The Talmud rejects this understanding of the mishnah. This agreement to provide for the wife’s daughter was entered into at the time of the betrothal, kiddushin. They are like the agreements made by the fathers of the bride and groom to support the couple. Because of the seriousness of the event of the betrothal, no formal “kinyan” acquisition need be performed. It is sufficient for the person to verbally commit himself and he is obligated. The writing in the document is for documentation and not as a means by which he effects acquisition.
First born sons must be redeemed for five selas (=shekalim). This person instead of just giving the priest five selas, writes in a document that he is obligated to give him five selas. According to the baraita, he owes him five selas, but still his son has not been redeemed. This baraita would seem to prove that if a person admits that he owes someone else money, he is liable to pay him that money. This case is different. It is not someone who just says out of the blue that he owes someone money. He is obligated by the Torah to pay that money. Only in such case would a simple statement be sufficient to obligate himself to pay.
This case is different. It is not someone who just says out of the blue that he owes someone money. He is obligated by the Torah to pay that money. Only in such case would a simple statement be sufficient to obligate himself to pay.
If he was already obligated from Torah law to pay the priest five shekels, then why would he write this out in a document? The answer is that he wanted to specify to which priest he was going to give the money.
Why then is the son not redeemed through the document that says that he is obligated to give five selas over to the priest? The answer is that this baraita accords with Ulla. Ulla (an amoraic sage) holds that according to the Torah, when the man gives the money that he obligated himself to give, the son is indeed redeemed. But if we allowed this, people might think that he was redeemed by the writing of the document itself, and the rule is that the son is only redeemed when he gives the money. To prevent misunderstanding, the rabbis ruled that if a person writes out a document saying he is obligated to pay a certain priest five selas, he will have to pay that priest five selas and then still pay another (to any priest) to redeem his son. This will prevent the misunderstanding that redemption of the first born can be done with document.
Introduction
We have been discussing whether a person who simply says that he is obligated to pay another, or one who writes this in a document, is indeed liable. This continues to be the subject of this sugya.
Rava says that there are tannaim who dispute the same issue as did R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish. The case here is where a guarantor to a loan signed below the signatures of the witnesses. Since he signed afterwards, there are no witnesses to his statement that he is obligated to pay if the debtor defaults. According to R. Ishmael, this signature is sufficient such that the creditor could collect from unencumbered property, meaning property free of debt that belongs to the guarantor. This would be like R. Yohanan. But Ben Nannas holds that such a signature is not worth anything. This is like Resh Lakish—without witnesses, his statement has no legal force.
Ben Nannas argues that the guarantor that signs after the witnesses is like a friend who stops an assault by saying that he will pay the assaulter to stop. He clearly does not mean to obligate himself. So too in this case, the creditor loaned without the guarantee of the guarantor. Therefore, if the borrower defaults, the guarantor need not pay.