The problem is that we can still think about the person who struck another person as liable for payment. We could still say that in general a person who inadvertently commits a sin for which he is liable for lashes and money does pay money since he cannot be lashed. In other words, he is exempt from paying because he didn’t really damage the person, not because he could theoretically be lashed.
The answer is that the verse could refer to a case where a person struck another person and damaged his property at the same time. If he was not warned then he cannot be lashed for striking another person. And since he is theoretically liable for lashes, he also does not pay the fine.
So to summarize—if one strikes another and causes no property damage, he pays compensation for bodily damage. If one strikes another and causes property damage but no bodily damage, he will pay nothing. If he was warned beforehand he will be lashed, and if he was not warned beforehand, nothing will happen to him. Again, we see the impracticality of Jewish law.
Introduction
Today’s section deals with the statement of the House of Hezekiah from earlier on this page (section one). To aid I am quoting the English in its entirety:
“He that kills a man . . . he that kills a beast:” Just as in [the case of] the killing of a beast you have made no distinction between [it being done] inadvertently and willfully, intentionally and unintentionally, by way of going down or by way of going up, so as to free exempt him [from the payment], but [to in any case] make him liable to pay, so also in [the case of] the killing of a person you shall make no distinction between [it being done] inadvertently and willfully, intentionally and unintentionally, by way of going down or by way of going up, so as to make him liable to pay money, but to free him from paying money?
The House of Hezekiah stated that when it comes to killing the animal, the Torah made no distinction—one who does so pays, whether he has been warned or not. But R. Hiyya points out that this is not necessarily true. If one kills an animal on Shabbat he does not pay the fine because he has transgressed Shabbat. If so, we could not state categorically that one who kills an animal pays a fine, and then we could not state categorically that one who kills a person does not pay a fine.
Rava (or the Talmud) now explains why the verse must refer to a week day and not Shabbat. The verse says that if he killed a man, he must be put to death. This means that he was warned, for if he was not warned he could not be put to death. So if he was also warned not to kill an animal on Shabbat because if he did he would be liable for death, then he would be executed and not pay the fine. Therefore, the verse which says that he does pay the fine, must refer to the week day. On the week day, he will always pay a fine for killing an animal and never pay a fine for killing a man.
Introduction
Today’s section refers back to a statement made by Rabbah on page 34b. The following is the quote:
Rabbah said: Indeed [it speaks of a case] when he slaughtered it himself and R. Meir holds the view that [though generally] one may receive the lashes and pay, one cannot receive the death penalty and pay but these [cases] are different, because the Torah has enacted something novel with regard to a fine, and [therefore] he has to pay, although he has to suffer the death penalty.
According to Rabbah since the case of fine is a “novelty” one can, under certain circumstances, pay and suffer the death penalty. The specific case referred to here was a thief who stole an animal and slaughtered it on Shabbat. He is liable for the death penalty slaughtering on Shabbat, and he pays the four or five fold fine. Our sugya discusses this claim.
According to the Mishnah if one rapes his virgin daughter, he is executed and does not pay the fine, because daughter incest is punishable by death. This does not accord with R. Meir, who holds that one can suffer the death penalty and pay a fine. According to the Mishnah, if he rapes his virgin sister, he can be lashed and pay a fine. This does not accord with R. Nehuniah ben Hakaneh who holds that one cannot be lashed and pay a fine for the same crime. Finally, our mishnah says that he is liable for karet for raping his sister. According to the mishnah in Makkot, the court lashes one who is liable for karet. But R. Isaac disagrees with this principle—one liable for karet is not lashed. According to R. Isaac one who rapes his sister is not lashed at all, therefore he pays the fine. But all agree that one who rapes a mamzeret is lashed. So our mishnah that holds that he pays a fine would not accord with R. Isaac.
Rabbah could solve the problem by following R. Yohanan who says that our mishnah according to which he pays a fine even though he is liable for karet, refers to a case where he was not warned and therefore cannot be lashed. This would allow the Mishnah to work with R. Nehuniah ben Hakaneh. But Resh Lakish did not hold like R. Yohanan. So if Rabbah holds like Resh Lakish, then how could Rabbah then understand the mishnah.
The answer is quite simple—Rabbah holds like R. Yohanan.
According to Resh Lakish one who deserves lashes does not pay the fine, even if he cannot actually be lashed. So then who is the tanna of our Mishnah in Ketubot that does hold that he is lashed and pays the fine? The answer is that it is either R. Meir or R. Isaac. R. Meir would simply hold that he indeed is lashed and pays a fine. R. Isaac would say that according to our Mishnah he receives karet, but he is not fined. Therefore he is lashed.
Introduction
Today’s sugya opens with a new baraita (yes, this section for the first time in a very, very long time, is not directly connected with the previous one).
The baraita refers to two topics that really the same. The first is the fine paid for rape and the second is the payment for seduction, both of a virgin. These are the payments outlined in Deuteronomy 22:28-29 (rape) and Exodus 22:15-16 (seduction). The rabbis generally equate these two laws such as that they apply equally.
Furthermore, I should again emphasize that by the rabbinic period these issues were no longer practiced. As is often the case, the rabbinic discussion is more connected to theory of law than practical law.
The baraita lists women who may not claim these payments.
Below the Talmud will explain what “forbidden relations” are. Relations forbidden in the second degree are secondary incest prohibitions. This will also be explained below.
An aylonit is someone who is clearly female, but never develops signs of reaching sexual maturity. By definition she cannot give birth.
A “woman who has gone out on account of an evil name” seems to refer to a woman whose husband accused her of not being a virgin at the time of her marriage. This too will be discussed below.
If “forbidden relations” refers to biblical incest prohibitions, then “relations forbidden in the second degree” would assumedly refer to those relationships prohibited by the rabbis. This would include grandmother and other such distant relations. The problem is that if the relationship is only prohibited by rabbinic law, then why shouldn’t she receive the fine, which is mandated by biblical law. This is understandable when it comes to the biblical prohibitions, but not with regard to the secondary category.