כי תקנה עבד עברי. פירש"י מיד ב"ד שמכרוהו בגניבתו כדכתיב ואם אין לו ונמכר בגניבתו או אינו אלא במוכר עצמו מחמת דחקו אבל מכרוהו ב"ד אינו יוצא בשש. ותימה דהיאך מצי למימר דמכרוהו ב"ד אינו יוצא בשש והרי כתיב בפרשת ראה כי ימכר לך אחיך העברי או העבריה ועבדך שש שנים וכי ימכר על ידי אחרים משמע וגם רש"י פרשו במכירת ב"ד לכך י"ל דפירש"י מדרש על פי המכילתא כי תקנה משמע שיעבוד הבן או האח שאם ימות האדון בתוך שש שיעבוד הבן במקומו ואם אין לו בן יעבוד האח היורש במקומו ובמכרוהו ב"ד אתה אומר במכרוהו ב"ד או אינו אלא במוכר עצמו מפני דחקו בזה אמרינן שיעבוד הבן או האח אבל במכרוהו ב"ד אינו עובד לא את הבן ולא את האח כדכתיב כי ימכר לך וגו' דמשמע דמכרוהו ב"ד וכתיב ועבדך שש שנים דמשמע מיעוט ועבדך ולא ליורש כשהוא אומר כי ימוך אחיך ונמכר לך הרי מוכר עצמו אמור ושם כתיב עד שנת היובל יעבוד עמך דמשמע יעבוד את הבן ואת האח הא מה אני מקיים כי תקנה במכרוהו ב"ד ואי לא כתיב אלא האי קרא ה"א דמכרוהו ב"ד יעבוד את הבן ואת האח דה"נ משמע יעבוד לכך כתיב נמי במכרוהו ב"ד כי ימכר לך אחיך וכו' וכתיב ועבדך שש שנים דמשמע ולא ליורש הא לך רבוי ומיעוט במכרוהו ב"ד ונוקים הריבוי בבן והמיעוט באח ונאמר במכרוהו ב"ד עובד את הבן ולא את האח. ובמסכת קדושין פריך ומה ראית לרבות את הבן ולהוציא את האח ומשני מרבה אני את הבן שכן קם תחת אביו ליעדה ולשדה אחוזה כדאית' התם. ועוד תימה לפירש"י דפי' דחדושא היא מיציאת שש וא"כ מאי קאמר כי ימוך אחיך ונמכר לך הרי מוכר עצמו אמור ומה בכך מ"מ איצטריך האי קרא במוכר עצמו לו שיוצא בשש דאלו מהאי קרא דוכי ימוך לא שמעינן אלא שיוצא ביובל כדכתיב עד שנת היובל יעבוד עמך וי"ל דשמא מוכר עצמו אינו יוצא בשש ויליף לה מגז"ש דשכיר שכיר למאן דאית ליה במוכר עצמו כתיב כשכיר כתושב ובמכרוהו ב"ד כתיב כי משנה שכר שכיר: כי תקנה עבד עברי, “if you acquire a Hebrew servant;” according to Rashi, the scenario described here is that a thief who did not have the means to compensate his victim for what he had stolen, has been “sold” (i.e. the value of his labour for six years) by the court which had convicted him. [A Jew’s body cannot be sold by any court. Ed.] The procedure has been described in Exodus 22,2. Alternately, the person described in the Torah here has fallen on hard times and has sold his labour for six years to a “master” in order to pay off his creditors. If he had been “sold” by the court he does not automatically leave his master’s employment at the conclusion of six years service. Thus far Rashi on above verse. The problem is what prompted Rashi to write that someone sold by the court does not automatically conclude his service at the end of six years? We have a verse in Deuteronomy 15,12, according to which if someone who is a Jew or Jewess, has been “sold” to you, his contract is valid for six years be he a male or a female. He is to be released at the end of that period, and his master is to provide him with a minimal stake to enable him to establish himself economically from that point. (verses 13-14 there) Clearly, that verse and its provisions do not apply to someone who had “sold” himself but had been “sold” by the court. Rashi there also comments that the person in question had been sold by someone other than himself. We must assume therefore that Rashi was explaining the commentary of the Mechilta, according to which the words: כי תקנה apply to the son or daughter of the original master, who had died during these years. The question is whether the contract can be inherited by the master’s children, or in the event that the master did not leave behind any children, whether whosoever inherits the master’s estate this includes the unexpired period of such a servant’s contract. In the event that such a servant had been “sold” by the court would the contract expire automatically with the death of the original purchaser? The wording in Deuteronomy, כי ימכר לך, “if he has been sold to you,” as is distinct from the wording in our verse where the master is described as actively acquiring the servant, i.e. כי תקנה, suggest that the two situations described are not identical. In Deuteronomy the period of service is spelled out as being six years, adding that in the seventh year such a servant has to be released unconditionally, whereas in Exodus, in our verse the Torah adds the same clause. In Deuteronomy the word (unnecessary) ועבדך, “he shall serve you” is added. This reference to “you” is absent in our verse here. In Leviticus 25,39, where the subject of an impoverished Israelite selling himself is first raised, the Torah does not speak of a term of 6 years but a period concluding with the Jubilee year, a year when all such forced sales of land or labour are automatically reversed. If such servants are not released until the Jubilee year, it stands to reason that they continue serving the son or daughter of their master if he passed away before the onset of the Jubilee year (once in 50 years). This means that the verse we are dealing with, commencing with the words: “when you acquire, etc.,” must apply to someone who had been sold by the court. If the Torah, in dealing with the acquisition of a Jewish servant, had only written the one verse on the subject in our portion, I might have thought that such a “servant” would have to continue serving upon the death of his master either his son or even his brother. To prevent us from misunderstanding this, the Torah had to write when speaking of a servant who had been sold by the court: כי ימכר לך אחיך, “when your brother has been sold to you,” and it had to add: ועבדך שש שנים, “and he has to serve you, (the purchaser) for six years.” This excludes any service to an heir of the purchaser. We therefore find that on the one hand the text implies something additional, and on the other hand it implies something less. The Rabbis therefore interpreted the addition as being the heir if he is a son or a daughter, but excluding the brother in the event the master did not leave behind a son or daughter in the event that the servant had been sold by the court. We find in the Talmud, tractate Kiddushin, folio 17 that the Talmud asks what forces us to include as heir the son, while at the same time excluding the heir when he is a brother, i.e. not a direct descendant. The answer given is that a son takes the place of his father when it comes to inheriting landed property or a maidservant whom the father may assign to his son to inherit as maidservant, (wife) when of age. (Compare Leviticus 27,20 and Talmud tractate Erchin folio 25.) [At this point our author refers to Rashi saying that the whole concept of the servant leaving his master’s forced employment is a chidush, something not derived from standard methods of interpreting the Torah’s laws, and he proceeds to suggest that it could be a g’zeyrah shaveh, an accepted method of interpretation. As I have not found in my editions of Rashi, any reference to his saying that there is a chidush, I’ll skip this. Ed.]