Introduction
This is the final section of the long sugya about tzedakah.
In the first story, R. Abba finds a way to give tzedakah without knowing who takes it. However, in this case, the receiver would know from whom he is receiving the money.
The second story again illustrates the case of a person who takes tzedakah but does not need it. R. Hanina’s response is that we should be grateful for such deceivers, for they prevent us from sinning. Knowing that people are deceptive gives others the excuse to not give them tzedakah, and in this case, it is a legitimate excuse. But it is just an excuse. People would probably not give tzedakah even if those who received it were honest. And doing so would be sinful, as we learn from the verse. Now that there are deceivers, the excuse becomes legitimate.
Joshua b. Korha uses the fact that the same word “base” is found in these two verses to equate not giving charity to idol worship. It would be worth asking what makes these two crimes similar.
Pretending as if one is in need is not only deceptive, but will in the end lead to actually needing help.
A person who has more than 200 zuz may not take the agricultural offerings such as forgotten sheaves and corners of fields. The issue at hand here is whether a person must sell his possessions to prevent him from going below the poverty level. The first baraita says that he need not, whereas the second baraita says that if he was used to using gold, he must now use copper.
Zevid resolves the two contradictory sources by stating that one does not need to sell his cups and dishes. But he does need to sell his bed and table.
The problem with R. Zevid’s resolution is that it is hard to understand why a person could be forced to sell his expensive bed and table but not his expensive cups and dishes. Therefore two other resolutions are offered. The first is that the person need sell only toys or other such unnecessary but valuable objects. The second explanation is difficult and there are many interpretations. I will suggest one. There is a difference between taking the agricultural offerings and taking tzedakah funds. We don’t require a person to sell his possessions in order to collect agricultural offerings. However, we do require him to do so in order to collect tzedakah.
Introduction
This mishnah discusses the dowry given to an orphan girl who was married off by her mother or brothers.
Usually, only a father has the legal ability to give his daughter in marriage. However, the rabbis gave mothers and brothers the ability to marry off the daughter should the father have died. If the mother or brothers give the daughter a smaller dowry than is typical of a family of their economic status, the daughter may, upon reaching majority age, make a legal claim against her father’s estate and receive a higher dowry. We can see that the dowry is a legal right of the daughter’s and that right cannot be abrogated by her mother or brothers, who might, after all, have a vested interest in reducing her dowry (since a large dowry cuts their inheritance.
According to Rabbi Judah, if the father had an older daughter whom he married off before dying, the court can force the family to give the same amount to the second daughter. The Sages, however, disagree, for sometimes a family can grow rich and sometimes they grow poor. Furthermore, sometimes a rich father can be cheap and give his daughter a small dowry. While alive, since it is his money, this is his right. Likewise, a poor father might give his first daughter a larger dowry than he could afford. In both cases, the first daughter’s dowry should not indicate the size of the second daughter’s. The only way of assessing how much her dowry should be is by correlating it to the size of the estate.
Introduction
Today’s sugya is about assessing the dowry a girl would receive in a case where her father had died before he married her off.
Shmuel says that if a father is no longer alive when his daughter is being married, we assess how much he would have given to his daughter as a dowry and that is what she receives.
The Talmud raises a difficulty on Shmuel, under the initial assumption that the source refers to the dowry. The baraita says that the estate is evaluated, not what the father would have wanted to be given. These two methods of evaluating what the father would have given could yield a different dowry amount. For instance, let’s say the family is very wealthy, but the father is known to give small dowries. If we assess the estate, she would receive a low dowry. But if we assess the husband’s wishes, she would receive a high dowry. The opposite could also be true.
Nahman b. Yitzchak says that the baraita does not refer to the dowry—it only refers to the maintenance of the girl before she is married. The Talmud interprets the two clauses “are to be maintained and provided for” as referring to both food and drink and to clothing and bedding. In all such cases she is provided for according to her father’s wealth and not what he would have wished to have done. But when it comes to dowry, we could still say that we estimate how much the father would have given were he alive.
The Talmud now uses the mishnah to raise an objection against Shmuel. According to the sages in the mishnah, if the father is dead the estate is evaluated and whatever she deserves she is given. Thus, Shmuel is refuted because he does not agree with the sages.
Shmuel can hold like R. Judah, according to whom we estimate how much the father would give the second daughter by seeing how much he gave to the first daughter.
The Talmud now explains that Shmuel had to say “that the assessment is based on the father” and not just that “the halakhah follows R. Judah” to let us know that even if the father had not married off a first daughter, we still estimate how much he would have given and give that amount to the daughter who is married after his death.
The mishnah mentions that he married off his first daughter only to let us know that even in that case the sages who disagree with R. Judah hold that we do not assess the father’s wishes. According to the sages, the estate is assessed, not how much the father would have given.
Introduction
Today’s sugya continues to discuss the dowry an orphaned girl can claim from her father’s estate.
Rava says that according to R. Hisda, the halakhah follows R. Judah from the Mishnah, according to whom we assess how much the father gave the first daughter in order to determine how much the second daughter receives. R. Hisda is pleased with this report.
Above Rava says that we estimate how much the father gave the first daughter and that is the amount the second daughter receives. Here Rava seems to say the opposite—she receives ten per cent of the estate. In other words, what she receives is based on the size of the father’s estate, not his estimated generosity.
The Talmud resolves the difficulty by saying that the first statement of Rava refers to a case where we were able to estimate how much the father would have given. If we cannot estimate what the father would have given, then the size of the dowry is based on the size of the estate.
The Talmud supports this resolution by noting that if we didn’t differentiate between cases where we could estimate how much the father could give and cases where we could not, then Rabbi’s statements would contradiction one another. Earlier he said she receives 10 per cent of the assets, whereas here Rabbi says she receives 1/12. To resolve these contradictory halakhot, the Talmud rules that one is a case where she received an amount based on the size of the estate (ten per cent), the other is a case where she received an amount based on the estimate of the father’s generosity (1/12, in that particular case).
This baraita expands what Rabbi really meant when he said that a girl receives ten per cent of her father’s estate. The second girl (and so on) receives ten per cent of what is left after the first girl is married off. She will receive less. The end of the baraita is not clear and will be clarified below.