first of these stories refers to an oath. Generally, if Reuven claims that Shimon owes him money, but he has only one witness to prove it, Shimon can take an oath that he does not owe Reuven anything and thereby avoid paying. However, there are exceptions to this rule.
The woman under discussion here was obligated to take an oath that she was not liable to pay money to a certain person. But R. Hisda’s daughter who is married to Rava said that this woman is known to lie under oath. Rava accepts his wife’s words and thereby allows the claimant to take the oath that the woman does owe money and thereby recover his loan.
In this case, Rava does not accept R. Papa’s testimony that the document was already paid off. Jewish law requires two witnesses; one is not sufficient.
Adda b. Matana is surprised that Rava relies on the testimony of one woman but will not rely on R. Papa because he requires two. Why the inconsistency? Rava pointedly replies that he knows how honest his own wife is and therefore can rely on her. But he cannot rely on R. Papa.
We should note here that this is a classic exception as to how “real life” does not always accord with the law. According to the law, two witnesses are required, but Rava relies on one, because he evaluates the situation and determines that his wife is reliable.
Papa now derives a halakhah from the fact that Rava accepted a single witness (his own wife) because he was “certain about her.” R. Papa says that if his own son were to tell him that a certain document had been paid back he would tear the document up. The Talmud thinks that this is extreme—tearing up the document would prevent it from every being collectible. Therefore, they slightly emend his statement. He would not tear up the document. He would merely “impair” it—meaning that it would be impossible to collect based solely on the document. But should other witnesses come and testify that it was indeed not paid, it could potentially be used as evidence.
Introduction
The Talmud continues with another legal story of a woman obligated to take a vow in court that she does not owe money.
The litigant wants the woman who purportedly owes him money to take the oath in a more public forum. He hopes that the shame she would feel at lying in the city would force her to tell the truth.
Before she is willing to take the oath in the city, she wants a verdict written in her favor, that when she takes the oath, he will have to give her the money.
Papi first utters a general slur against R. Bibi b. Abaye, and then he explains why such a document should not be issued—it looks like a lie to have a document written up before the action it confirms takes place.
The Talmud disagrees with R. Papi. A document can be written up without the event actually even being planned. R. Nahman says that according to R. Meir, there is no need for the get to be written for a particular couple. A husband can find a get anywhere, even in the garbage, and use it to divorce his wife (as long as the names are the same). So too here, the court can write up a document even though the verdict has not yet been reached.
The Talmud adds that even the rabbis who disagree with R. Meir require only that a divorce document not be written without a specific case in mind. In other cases they agree that documents can be drawn up even if the event has not yet occurred. The only concern we have is that if a debt has been repaid, and then the same document was reused, it would create a lien from the date of the first loan, when it really should create a lien from the date of the second loan. This would be unfair to anyone who had purchased from the second borrower after the date of the first loan. But in other cases, a document could be written up before the event takes place and we are not concerned that “this looks like a lie.”